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The Life of
Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert
Fourth Earl of Carnarvon

1831-1890



THE EARL OF CARNARVON

In the uniform of the Hants Yeomanry. Æt. 19

By J. E. Collins

The Life of
Henry Howard Molyneux
Herbert

Fourth Earl of Carnarvon

1831—1890

BY

THE RT. HON. SIR ARTHUR HARDINGE
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

EDITED BY

ELISABETH COUNTESS OF CARNARVON

IN THREE VOLUMES

VOLUME II

1868—1878

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

CHAPTER I

1831-1843

EARLY DAYS. Herbert and Howard Ancestors—Marriage of Lord Porchester and Miss Howard Molyneux—Birth of Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert—Becomes Lord Porchester—Travels to Switzerland and Italy—Childhood, Travels to Rome—Athens—Constantinople—His serious illness—Early education 1-31

CHAPTER II

1844-1852

ETON AND OXFORD 32-46

CHAPTER III

1853

EASTERN TRAVELS. Beyrout—Mooktara—Damascus—Nineveh—Bagdad—Babylon—Trebizond . . . 47-64

CHAPTER IV

1850-1861

HOME AND COUNTRY LIFE. The Family Circle—Property Administration—County Work . . . 65-77

CHAPTER V

1854-1857

EARLY DAYS IN PARLIAMENT. Maiden Speech—Choice of Seat—Speech on Colonies—Visit to Crimea—International Law—Chinese War—The Penal System—The Coal Whippers—Divorce Bill 78-106

CHAPTER VI

1858-1859

THE COLONIAL OFFICE. Lord Canning's Proclamation
—The Coolie Traffic—Canada—South Africa—Ionian
Islands—Defence—Defeat of the Government—Gladstone's
defection 107-146

CHAPTER VII

1859-1861

TRAVELS. Quarter Sessions—Foreign Politics—Malta—
Naples—Egypt—Beyrout—Syria—The Druses . 147-180

CHAPTER VIII

1861

MARRIAGE TO LADY EVELYN STANHOPE

181-184

CHAPTER IX

1857-1878

PRISONS AND PRISONERS. Papal Prisons—French,
Neapolitan and Belgian Convicts—County and Legislative
Prison Reform—Vagrancy—Reform of Workhouse Infirmaries
185-221

CHAPTER X

1856-1888

FREEMASONRY. Principles of Constitution and Colonial
Policy—French Masonic Infidelity—The Papal Encyclical—
Australian Masonic Union 222-229

CHAPTER XI

1860-1862

FINANCE AND DEFENCE. Gladstone's Finance—The
inadequacy of Colonial expenditure—Sport . . . 230-239

CHAPTER XII

1860-1865

REMANIEMENT DE LA CARTE. Poland—Schleswig
Holstein — Japan — United States — International Law —
Travels—Paris—Rome 240-270

CHAPTER XIII

1865-1866

THE LOWERING OF THE FRANCHISE. The Cattle
Plague—Gladstone's Reform Bill—Organization of the Op-
position—Defeat of the Government—Acceptance of Office
271-284

CHAPTER XIV

1857-1867

THE DOMINION OF CANADA. British Columbia—Red
River Settlement—Canadian Defence—Fenian Invasion—
The Confederation of British North America—The Ethics of
Martial Law—Riots in Jamaica—Circular Despatch on
Martial Law 285-333

CHAPTER XV

1866-1868

LORD DERBY'S REFORM BILL. The Reform Resolu-
tions altered—Error in the calculations—Precipitate changes—
Speech on Resignation of Office 334-361

CHAPTER XVI

RELIGION AND EDUCATION. The Established Church
—Colonial Churches—The Ritual Commission—Religious
and Secular Education—Science—Adult Education—Archae-
ology—County History—The British Museum . 362-382

CHRONOLOGY 383

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

CHAPTER XVII

1868-1869

THE DISESTABLISHMENT AND DISENDOWMENT
OF THE IRISH CHURCH. Irish Church Debate—Lord
Carnarvon's Speech—General election and change of Govern-
ment—Speech, and efforts to compromise on Disendowment—
Reconciliation with Lord Derby—Chancellorship of Oxford
University 1-13

CHAPTER XVIII

1869-1871

A CRITIC OF GOVERNMENT. The Irish Land Bill—
Relations with the Colonies—Defence of the Empire—Army
Regulation Bill—Military Deficiencies 14-28

CHAPTER XIX

1870-1873

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS. Return to the Front
Opposition bench—The Greek Massacres—The Franco-
Prussian War—British Charitable Fund—Travels in Ger-
many and Switzerland—Illness—Yachting—The Athanasian
Creed—Paris—Spain—Revolution at Malaga and Barcelona—
The International Exhibition—The Judicature Bill 29-56

CHAPTER XX

1874

THE COLONIAL OFFICE. Mr. Disraeli's Government—
Misgivings as to Office—Secretary of State for the Colonies
for the second time—Cabinet divisions on Church legislation,
and subsequent results 57-81

CHAPTER XXI

1875-1876

GOVERNMENT MEASURES. Foreign Affairs—Fugitive
Slaves—Judicature Bill—Egypt—Suez Canal—Viceroyalty of
India—The Admiralty—Imperial Defence—Royal Titles Bill
82-101

CHAPTER XXII

1876

THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS. Experiments on
Living Animals—The Royal Commission—The Cruelty to
Animals Bill—Speech—Medical Opposition—The Act of 1876
102-111

CHAPTER XXIII

1874-1878

IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATION. *The Dominion of Canada*
—Reciprocity Treaty—British Columbia—Canadian Pacific
Railway—Red River Insurrection—Lepine and Riel—
Merchant Shipping Bill—*The Annexation of Fiji*—*The Annexa-*
tion of Perak—*Gambia*—*The Gold Coast and the Abolition of*
Slavery—*The Coolie Traffic* 112-154

CHAPTER XXIV

1867-1877

SOUTH AFRICA. Historical dates—Differences in Native Policy—South African politics—*Griqualand West*—Sale of Arms—*Natal*—Langalibalele—Gravity of crisis—Wolseley's Mission—Constitutional changes—*The Transvaal*. Its aggressive policy—Possibilities of Federation—Froude's Mission—Keate's Award—Delagoa Bay—German policy—A deliberative Conference on Native Affairs—A favourable opportunity—President Burgers' concurrence—Cape Government's precipitate refusal—Colonial support of Conference—Lord Carnarvon's despatches and Mr. Froude's reports—Crisis at the Cape—President Brand in England—Settlement of Diamond Fields Controversy—South African Conference in England—Agreement on Native Policy—Mr. Molteno's fruitless errand—Permissive Bill for Confederation—Sir Bartle Frere.

155-224

CHAPTER XXV

1876-1877

THE TRANSVAAL. Boer treatment of Natives—President Burgers' aggressive policy—War with Sekukuni—Defeat of Boers—Cession of the Transvaal apparently imminent—A bankrupt State—Crisis in the Transvaal—Boer atrocities—Cetywayo's policy—Sir T. Shepstone's Mission and Reports—The Volksraad's impotence—The verge of Civil War—Faction—Bankruptcy and Anarchy—Hostile Native tribes—Annexation proclaimed—Boer protest—Boer delegates in England—The sovereignty of the Queen accepted . . . 225-271

- Appendix* I. The Policy of the Government with regard to Annexations of Native Territory . . . 272-273
- „ II. Agreed Conditions of the Annexation of the Transvaal . . . 273-275
- „ III. Proclamation of the Annexation of the Transvaal . . . 275-281

CHAPTER XXVI

1877-1878

THE CAPE AND CONFEDERATION. Speech on Second Reading of Permissive Bill—The Transvaal—Natal—The Kaffir War—Sir Bartle Frere's Reports—Annexation of Walfisch Bay and Tembuland—The Office of High Commissioner—Deposition of Kreli—Cetywayo's ambitions—Russo-Turkish War—Cape and Imperial interests—Lord Carnarvon's resignation 282-308

Appendix. Lord Carnarvon's Speech on the Second Reading of the Permissive Bill. 309-324

CHAPTER XXVII

1875-1878

THE MAKING OF THE BALKANS. Insurrection in European Turkey—Christians and Moslems—Andrassy Note—Bulgarian Massacres—Berlin Memorandum—Turco-Servian War—Turkish barbarities—Mr. Gladstone's Pamphlet—Lord Carnarvon's Memorandum—The Indian Famine—Reforms in the Balkans—Failure of Constantinople Conference—Lord Carnarvon's Memorandum—Cabinet Crises—Speech to South African deputation—Cabinet adopts War measures—Resignation of Office 325-379

Appendix. Lord Carnarvon's Speech on Resignation of Office
380-391

CHRONOLOGY 393

CONTENTS OF VOLUME III

CHAPTER XXVIII

1878

A DETACHED POSITION. The Treaty of San Stefano—Berlin Congress—Secret Treaties—Afghan War—Lady Portsmouth—Gladstone—Meredith Townsend—J. A. Froude—Fountains Abbey—Newstead—The Falkland Memorial—Edinburgh, Address on Imperial Administration—Marriage to Miss Howard of Greystoke 1-21

CHAPTER XXIX

1879

A WATCHING BRIEF. Kaffir and Zulu Wars. South Africa—Armenia—Agricultural depression 22-34

CHAPTER XXX

1859-1882

DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. Critical state of National and Imperial Defences—The Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce abroad 35-41

CHAPTER XXXI

1879-1884

THE SWING OF THE PENDULUM. Change of Government—Illness—The Classics—Birth of his second son—South Africa—Radical measures—Stories of Napoleon—Return to Conservative Councils—Stories of Wellington—Winter in Madeira—The Transvaal—Majuba—Reversal of Policy—Death of Lord Beaconsfield—Indictment of Government—Transvaal Loyalists—Convention of Pretoria—Condition of Natives 42-73

CHAPTER XXXII

1881-1885

AT HOME AND ABROAD. Portofino—Political Meetings—House of Lords—City Churches—St. Paul's Cathedral—Christ Church Mission—Egypt—Ireland—The *National Review*—Birth of his third son—Visit to Canada and the United States—Emigration—Fair Trade . . . 74-98

CHAPTER XXXIII

1884

COUNTY FRANCHISE. Women's Suffrage—Democracy—Collision between the two Houses on Redistribution—Organization of Autumn Campaign—Speeches at Meetings—Suggestions for compromise—Negotiations and solution . . . 99-119

CHAPTER XXXIV

1883-1885

FOREIGN ENTANGLEMENTS. Annexation of New Guinea—Confederation of Australia—A common fiscal policy—German colonial extension—Egypt and General Gordon—Russo-Afghan War . . . 120-136

CHAPTER XXXV

1880-1885

IRELAND. Coercion and Conciliation—Verge of Civil War—Kilmainham Treaty—A Constructive Policy and Imperial Federation foreshadowed—Consultation with Lord Salisbury—Liberal Government breaks up on Irish policy—Lord Carnarvon's suggestions of conciliation and a fresh departure—Accepts the Viceroyalty as a Special Mission for a limited time
137-159

CHAPTER XXXVI

1885-1886

THE IRISH VICEROYALTY. The Roman Catholic Hierarchy—Speech on policy of Conciliation—Maamtrasna Convictions—Parnellite speeches by Ministers—His policy hampered—A financial crisis—Consultation with Lord Salisbury on meeting with Parnell—Interview with Parnell and Memorandum of conversation written at Hatfield, 1st August—Conciliatory measures—Tour in West—Industrial Schools—Tour in North—Boycotting—Faction—Gladstone's Manifesto—Memorandum for Cabinet, 6th October—Pressure to retain Office—Cabinet Memorandum, 23rd November—Mr. Gladstone's Irish Memorandum—Election returns—Parnell's casting vote—Again suggests Joint Committee of both Houses to consider the Government of Ireland—D.C.L. at Trinity College, and Speech in Latin—Administrative measures—His retirement announced—Correspondence with Lord Salisbury—Conservatives abandon Conciliation policy—Fall of the Government 160-216

CHAPTER XXXVII

1885-1890

A NEGATIVE POLICY. Memorandum on Ireland—Gladstone's Home Rule Bill—Parnell's allegations refuted—Lord Salisbury's silence—Urges plain speaking—Replies to Gladstone's attack—Lord Salisbury's Administration—Personal independence and support of Government—Condemns Gladstone's Home Rule Bill—Tour in Wales—Publishes XII Books of the *Odyssey*—Lord Iddesleigh's death—Portofino—Prince Alexander of Battenberg—The Earthquake in Italy—Irish Land Bill—Coercion Bill—The Parnell Commission—Parnellite allegations refuted in letter to *The Times*—A constructive policy for Ireland—Urges Lord Salisbury to plain speaking—Lord Salisbury's objection to National Aspirations—The spirit of reconciliation 217-250

- Appendix* I. Lord Carnarvon's private Memorandum on the
State of Ireland, 1885 . . . 251-256
 „ II. Memorandum for the use of the Cabinet, 7th
December, 1885 . . . 256-261
 „ III. Letter to *The Times* on Alternatives in Irish
Government, 10th May, 1888 . 262-266

CHAPTER XXXVIII

1887-1889

THE CAPE AND AUSTRALIA. *The Cape*—Cape Town—
The Colonial Church—The Great Karoo—Kimberley—The
Diamond Mines—Cape University—Extension of the British
Protectorate—*Tasmania*—Hobart—*Australia*—Melbourne—
Adelaide—Sydney—The Blue Mountains—Brisbane—Darling
Downs—Australian Centenary at Sydney—Mount Macedon—
England—Speech on Chinese Immigration—A White Aus-
tralia—A Constitutional question—Appointment of Colonial
Governors—Queensland—The Cape . . . 267-294

CHAPTER XXXIX

1869-1890

REFORMS. The House of Lords—Local Government—
Passing of Quarter Sessions—County Councils—County
Councillor for Highclere—A Liberal Conservative Policy—
Speech on the Armenians—Speech on the Prosecution of
the Bishop of Lincoln—Correspondence on Open Churches—
Address on Liberty of Speech—Family Life—Speech on
Imperial Federation—Industrial Strikes—Visit to Tennyson—
Christmas at Highclere—Portofino—Cologne—England . . .
295-315

EPILOGUE

Sir Herbert Jekyll's Recollections—Daily Life—Principles—
Political Moderation—The Great Future—Literature—Books
—Eloquence—Travelling—The Promised Land—The City
of God 316-336

CHRONOLOGY 337

INDEX 351

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

VOLUME I

The Earl of Carnarvon, æt. 29. 1860 . <i>By G. Richmond, R.A.</i>	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Table of Descent	<i>Page xxiii</i>
Henrietta Countess of Carnarvon, Lord Porchester, and Lady Eveline Herbert. 1836 <i>By Hugh Barclay.</i>	<i>To face page 18</i>
Lord Porchester and Lady Eveline Herbert in Turkish dress, on their return from Constantinople. 1840 <i>By Thomas Sampson.</i>	<i>To face page 24</i>
The Lake House, Milford <i>By G. F. Prosser.</i>	<i>To face page 30</i>
Family Group of Lord Porchester and his Brothers and Sisters. 1846 <i>By E. W. Eddis, R.A.</i>	<i>To face page 70</i>
The Dominion of Canada	<i>To face page 285</i>
Map of Eastern Travels. 1853	<i>At end of Volume</i>

VOLUME II

The Earl of Carnarvon in the Uniform of the Hants Yeomanry	<i>Frontispiece</i>
<i>By J. E. Collins.</i>	
Highclere Castle	<i>To face page 34</i>
Map of Fiji Islands	<i>To face page 128</i>
Map of Perak. (The Malay Peninsula)	<i>To face page 136</i>
West Africa. The Gold Coast, Gambia, &c.	<i>To face page 142</i>
Historical Map of British Possessions in South Africa	<i>To face page 154</i>
Sketch Map of Native Dependencies in South Africa	<i>To face page 300</i>
<i>By Sir Bartle Frere.</i>	

VOLUME III

The Earl of Carnarvon	<i>Frontispiece</i>
<i>From a miniature. 1883</i>	
Pixton Park (before the alterations)	<i>To face page 14</i>
Chart showing Principal Trade Routes and Fortified Ports	<i>To face page 35</i>
The Earl of Carnarvon and his son Aubrey Herbert. 1885	<i>To face page 47</i>
Map of New Guinea	<i>To face page 123</i>
The Earl of Carnarvon. 1885	<i>To face page 302</i>
<i>From a drawing by E. W. Eddis, R.A.</i>	
Translation of Hadrian's Address to his Soul	<i>To face page 332</i>

CHAPTER XVII

THE DISESTABLISHMENT AND DISENDOWMENT OF THE IRISH CHURCH

1868-1869

‘Honest politicians should be very flexible and accommodating in small things, very rigid and inflexible in great things.’—S. SMITH.

ON the 10th March, 1868, Mr. Maguire, member for Cork, moved for a Committee to inquire into the state of Ireland. In the course of the debate which followed Mr. Gladstone declared¹ that the connection between Church and State in Ireland must be severed, and religious equality acknowledged by disestablishment and disendowment. This memorable pronouncement Mr. Disraeli stigmatized as the ‘monstrous invention of a crisis’, and protested against any solution of the question without an appeal to the country.

The signal once given, Mr. Gladstone instantly pressed on to the attack, and before the end of June had passed three resolutions on Irish disestablishment and disendowment, and a Bill to suspend the creation of fresh interests in the Irish Church. Before the suspensory Bill reached the Lords, Lord Carnarvon wrote to his friend Canon Liddon :²

‘I am very anxious to have your opinion. . . . Gladstone’s suspensory bill will be with us in the H. of L. very shortly and I conclude will be resisted by the Government and their supporters very strongly. A few years ago I think that my decided view

¹ 16th March, 1868.

² 10th June, 1868.

would have been for absolute resistance. I never have been happy in my mind as to the Irish Church. I have for a long time felt the anomalies and many of the evils of the existing system—still I should have undoubtedly looked to a redistribution of means within the Church and to such other methods, and should have resisted to the utmost disestablishment. Now however—whether I am right or wrong—I cannot look at matters from this point. *Practically* I believe disestablishment to be inevitable, though I admit the conclusion possibly may not be so immediate as many suppose. But granting disestablishment, there remains the question of disendowment, which is one of degree, and in the interests of the Irish Church I am much inclined to accept the former in order to assist and mould, if possible, the latter in a favourable sense to that Church.

‘But I wish to see clearly how this course will assist the Church in England, which is after all my primary care, and especially how it will affect the minds and feelings and conduct of the Clergy. By the Clergy I do not of course mean the narrow section of pure evangelical views: but the reasonable High Church portion. Some of the *extreme* High Church entertain I know opinions not very different from the Liberation Society. I believe these opinions to be as great political unwisdom as a want of faith in the Guidance which has carried the Church of England through difficulties quite as great as the present before now. But I hope that this party is really limited in numbers, whatever good men it may contain.

‘I do not conceal from myself that when the Irish Church question is disposed of we may be obliged to fight and to fight hard for our own Church in England: but I doubt whether the existence of the Irish Establishment gives us logically, morally and religiously any advantage in our defence of that Church.’

Canon Liddon answered¹ that his own proposal ‘would be to accept Disestablishment for Ireland and to endeavour by doing so to secure two advantages or as much of them as possible’.

‘(α) First, the preservation of the endowments, or as much of them as could be saved. Disendowment may mean the transfer

¹ 13th June, 1868.

of what has been dedicated to God from one religious body to another. It may mean the secularization of religious property. . . . Such disendowment involves to my mind, a far more serious blow to the interests of religion and to the due honour of God among us than any disestablishment. . . .

‘(β) The other advantage . . . is to my mind, more important ; I mean freedom of spiritual action, and, in particular, freedom from the doctrinal jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The constitution of that Court, aggravated by the decisions which it has actually given, is assuredly the weakest point in the armour of the Church of England at the present day : but if, as we are told, some such assertion of State control is the inevitable correlative of a wealthy establishment, there can be no reason for maintaining it when the advantages of establishment . . . have been surrendered. . . .

‘If the Disestablishment of the Irish Church helps to deepen in us English Clergy the useful and stimulating conviction that the real strength of our Church must lie (humanly speaking) in the moral power which she can assert over the English people, and not in the protection of the Government, it may do us considerable service. . . .

‘As to English clerical opinion, it is clear that for the present the Irish Church Debate has enlisted the sympathies of the great mass of the Clergy in behalf of the present Government. Even the leading Liberal Clergy, such as the Bishop of London and the Dean of Westminster, are in this matter at issue with their friends in the House of Commons, although as the papers show they do not carry all their followers with them. High Churchmen are less unanimous than Low Churchmen ; but the great majority of the High Church clergy is opposed to Mr. Gladstone’s proposals as involving disendowment rather than as involving disestablishment. The motive of all this I need not say is not greed of property, but the fear of profaning that which has been dedicated to the service of God. . . .’

On the 25th June the Irish Church Debate began in the House of Lords. ‘Lord Derby and the Bishop of London made the only good speeches on the Government

side,' wrote Lord Carnarvon. The Government were not anxious that Lord Carnarvon should speak, doubting whether he would give them much support ; but with the concurrence of the Opposition he moved the adjournment of the Debate, which he opened on the following day.

Lord Carnarvon was not, he said, so sanguine as to believe that this Bill would succeed in appeasing Irish discontent, when other concessions, represented at the time as all that was really needed to conciliate the Irish people, had been one after the other made in vain. He admitted the hardships entailed upon the Protestant minority which had settled in Ireland on the assumption that the Church would remain established ; and the danger from Ultramontane influences, unfriendly to civil government and constitutional freedom ; but he laid the chief blame for the present controversy on the ambiguous language employed by Mr. Disraeli and his colleagues since their assumption of Office.

They had begun with a promise to endow an Irish Catholic University independent of public control. They had then promised religious equality by a process of 'levelling up'. Immediately afterwards, the University proposal had been abandoned as impracticable, and religious equality explained away as merely meaning increased facilities for Roman Catholic chaplains in Irish gaols and workhouses. Then an Orange deputation which demanded the maintenance of the Irish Church, an increase of the *Regium Donum*, and a pledge that no public money should be allotted to any distinctly Roman Catholic institution, had received from Mr. Disraeli what it regarded as a satisfactory assurance on all points. The Prime Minister had indeed, after first denouncing the

principle of Disestablishment, himself begun to apply that principle to the Anglican Church in the West Indies. It was open to the Prime Minister to adopt with consistency one of several different courses. What he could not do was to combine these courses and to court at the same moment the Roman Catholic and the Orangeman and to promise in one breath both religious equality and Protestant ascendancy.

Mr. Disraeli had informed the House of Commons, in mystical language, that he proposed to heal the sorrows of afflicted centuries. Lord Carnarvon thought it safer for the Church of Ireland, while she was still in a position to do so, to make terms with her opponents rather than to rely on those who professed themselves her friends.

He then approached in a judicial spirit the true position of the Irish Church, and pointed out that the State had imposed on her a task not easy to discharge. In spite of the eminent men she had produced, prelates such as Bramhall, Usher, Berkeley, and Taylor, she had failed in the mission assigned to her, so much so that already in 1834 her revenues had been reduced by Parliament.

No Church which was in a numerical minority, neither the Anglican Church in Scotland nor the Protestant Church in France, could conceivably be assigned a privileged position. Even if the Church of England were in a similar position, 'though I believe in her truth, in her doctrines, in her spiritual ministrations, and though I should, if possible, honour her with a greater reverence and affection in adversity than in the day of her strength—I could not . . . maintain that she was entitled any longer to that predominancy and ascendancy which now of justice and right belong to her. Were I to do otherwise I should contradict the whole mission of the Church

of England. . . . I should be consenting to place justice in one scale and the interests or supposed interests of the Church of England in the other. If I might venture to apply some of the noblest lines ever written, to the Church of England, I would say :

“ Yet this inconstancy is such
As thou too shalt adore ;
I could not love thee, Dear, so much,
Loved I not *Justice* more.” ’

While pleading, therefore, for the just treatment of the Church of Ireland, he felt unable to resist the demand for her disestablishment. It was painful to him to be in this position, knowing that he would not be supported by his own political friends, and would be opposing the Primate, the head of the Church ; but in the interest both of the English and Irish Churches, whose spiritual unity, he trusted, would be maintained in spite of it, he could not assume the responsibility of assisting in the rejection of the Bill.

After a very vigorous debate it was rejected on Monday, the 29th June, by a majority of ninety-five. ‘ The Bishops ’, wrote Lord Carnarvon, ‘ were all very cross. I did not get home till 4.30, for when I reached Grosvenor Street with Somers, I still felt so heated and the morning felt so fresh and pleasant that I walked on with him to Hyde Park Corner.’

The House was crowded and very attentive, and the Liberals began to have great hopes that Lord Carnarvon was a convert. ‘ Carnarvon’s speech last night was really very powerful,’ wrote Lord Clarendon ¹ to their mutual friend Lady Salisbury, ‘ and will raise him immensely in public estimation. . . . Cranborne [Lord Salisbury]

¹ 26th June, 1868. *Life and Letters of the 4th Earl of Clarendon*, vol. ii, p. 346.

alluded to his noble friend [Lord Derby] only once, in order to agree with him, and he carefully abstained from pitching into the Government as Carnarvon had done. . . .’ Lord Carnarvon’s comment on his friend’s speech was that it ‘was a very fine one of a very high order in all respects, but it left open, as I thought, a dangerous point for the future, in deliberately joining for the sake of present argument, Ireland with England, and in connecting more closely than I liked the fortunes and futures of the English and Irish Churches’.

But it was a grief to run counter to the opinions of his best friends. ‘It is part of the sacrifice which I have knowingly made,’ he wrote to Sir William Heathcote,¹ ‘that I have acted against your opinion, as well as that of many friends, who look upon me with mingled feelings of anger and vexation and regret. . . . Yet . . . I must honestly own that I cannot regret the decision that I took . . . and I shall be much mistaken if Salisbury and those whom he will lead, will not before long be obliged to come to the position which I occupy. . . .’

‘I hope however that in part you will approve my speech on the Irish Church, and nearly the whole if not the whole of my defence of myself last night : to this last I was driven by the misrepresentations of the Chancellor.² . . . I think I may certainly say that he came off much the worse and I hope that the lesson will not be thrown away upon him. It is just as well that these lawyers should learn that, layman as one is, one is not disposed to be rough-ridden by them. . . .’

The year closed with the resignation of the Govern-

¹ 8th July, 1868.

² 5th July, 1868 : ‘Careful examination of the Statutes showed me that Carnarvon was right and the Chancellor wrong on every point as to the application of the West Indian Church Disendowment Bill, and as to the principle of the Irish Church Disendowment Bill.’—*Sir Robert Phillimore’s MS. Diary*.

ment and the General Election in November. Lord Carnarvon was not much in sympathy with either party. 'I sometimes wish', he wrote to his mother,¹ 'that I could look at matters more as a partisan : but I cannot, and the foolishness and violence of both parties whenever I come in contact with them, repel me.'

The result of the Election was disastrous to the Conservative cause, precisely in those urban constituencies in which the newly enfranchized electors were most powerful. 'Infelix imbuit auctor opus' proved the epitaph of Mr. Disraeli's first tenure of office ; for the new voters, whom he had called into being, confirmed the worst fears of such prophets as Lord Carnarvon, Lord Salisbury, General Peel, and Mr. Lowe. The contrast between the political sentiments of the pre-Reform and post-Reform electorates was still further emphasized by the rejection in South Lancashire, which the Bill had not affected, of Mr. Gladstone, followed by his immediate election at Greenwich by the votes of the newly admitted artisans.

The new Liberal Ministry was a strong one, representing every section of the Party. Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister ; Lord Clarendon, representing the old Whig school, was at the Foreign Office ; Mr. Cardwell embodied the Peelite tradition ; Mr. Bright represented Pacifism, Cobdenism, advanced Radicalism, and militant Nonconformity.

The disestablishment and disendowment of the Irish Church was the first measure to which the Government intended to devote their attention.

'Is it desirable', Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir Robert Phillimore,² 'that the Irish clergy should show themselves ready to come to terms with the Government,

¹ 4th February, 1869.

² 4th October, 1868.

accepting Disestablishment as a fact? I hold that it is—and I know that you do, if possible more strongly still.' And he asked him if he could suggest what Mr. Gladstone's views were likely to be.

At Hursley the Archbishop of Dublin discussed the position with Sir William Heathcote and Lord Carnarvon. They both urged him strongly to communicate with Gladstone openly, in the hope of securing better terms. But it appeared that the Irish bishops in their protest had virtually declined to make any compromise with the Government.

The Irish Church Bill was introduced by Mr. Gladstone on the 1st March, 1869, in a speech of great brilliance. It entrusted the property of the Church to an Ecclesiastical Commission appointed for ten years. The *Regium Donum* and the Maynooth grant were to be abolished, subject to a certain compensation which would also be extended to existing vested interests. The union between the Irish and the English Church was to be dissolved on the 1st January, 1871, and all the Irish Ecclesiastical Courts and laws would be dissolved with it.

The Bill was passed by the Commons with little alteration, and the House of Lords was then faced with the problem of attempting to modify its severities.

On the 5th June Lord Carnarvon and Lord Salisbury went together to the meeting of Conservative peers at Lord Derby's house in St. James's Square. Lord Cairns made a long speech, advocating rejection. No middle term appeared to him possible. Lord Salisbury followed, declaring that as it was only a question of time and pressure, he could not vote for its rejection. Lord Stanhope declared that rejection would destroy all chance of getting better terms. But Lord Derby denounced the Bill in the strongest language, and said that 'there was

anyhow no individual who did not dislike and protest against every part of the Bill and regard it as revolutionary and abominable'.

Lord Carnarvon then spoke. He could not assent to that uncompromising denunciation of the Bill, but he did object greatly to some parts of it. Disendowment was repugnant to him, and was unjust and cruel to the Irish Church. He was ready to assist in amending it, but he deprecated earnestly the rejection of the measure, which would bring the House of Lords into collision with the country. The final result was inevitable, and there would then be no power of making amendments, which would be most injurious to the Church. He pointed out that the old constitutional power was almost in suspense. The present crisis might be tided over and the country recover its balance, but if a collision were provoked, indefinite changes and disasters might follow.

Later he did his best to sound some of the Liberal leaders as to the possibilities of some compromise, and Lord Granville intimated to him privately that the Government could not propose, but would not object to 'plausible' amendments which did not 're-endow' the Irish Church.

The Bill was debated for five nights. Lord Carnarvon spoke on the 14th June. He protested against the spoliation of the Church, which he calculated would get only a miserable £150,000 out of her original capital of £16,000,000.¹ But in spite of this he supported the Bill, in the interest of the House, 'whose authority should not be unnecessarily strained; secondly in the interest of the Church of Ireland, which can gain but

¹ In consequence of this debate better terms were granted by Mr. Gladstone. *Gladstone*, vol. ii, p. 277.

little by delay ; and lastly in the interests of Ireland itself, which ought not to, but which may in the event of this measure being rejected, become a battle-ground of faction.’¹

Lord Derby, who had attacked the Bill as a violation both of the Act of Union and of the Coronation Oath, had referred to his former colleague in very bitter terms. Lord Carnarvon did not object to differences on political grounds, but he greatly regretted that it should have affected their personal relations outside the House ; and writing subsequently² he assured Lord Derby that ‘ if ever during the last two years events have seemed to place us in this House in less complete accord with each other than in former times, it has been not only against my personal inclinations but to my great regret. Every one, of course, must be free to hold his own opinion and to take the course that he thinks right, but, whatever happens, I shall not forget that I owed my first introduction to office to you ; and I hope that you will not allow any unkindly feeling to exist towards one who can honestly sign himself as most truly yours.’

It led to a reconciliation. Lord Derby met him in the House, shook hands, and assured him that as far as he was concerned there was absolutely no ill feeling ; and Lord Carnarvon’s desire to be at peace with him was satisfied. A few days later he had a curious interview with his former chief, on the last occasion on which they ever met. He called at 10 St. James’s Square to confer with Lord Derby on the University Tests Bill, on which he agreed to move the previous question. ‘ The last time I was in that room ’, wrote Lord Carnarvon, ‘ was the morning of the famous ten minutes’

¹ The debate on the Second Reading ended early on the morning of 19th June with a Government majority of 33.

² 18th June, 1869.

Cabinet when the Reform Bill broke down. Lord Derby was very much changed—voice, strength, mental power. He spoke of himself as “politically dead”. . . . He tried to induce me to sign a protest as to the Irish Church, which would put me in a ridiculous position after the line I had taken, but when I declined he said he was not surprised. We parted as friends, and I never saw him again.’

Amendments introduced by the Lords were refused by the Commons, and returned to the Second Chamber, which decided to stand by some, including Lord Carnarvon’s amendment as to fourteen years’ purchase and compulsory commutation.¹

‘The debate on the Preamble’, wrote Lord Carnarvon on the 20th July, ‘was very hot. I never remember the temper of the House so keen on both sides. We divided and beat the Government by 78—a momentous division—I think we had no alternative, but the crisis is a very serious one. Is it like the first shot fired on Fort Sumpter?’

Two days later all was again changed by a compromise which Lord Cairns effected with the Government,² and the Bill was passed on the 22nd July. ‘We owe it’, wrote Lord Carnarvon, ‘entirely to the Division of Tuesday evening, and in a great measure I think to Salisbury’s uncompromising speech. On the whole we are well out of a great difficulty, though the terms of compromise may not be all that we might desire.’

Lord Carnarvon’s speech was by no means well received by his Conservative fellow peers, with many of whom his resignation two years previously had made

¹ 16th July, 1869.

² Lord Cairns had demanded a further concession of about a million pounds. A conversation with Lord Granville now resulted in Lord Cairns accepting a smaller sum.

him for a time unpopular. The speech was indeed a characteristic act of courage, for its frank acceptance of the principle of Irish Disestablishment gave mortal offence to many of the Clerical Party, who had hitherto regarded him as one of their most trusty champions.

The Chancellorship of the University of Oxford was on the point of becoming vacant, and Lord Carnarvon, as a graduate who had won high academical distinction, was already High Steward of the University,¹ and had resigned a seat in the Cabinet rather than sacrifice Conservative principles, was an obvious candidate. But the clergy were bitter about his speech on Irish Church Disestablishment, and although Lord Salisbury was equally committed to the Act, his part had been less prominent. Neither wished to stand against his friend ; and Lord Carnarvon not only refused to compete, but begged his friends at Oxford to understand that he threw his whole weight into the election of Lord Salisbury, who became Chancellor in November, 1869.

¹ Lord Carnarvon became Lord High Steward in March, 1859. In December, 1858, he refused a distinction offered by the University of London, being unwilling to connect himself with any other University than the one at which he had spent two or three of the happiest years of his life, and doubting whether he could be useful where he did not feel a strong interest in his work.

CHAPTER XVIII

A CRITIC OF GOVERNMENT

1869-1871

‘ Large in promise, short in performance, and generally fatal in practice.’—SOUTH.

I

THE manifold difficulties of the Irish problem were not solved by the disestablishment of the Irish Church. The great famine of 1841 and the consequent emigration to America, combined with the establishment of Free Trade in the United Kingdom, had inflicted very serious injury on the agricultural interests of Ireland. This injury Peel had attempted to remedy by the ‘ Encumbered Estates Act ’, enabling landlords to get rid of entailed properties, in the hope, only very imperfectly fulfilled, that these would find new and more solvent purchasers. In 1850 a ‘ Tenant Right League ’ had been founded for the purpose of securing what were known as the ‘ three F’s ’, a Fair Rent, Freedom of Sale, and Fixity of Tenure ; but the brief outburst of enthusiasm with which its establishment had been hailed was not proof against the inveterate antipathies and jealousies of Irish politics.

In the spring of 1869 Lord Carnarvon twice drew attention¹ to the increase of agrarian outrages—no longer isolated occurrences, but now indicating malicious intent and design. He regretted the attitude of the

¹ House of Lords, 30th April and 7th May, 1869.

Government towards this menace. Their land policy had been proclaimed in an uncertain voice, and their release of Fenian convicts undermined the position of 'the pillars of our existence in that country'—the Irish constabulary—and was a clemency which invoked no return.

Mr. Gladstone's Irish Land Bill, introduced into the House of Commons on the 15th February, 1870, without going so far as to establish the three F's—he himself indeed regarded these as an invasion of the rights of private property—nevertheless gave statutory force to the customary system of joint ownership known in Ulster as Tenant Right, and, at the same time, allowed tenants desirous of doing so, to avoid it by a special contract. It empowered a tenant, moreover, to claim compensation for disturbance, so long as he paid a rent deemed by a Government valuation to be reasonable; and under a provision suggested by Mr. Bright, enabled the Board of Works to advance to him two-thirds of the money required for the purchase of his holding, at an annual interest of 5 per cent., repayable in thirty-five years. As regards its principle the measure met with general acquiescence, though some of its provisions were subjected to a good deal of criticism by Lord Cairns, who, as an Irishman and a lawyer, was qualified to speak with some authority.

Lord Carnarvon supported the Bill¹ on three ground principles—consideration for the landlords of Ireland, who in many cases could obtain no rents, and were constantly in risk of their lives; consideration for the great mass of the peaceable trading population, to whom the condition of things was an abomination; and lastly, consideration for the interests of the Empire,

¹ House of Lords, 17th June, 1870.

distracted by the chronic disaffection of a large section of the inhabitants of Ireland. Under the circumstances he considered the experiment worth making, and he indulged the hope that it might do for Ireland what cordial and kindly feeling between landlord and tenant had already done in England.

But on every other ground he regarded the measure as retrograde. Tenant-right had been declared to be founded on economically vicious principles, yet the House was invited, without even defining it, to stereotype it, and give it new vitality and force. It interfered with the freedom of contract. Any reckless interference with freedom of contract he profoundly deprecated, and he thought that compensation should be given for the forced transfer of any proprietary rights, whether the property affected were real or personal. He doubted the wisdom of the acquisition of real property, as a security on its advances, by the State. While the existence of a certain proportion of small owners was an advantage, their excessive multiplication might prove an evil. If the effect of all these processes, in addition to 'the feudal practice of shooting the landlords', was to accentuate absenteeism, and the landlords were driven from the country, the influence which they exercised would necessarily be transferred to the Roman Catholic clergy, which counterbalanced the landed aristocracy as one of the two powers in Ireland.

'The object of this Bill', he concluded, 'is the pacification of Ireland. I trust that object will be effected, and I heartily echo the wishes of many noble lords on the other side of the House, for no one feels more strongly than I do the danger of chronic disaffection in Ireland. I cannot, however, forget the cry last winter for fixity of tenure. I know that by this Bill you do not mean to

accord it. I know the Bill does not propose confiscation; it is not, I believe, even a stepping-stone towards it. But if the Bill does none of these things, do you think it likely to satisfy those who clamoured last winter for fixity of tenure, since it is extremely different from what they wish and say? I am prepared to vote for the Bill, because I understand it to be the expression of a desire on the part of England to strain every point, even to a doubtful extremity, in order to meet the wishes of the Irish people. On the other hand, I hope it is their intention, if it is passed, to obey the laws of the Empire. . . . If Ireland desires to recover her prosperity, she can only do so by learning that lesson, which both individuals and nations must submit to learn, obedience to law and constituted authority.’¹

II

But while Ireland was receiving a full share of attention, the colonies were not only neglected but had reason to think that they were looked upon as undesirable appendages by the Mother Country.

‘Granville really does desire the separation of Canada,’ wrote Lord Carnarvon.² ‘He instructed Sir T. Young³ to feel the pulse of the country, and he accordingly made the speech which made so great an effect at the time, and which he subsequently tried to explain away at Halifax. Granville also wrote to Galt, who had talked of approaching separation, and said he had never had a communication which gave him greater pleasure.’

When Parliament met on the 14th February, 1870, there was a notable omission in the Queen’s speech to

¹ The Irish Land Act received the Royal Assent on 1st August, 1870.

² 10th December, 1869.

³ Governor-General of Canada.

which Lord Carnarvon called attention. There was no reference to the relations of England with her Colonies.

‘ With the exception perhaps of the various considerations with regard to Ireland, scarcely any subjects have within the last few months been more in the public mind than questions relating to our colonial Empire. We have had a grave and dangerous crisis in New Zealand. We have had a rebellion in the Red River Colony. We have had a petition from certain agitators in British Columbia for annexation to a neighbouring republic. We have had the public mind stirred very much on the question of State aid to colonial emigration. . . .

‘ I propose to draw attention to the relations which exist between ourselves and our great self-governing Colonies—first of all, in what may be called the incidents of civil government, and afterwards in that which is, after all, one of the main ties between us, the question of military organization and defence. . . .

‘ At the present time the self-governing Colonies have little, I think, to complain of. They have the amplest measure of self-government ; they have personal and political freedom without stint ; they have legislative and administrative liberty to do almost as they please. . . . The result has been that during the last ten or fifteen years, the old feeling of irritation, of jealousy of Downing Street influence, and of the Secretary of State have gradually been fading away into visions of the past, and the Secretary of State is now looked upon rather as a friendly arbiter and adviser, on whom they can count in all times of difficulty.’

But within the last few months there had been a change in colonial sentiment which he deeply deplored. Many remedies had been proposed, such as a Confederation of Empire, or the creation of a Council like that which

assisted the Secretary of State in the administration of the Indian Empire. But neither of these suggestions was really practicable. Lord Grey considered that concessions had already gone too far, but although Lord Carnarvon was inclined to agree with him here, it was at any rate too late to recall them.

He was not, however, despondent. 'If on the part of English statesmen there exists, as I believe there does on the part of Colonial statesmen, a desire to find a remedy . . . nothing will ever persuade me that the task cannot be accomplished. The problem is to secure and preserve on the one hand the self-government which you have given to the different Colonies, and on the other hand to add to that a more real connection than that which now exists. . . . There are several influences at all events which may greatly tend to bring such a result to pass. In the first place a greater sympathy, a greater heartiness of expression, a greater affection, a more sincere pride in this great Empire, are all circumstances which would tend to promote the object in view.'

He advised some attempt to define more clearly the respective powers of the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and to discuss those questions on which they might safely invite Colonial co-operation. Above all they should consider the principles of military defence of the Empire, 'which might be a great source of strength, and at all events is the one great tie which still holds the Colonies to England'.

This led him to a severe criticism of Government policy. The Liberal Government had been indulging in drastic reductions both of troops and expenditure, 'but after all', he said, 'gold may be bought too dear, and he is not a prudent man who will not insure his house simply because he grudges the insurance money.'

The civil charges of the whole of our Colonies are so trifling that they are not worth a moment's consideration. The military charges, then, are the only real burden that can be said to weigh upon us, and let me point out that they are not really a great burden to this country when you propose to reduce largely your whole military establishment. If in recalling troops from Canada, you are prepared to strike those troops off the roll of the British Army, you of course effect a reduction. . . . I may say in passing that you struck off some 10,000 last year, and that if this year, as it is rumoured, you strike off another 10,000, and find yourself without an adequate reserve, you place the fortunes of this country in a very critical position.'

In Canada 'you have a territory confessedly lying open to attack, and you know that that attack, if ever made, will be in great force'. With its patriotic population, and with Imperial assistance, the territory could well be defended; and yet the Government had determined to withdraw the troops from Canada. 'Their presence is the visible presence of the Empire, and their absence, whatever you may say, will be construed as the abandonment of the Empire.'

In 1866 he had himself on account of Fenian disturbances maintained a greater number of troops in the Dominion than was normally necessary. His successor, the Duke of Buckingham, had reduced the number to 8,000, and that Lord Carnarvon regarded as the minimum. But in 1869, 4,000 more were recalled; only a little more than 3,000 men remained, and now a move was being made to recall them all.

'Three years ago you built up this Dominion, and scarcely was it created when you heaped upon it first one question, and then another of Imperial concern . . .

and then you say the sooner you wash your hands of it the better. . . . While our troops were there Canada paid for their whole barrack accommodation. She maintained an active militia upon which they had spent nearly half a million of money. Lastly, they had voted £1,000,000 for the permanent fortifications and defences of Canada.' He considered the Government policy 'impolitic as well as shabby'. The question was no longer a Colonial one. It was directly Imperial, and he concluded his speech with an emphatic protest against 'a course at once cheeseparing in point of economy, and spendthrift in point of character . . . ruinous to our honour, and fatal to the best interests of the Empire'.

Lord Granville's reply showed a strange ignorance of the feeling overseas. He maintained that the relations with the Colonies were admirable. 'I am not aware', he said, 'that any self-governing Colony has anything like a grievance against us.'

Canada thought otherwise. 'We are glad to know that we have in you a friend,' wrote Sir John A. Macdonald,¹ 'I may almost say a friend in need—for we greatly distrust the men at the helm in England, who cannot, I fear, be considered as appreciating the importance of maintaining the Empire as it is, intact.

'We indulge the belief here, however, that Messrs. Bright, Lowe, and Gladstone (shall I add Lord Granville?) are not true exponents of the public opinion of England. We may perhaps be obliged to appeal from the Government to the people of England.

'The withdrawal of the troops from Canada is, I think with you, a most unwise and short-sighted proceeding. At this moment we are in daily expectation of a formidable Fenian invasion, unrepressed by the United States

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 14th April, 1870.

Government and connived at by their subordinate officials. And we are at the same time called upon to send a military force to restore order in Rupert's Land.

'H.M. Government have been kept fully informed of the constant threats from the Fenian body for the last five years, and they have been especially forewarned of the preparations for the present expected attack. And yet this is the time that they choose to withdraw every soldier from us, and we are left to be the unaided victims of Irish discontent and American hostility, caused entirely by our being a portion of the Empire.

'We must, however, bear it as best we may, and we intend, with God's blessing, to keep our Country if we can for the Queen against all comers.'

III

The abolition of Purchase in the Army was another of those questions which Lord Carnarvon held should be considered in the large context of Imperial responsibilities and dangers. In a letter written to Lord Salisbury on the 27th January, 1871, Lord Carnarvon drew attention to the Prussian menace and to the probable expediency of introducing into England a scheme of universal military service.

'I do not myself think that Germany wishes to quarrel with us, independently of the rest that she must need for a time at least after the War¹; but her plans may easily bring her into collision with us. France, on the other hand, however we may pity her, is for the moment identified with Republicanism. What should be our tone with regard to Germany on the one side, and France on the other? How far practically are we right in going into

¹ See Chapter XIX.

conference on the Black Sea without France, whose interests there at least may be presumed to agree with ours? How far again if we do go into Conference, are we right in abstaining from an attempt at mediation, and how, if on proposing mediation, Prussia, as is not unlikely, withdraws? We must bear in mind how easily in supporting France we may be drawn into a support of Republicanism; for which the mob is already with its own natural instinct clamouring. Of course, you will not think that I am insensible to the opposite danger, which arises out of the tremendous growth of German power. This leads, naturally, to the consideration of political parties, as at present adjusted, or mis-adjusted. The Liberals are much disorganized and the Government much weakened. Disraeli probably ready to do anything unprincipled.

‘On the other hand, I doubt if the country—apart from all exaggeration—is in a military point of view safe—whilst abroad our resources are known to be so halting, that we may, and probably shall, be exposed to all sorts of discredit. . . . I have been thinking more or less on this complicated and difficult subject, and I own that really large changes seem to me necessary, if we would avoid at some future day a great disaster, but I think that the changes must have in the broad sense of the word, a conservative influence. . . .

‘One or two points there are which present to me peculiar difficulties—e. g. Purchase. The Radicals will attack it bitterly—it is in theory indefensible—but in practice after a good deal of mental oscillation, I am inclined to believe it is worth retaining. But it can only be defended in very qualified language, and with considerable caution. . . .

‘Once more—the obligations of military service on every one within certain ages—I personally believe this to be right and politic—but I suppose a great many of our friends would strongly object—and I am told that a large majority of the Liberals would be vehemently opposed to it. . . .’

The Bill abolishing the Purchase system passed the House of Commons in June, 1871, and a Conservative meeting at the Duke of Richmond’s on the 19th June showed that almost all were in favour of a direct negative

on the second reading. Lord Carnarvon suggested its acceptance on certain conditions, but this found little favour, and only one peer, Lord Longford, was willing to accept it purely and simply. A fortnight later Lord Carnarvon discussed the course to be taken with Lord Salisbury, and showed him a memorandum which he had drawn up—on the whole against a summary rejection of the Bill. Lord Salisbury, on the other hand, wished to reject the Second Reading. He was evidently influenced by the old feeling of irritation at the humiliating position in which he thought the House of Lords was placed, and was by no means averse to a conflict with the House of Commons.

The following day,¹ a meeting of Conservative peers was again held. ‘Stanley and Cairns, followed by the Duke of Marlborough, argued strongly against rejection of the Bill—Salisbury for rejection. I pointed out that it was a conflict of difficulties, but that on the whole the rejection pure and simple was open to the greatest difficulties. I suggested amendments, but this found no favour.

‘A very unsatisfactory meeting in some respects : but a very clear division of opinion.’

On the 7th July, at a final meeting, it was unanimously agreed to reject it, Lord Carnarvon—and in a lesser degree Lord Cairns—waiving their doubts in deference to the very strong opinion of the party.

When the Bill reached the Lords,² Lord Carnarvon began by admitting that he had no theoretic love for the Purchase system. He objected, however, to the Army Regulation Bill abolishing it, ‘first because no real scheme of Army reorganization is given us ; next, because all the essential principles of Army reorganization

¹ 4th July, 1871.

² 14th July, 1871.

and reform which you desire to be carried out, can be carried out quite as well without the abolition of Purchase as with it ; and thirdly, because in thus summarily abolishing Purchase, you indirectly lose certain serious advantages which attend it and incur very serious risks ; and lastly, because the measure must involve an enormous and perhaps indefinite burden on the taxpayer.'

He urged the House to reject the Bill, not for party reasons, not from pique, or from any desire to assert its authority, nor again in the interest of any particular class of officers, but on the sole ground of duty. The House of Lords had assented to the principle that it ought to reject all rash or immature legislation. This Bill was incomplete, a mere fragment of the original measure, and would have been, if originally presented in its actual form, rejected by the other House. All the Army Reforms advocated could have been effected without it ; it was costly ; there was no evidence of a desire for it in the country, and the press was equally divided on the question and showed, if anything, a balance of opinion against the changes proposed. Only two petitions in its favour had been presented, as opposed to two hundred and fifty-eight against it in the House of Commons ; and the Division List showed that in that House the majority of English members were against it.

The Commander-in-Chief (the Duke of Cambridge) had neither condemned nor approved the Bill ; he had been in fact an ' armed neutral '. Already every country in Europe was either seething with the secret fires of social discontent or organizing its population into a great military force. England alone stood by, in a state of self-complacency, buoyed up by the memory of past glories, but helpless either for attack or for defence.

He concluded by alluding to the threats addressed to

the House of Lords, as to the consequences of its rejection of the Bill. Rejection would involve the waste of the Session—'but to take this leap in the dark, to adopt measures which might jeopardize the efficiency of the Army and saddle the country with an indefinite amount of expense to the already heavily burdened Income Tax payer, would be a still greater evil, and one to which the House of Lords in its legislative character, ought not to be a party.'

The measure was rejected, after 2 o'clock in the morning of the 17th July, by a majority of twenty-five in a House of two hundred and eighty-five. Gladstone then played his trump card. The system of Purchase had no statutory authority and was merely one which the Sovereign as Supreme Head of the Army had created, and it could therefore be legally abolished without the authority of Parliament. Its abolition had figured as one of many other changes in a Bill, but it could, constitutionally speaking, have been equally well effected by an exercise of the Royal Prerogative; and the Government accordingly proceeded to suppress it by Royal Warrant.

An article which showed a wide knowledge of his subject and gave a gloomy picture of the deficiencies in our military defences was written by Lord Carnarvon when at Wildbad.¹

'In men, in material, in training, in equipment, in the proportionate blending of localization and concentration, in transport, in all that makes an army readily available for attack or defence, and distinguishes it from an armed rabble, we are . . . nearly if not absolutely deficient.

¹ 'Army Administration and Government Policy,' *Quarterly Review*, October, 1871.

‘ In continental phraseology, we are “ effaced ” from the roll of great powers, and it is not only known that we have no means of fighting, but it is thought that we will not fight. Nor can we complain of it as unreasonable if foreigners inquire whether those who showed such unmistakable reluctance to support Savoy and Denmark, and Luxembourg and Turkey, would be very eager to compromise themselves on behalf of Switzerland, or Holland, or Belgium. . . . In conversation, in the Press, from the Chairs of Professors, in the significant attitude of foreign Governments, in the unhappily still more significant attitude of our own Ministers, we may observe how wide a chasm yawns between the England of to-day and former times.

‘ We are content to assume that France is for the moment crippled ; that America is yearly growing more friendly as the jealousies and misunderstandings of former times fade into the distance of history ; that Russia, alone and unaided, could do little, and that Prussia has neither the desire nor the material inducements to bring her into collision with us. . . .

‘ A friendly intercourse between Germany and England seems as natural as it is desirable ; but history is read backwards, if consanguinity is accepted as a guarantee of goodwill. Family quarrels are often the bitterest and the least reasonable ; the world is still very far from the millennial serenity which the apostles of Free Trade and International Exhibitions once prophesied ; and the cynical maxim that men should treat their present friends as their eventual enemies, and their enemies of to-day as their friends of to-morrow, is as true now as when it was written by the Greek philosopher more than two thousand years ago. Prussia at least acts on this principle. She has never allowed sentiment or present ease to disturb the calculations of her well-considered policy. Even the measurements of our ships, the armaments of our fortifications, the resources of our southern and eastern counties, are, doubtless, recorded with mathematical precision in the Berlin archives, readily available should ever an emergency arise. . . .

‘ On the continental seaboard vast harbours confront us, such as Kiel, the prize of the Danish War ; or Jahde, in the sinuous recesses of which a whole navy might float unsuspected and secure ; or Antwerp, which was once described as a pistol held at the head of England. . . .

‘Heavily weighted in the race of commercial competition ; consuming with improvidence the resources on which much of commerce depends ; loved by none, envied by many ; with enormous wealth to tempt, and with little power to defend ; undermined by a pauperism that is growing up by the side of and in deadly contrast to our riches . . . we talk as if Providence had ordained that our Government should always borrow at three per cent., and that our trade must come to us, because we live in a foggy little island set in a boisterous sea.’

CHAPTER XIX

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1870-1873

I

IN 1870 Lord Cairns's resignation of the Leadership of the Lords brought the necessity of reconstruction and consolidation of the party vividly into view. Lord Carnarvon fully recognized the importance of unity, yet hesitated to commit himself to a fresh connection with Mr. Disraeli. Like the centurion, with a great price he had bought his freedom,¹ and he was indisposed to sacrifice it for an uncertain advantage.

A strong leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords was now required. Lord Carnarvon set himself to find one. He failed indeed to persuade Lord Salisbury to take the position, and his appeal to Lord Stanley was equally ineffectual, but he succeeded in overcoming the reluctance of the Duke of Richmond, whose first act was to urge the two friends to support him. They yielded to his desire as a personal request, and maintaining a non-committal attitude to Mr. Disraeli, returned to their old seats on the Front Treasury Bench, and to the Conservative Councils of the House of Lords.

In that same spring Lord Carnarvon suffered a severe domestic loss by the tragic murder of a well-loved first cousin in Greece. Edward Herbert, the sole surviving

¹ Letter to Lord Hardinge, 8th January, 1870.

son of his father's only brother, clever, handsome, and gifted with singular charm, was in 1870 Secretary to the British Legation in Athens. On an expedition to Marathon, accompanied by Mr. Vyner, by Lord and Lady Muncaster, and by Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd, he was captured by brigands, carried off into the hills, and held up for a ransom of £25,000 coupled with an amnesty.

On receiving this news at Ventnor on the 14th April, Lord Carnarvon hurried to London, raised the money from his bankers, and within two days telegraphed to Athens that it was at the disposal of the Greek Government. While the news of the health of the prisoners was good, there was no reason for great fear, so long as the Greek Government respected the robbers' conditions. But they did not do so. They refused to grant the amnesty, and despite all entreaties and promises despatched a party of troops in pursuit of the outlaws. This sealed the doom of the captives. In the mountain fastness where they were detained, Edward Herbert wrote in his journal that the brigands performed their devotions on Easter Sunday with edifying fervour. On Easter Monday the Greek troops were seen approaching. Even in such circumstances Edward Herbert's personal charm was not without effect. His gaolers promised not to kill him while he could keep up with them in their retreat. His physical strength was unequal to the task; he ran as long as he could; when he fell he was cut to pieces.

On the 23rd April Lord Carnarvon received from the Foreign Office the British Minister's ¹ despatch from Athens, detailing the capture, and containing an earnest warning from Edward Herbert and a solemn promise from the Greek Government that the troops should not attack. At the same moment the news arrived that the

¹ Mr. Erskine.

brigands were surrounded by Greek soldiers. A few hours later the fatal news of the murders arrived. It was a crushing blow. 'He was to me', Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir William Heathcote,¹ 'like a younger brother—a good, true, and high-minded nature—and, poor fellow, he seemed to cling to Evelyn and me and this place beyond anything else.'

The bodies were brought back to England and were received at Southampton with public signs of mourning, muffled bells, minute guns, closed shops, and flags half-mast high; and Edward Herbert's body was laid to rest among his own people at the old Burghclere Church.

Lord Carnarvon held that the Greek Government had been most culpable. 'Had the operation indeed remained under your control,' he wrote to Mr. Erskine,² 'it might have been sufficiently guarded, but conducted by an unscrupulous Greek Government and by its still more unscrupulous subordinates, it became fatal.'

A wave of passionate indignation swept over England, and notwithstanding the pressure of the Government to be silent, Lord Carnarvon felt it his duty to bring the matter forward in the House of Lords. His indictment of the Greek Government, delivered in a crowded, sympathetic, and silent House, found a responsive echo in the hearts of Englishmen.

Edward's property in Somersetshire was left to Alan, but the latter had long since carried out his early aspirations. He was now a doctor in Paris, and would not resign his career which was shortly to provide him with all the work that the most ambitious could desire.

The Franco-Prussian War affected the Herbert family in more ways than one. When war was declared Alan

¹ 24th April, 1870.

² 26th May, 1870.

instantly offered his services to the Civil Hospitals in Paris. Auberon immediately departed for Germany.

Auberon's experiences had already been many and varied. He had followed his eldest brother both at Eton and Oxford, where he was elected at St. John's College as a 'Founder's Kin Fellow' without examination. In 1857 he took a second class in classical honours, but, without waiting to take his degree, suddenly decided to enter the Army, and soon afterwards went with his regiment, the 7th Hussars, as a lieutenant, to India. In 1862 he left the Army and returned to Oxford, where he graduated as a Bachelor and a Doctor in Civil Law, and, resuming his residence as a Fellow of St. John's, lectured on History and Jurisprudence. But he was always ready to wander abroad in search of romantic experiences. On the invasion of the Danish Duchies by the Prussian armies, he dashed off to Duppel and covered himself with glory by rescuing wounded Danes under heavy fire and bringing them back to their lines. For these exploits he received the Order of the Dannebrog, while some years later the Iron Crown was bestowed upon him for saving Austrian shipwrecked sailors at Westward Ho! When Denmark succumbed to her conquerors, he sought similar experiences at Richmond in Virginia, then besieged by the Federal Army.

In the intervals between these adventurous journeys he combined with knight errantry, energetic political activities, first as a Tory, later as a Radical—and lastly as an individualist. As an undergraduate at Oxford, he had commemorated the most brilliant writer in *The Anti-Jacobin* by founding the Canning Club, with its ultra-Tory motto, 'Sceptra fide, frenis plebs eget, ara metu', and its sister society, the Chatham. Defeated as a Tory candidate for the Isle of Wight, he became private

secretary to Sir Stafford Northcote; but caused a great sensation by suddenly announcing his conversion to the Radical faith, and although beaten as a Radical candidate for Berkshire, he was elected in 1870, with the help of his friend Mr. Mundella, for Nottingham, where he seems to have been very popular with the 'Lambs'.

He had arrived too late to witness the brief Austro-Prussian War, but in 1870 he started, on the 17th August, to make his way to Weissenburg in the rear of the Prussian army, and on the 23rd *The Times* gave an account of three English 'amateurs', who were following the German armies, alluding to Auberon, Mr. Winterbotham, and Sir Charles Dilke.

French defeats followed each other in rapid succession. After the defeat of Marshal MacMahon had been announced on the 2nd September, Lord Carnarvon wrote:

'The fighting seems to have gone on now for three days, villages are burning, the Meuse is full of dead bodies, and the horrors of carnage and butchery are on every side. . . . It is a tremendous time, more awful I think than any since the French Revolution. Devils seem unchained on the face of the earth.'

3rd September:—'At 12½ the overwhelming news of the capitulation of the Emperor and MacMahon's army to the K. of Prussia. My first feeling was one of pleasure to think that this horrible carnage would be brought to an end: my next of apprehension of a frightful revolution in Paris and the danger among other things to Alan.'

5th September:—'This morning the news of the invasion of the Chambers by the Paris mob, the proclamation of the Republic, and the establishment of a Provisional Government. The Revolution seems to have taken place and as yet without bloodshed but all the elements of disorder and lawlessness are there. . . . I heard from Alan, who wrote as the news of the collapse of the French army was known, and who says Auberon has arrived in Paris. It is a most mad and reckless act to go there direct from the Prussian camp. . . .

‘In the evening Delane dined with us. He had just seen Russell, who had returned from the seat of war after the battle of Sedan, and was full of all its incidents. The surrender of the Emperor was very touching. The only request he made was not to pass through his own troops. He was accordingly sent through the Prussian lines—all standing at attention—an interminable drive—but he bore it all until he came . . . to the scene of one of the severest struggles, where the Prussian dead had been buried, but the French were still lying in heaps on the ground. Then he burst into tears. . . .’

11th September, London :—‘I have had a long morning of business instead of Church. Dr. Worms—connected with Gambetta—J. Favre and others of the Provisional Government in Paris, as well as with the Orleanists—was brought to me by the Prince de Beauveau. He is charged with a “mission officieuse” to represent how grave is the situation in Paris, how deliberate the determination to push matters to extremities, and to make Paris a heap of ruins if too severe terms are insisted on. The important point of his communications was that which affected the defence of Paris, and the preparations made for undermining and blowing up etc. the different parts of the town. He desired to see Granville, but had reached London yesterday evening after G. had left for Walmer. I went with him to Gladstone, but Gladstone had gone to Church : and I then wrote a letter of introduction to Granville. . . . He is to go by the 2 p.m. train. I also gave him one for Alan.’

The continental position gave still greater impetus to Lord Carnarvon’s study of defences and military matters at home. On the 22nd September he went to Aldershot, and the following day at his local agricultural dinner he made a speech to his labouring audience, *more suo*, on the state of England’s defences, which was very attentively listened to. Shortly afterwards he went over the Arsenal at Woolwich, where the Government were thinking of selling the dockyards ! It was not the army only which gave cause for concern. He was told on unimpeachable authority that the Admiralty had been reducing



HIGHCLERE CASTLE

workmen, till the war alarmed them and they suspended action.¹

Lord Strathnairn, the old Field Marshal, with whom he was a guest at the Grange, had much to tell them on the military situation, the lack of men, stores, transport, guns, etc. He apprehended great danger from Prussia, and even contemplated the possibility of France joining Germany against England, so greatly did she dislike her.

In September Lady Carnarvon's second daughter was born,² and Margaret Evelyn Leonora Selina was christened in the new church at Highclere by the Bishop of Winchester, who at the same time performed the consecration, in November. The abandonment of the old church, built by Sir Robert Sawyer two centuries previously, close to Highclere House, was a matter of sincere regret to Lord Carnarvon.

'The last Sunday in the old Church—a great many memories of former times and of those who have passed away crowded on me—my poor Father at the end of the pew with Fiddle [the dog] under his chair—Mr. Gowen looking grave and cynical—Mr. Kent passing through many phases. My uncle Edward Herbert, and many many others. It was like a procession of Ghosts; but for Winifred who sat by me and laid hold of my hand the whole time.'

Normal means of communication with Paris ceased, and Lord Carnarvon endeavoured to obtain news of Alan through other channels. Auberon could tell him little. He believed that Alan was still helping in the children's hospital, but he could not be sure. The 'ballon monté' and carrier pigeons were the only mediums, and very

¹ In January 1871 work was again suspended. On the 23rd February Lord Carnarvon brought forward a motion in the House, calling attention to the state of the National Defences.

² 18th September, 1870.

precarious ones, whereby communication could be maintained.

The condition of British citizens in Paris early became a matter of anxiety. Relief was distributed by a Committee of the British Charitable Fund, of which Dr. Herbert soon proved himself one of the most active and efficient members, while Lord Carnarvon supplied him with money and stores and appealed to the English papers for support. Grand Lodge also, on his motion, granted £500 for the Sick and Wounded Fund.

‘We have now nearly 1,000 persons to feed,’ wrote Alan Herbert to his mother, the 6th December. ‘We have got little by little into managing it better.’

By New Year’s Eve he could no longer send a reassuring report of the stock of provisions. Specie was well-nigh as rare as nourishing food, and the little store of sovereigns, which Lord Carnarvon’s foresight had provided, proved almost as precious as the tinned provisions which Alan had prudently accumulated.

‘Bread . . . may last two months more, but that only by mixing bran and pounded rice in it. . . . We doctors are in very low spirits, as our poor wounded soldiers almost all slip through our hands. . . . I ate some camel the other day ; it came from the Jardin des Plantes, and was excellent, but very dear. . . .’¹
‘Rats are declared to be a great luxury. The other day a fat old friend of mine was expatiating on the delightful quarter of lamb he had, only 20 francs. When a friend asked whether he was sure it was lamb, “Of course ; I could not mistake a beautiful white meat”. “Oh, *that* was dog”. . . .’²

In January the bombardment began. Alan’s ‘old woman’ sent word to say that she saw ‘une bombe toute rouge’ pass before her window. He went to

¹ To Lady Gwendolen Herbert, December, 1870.

² To Lord Carnarvon, December, 1870.

rescue her, but she preferred to take refuge in the cellar, and as he 'had long wished to feel the effect of a bombardment', he took a room in an hotel near by.

'I was fortunate : a bomb struck the house. It is not very horrible ; there is a good deal of noise and a shock, and women crying, but no great harm done. I shall not make the attempt again—tell Mother so.'¹

While Alan was blockaded in Paris, Auberon, who had followed the earlier stages of the war as a newspaper correspondent with the German army, was impatiently awaiting the moment when he could rejoin his brother. The capitulation took place on the 28th January, and although General Walker in his official position could not help Auberon to evade the outposts, he slipped in with a piece of beef in his knapsack for his brother's consumption, the first unofficial Englishman to enter the capital. From the gates to the Place Vendôme he did not see a single child. They seemed to have been swept out of existence.

On the 31st January he wrote to his brother, 'I got in to-day, defeating the great German army—strictly against orders—but fortunately got a golden opportunity. . . . Dear old Pal !—such a great pleasure. I believe I am the first in Paris, though not sure.' On the 19th March the terrible event known as the outbreak of the Commune occurred in Paris, and it is significant of Alan's temperament that on receipt of the news he at once broke off a short visit he had been paying in England, and returned to the scene of murder and sudden death.

'The fighting desperate, and all round the Place Vendôme, Tuileries, etc. [the quarter in which Alan lived]. Communications are cut off. . . . Alan's position is clearly a very dangerous one,' wrote Lord Carnarvon

¹ To Lady Gwendolen Herbert, 9th January, 1871.

two months later, on the 23rd May. A reassuring telegram about Alan came through on the 24th, but the following day : ' Still worse news from Paris. The fighting going on round the Madeleine. The Louvre and Tuileries said to have been set on fire with Petroleum by the scoundrels of the Commune. . . . Later a letter from Hammond¹ arrived announcing a telegram from Versailles, in which it is said that Alan is quite well. It is a great relief ; but the danger even yet cannot be over.'

25th May : ' The Tuileries a heap of ashes, the Louvre half destroyed. The account sent by telegraph by *The Times* correspondent is one of the most admirable pieces of writing I remember. It is a picture evoked from the book of Revelation, and one can hardly resist the belief that the wicked but brilliant city is at last paying the penalty of all her corruption and crime. God's judgments seem in truth to fulfil themselves. A letter from Alan, saying that the fighting all round is terrible, but he and his furniture are safe.'

When Alan's letters arrived they contained some vivid accounts of the scenes which he witnessed, virtually imprisoned in his house in the Rue Chauveau Lagard, while the Versailles troops were attacking the Red insurgents who held the square near the Madeleine Church. The Communists returned the fire with considerable determination,² their leader being ' a grey-headed, grey-bearded old man, who was the most blood-thirsty old fellow I ever saw. He hounded the others on, and had hot discussions, even with his own officers, so great was his determination to kill every one he could see at the window, whether a soldier or not. . . . There were in all about twenty or thirty firing and it was

¹ Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office.

² Dr. Alan Herbert, Paris, to his mother, 25th May, 1871.

a horrible sight. They quarrelled as to who should have the most shots, whose turn it was to shoot, and from time to time one heard such expressions as "Oh, that caught him!" It was just like boys out rabbit shooting.'

At the conclusion of the siege the French Government showed its appreciation of Alan Herbert's services by giving him the Legion of Honour, and when Sir William Wallace converted his siege hospital into a permanent British institution, the Hertford Hospital, it was to Dr. Herbert that he entrusted its arrangement and management; and he remained as physician in charge until the hospital was formally made over to the British Government in 1900.

No sooner had the news of the Revolution in Paris reached England than Auberon again endeavoured to reach his brother, but this time he was fortunately prevented from proceeding. Shortly afterwards he became engaged, to the great satisfaction and pleasure of his family, to Lady Florence Cowper.¹ She shared his unconventional preference for lunching under hedges, and entire indifference to time, dress, and ordinary customs. Together they experimented in farming at Ashley Arnwood, in Hampshire, but their plans were so novel and their methods so inconsequent, that success could scarcely be anticipated, and his desire that they should share a common table with their household and labourers was found embarrassing to the latter.

His political and other activities had been very various, and excited much comment. In his new profession as a Radical he burned all the ancient gods of the Herbert family in Church and State alike. He preached the secularization of the schools, the suppression of all distinctive religious teaching, and the abolition of the House

¹ Daughter of the 6th Earl Cowper.

of Lords ; and he completed this meteoric transformation by joining with Sir Charles Dilke in an attack on the Civil List, and proclaiming himself a convinced Republican. His speeches were taken seriously by the Court, and the Prince of Wales commented upon them to Lord Carnarvon, who, personally disapproving of them, made it quite clear that 'His brother was his brother', and that, Royalty or no Royalty, he allowed no criticisms upon him to be made to himself. It was only a temporary ruffle ; and when, at his next breakfast at Chiswick, the Prince assured him of his regret that he should have unintentionally annoyed him, the matter was smoothed over.

The Liberal Government was meanwhile in a very shaky condition. 'I see', wrote Lord Carnarvon, 'a horrible phantom before me in the coming break-up of the Government, who seem bent on self-destruction, and in the consequent struggles of the Conservatives to get back into Office.' Feelers were thrown out as to whether he thought Lord Salisbury and he himself would in such case take office with Mr. Disraeli. His answer was still the same ; he thought Salisbury would not join, and his own relations with him had been far too personal and intimate to separate their fortunes.

After a summer visit to Wildbad, where he was engaged in writing the article on Army Administration already quoted, he and Lady Carnarvon travelled to Baden and Strasburg to see the results of the war. 'There is nowhere', he wrote, 'the picture of desolation or anything approaching to it which I saw at Sebastopol.' During a few days at Neuhausen they visited the middle rock of the falls.

9th September :—'It really was a very grand sight, and apparently one mingled with a little risk, though I believe there has not been for

generations an accident. We tossed about a very angry cross-sea of broken waves as we approached the fall, some few breaking in spray into the boat. . . . We finally reached the rock, climbed up the rough steps to the summit, and looked down to the furious strife of waters on all sides. Perhaps the most striking view of all is that up the river, where the stream bears down full upon the rock across dull slabs—*dorsa immania saxi*—which gleam under the surface or just rise above it. . . . The sheets of foam are rather horrible—they remind one of some wild beast—that is all fury and passion and strength, and from which all individuality has passed away. . . .’

In October they returned to England, and he soon afterwards had an opportunity of meeting Carlyle, whom he had not seen for fifteen or sixteen years, at a dinner at Mr. Froude’s. ‘I found him aged, but otherwise the same—the fire untamed, and the wit and humour unquenched.’

II

The year which had brought such anxiety and sorrow ended sadly; his brother-in-law, Lord Chesterfield, died at Bretby after a short illness, leaving his estates to Lady Carnarvon and her son.

In 1872 the long physical strain produced its effect on Lord Carnarvon in a serious break-down and illness, which was followed by a slow convalescence. It was then that his mind, always attuned to spiritual issues, gave expression to its sense of the nearness of the other world in a book entitled *The Shadows of a Sick Room*, which was published anonymously.¹ Of this piece of English eloquence his sister Lady Portsmouth wrote that ‘those who are most familiar with the author may find him most surely again’ in this intimate record of devotional feeling.

¹ In 1873 by John Murray.

Some months' yachting were advised as a restorative, and on the 15th May he took possession of his new yacht, *The Marcia*, at Gosport. 'I have come on board, had my first dinner, smoked my first cigarette, and am sitting by the light of my lamp writing in the cabin. I have not yet arranged all my household goods, and got things into complete shape ; but there is a sense of quiet and seclusion with also a sense of locomotive power which is not unpleasant. My books are ranged in their shelves, the lamp sheds a quiet light on the mahogany fittings and the green panels, I hear the sounds of more or less life from the *Victory* near which we are lying, or the more distant parts of the harbour, and pretty tired out with all my business of the last week or two, partly subdued by the sea air, I begin to feel the sleepy influences. . . .'

From the 15th May till the 2nd September most of his time was spent on board in short cruises with friends and relations along the coast : to Cherbourg with his sister Gwendolen, to Dieppe with Lady Carnarvon and Mr. Kingsley, and to the Scilly Isles with Sir Stafford Northcote.

A few days were spent in London in July, when, as he wrote, the Prince of Wales and others seemed 'to look upon me as if I had come back from the nether world—so strange have I grown by my exile to Society'. He presided at the International Prison Congress, but another bad fit of gout supervened and forced him back to his yacht.

On the 13th July he notes :

'I am writing alone late at night in my silent cabin—with hardly a sound but the pattering of rain overhead, and the lapping of the waves against the side of the ship. There are few places more silent than a ship at anchor can be at night—now and then

the murmur of voices forward comes in, but it makes the general stillness more perceptible.'

His cruise ended at Ryde on the 2nd September.

'My last day on board, and a long tiring afternoon sorting papers, packing, etc. I think that on the whole my 3 or 4 months cruising has answered. My general health is the better for it, and the quiet has been very useful. I have also learnt something new, and I carry away grateful and pleasant recollections of many things.'

In the autumn Lord Carnarvon was sufficiently recovered to begin taking up his usual occupations, and among other things the reorganization of Repton School, of which he was a Governor, was effected.

On the 27th November he attended a private meeting of the Bishop of Winchester's, of bishops and laymen, to consider the question of the Athanasian Creed. Dr. Pusey advocated no concession, after which the bishop invited opinions from the laity, and Lord Carnarvon urged the acceptance of some modifications of the *status quo*. (1) Re-translation. (2) Explanatory Note. (3) Exemption of civil penalties under the Act of Uniformity, for non-recitation.

Considerable discussion followed. 'Some few were against all change. . . . The general conclusion at which we *seemed* to arrive, for it was very loose and vague, was that some communication might be made to the Government in the sense of my three proposals . . . not to the effect that we were willing to co-operate, but that we would not resist. It was not satisfactory, and it was certainly not definite, but perhaps nothing more could be reasonably expected.'

There followed visits to Sandringham (the Prince speaking 'with great regret but with great moderation' of Auberon's recent letter proclaiming himself a Repub-

lican and extolling Mazzini), to Knowsley, when doubts were expressed as to the ability of Mr. Disraeli to retain the leadership of an undivided Conservative party, a family Christmas at Bretby; and in the New Year a tour with Lady Carnarvon.

His impressions of France at this juncture of her history are worth recalling :

1st January :—‘ Paris seems much changed—the streets ill-lit—very few persons moving about—the shops shut—the brilliancy gone—few in the Cafés, no one sitting outside—trade too I hear slack—no real stock in the shops—all living from hand to mouth, and endeavouring to recoup themselves by high prices.’

2nd January :—‘ The sight of Paris is very sad. The Tuileries a ghastly wreck—the Louvre half-down, the Rue de Rivoli still scorched and half-burnt walls—the Hôtel de Ville a horrible ruin—and on the other side of the River, the Conseil Général and other buildings in no better condition. The look of the people seems to me altered. They walk about as if on business, and the old half-idling, self-satisfied appearance is gone.’

7th January :—‘ We drove to St. Cloud. The little town is rising from its ashes, and the traces of shot and shell are rapidly disappearing : but the Palace is a mere wreck—a skeleton of bare and blackened walls. Close by is the garden of the little Prince Imperial, ragged and over-grown with weeds—a melancholy commentary on the vanity of human wishes.’

9th January :—‘ Drove to Versailles with Lyons . . . and went to the Assembly. It was sitting in the Theatre of Louis XIVth. Grévy on a small platform ringing his bell incessantly to obtain silence, and the Pit about two-thirds full of the members. The noise and interruptions and vehemence of these gentlemen were to English ears extreme. No speech could be made without repeated and sometimes personal interruptions, and the loud open talking which followed on these could bear no comparison with the hum that generally follows in the H. of C. on a point being made by the speaker, or a successful interruption. Their gestures were generally vehement—on the part of speakers and interrupters.

‘ I was fortunate as to the former. First came Pressensé—

heavy, solid not very attractive, but generally applauded by the Left—next Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans—too long and diffuse—but he provoked the Left, and this led to personal attacks and much vehemence ending in a short explanation by Gambetta. He has undoubtedly the oratorical power. His voice very good and powerful. His manner collected. He was the only one whom I could hear distinctly.

‘I dined afterwards with Lyons at the Hotel, and in the evening went with him to Thiers’ reception, having an hour or two before seen in the papers the death of the Emperor. It was a curious and strange scene to see Thiers and Madame Thiers receiving in the great rooms where Emperors and Princes had so often played their parts.

‘Madame is abrupt and disagreeable in manners—but Thiers rather genial and attractive—a squeaky voice—and an appearance of age—very civil and inclined to be chatty. He offered me tickets for his “Tribune” in the Assembly to-morrow.

‘He confined all his remarks relative to the Emperor to his illness.’

On the 10th January he drove with Lady Carnarvon to Versailles, and heard another debate in the Assembly.

‘There are several points of form which really are points of principle and which strike one. (1) The speaking from the Tribune. I had imagined it an impracticable arrangement, but by arrangement with the President it is possible. It is however rendered necessary by (2) the great size of the room and the large number of deputies—between 700 and 800. (3) The practice of addressing the Assembly and not the President. (4) The less respect which the President enjoys. His ruling was yesterday disputed. (5) The vehemence of action and language of the speakers. (6) The inborn and natural fluency of all the speakers. None ever referred to notes, and most spoke with a volubility unknown to us. (7) The very loud talking of the members during the speeches.’

A visit to the battle-fields followed, and on Sunday,¹ he notes, ‘We went to the Oratoire, being unable to

¹ 12th January, 1873.

undergo another infliction of Mr. Forbes at the Embassy Church; but we did not gain much by the change.'

At Madame Mohl's Salon they met Renan. 'His appearance—very large and massive head—and his general conversation were rather striking, but when he came to talk politics, all he could do was to give a general assent to the principle of the sub-division of property, and to acknowledge that the peasant class were hopelessly ignorant and incapable. . . .'

They returned to London for the meeting of Parliament, but he did not remain long in England, having been advised by Sir William Gull to take a long cruise.

Lord Carnarvon left at the end of February, by the *Simla*, and reached Gibraltar on the 5th March, where the *Marcia* and his Secretary, Mr. Corbett, were to meet him, and where he stayed at the Convent, receiving the heartiest of welcomes from Sir Fenwick Williams, the Governor. The latter put a gunboat at his services to cross to Tangiers, now a resort of the tourist, but then little known. It was his first visit there.

'The shores on both sides are fine—Ape's Hill particularly. Ceuta looks the curious counterpart of Gibraltar in outline. The old Moorish watch-towers on the Bluff headlands are picturesque. From the sea Tangiers looks picturesque also—the remains of the Mole, which we destroyed on giving up the place, show above the water and the waves break over it in a long ridge of foam. Made acquaintance with Sir J. D. Hay, who took us a ride into the interior to see his country house. It is finely placed in the remains of a wood of arbutus where often the wild boar has been hunted to bay, and apparently anything will grow: but it is not tended with any special care and all things considered it is a little disappointing. I am in fact less struck with the country

than I quite expected ; but I see it under the disadvantage of a cloudy sky. The most striking scene are the old walls of the town—quaint, grey with extreme old age, and picturesque in form, as they rise on a steep bank covered with prickly pear and aloe. In them is the history of all ages—Carthaginian or Phœnician—Roman, Moorish—Spanish—possibly English. . . . Sir J. Hay gives a poor account of the Government of the country. It seems nearly the old Turkish system of no pay to the Governors, and of consequent plunder and fleecing by them—a graduated oppression from high to low.’

Tangiers, 9th March, Sunday :—‘ Walked up to the market, which was a picturesque scene with its moving and excitable crowds of Moors from the country, with their brown cloaks and bare legs. . . . It brought back many scenes in Asia Minor. The dirty streets, the shouting men, the half-veiled women, the laden donkeys, the prowling dogs, the picturesque Moorish archways, the horses marked with tokens to avert the evil eye, the guttural language, have been a great charm to me again by recalling a host of old recollections.

‘ Paid a visit to the Governor with Sir J. Hay. He showed us over the old castle, which once was a fine specimen of Moorish architecture with its horseshoe arches and delicate tracery—now it is decrepit, and whitewash fills up the lacunae where once nobler materials covered the wall.’

10th March :—‘ The steamer never arrived yesterday, so I am detained here. The cause of the delay is the fact that to-day is a Moorish holiday, but in the East any or no cause of delays is the same. I spent the morning in Jews’ shops, buying carpets. . . . Everywhere picturesque groups of villagers from the interior who had come in for the fair—all in good humour, and with none of that scowl on their faces which is so common in Turkey when a Christian passes. . . .’

On his return to Gibraltar he saw a curious but not uncommon sight. He wrote : ‘ In the afternoon we rode along the sands . . . saw a boat of rather picturesque smugglers landing spirits in broad daylight within half an inch of a custom house station, and within fifty yards

of a Spanish carabineer, who with his dog, sat complacently watching the proceedings ! ’

He reached Ceuta on the 20th March¹ and was overwhelmed with civilities by the Spanish Governor. He gave him breakfast, and then took him for a ride in the country.

‘ It must be an uncommonly dull place . . . but it is very picturesque—a succession of old walls each enclosing the other, and each bearing the arms of the King by whom it was built. There cannot be less than five, and in one case there is a wet ditch formed by bringing in the sea. Ceuta therefore is actually an island. In parts the walls are quaint and striking—with twisting passages and low, long gateways and all the appliances of old-fashioned warfare ; but to compare Ceuta with Gibraltar for modern defence seems to me absurd. It has none of the wonderful natural scarp of Gibraltar and it is commanded by the neighbouring hills.’

Both at Gibraltar and Ceuta he visited the convict establishments, lamenting in the former instance the Government intention to break it up, and in the latter, little pleased with the lack of all arrangements and the accommodation for the 2,000 men, many of whom were Chinese deported from Cuba.

Malaga was the next port, and this he found in the midst of a revolution.

‘ The town of Malaga is at present in the hands of the mob, who are armed, but who are for the moment quiet. There have been some cases of pillage ; the richer families have mostly fled. They and all respectable people are frightened to death at the Republic, but they are absolute cowards. The disbanded soldiers disliked the conscription, and therefore were glad to be released ; but the General here in command, though a Republican, nearly committed suicide in his despair. The Malaga Bank was so

¹ The news of Gladstone’s resignation (13th March) threatened to end the holiday. But Disraeli refused Office, and Gladstone returned to power (20th March).

alarmed that it sent most of its specie and its paper money to the English Consulate as the safest place, and in this way Mr. Wilkinson was able to cash me a £10 note. Here they are all in favour of a federal-republic, wishing to have free trade, but also as I understand making common cause with Andalusia. To-morrow there is to be a great demonstration at which the "Republic" is to be proclaimed; but though it is not said so, the *federal* republic is intended. . . . Everything is most unsettled, and at any moment an explosion ending in bloodshed may take place.

'I walked about and saw all that there was to be seen; the old Castle—in the hands of the gentlemen of the pavement—is very picturesque, as also some old walls. . . .'

The yacht was weather-bound, and the following day, after church at the Consulate, Lord Carnarvon went to some private rooms at the Alameda Hotel, and saw the public ceremony.

'It was a picturesque scene. The broad and rather stately Alameda with its trees just beginning to come into green leaf, and here and there the distant mountains—the crowd of moving colour, striped shawls, white caps, gay dresses—but hardly any of the higher class were to be seen—mules and muleteers and varieties of national dress. First there defiled—twice over I suspect, as the soldiers on a stage—some 5,000 or 6,000 men dressed mostly in wideawakes and jackets, more or less organized into companies and led by officers who generally wore a red or white cap—the only military decoration—but armed with guns and bayonets. . . . A very rough and inharmonious music accompanied them. Flags of all colours, but the red flag ominously predominant, and interspersed in the different columns were men with red caps who were said to be the internationalists and communists. One red flag was carried by children bearing an inscription in favour of "gratuitous and compulsory education". The little victims, heedless of the nature of the inscription, trooped along and saluted with acclamations the banner—which if they had understood it, would I conclude have been their detestation.

'At length the Governor and the notabilities—including to my astonishment the Bishop of Malaga and some priests—ascended

a platform and amidst waving flags, shouting populace, and thundering cannon he declared the *Federal Republic*. There was a paroxysm of enthusiasm but great order. . . . That the Bishop should be there was most curious. He at least, and his priests, know the meaning of the Federal Republic, and that they should sanction its establishment is a piece of monstrous hypocrisy. But there is no saying to what consequences this day's work may not lead. . . .

'As regards Federalism, I see that the movement *here* at least recommends itself to some of the more respectable classes by the promise of free trade, and consequent commercial advantages : but I apprehend that whilst Andulasia may desire free trade, La Mancha desires protection. . . . Scarcely any of the richer classes are in Malaga—they have all fled—a cowardly proceeding : an absence nearly as cowardly as was the presence of the Bishop of Malaga and his priests. . . .

'There were one or two men riding about with red sashes, mostly I imagine favourite demagogues—one of them as I passed him scowled at me with an instinctive knowledge that I was not exactly of his way of thinking. . . .'

On reaching the Balearic Islands a landing was attempted in the bay of St. Antonio,¹ but 'on reaching the shore, we were met by an official in a long dirty blue coat who said he had strict orders to allow no one to land except with a permission from the Governor of Iviza—three hours distant !—the benefits of a revolutionary Government !'

Barcelona was also in the hands of the mob when they landed on the 1st April.

'After considerable difficulty and explanations I got permission to see the Cathedral, which is shut up. The priests have fled and some dirty-looking vagabonds in blouses and red caps with muskets keep guard over the door. In the cloisters was a picturesque group of red-bonneted gentry sitting round a fire of wood which they had lit on the stones, having turned a side chapel with its altar

¹ 29th March, 1873.

into a guard-room. The Cathedral is very fine—Spanish Gothic—with beautiful old glass and stately clustering shafts which run up to a great height.’

After leaving Barcelona Lord Carnarvon made his way home overland, via Toulon, Avignon, and Lyons, and reached Highclere in the middle of April. The new house in Bruton Street¹ was almost habitable, and it was pleasant, after an experience of London hotels, to have a roof of his own over his head once more; and incidentally it pleased him to recall that 16 Bruton Street was the scene of Jeanie Deans’ pathetic pleading for the life of her sister with the Duke of Argyll, whose arms still ornamented the staircase. Here, too, Charles Greville, ‘the Lodger’, as Lord Granville called him, had inhabited the drawing-room floor, and had written the *Memoirs* which created so general an interest, and so great an indignation in royal circles.

The Committee of the International Exhibition of which he was Chairman had much work on its hands, and when the Shah arrived in England, a reception was arranged for him at the Exhibition, where Lord Carnarvon received him.²

‘The Shah seemed intelligent and could hardly be got through the machinery, so interested in it was he. The Prince of Wales was admirable in his good humour and patience, and finally after a striking promenade through the galleries of the Exhibition we reached the Albert Hall, where I separated myself from the rest of the train and found my way to the committee box, where a scene of really extraordinary splendour burst upon me. The whole of the Hall was filled with spectators—some ten or eleven thousand in number—the arena looked like a parterre of flowers, gay in

¹ After the sale of 43 Grosvenor Square Lord Carnarvon lived at 3 Park Street until his marriage in 1861, when 66 Grosvenor Street was bought. In 1873 he moved to 16 Bruton Street, and later, in 1879, he bought 43 Portman Square.

² 23rd June, 1873.

ladies' dresses and uniforms, whilst above tier over tier the brightest colours rose up to nearly the roof—fifteen hundred performers filled the orchestra and at the Organ sat the organist like a seraph in his crimson and white robes of silk. It was a very dream of beauty, and was an idealized picture of the Coliseum such as it might have been two thousand years ago. . . . Form—architecture—grandeur—colour—sound—all combined to fill the senses.'

III

One of the most important measures of the Parliamentary Session was Lord Selborne's Judicature Bill. Lord Carnarvon was opposed to it, partly because he saw in it a blow aimed at the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and partly because he was opposed to the removal of the bishops from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The topic came up in the House of Lords on the 5th May, when Lord Carnarvon spoke, and again in the evening of the 13th July, when 'Disraeli dined with us, the first time since our memorable schism in '68', and was 'very agreeable'. The great man was, or seemed to be, of opinion that the Bill might even yet be thrown out and that Cairns was really at heart sick of it. 'I intimated a disposition if circumstances allowed of it and "if Cairns was not actually a consenting but an assenting party", to move to get rid of the Bill on the ground that it was morally damaged—like indeed the Government. Disraeli caught at this, said he would speak to Cairns and it was understood that some communication should follow.

'In conversation D. said a curious thing speaking of the Duke of Richmond, "that he was entirely under Cairns' guidance". Curious but quite true. He spoke too of Cairns with some slight touch of criticism as a very able lawyer but only a lawyer.'

A couple of days later Mr. Disraeli at the Carlton expressed himself in favour of extinguishing the Bill in the House of Lords, and when Lord Carnarvon intimated that should all circumstances be favourable he would be ready to move something to this effect, Disraeli said he felt sure that Cairns would be glad if he did so, as Lord Cairns felt himself in a false position by the course he had taken, and would be glad to get out of it.

This, however, was scarcely the situation, for when Lord Carnarvon told Lord Cairns that he thought there was a chance of postponing it for a year, the latter, while admitting that many disliked it, did not think it would be possible to deal with it in this way, that 'the weak-kneed members of the House would flinch', and finally said he was so bound in honour as to be unable to support such a motion.

A few days later Mr. Disraeli came to him to discuss the matter again, and on the 24th July the Bill came on in the House of Lords. 'The result', wrote Lord Carnarvon, 'of all our conversations, communications, etc., was the carrying of the Commons' Amendments with one or two exceptions. The truth is that Cairns and Richmond and Derby were all for them, and even Salisbury would not vote. . . . I turned a few votes but after all we only divided 34 to 61, there being a good many pairs.'

'I am sorry for the result of Thursday night,' he wrote to Mr. Disraeli.¹ 'We made the best fight we could, and but for a singularly untoward combination of unlucky circumstances might have been successful.'

Mr. Disraeli answered characteristically :

'Whatever regret you may feel about the passing of the Judicature Bill, you cannot at any rate feel remorse. You did

¹ 26th July, 1873.

the right thing, and you did it well. I was in your House a good deal during the fatal evening, and, more than once, thought your eloquence and energy would have triumphed. I helped you a little at the last moment, and turned one who was going to follow the Duke of Richmond, into a teller with Redesdale. Almost a miracle !

‘ I am on my way to Hughenden, and leave the Government in as different a position from that in which they met Parliament as human circumstances could well create. They are enfeebled, or dishonoured, in almost every department, and the Treasury, which is the soul of all administration, principally. I think it probable that the next ten days may be very damaging to them. They will be harried, and by Actæon hounds, who will be fiercer for my absence. . . .’

On the 1st August Parliament broke up. ‘ In the House a desultory discussion on many subjects and a sort of friendly leave-taking of friends and opponents much as it used to be when going home for the holidays from school.

‘ Kimberley’s last words to me were that he wished that I was in his place. . . .’

In October the family was again at Bretby. Before long Mr. Disraeli appeared,¹ and made himself very agreeable. ‘ We talked freely enough of political matters, though of course abstaining from reference to our old subject of division ; but a great deal on literary questions, where he is at home. His training as a trustee of the British Museum has given him knowledge of many of these matters. . . .’

‘ One of the most remarkable features of this remarkable man is the apparently total absence of personal rancour. He seems to have no feeling against those who have shown the greatest feeling against him. He spoke of Salisbury and Hatfield in the language of a wholly indifferent bystander—allotting to Hatfield the

¹ 7th October, 1873.

preference over every other country house in England—oddly enough on the same grounds on which I have always said the same.’

A few days later they took a long stroll together through the Park. ‘His conversation is of an agreeable kind—easy, with much anecdote, occasionally a sparkle of genius, and often inclining to the dreamy not to say mystic. Anything of a poetical cast seems to attract him and his mind has much more *classical* culture than I had supposed. I fancy it has been obtained through German rather than English sources. Speaking of death, he said to me, “When the curtain falls I avert my eyes and dare not look beyond,” yet he acquiesced heartily when I said afterwards that it was far harder to disbelieve than to believe. He spoke of recent discoveries having given a real historical value to the Scripture records. It would be hard to say what are the limits of his religious belief.’

In November, being at Melbury for shooting, he was much interested in the old Game Books, written about 1754, during the time of the first Lord Ilchester. ‘Some facts are curious. They did not limit themselves to the present shooting months—some entries occur in August and many in February.

‘The day’s sport was small—“4 noble cock pheasants” were thought a fine day. Sometimes “Nothing” is recorded. Sometimes a pheasant is entered as having been shot on a tree. They seem to have often been driven in by wet. Much “chaff” directed against the various members of the family or party. The book is really an account of every day’s proceedings; but there is evidence of much cultivation in quotations from Virgil and Horace, and though there are occasional bits of gossip and scandal, there is very little coarseness. . . .’

Extracts referring to his own great-grandfather and great-grandmother were interesting to him :

‘ Mr. Acland courted Lady H. Strangways day after day all the month of November.

‘ Ditto December. Sir Thomas Acland and Mr. Hugh Acland spent some time here in December. The latter end of December Lady Lucy and Lady H. went to town to buy fine things for the wedding.

‘ On the 7th January, 1771, John Acland, Esq., eldest son of Sir Thomas Acland of Killerton in Devon, was married by virtue of a special licence in Redlynch Chapel to the Lady Christian Henrietta Caroline Strangways. The ceremony was performed by Mr. Charles Digby, Rector of Kilmington. The end of December, 1770, Captain Strangways arrived from Ireland upon recruiting duty, and was present at the wedding.’

Later he was at Longleat.¹ ‘ The day was wet, and I did not shoot ; but spent part of the morning with Canon Jackson in Bishop Ken’s library at the top of the house, looking at MSS. some of which were very interesting. It is altogether a very remarkable collection.

‘ The book which records the prices, etc., during the building of the house, bears on the cover this legend :

“ Tenes bon compt de part Dieu.” ’

¹ 16th December, 1873.

CHAPTER XX

THE COLONIAL OFFICE

1874

THE Conservative refusal of Office in 1873 had compelled Mr. Gladstone to retain it for a time, and he combined the duties of Prime Minister with those of Chancellor of the Exchequer, which Lowe had resigned in order to become Home Secretary. In this capacity he was bent on a reduction of the Army and Navy estimates, which the Ministers responsible for these departments were unable to accept. Defeated by the Tories at the beginning of the year on an Irish educational question, and now confronted with opposition in his own Cabinet, Mr. Gladstone resolved in January, 1874, to appeal to the country, offering to the electors the tempting bait of the complete abolition of the income-tax, which Disraeli immediately capped by the promise of a corresponding relief from the sum total of taxation. In the England of 1925, groaning under more oppressive fiscal burdens than have probably ever been borne, even in the days of Empson and Dudley, it requires some effort of the imagination to picture a golden age in which statesmen competed with one another as to which should most successfully reduce taxation. Lord Carnarvon saw in this refreshing emulation, as our own gloomy iron era would now regard it, a fulfilment of his own former prophecies of the political corruption which democracy was fated to produce. 'Gladstone', he said, 'offers

a bribe of £50,000 in the shape of remission of taxation, and Disraeli at once caps it. It was what we said at the passing of the last Reform Bill that the Constitution would be put up to auction at each general election.'

He wrote to Mr. Kent from Bretby : ¹

'I do not indeed admire much the addresses or the speeches on either side. With those on the Liberal side I almost always disagree : whilst I am obliged to admit that on my own side there is not the statesmanship or breadth of thought which I could desire. Still one cannot get everything in this world, and I am hoping, like all the rest of the Conservatives, for a triumph in some form or other.

'I hardly remember a time when my own hands have been more full—much going on at Highclere—at Pixton—the house re-building in London—a yacht half-finished at Cowes—a great deal in Nottinghamshire—the reorganization of the County Police in Hampshire—the choice of a Headmaster for a public school—with many other things—and unfortunately it happens that I am once more single-handed. Poor Corbett broke down, as you have heard, entirely.'

The Conservatives were winning victories everywhere. Early in February it became probable that a Conservative Prime Minister would be called to the helm. That Disraeli would be that Minister was a foregone conclusion. But how would his Cabinet be composed ? Speculation was active in political circles.

Lord Carnarvon knew through Lady Derby that Mr. Disraeli wished him to take the Colonies. He himself held, as he told Lord Salisbury,² that Disraeli was in a different position as a Minister with a majority from what he had been as a fortune-hunter with a minority ; whilst Gathorne Hardy and Derby would be a sort of support, if not guarantee, against violent changes. He also thought that if Lord Salisbury held aloof, he would

¹ 4th February, 1874.

² 8th February, 1874.

cause a split in the party, and certainly waste great powers which he might otherwise exercise politically.

Lord Salisbury was reluctant on two grounds: first, that Disraeli might play them a trick as before, and that their last card, resignation, was played out; secondly, that they would be placed in a position of servitude, that it would be an act of submission, and that he might retaliate upon them.

*The Times*¹ urged that the two ex-Ministers should 'condone the past and return', and their friends were insistent. 'I think it also of immense importance', wrote Lord Bath,² 'that we should have the influence of some sound men like yourself in the new Cabinet. I do not see any good either to yourself or others you can do by holding back, and although there are many reasons that can be urged against your going, those in favour clearly preponderate.' And the Duke of Northumberland pressed Lord Carnarvon strongly to put aside all scruples.³

'I am so intimately convinced that this is our last opportunity of giving to the country the proof that a Conservative Government can carry on the affairs of the country and effect necessary reforms without the necessity of claptrap and coups d'état, that I cannot refrain from urging on you the expediency of thus placing yourself in the position of being able to give check to any such attempts on the part of the great actor to whom the destinies of the Empire are shortly to be committed. It will be impossible for him, if you do (and if Salisbury is also content to lend his support to her tottering institutions), to play the part he has formerly enacted—though success will doubtless not diminish his self-confidence, and he will become therefore the more dangerous in a Cabinet of subservient nominees. His speech at Newport the other day, when he complimented the two communists who have been returned as

¹ 9th February, 1874.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 15th February, 1874.

³ 12th February, 1874.

the representatives of the working classes, had an unpleasant ring in it. . . .’

Lord Carnarvon replied from Bretby :¹ ‘ . . . There is, I own, much to make me shrink from binding myself up in the new Cabinet, though amongst its members there are several for whom I have a strong personal regard, and some in whose judgement and firmness I hope I may put confidence. . . .

‘ I am at times in many minds. . . . But probably it is my duty to accept—if the offer comes, and comes in such a shape that I can entertain it—and to do my best by the Government. I feel as strongly as you can that the present time is a critical one, and that some risks may and ought to be run. . . .’

Lord Salisbury wrote :

Hatfield House,
Hatfield,
Herts.

10th February, 1874.

MY DEAR CARNARVON,

I am sure you cannot wish more earnestly than I do that our political association may in no degree be weakened. . . .

I heard last night from Heathcote, who takes your view strongly. His opposition comes down upon me like a sledgehammer, after yours. The Liberal papers too, take the same view ; so that I am quite alone. I feel in despair—for I know it is unwise, and hardly right, to act on so perfectly isolated an opinion. I can only hope that D.’s arrogance may stand my friend—and that he may either not make the offer—or make it in such a way that we must refuse. But I cannot resist the feeling that I am tied hand and foot and that no good can come of what I am doing. I wish Party Government was at the bottom of the sea. It is only insincerity codified.

Yours very truly,
SALISBURY.

¹ To the Duke of Northumberland, 13th February, 1874.

There was no hesitation in Sir William Heathcote's mind as to the course they should both adopt. Salisbury had written to him: "You and Carnarvon are the only two persons for whose political judgement I care." He then goes at some length into his own grounds for great disinclination to the course which you and I have indicated, and I think that if either of us had agreed with him, and so neutralized the other, he would not have given way. . . .'¹

On the 15th February Lord Salisbury wrote :

'Lady Derby sent for me yesterday—on D.'s behalf. Her object was to ask, previous to any negotiation, whether I should refuse any offer that was made, or not. Heathcote had been with me for an hour in the morning, so I was in a meek frame of mind : and replied that it must depend on the policy they proposed to pursue. I afterwards saw Derby, and questioned him. He was perfectly clear on every subject, except legislation against the Ritualists. But he could hardly get himself to listen to me on that subject—being anxious to go off to "a subject of real importance", viz. the income-tax. This religious point I reserved to ask his chief upon : but otherwise I professed myself satisfied.

'The more I look at it, the less I like it : but every other alternative seems worse. . . .'

On the 17th February Mr. Disraeli, having obtained a majority of fifty over Liberals and Home Rulers combined, received the Queen's commands to form a Government. The following day Lord Carnarvon, who was at Bretby, received a telegram from the new Prime Minister asking him to go and see him.

Meanwhile Lord Salisbury, yielding to the pressure of his friends, had accepted office. 'Yesterday afternoon', he wrote to Lord Carnarvon,² 'D. sent to ask me to come to him, which I did. I pressed the point

¹ Sir William Heathcote to Lord Carnarvon, 11th February, 1874.

² 18th February, 1874.

as to any Bill for sharpening discipline against a party in the Church. As far as words went, he was all that could be desired on this subject, and on the maintenance of the Church of England as it is, professed himself generally a High Churchman, regretted secessions, thought that legislation would be insanity, intended to exercise his patronage so as to represent all parties in the Church, without favouring extremes of any. Valeat quantum. . . .’

To Lord Carnarvon calling at Whitehall Gardens, Mr. Disraeli was both friendly and frank. He described the composition of the Cabinet, which he said he desired to reduce to much smaller numbers. Speaking of legislation, Lord Carnarvon alluded to the possibility of some aggressive measure against the Ritualists being urged, and said, that although he had no sympathy with them, he should object to legislation directed against them, and he trusted that Mr. Disraeli would not sanction it. Mr. Disraeli entirely assented, and added that some private bills on such subjects must be treated as ‘open questions’. He desired that all Church appointments should be shared by the several parties within the Church—those parties being within certain limits.

Two days later Lord Carnarvon kissed hands as Colonial Minister in a little room at Windsor only just large enough to hold Her Majesty and her new confidential servants.

His return to Office elicited congratulations from friends and opponents alike. ‘You are sacrificing inclination to public duty in joining Disraeli at all,’ wrote Sir William Heathcote,¹ ‘Salisbury even more than you, inasmuch as his repugnance is greater and his hopes of good less than yours.’

¹ 19th February, 1874.

Lady Derby did her best to reassure him. Disraeli, she said, was entirely altered, cautious, averse from innovation, and free from any personal grudge. There was no chance of any 'mine'.

'Although I am not insensible of or indifferent to the crushing defeat which my party has sustained,' wrote Mr. Mundella,¹ 'I can assure you of my sincere satisfaction at your return to the Colonial Office. I so fully share your views on Colonial affairs. I am so satisfied that your administration will tend to bind the Colonies closer to the Mother Country, and to the maintenance of the unity and greatness of the Empire, that I cannot refrain from congratulating you and the country on your accession to your old place in the Government. . . .

'I hope it will not be forgotten that our dear Auberon and his allies have had no small share (unintentional no doubt) in the restoration of yourself and colleagues.'

Mr. Lowe was happy to think that he had by those economies which had made him 'hateful to God and men'² contributed to the amenities of the position of the new Government.

For the first time, indeed for many years, the prospects of the Conservative Party appeared once more brilliant, or at least full of hope, supported as it was by a majority of fifty in the House of Commons, commanding a large surplus in the National Exchequer, and confronted with a disorganized and discredited Opposition.

Lord Carnarvon was the first Secretary of State for the Colonies to use the present Colonial Office, of which he took possession on the 17th January, 1876. 'My room is simply vast,' he wrote, 'and it requires time to see

¹ 21st February, 1874.

² Mr. Lowe to Lord Carnarvon, 19th February, 1874.

who is walking across it.' It was not, however, without a struggle that the Colonial Office came into its own. The War Office cast covetous eyes upon the spacious building, and he had to invoke the original intention of Parliament and the Act, under which the new buildings had been specially planned and arranged, with all their subordinate accessories—the new office of the Colonial Agents placed close by it, and the adjoining Foreign Office—in order to keep it for the use of his own Department.

The permanent head of that Office, Robert Herbert, was the only son of Lord Carnarvon's great uncle Algernon, but his own exact contemporary at Eton, where the two boys constantly sat next to each other in school; and later at Oxford, where he became a Fellow of All Souls. He was afterwards appointed Secretary to Gladstone. He had served an unusual apprenticeship as Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary in the young Colony of Queensland,¹ and was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office by Lord Granville.

Although the work at the Colonial Office absorbed the greater part of Lord Carnarvon's time, county administration was not neglected, and he presented at Quarter Sessions² the county scheme of police reorganization, to which he had devoted much time and thought. It was a great revolution in the organization of the force, and although it entailed a large increase of expenditure, which caused some opposition, the scheme was warmly supported by Sir William Heathcote and triumphantly carried by a large majority.

¹ Sir George Bowen, 16th January, 1861, wrote: 'As my Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary, Herbert led the Assembly with equal ability and with far greater tact, good sense, and success than his former Chief, Gladstone, ever led the House of Commons. Apropos, who shall dare to say that University reform has not borne fruit at Oxford, when we see a young *Fellow of All Souls* "wielding at will the fierce democratie" of an Australian Parliament?'

² 6th April, 1874.

Some days later ¹ he was at Osborne, where he found the Queen 'in better spirits and more animated than I ever saw her'. She asked much after his mother; and she reminded him that she had first known him when he was quite a child and she was the Princess Victoria, and finally went into fits of laughter over the story of Lady Chesterfield's supposed marriage with Disraeli.

During the first months there were few large questions before the Cabinet, but the Departments were busy, and the South African troubles were already a cloud on the horizon. 'I am anxious', wrote Lord Carnarvon,² 'as to this South African difficulty between the Transvaal Republic and the Batlapin tribes. It looks very awkward, and may easily grow into a very serious difficulty.' Mr. Disraeli's health, always an important factor, was satisfactory. He dined with Lord and Lady Carnarvon on the 10th May. 'I never knew him more agreeable or full of conversation and anecdote. The look of languor and lassitude so common to him was gone and he looked ten or twelve years younger.'

But by the middle of June Mr. Disraeli was again attacked by gout, and his colleagues anxiously discussed the possibilities of carrying on the Government in the event of his failing.

The legislation on Church matters which Lord Carnarvon and Lord Salisbury had deprecated when they took Office was already agitating the Cabinet. The two Primates, Tait of Canterbury and Thomson of York, wished to bring in a Bill for restraining those frequent innovations or irregularities in the services of the Church with which the Ritual Commission, described in an

¹ 16thth April, 1874.

² 20th April, 1874.

earlier chapter, had already attempted to deal. To this proposal the whole Cabinet, except Lord Derby, was at first opposed, until it had been thoroughly discussed in Convocation.

Religious susceptibilities were also involved in Sir Stafford Northcote's Bill to amend the Endowed Schools Act of 1869.¹ This Act had affected some three thousand schools, with a total income of £59,000, and was regarded by the Liberals as one of the best measures passed by Mr. Gladstone's Government. Lord Carnarvon had criticized the Bill in 1869, and Lord Salisbury had attacked it with some vehemence. The Government now proposed to transfer the administration of the schools from the Endowed Schools Commission to the Charity Commissioners, and to add some clauses drafted to secure the Church character of a school whenever the trust deeds recognized the authority of the Bishop, or desired that the services attended by the scholars should be those of the Church of England, or made similar references to the National Church.

The Bill was vehemently opposed in the Commons by Mr. Forster, who pointed out that of 1,082 existing grammar schools, thirty-five had been founded before the Reformation, which had made radical changes in the earlier doctrines of the Church of England; and forty-four during the Commonwealth, when those doctrines had been again altered for a time by the Puritans; and that the reasoning which had led to the abolition of University Tests applied with equal force to Primary and Secondary Education. Mr. Gladstone followed with the argument

¹ An Endowed Schools Bill had been introduced into the House of Commons in 1859; but it was not 'received with any great favour', Lord Carnarvon said, when opposing a similar Bill introduced into the House of Lords in 1860. The Bill of 1860 desired to permit any person, whatever his religious faith might be, to be a trustee of any endowment for educational purposes, unless otherwise expressed in the will or deed of endowment.

that 'the Church had no title to endowments created between the years 1530 and 1660, when no man could *live* outside her pale', and Robert Lowe urged that the immediate reversal by a new Cabinet of an important measure passed by its predecessor was opposed to Constitutional practice and to expediency.

In the Cabinet, too, the Bill gave rise to acute divisions of opinion. The second reading had passed in the Commons with a majority of 82, but only upon the omission of the 'foundation clauses' to which the Non-conformists objected. Disraeli accordingly decided to drop these clauses and to confine the measure to the substitution of the 'Charity' for the 'Endowed Schools' Commissioners—a surrender distasteful to zealous champions of religious education.¹

A Cabinet meeting was called on Monday, the 20th July, to discuss the Bill, for which Lord Carnarvon returned from Highclere, after 'Sunday, a divine day, a large part of which I have spent inhaling the perfume-laden air under the limes to the murmurous music of thousands of bees overhead'.

The Ministers were divided on a proposal to throw open the governing bodies to Dissenters, but finally the Cabinet agreed on a compromise.

'It was a curious but not satisfactory Cabinet. We carried the clause though we were a small minority, Salisbury—myself—Hardy—and J. Manners. There were signs of concert and combination and pre-arrangement—and Disraeli showed all that curious desire of going with the House of Commons and of manipulating them which has always distinguished him.'

The week-end was passed at Highclere, but Lord Salisbury wrote ² that having been much pressed to agree to drop the debated clauses, he anticipated 'hot water'

¹ 24th June, 1874.

² 24th July, 1874.

in the forthcoming Cabinet. He preferred himself to drop the Bill altogether, and asked for an immediate answer. Lord Carnarvon agreed.¹

‘Any change of purpose will lead to difficulty, but perhaps, as I telegraphed to you, dropping the Bill is on the whole the least objectionable . . . the interval of six months will give us time to consider it by the light of the last fortnight’s discussion, and will show what the country clergy think of it. They seem now to think only of the Archbishops’ Bill. . . .’²

Next day Lord Salisbury reported to his friend a ‘very unpleasant Cabinet’. He had been absolutely beaten on all points, and he felt himself in a very disagreeable position, though it was too small a matter on which to resign. To this Lord Carnarvon assented. Resignation ‘would not be understood—it would not be recognized as a matter of principle . . . and it would make the position subsequently even more hopelessly impossible than a refusal of all office originally would have made it. . . .’

The Prime Minister himself wrote to Lady Chesterfield, who was at Highclere, that the Cabinet was ‘a most critical one’, and he was very sorry for Lord Carnarvon’s absence, though he hoped all would go well.

The Public Worship Bill had in the meantime approached its critical stages. The intention of the measure, as described by the Bishop of Peterborough to Lord Carnarvon, was to leave things indifferent to the discretion of ministers, and to restrain or sanction action pronounced illegal, by giving the bishops and the Council coercive and dispensive powers. The difficulty was in defining what was illegal, and in providing a satisfactory tribunal.

The Bill proposed that a rural dean, archdeacon, or

¹ 24th July, 1874.

² Public Worship Bill.

any parishioner should have a right to complain of any ceremonial irregularity on the part of any beneficed clergyman, that the complaint should be heard by the bishop of the diocese, and that if the latter and a Board of Assessors declared the clergyman's action to be irregular, the practice complained of should forthwith be discontinued.

The Cabinet was divided. Lord Salisbury urged that the measure should be considered an open question, and Mr. Disraeli, who was then not much interested personally, wisely pressed his colleagues to come to an agreement among themselves. Subsequently a working compromise was arranged by the Prime Minister between the High and Low Church parties. Mr. Disraeli considered it 'the greatest thing he had ever done'.

The Bill passed the Lords without difficulty. In the Commons¹ it met with a different fate. Here it was at once confronted by the severe and expert criticisms of Mr. Gladstone, who, after his defeat at the polls, had withdrawn like Achilles to his tent, and now emerged, as depicted by *Punch*, to plunge into the ecclesiastical controversies so congenial to his disposition.

Disraeli now threw aside all appearance of neutrality, and at a Cabinet on the 11th July described the feeling of the House as passionate for the Bill. The Queen was also strongly Protestant, and urged the Prime Minister vigorously to support the measure. Accordingly Disraeli—whose utterances on religious topics, like his 'ape and angel' speech about Darwinism at Oxford, were not his happiest oratorical performances—proclaimed and applauded the putting down of 'Ritualism' as the object of the Bill, attacked auricular confession and prayers offered to the Virgin, and urged the House to rally to

¹ Second Reading and Mr. Gladstone's six Resolutions, 9th July, 1874.

the platform of the Reformation. As if this were not sufficiently offensive to the High Church party, he irritated his own colleagues and supporters in its ranks by an ill-conceived pun upon Mass and Masquerade. And he finally declared he would oppose Mr. Gladstone's resolutions, although his own colleague, Hardy, had supported them.

Lord Carnarvon wrote ¹ to Lord Salisbury to ask what he thought of the speech.

'He describes the Bill as a measure for putting down Ritualism, and defines Ritualism somewhat unfairly—and he seems to pledge Government support to the Bill passing—which is in excess of what was understood : but he also speaks only for himself. It may be replied that a Prime Minister cannot speak for himself ; yet it is hard to deny him the right which we all claim and take. He has certainly declared himself in sympathy with the House of Commons ; and there is no doubt that the feeling of the House is simply overwhelming. . . .'

Mr. Gladstone's resolutions were withdrawn, the second reading was carried without a division, and the only amendment of importance inserted by the House of Commons was a clause sanctioning an appeal from the decision of the bishop to the archbishop of the province.

Lord Carnarvon discussed this in the House of Lords on the 4th August.

When the Bill was first introduced, the proposed judicial power was to be vested in the bishops. The House had disagreed, he thought rightly, from that proposal, and a purely episcopal tribunal was converted into a lay tribunal, though a certain discretion had been left in the hands of the bishops, which he thought was due as much to their office as to the natural fitness of things.

¹ 16th July, 1874.

The amendments appeared to have practically taken away the discretion from the bishops and transferred it to the archbishop of the province. It placed the bishop in a position altogether novel, altogether unsatisfactory as regarded his diocese, and almost personally degrading to himself. That was his first objection. His second was that he could not understand the appropriateness of the change. The bishop's intimate and familiar knowledge of his diocese must be greater than that of any other person, and certainly greater than that of the archbishop, and yet they assumed that the archbishop, who knew nothing about the diocese, was likely to exercise the powers with greater discretion. The Bill as it had been returned to them seemed to him to encourage that which it was the object of all reasonable men of every party to avoid—namely, the tendency to litigation.

The debate was a heated one, and ended somewhat unexpectedly by a rejection of the Commons' amendment by twelve votes, including nine bishops'. Two High Church Prelates, Wilberforce of Winchester and Wordsworth of Lincoln, attacked it with peculiar vigour, the former exclaiming that if episcopal authority were not of divine institution, he would trample his own sacred robes underfoot; whilst the latter accused the Government of attempting to set up a Pope at Canterbury and an Anti-Pope at York. The event of the day, however, was the indignant attack of Lord Salisbury on the Bill which his Chief had just defended, and his incisive denunciation of the bluster of 'the majority in another place'.

Sensitive to any hint of dictation, Lord Salisbury always disliked 'going back again at the first prod'¹

¹ Lord Salisbury to Lord Carnarvon, 14th October, 1874.

of the House of Commons, but Lord Carnarvon regretted the extreme warmth of the speech, and after the debate was over he urged his friend to prune down the strength of his expressions. Scarcely had they parted when Lord Salisbury wrote to him :

‘ To show you how much I have improved in style under your teaching, I enclose my reply to a strange note just received from D. What impertinence he has been saying about me I can’t conceive.’

Lord Salisbury’s caustic words as reported in the House of Commons had had an electrical effect on the Prime Minister, who made an even more combative reply. Lord Salisbury, Disraeli told the Commons, was ‘ a great master of flouts and gibes and jeers ’,¹ but it was to be hoped that his hearers would not fall into the trap laid for them, and would remember some of the noble lord’s manœuvres when he was a simple member of their House.

Lord Salisbury’s conciliatory answer was written before he saw Mr. Disraeli’s speech, and a perusal of the morning’s paper put the matter in a much more serious light. ‘ Nothing ’, wrote Lord Carnarvon, ‘ can be worse or more offensive than Disraeli’s speech on Salisbury. Not one expression, but a succession of sentences each worse than its predecessor. Salisbury came to me and talked matters over and settled to make an explanation in the House which he did and with complete success.’

The other Ministers were disturbed. Sir Stafford Northcote, alarmed at the possible consequences, had, he told Lord Carnarvon,² persuaded the Prime Minister to write his apologetic letter.

‘ I thought it best, though you had sworn me to secrecy, to tell Disraeli that I had heard that Salisbury was annoyed at what

¹ *Disraeli*, vol. v, p. 327.

² 12th August, 1874.

passed in the Cabinet about the Endowed Schools Bill. He was much surprised, as he could not have thought that his words would have been so taken ; but I hope he will be more cautious in future. I impressed on him that he was on no account to take any notice of what I had told him ; but I thought it best to do so, as he would see the greater necessity for obviating any bad effect of his second offence, as to which also he seemed to be very unconscious.'

Disraeli was, however, scarcely less angry with Lord Carnarvon, who, he wrote, 'not only voted against the Archbishops, the Ld. Chanr. and D. of Richmond, but spoke against them ; and did as much harm as Salisbury: more they say.'¹ But he showed his vexation in a different manner.

The cession of Fiji was imminent and a Cabinet was required to make the final decision. At the last moment a curt note from Mr. Corry informed Lord Carnarvon that it had been put off indefinitely. He protested vigorously and decisively to Mr. Disraeli, and asked that the settlement of the question should be left in his hands. A 'very civil and sphinx-like epistle' was the answer:²

Longleat.

DEAR CARNARVON,

Your letter just arrived : fortunately I have a messenger here, who departs in half an hour.

It was most unlucky that we were obliged to put off the Cabinet—but it was your vote, and perhaps speech, that occasioned that, for if I had not worked from the moment I rose till noon, the Commons would have rebelled. As it was, I had never seen the newspapers, and, of course, took it for granted that Harcourt was strictly accurate in his quotation of Lord Salisbury's speech, particularly as Cairns had complained to me the night before of S.'s violent speech. It was a mess—but Salisbury has behaved like a gentleman, and I earnestly trust that we shall all manage to keep

¹ Mr. Disraeli to Anne, Lady Chesterfield, 5th August, 1874. *Disraeli*, vol. v, p. 326.

² 8th August, 1874.

together. No effort, for the object, will be spared on my side. I think we have seen our worst difficulties.

With regard to your point. . . . All our friends in the House of Commons were much opposed to it, and the tone of the Fiji debate in the House of Commons was of a character to make them cautious, as no doubt we shall have some future fights on the matter. However, I must leave the matter entirely to your discretion. There is none of my colleagues in whom I have more confidence than yourself, and I always say that your administration of your office is most able. I believe too, that is the public opinion.

The ink here is like mud, and the pens plucked from a goose on the common—but I hope you will make this out.

Yours sincerely,

D.

Lord Carnarvon, in acknowledging the letter, earnestly hoped that there might be a thorough and loyal understanding among the individual members of a Cabinet 'amongst whom there ought, I think, to be unusually few causes of disagreement in essentials'. He sent on the Prime Minister's letter to Lord Salisbury, on the 10th August.

' . . . It is very difficult to know exactly what he means. The more that I see of him the more sphinx-like I think him ; but on the whole I am disposed to believe that my first notion was correct in the main, and that he spoke under the effect of ill-temper (which was very evident as I had told you on the previous night), some physical ailment, or discomposure, and great fear that the Bill might be lost. . . . '

Lord Salisbury replied :¹ ' The letter is very curious. . . . D.'s impassibility I have always looked upon as a myth. He is in no sense a sensitive man : but he is far from imperturbable. On the contrary, when he is beaten, or in danger of being beaten, his temper gives

¹ 14th August, 1874.

way entirely. . . . D. evidently thinks he has made a great blunder, and dreads lest it should create trouble. But to the outside world I think he has generally given the impression that he wishes to get rid of me.

‘ This matter only shows that we must treat D.’s gout as an element in our calculations. . . . ’

Six months previously, when the friends had consented with so many misgivings to take Office, their chief anxiety had been with regard to ecclesiastical legislation. Already the Church questions were giving much trouble, and Lord Carnarvon thought they might even break up the Government.

One effect of the divisions in the Cabinet on the Public Worship Bill was certainly a temporary estrangement between the members holding opposite views on Church matters, and although it apparently passed into oblivion, to some extent it reacted upon their opinion with regard to the Eastern Question. There was no reason to doubt Disraeli’s sincerity when in February, 1874, he assured Lord Carnarvon that he might be satisfied that the Government would undertake no legislation against any party in the Church, and he had subsequently plunged into the complex ecclesiastical controversy without any deep or real interest in it ; but the dislike of the High Church party, and the Protestant feeling in the House of Commons, had led him to support the measure with unrestrained zeal. His anger at opposition was correspondingly strong, and was in 1876 re-aroused when the sympathies felt by High Churchmen for the oppressed Christians of the Ottoman Empire, obstructed the Turcophile measures on which he was bent. The battle over the Public Worship Bill was thus in a sense the prelude to the graver and more far-reaching conflict about

Turkey; and when Disraeli arrogantly hoped that he had heard the last of 'Bathism, Lyddonism [*sic*] really Gladstonism',¹ and when he later reminded the Queen, during the secret negotiations he undertook with foreign Powers, that the Public Worship Bill showed what a Sovereign and her Minister, acting together, could do,² the reference was plain.

II

August was spent at Highclere. There was Mr. Froude, on the wing for the Cape and Australia, the Dean of Westminster, and Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, the latter with plans for Imperial Defence and for strengthening our relations with the Australian Colonies, for which he thought the time, and the fact that Lord Carnarvon was at the Colonial Office, most favourable. There were Mr. Delanè, Mr. Borthwick, and Mr. Vernon Harcourt, who made no secret of his liking for Dizzy and his wish that he could exchange leaders and act with him. And finally Auberon Herbert and his wife arrived in their usual unconventional manner.

'Auberon and Dolly came in most singular guise in a pony carriage with a very pretty Arab white horse and a dog—but with nothing else—dusty, sunburned, altogether very rural. . . . Both of them looked well. Auberon is undergoing a new phase of thought, and talks mainly of table-turning and spiritualism, and he condemns the "philosophers" for their unphilosophical way of treating the subject.'³

¹ Lord Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 24th March, 1877. *Disraeli*, vol. vi, p. 129.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207, 27th February, 1877.

³ Auberon persuaded Lord Carnarvon to attend a séance at Mrs. Guppy's. 'What I saw did not impress me. It gives me all the impressions of imposture. . . . I was however invited to ask for anything I liked, and I called for a piebald rabbit—a volume of Dante and Romulus' collar but could get none of my requests. . . .' 26th April, 1876.

Later on in the autumn, when he joined Lady Carnarvon at Bretby, he found Mr. Disraeli better, but looking very ill. He seemed pleased to see Lord Carnarvon and began to talk of what should be done in November. It was no use merely to ask each other how they had spent the holidays. Views as to legislation were required.

‘I expected something serious and large after this, and remembered the hints as to reform in ’67: but he proceeded to say that Cross, in whom he had great confidence, had promised to consider some scheme as to dwellings for the working classes—that he had not asked him what his plan was, but that he believed that he was maturing it. And there he stopped, adding I think something as to sanitary reforms. He went on however to the Judicature Bill, reminding me that he had always disliked the removal of the power from the H. of Lords; and saying there would be no real opposition from Cairns on the subject. . . .

‘Something was then said as to the Religious Worship Act; and I said that it would not come into operation till July and that then no one could say without further experience how it would work. To this he assented—and he gave me the impression that he did not contemplate any movement in this direction. I told him that the clergy were still sore, to which he also assented.’

They had much conversation on Colonial subjects, and Lord Carnarvon broached his ideas of a fusion of the St. Michael and St. George in the Order of the Bath. Mr. Disraeli agreed to it, and said it ought to have been done when the St. Michael and St. George was revived; but that it would need consideration and care and should be dealt with as a whole.¹

Lord Carnarvon also explained his notions of a scheme of joint Colonial Defence, Military and Naval, into which

¹ The amalgamation did not take place, but Lord Carnarvon reconstituted the Order of St. Michael and St. George, and recommended that there should be an Official Prelate. Bishop Selwyn, the missionary bishop, was the first appointed (24th July, 1878). *St. Michael and St. George*, p. 177.

Mr. Disraeli entered very warmly and promised his heartiest support. 'He said that he wanted to send the "bearskin" back again to Canada to reassert the visible sovereignty of the Empire.' Their intercourse was cordial and very satisfactory. The Prime Minister, however, was visibly shaken in health, and Lord Carnarvon was distressed to see his depression and feebleness. He gave him his arm to go to his room and begged him not to hesitate to give himself and all of them the satisfaction of a second medical opinion. Lord Carnarvon's own opinion of him was raised by these intimate conversations.

'I have I think seen more of Disraeli and got a juster appreciation of him than ever before. There is no doubt as to his genius—and his breadth of view. He detests details and always looks to the principle or rather the *idea* of any question. He is in fact unable to deal with details. He does no work. For many days past he has not put pen to paper. M. Corry¹ is in fact Prime Minister and on the whole does not manage amiss or abuse much his power. He is in private life amiable.'

On his return to London he wrote to Lord Salisbury: ²

'If he [Disraeli] is left to himself nothing can be better or more reassuring than his frame of mind. He does not desire any ecclesiastical legislation, and I am inclined to believe all that he has said to me. Indeed, my fear is that his health may not last—for he has had a very severe shock, and is by no means strong. J. Manners sent him a long drive over the Scotch hills in an open carriage in cold weather; the Queen then put him into draughts, and by open windows in icy cold rooms; Jenner then ordered him champagne which brought on the gout, and he in order to remedy this on his own judgement gave himself heavy doses of colchicum, all of which combined nearly killed him!'

Shortly afterwards the news of two important colonial transactions, the unconditional cession of Fiji, and the

¹ Montagu Corry, later Lord Rowton.

² 4th October, 1874.

abolition of slavery on the Gold Coast, were communicated to the Prime Minister. Mr. Disraeli's acknowledgement of the receipt of the Slavery despatches is very characteristic.

Hughenden Manor,
26th October, 1874.

DEAR CARNARVON,

I have read your despatch of the 21st August with the utmost satisfaction. It is a masterly, indeed admirable, performance, and will reflect great credit on Her Majesty's Government. Your whole conduct of your office cannot be too highly praised.

I only hope, and willingly believe, that you have men on the spot, to carry out your policy, worthy of their Chief. . . .

Yours sincerely,
D.

November saw the Government back in London. Cabinets began again, but Mr. Disraeli could not shake off his illness or his depression, and seemed scarcely able to get through his speech on Lord Mayor's Day,¹ though 'there were occasional brilliant and characteristic flashes of his old wit'. It was very different from the speech he made earlier in the year at the Academy dinner, when Lord Carnarvon wrote, 'The speaking was very poor with the exception of Disraeli's speech, which was a curious and highly wrought specimen of fine art—mosaic in its structure and pervaded by a dry humour and cultivation of thought—altogether a remarkable effort'.

All through the remainder of the autumn the gravest misgivings were felt as to the Prime Minister's health. Though he could talk admirably on every literary subject, he seemed incapable of decision. Everything which seemed troublesome was put aside. The old courage, nerve, and promptitude were things of the past. Lord

¹ 9th November, 1874.

Carnarvon became seriously uneasy about him, and wrote to Mr. Corry to advise him to come to Town. 'I am very sorry for D., alone—untended—uncared for in the midst of all his external power and fancied prosperity. . . . I sometimes doubt whether we are not on the immediate verge of great changes.' His colleagues in the Cabinet began to discuss the succession and the prevalent opinion pointed to Lord Derby.

III

In December, after his installation as Pro Grand Master at Grand Lodge, Lord Carnarvon left for Pixton, where his mother and his children were staying.

18th December. 'We shot Upton and had an excellent day's sport. It is the prettiest beat to my mind in all the south of England with its lovely scenery and its wild game. Every pheasant shot here is worth a dozen or half a hundred of the tame barndoor fowls that are massacred elsewhere. . . . I leave my mother and the chicks well, and it has been a very great pleasure to me to see them so happy and doing so well. After all, they contribute the chief happiness of life.'

But it was the last bit of quiet happiness. On the 30th December Lady Carnarvon gave birth to a daughter, both Mother and child seemed well, and for some days the progress made was satisfactory. But a set-back took place, and the New Year opened in great anxiety. On the 9th January, however, there was apparently a real change for the better; the Queen, whose inquiries had been constant, expressed her desire to be Godmother to the baby,¹ and all seemed to be going well. But the improvement did not last; and after a time of intense

¹ Victoria Alexandrina Mary Cecil Herbert.

anxiety, and alternating hopes and fears, Lady Carnarvon's strength gave way, and she died on the 25th January.

It was a shattering blow ; the sudden ending of the happy companionship of thirteen years, and the loss of one so singularly gifted, seemed to bring life to a standstill. Lord Carnarvon was left with four young children, the eldest of whom was only ten years old.

The funeral took place at Highclere, and for a time Lord Carnarvon was unable to resume his official work ; but urged by his colleagues and feeling the necessity of unremitting occupation, he left Highclere and returned to his Office in February.

CHAPTER XXI

GOVERNMENT MEASURES

1875-1876

I

THE foreign relations of England, since the overthrow of the second French Empire, had entered upon a new and somewhat difficult phase. Germany had begun to view with anxiety the rapid recovery of France, and Prince Bismarck was considering the expediency of arresting it by a fresh blow which should fell her to the ground. His relations with Russia were of a peculiarly cordial character. He had assisted her in the Polish question, and had been rewarded by her acquiescence in the spoliation of Denmark, and by her friendly neutrality during the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-German Wars. He had evinced his gratitude for these marks of friendship by warmly supporting her denunciation of those clauses in the Treaty of Paris which forbade her to maintain a Black Sea fleet, a denunciation which annulled an important security won by the Crimean War, but which Mr. Gladstone's Government was unable to oppose.

An alarming impression was accordingly produced throughout Europe early in 1875 by the language of the inspired German press, which appeared to suggest that the Chancellor was bent on a fresh war. Attacks on the threatening character of French armaments appeared

in the *Cologne Gazette* and *Berlin Post*, the latter ending with the ominous words, 'Is war in sight?' and it was announced that the German Emperor's intended visit to the King of Italy had been suddenly cancelled.

France appealed to Russia and England, and on the 4th May Blowitz, the Paris correspondent of *The Times*, at the instigation of the French Government, exposed the facts in an article in that paper.

The Cabinet met on the 8th May, and agreed on a telegram to Lord Odo Russell, desiring him to give the Emperor of Russia strong support in pressing peace upon the Emperor of Germany and offering co-operation with Austria and Italy, at the same time affirming that France did not desire war.

The next day, Sunday, the 9th May, the Queen expressed her desire to Lord Carnarvon, who was on a visit to Windsor, to supplement the telegram to Lord Odo Russell by a personal letter from herself to the Emperor Alexander. Lord Carnarvon doubted whether the Foreign Secretary would be favourable to this course, but as the letter was to be a personal one and deal with family subjects, he wrote at the Queen's desire to Mr. Disraeli :

'I have just seen the Queen, who has desired me to detain the messenger in order to write to you in reference to the telegram agreed upon yesterday by the Cabinet. The Queen entirely concurs, I think, in the terms of that telegram in its general purport, but she thinks that a private letter from herself to the Emperor of Russia in the same sense would confirm it, would do no harm and might produce good. The form that the letter would take would be one referring at first sight to family matters, and then expressing her great hope that the Emperor would further the general cause of peace.

'The Queen is strongly impressed with the belief that such a course is both right and expedient at the present moment, and

she will have the letter ready to-morrow, if you will arrange with Derby for a Foreign Office messenger to take it. She apprehends that neither you nor Derby will see any objection to such a communication, which will be personal in its character : but I understand that she would be glad of a telegram from you to-morrow expressive of your and Derby's concurrence, and probably announcing the time when the messenger should come.'

The intimation discreetly conveyed by the Queen to her representative in Germany and to the Czar, accompanied with a reassuring promise of support given by the latter to the French Ambassador and military attaché at St. Petersburg, obliged Bismarck to hold his hand and constituted a successful exertion of British influence on behalf of European peace and order, which, without being proclaimed from the house-tops, was speedily made known to all the chancelleries and redounded on the whole to the credit and prestige of the new Tory rulers of England.

A pleasant visit with the children and some good talks with Mr. Gladstone at Hatfield, a yachting holiday (his new yacht *The Alruna* was reported to be nearly perfect), a turn of ministerial attendance at Balmoral—these were incidents in a spring and summer mainly devoted to official business.

Stopping at Knowsley on his way south, he warned Lord Derby of the serious error into which the Admiralty had fallen in issuing a circular on Fugitive Slaves which was certain to run counter to the passionate anti-slavery feeling of the country.

The circular attempted to lay down the rules to be observed by naval officers towards fugitive slaves in the ports or other waters of countries where domestic slavery was a recognized legal institution. The gist of it was that the fugitive slave must not be allowed to remain on board

a British ship in territorial waters when once his servile status had been proved to the satisfaction of the officer in command ; that if discovered in the high seas, he should, on return to the territory from which he originally escaped, or by entry into its territorial waters, be surrendered on demand being made and supported by proof ; and finally that where the slave was the subject of a State ' in partial freedom ', the Commanding Officer was to hold an inquiry under the treaty and protect or not protect the fugitive accordingly.

It should have been obvious to any person acquainted with the state of English opinion respecting slavery, which had grown up during a period of nearly forty years, that these instructions would arouse a widespread feeling of disapproval in religious and philanthropic circles, and that their issue, and especially their publication, was a blunder.

Nine Englishmen out of ten were unacquainted with the humane mitigations which the Mahommedan Law in legalizing slavery had introduced into the treatment and general condition of the slave ; but nearly every educated Englishman was aware that the supply of slaves as labourers to the clove plantations of Zanzibar, or as guardians of white Circassian slave girls in the harems of Cairo and Stamboul, was carried on in the interior of Africa by a race of detestable Arab, or rather Mulatto raiders and traders, whose operations were often attended with horrible cruelty ; and, moreover, that in many savage negro kingdoms, slaves furnished a large proportion of the victims habitually slaughtered in human sacrifices on the tombs of native chiefs.

The Foreign Office and the Admiralty appear to have accepted as decisive the ruling of the Law Officers and of the Government of India. On the 30th April a com-

munication was received from the Foreign Office in accordance with which fresh instructions were issued by the Admiralty.¹ These drew a distinction between three hypothetical cases (1) where such slaves boarded a ship in harbour or other territorial waters in order to escape either cruelty or lawful punishment, (2) where the ship was on the high seas and the slave, if not taken on board, might lose his life, (3) where a slave claimed protection on the ground of detention contrary to a treaty concluded by Great Britain with his master's country. In (1) he was not to be allowed to remain on board, once his servile status had been established. In (2) he was to be retained on board, subject to restitution to his master, provided, or until, the ship reached a port in the latter's country. In (3) he might appeal to the terms of the Frere Treaty, and his claim was then to be examined and settled on the spot.

The Admiralty instructions gave great offence. They were violently attacked in the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Saturday Review*, and on the 3rd October, Lord Carnarvon, in discussing them with Northcote, declared that whether or not they were sound in law, they were altogether wrong in policy. He and Northcote accordingly addressed letters to Disraeli, urging him to call a Cabinet meeting with a view to their revision.

'I fear that we shall have some trouble with the "slavery regulations" recently issued by the Admiralty. Any hesitation on our part would I think lead to agitation and I believe that there is no question on which a stronger public feeling may be called up than on the idea that the policy of the country—apart from the law of the matter—is modified in a sense adverse to liberty. I had hoped that by this time the Admiralty would have put forth some

¹ Admiralty Circular, No. 38, 31st July, 1875.

statement of a reassuring kind. This has not been done. I see that meetings are being held, memorials agreed to, and articles written and I fear that unless speedy and effectual measures are taken we shall find ourselves in a position where it will be almost equally damaging to stand still or to retract.

‘ Unless you can yourself deal at once and completely with the question (which is perhaps difficult) I cannot but think that it would be very desirable that we should have a meeting of those of the Cabinet who are in the South of England and can attend, to consider without loss of time what should be done. No official notification of such a meeting need appear in the papers. . . .’¹

His intervention was only just in time.

Lady Derby wrote : ²

DEAR LORD CARNARVON,

I want you to have the satisfaction of knowing that your energy in stirring up the Prime Minister and the Ch. of the Ex. has saved the Govt. from a great deal of very damaging criticism. Had you not moved, the announcement of the suspension of the Admiralty’s circular would not have been made either at Middlesborough or at Liverpool, and it was not until after the vehement feeling which the announcement elicited on Friday night that the F. O. became fully aware of the unusual excitement in the country.

I thought often that evening of our conversation—we had been for ten days within seven miles of Liverpool, and had not had the slightest idea of what was in everybody’s mouth. . . .

Yours affly.

M. DERBY.

From the point of view of national institutions, the line taken by the circular was correct.³ Lord Carnarvon,

¹ 3rd October, 1875.

² 9th October, 1875.

³ Chief Justice Best in *Forbes v. Cochrane* had implied and Lord Stowell had laid down that a slave who had become free by touching British territory would yet revert to his servile character on returning to the State in which he had been a slave.

however, insisted on the necessity of modifying the latest edition of the Slave Circular.¹ He had the satisfaction of carrying his point, and persuading the Lord Chancellor to propose the withdrawal of all the earlier instructions, substituting for them new ones.

But after reading the revised Slave Circular on the 5th February, 1876, Lord Carnarvon pronounced it in some respects worse than the former one. 'I cannot but think', he wrote on the same day to Lord Derby, 'that we shall make a very serious mistake in laying the collection² in its present form. It will not only damage us and the late Government, but stir up bad feeling, raise disagreeable discussions on many points which had best be left alone, and increase public agitation.' On the 26th February it occasioned fresh lengthy Cabinet discussions, in the course of which Disraeli himself raised the question of suspending the operation of the original objectionable orders, and proposed an instruction, drafted by himself, to captains in the Royal Navy, directing them, pending further orders, to surrender no fugitive slaves without reference to the Admiral of their station, who was on his side to apply for directions from home. The Cabinet seemed inclined to accept this suggestion.

Before Parliament met on the 8th February, Lord Carnarvon obtained some alteration in the paragraph of the Queen's speech on the subject, but not what he desired, and he again warned Lord Derby that it would be most ill-advised to issue the circular in its then form, and privately lamented that none of the Cabinet, except Sir Stafford Northcote, seemed to have any instinct of the public feeling in these subjects.

On the 7th March, 1876, the question came up in the

¹ Cabinet, 4th November, 1875.

² Before Parliament.

House of Lords, and the end of the long controversy was a decision to recall all the earlier instructions, to overrule the technical objections of the Law Officers and to substitute a general instruction to Naval commanders, superseding all earlier directions to surrender fugitive slaves, thus avoiding the necessity of any precise directions as to the circumstances in which such slaves should be received on board. British captains were henceforth to be guided, whether on the high seas or in the waters of states recognizing slavery, by considerations of humanity—a somewhat elastic expression. But in the second case, where the territorial law recognized slavery, a fugitive slave should only be received and protected on board till the truth of his statement was proved, as the result of communications with the local British Consular authority.

On another measure, a legacy of the late Liberal Government, Lord Carnarvon was in disagreement with some of his colleagues.

He had strongly opposed the Judicature Bill,¹ as did Mr. Disraeli, but Lord Cairns, when he succeeded to the Woolsack, adopted his predecessor's policy, and in November, 1874, there was an unexpected and somewhat disagreeable discussion on the subject. The Chancellor and the Duke of Richmond insisted on their views, and Lord Carnarvon, supported by Lord Salisbury, intimated that he did not wish to oppose his colleagues, but that the strong part he had taken against the Bill in 1873 made it impossible for him to vote for it.

Lord Carnarvon's views on the subject were not so much technical as political. Regarding the House of Lords as the most effective check on imprudent legislation, he was anxious to prevent, as far as possible, any

¹ See pp. 52 ff.

further reduction of its constitutional authority and dignity. His attitude was justified, for the following year the new Act was amended in such a manner as to revive the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords.

II

The close of the year 1875 was marked by an important incident fated to produce far-reaching developments in Egypt. The extravagance of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, had involved him in grave financial difficulties.

The construction of the Suez Canal, begun in 1859 and opened ten years later amidst splendid festivities in honour of the Empress of the French, had cost Egypt about seventeen and a half millions sterling. Considerable sums of money had moreover been paid at Constantinople in order to obtain a firman under which the law regulating succession to the Viceroyalty of Egypt, formerly held by the eldest living descendant of Mohammed Ali, had been altered in favour of the eldest son of the ruling Viceroy, now given the quasi-royal title of Khedive, instead of that of Wali or Governor. Finally, heavy expenditure had been incurred in extending Egyptian authority over the Sudan, in reconnaissances effected as far into the heart of Central Africa as Lake Albert Nyanza, by General Gordon, and of remote Darfur by Colonel Purdy and Colonel Mason. The Khedive even aimed at including Abyssinia and Somaliland in the African Empire of which he dreamed, and was only prevented by the intervention of a British warship from seizing the Zanzibar port of Kismayu.

These expeditions could only be covered by crushing taxes, levied on the agricultural produce of the Nile valley, with a view to trebling the revenue paid to the

late Viceroy, Said Pasha, and largely collected in kind. The system, in accordance with which these taxes were levied, empowered the tax-collector to fix his own valuation on the crops and date plantations of the farmer or small peasant owner, as well as on trades, and even on the badges worn by donkey-boys, while the *corvée* or imposition of forced labour, required from the *fellahin* on the canals and on the vast estates of the Khedive himself and of his favourites, completed the penury of the miserable population. Out of the proceeds of these taxes, Ismail Pasha adorned the European part of Cairo with boulevards in the style of Haussmann, and erected a magnificent Opera House, to which the finest singers in Europe were attracted by lavish payments.

Unable to wring more money from his subjects, Ismail conceived the idea of applying to the British Government for competent financial advisers. But Lord Derby was by no means disposed to interfere in Egyptian financial affairs, and the Khedive was at length driven to the expedient of selling his own shares in the Suez Canal worth about four million sterling. The question of buying them if terms could be arranged was laid before the Cabinet by Disraeli on the 17th November, and 'carried at once by a sort of whirlwind of agreement'.¹

Some days later Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Prime Minister : ²

'Our discussion in Cabinet upon the policy which is to follow upon our purchase of the Khedive's shares has been much in my mind since I have been in the country and I cannot help giving you, for whatever they may be worth, my notions—they scarcely deserve the name of conclusions.

'Some of our colleagues, as you will remember, are much impressed with the expediency of announcing at once our readiness

¹ Journal.

² 29th November, 1875.

to abandon any exclusive advantage which we may have gained and to propose a joint Commission for the maintenance and regulation of the Canal.

‘This is no doubt very disinterested, and like all disinterested actions, it will, I suppose, have a certain reward : but I doubt whether much advantage will be gained abroad and (which is perhaps more important) whether such a concession will be very highly appreciated in England. People here will, I think, be inclined to say that we are frightened at our own boldness, and that having secured a national point of vantage we are imperilling it for a theoretical and cosmopolitan object.

‘The common idea is I think that Egypt, quite as much as the Canal, is the thing that ultimately interests us, that the control of the Canal is valuable as a step to the control of Egypt, and that it is no special object to us to be mixed up with other nations who may have very different interests to serve in keeping the gate of the Eastern Empire. I expect the common notion would be—the fewer concerned in this the better.

‘I do not mean to say that there will not be a party who will be pleased with the cosmopolitan policy : but they will not, I believe, be the majority of the people on whom the Government can most depend.

‘As regards foreign nations, you and Derby can probably form a better judgement than I can : but it strikes me generally that while France alone will be really irritated at our recent move and will be in no respect soothed or conciliated to it by introducing other parties into the management of the Canal, the other great Powers will not probably care very much—except so far as they read in this act a declaration of policy.

‘My own strong impression is to pause before we make a gratuitous offer to share the advantages we have secured with others—and to study the temper both of the great Powers and of this country, before we qualify what has been, so far, a great success. . . .’

To Sir William Heathcote he wrote, on the 26th November, ‘. . . You will see by this morning’s papers the great stroke that we have just made in Egypt. The four million shares which we have bought represent

about one-third of the total share capital, but the value of the move is moral and political more than financial. . . .'

The following year a discussion on the subject with Sir Stafford Northcote in one of their frequent Sunday walks, left both of them in a doubtful and puzzled state of mind. Sir Stafford anticipated an early bankruptcy of the Khedive, who was asking that England, with France and Italy, should send a Commission to undertake the management of the new bank. This they both agreed was impossible, because it would be involving the Government in a purely commercial enterprise. Sir Stafford's suggestion was that three trustees, to receive and apportion so much revenue as represented the debt, should be appointed. Lord Carnarvon, on the other hand, feared that German jealousies might be aroused, but in face of the difficulties he thought it worth consideration. The further difficulty was that the Prime Minister and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs were, it appeared, acting separately and sending divergent telegrams, which aroused a good deal of feeling in France.

At the next Cabinet,¹ the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his suggestion, and it was agreed that he, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary, should treat with France on the basis of a Commission to be appointed by the three Powers, France, Italy, and England, each sending a representative. Lord Carnarvon raised the question as to what German and Russian feeling would be on the subject, and a provision was then agreed to, that these Powers if they desired it should join in the Commission.

'The real credit', Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir William Heathcote on the 18th September, 1876, 'belongs to Disraeli; for he not only saw the value of the policy, but urged it with all the force of his position. . . .'

¹ 11th March, 1876.

III

In November, 1875, a very unexpected offer was made to Lord Carnarvon by the Prime Minister. 'Lord Northbrook', wrote Mr. Disraeli,¹ 'has resigned the Viceroyalty of India, and will return to England early in the ensuing spring.

'He resigns purely for domestic reasons.

'I wish you to permit me to submit your name to Her Majesty as his successor.

'It is a great sacrifice for myself personally to be deprived of the services of one of the ablest of my colleagues, but my sense of duty impels me to make you this offer.

'India requires a statesman, and one of a high calibre. The critical state of affairs in Central Asia demands a master mind. I feel confident, if you accept the trust, you will do great service to your country, and gain an imperishable name. . . .'

The offer greatly appealed to Lord Carnarvon. The prospect of working with Lord Salisbury at the India Office was attractive, and the entire change of scene and thought would have been very grateful to him.

But he decided to refuse for domestic reasons. His motherless children were the first consideration; his friend and doctor, Sir William Gull, was decidedly adverse to their going to India. 'Had it not been for the children', Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir William Heathcote,² 'I think I should have acquiesced and accepted it—but I could not, without a clear sense that it was an unquestionable duty, sacrifice them—for a sacrifice it *must* have been. . . .

'Salisbury thought I might be able to do useful work

¹ 5th November, 1875.

² 5th January, 1876.

in India—he thought also that personally it would suit me—but he also thought that I ought not to leave the children. . . .’

Shortly afterwards another equally unexpected suggestion was made to Lord Carnarvon.¹ The Prime Minister pressed him earnestly to take over the Admiralty, which indeed was not vacant, but its administration had given rise to so many difficulties that he strongly desired a change. Lord Carnarvon, whilst ready to give any help, said that he could not act ungenerously to the First Lord, but this Mr. Disraeli said could be arranged and made pleasant to Mr. Ward Hunt. Lord Carnarvon doubted very much whether it was wise to remove Mr. Ward Hunt, and felt reluctant to leave the Colonial Office in the critical condition of affairs, and urged that the decision should be deferred, at any rate, until the meeting of Parliament, when, if matters were still unsatisfactory, he undertook to reconsider the question. He held that it would be impossible to undertake the Admiralty without a change of persons, and probably a change in the Constitution of the Office. As far as he was able to judge, the First Lord had not enough independent power. Mr. Disraeli denied this, and said that Hunt had declared he was Lord paramount, and listened rather gloomily, like a man unconvinced, to Lord Carnarvon’s arguments, but finally the matter was allowed to stand over.

It was, however, a constantly recurring difficulty. But ultimately no change was made, and Mr. Ward Hunt only vacated his Office by death, and Sir Michael Hicks Beach was appointed to succeed him.

¹ 17th November, 1875.

² 18th November, 1875.

IV

Imperial defence was always a paramount consideration with Lord Carnarvon. 'There is a question of a very important and as you will see a very delicate nature on which I am anxious to have your careful opinion,' he wrote to Lord Dufferin, Governor-General of Canada.¹

'I was, as you may perhaps remember, much opposed at the time to the policy of the late Government in withdrawing English troops from the Colonies. To reduce the garrisons, or even in some cases to withdraw them altogether, might not in itself be wrong, but the ostentatious manner in which it was done, and the language which unfortunately was held, was I think calculated to do mischief by spreading abroad the belief that it was the intention of the Imperial Government to loosen the tie between us and the Colonies. . . .

'The different Colonies differ, as you know, so materially, that what might be expedient and proper in Australia might be much the reverse in Canada, . . . and as regards any plan which might be proposed or adopted, two questions, preliminary to everything else must be answered—1st, would the people of Canada cordially and heartily embrace such a policy as would give them back the presence of English troops—especially when it is remembered that this might involve some fresh expenditure? 2nd, do the arrangements already made consequent upon the withdrawal of the troops preclude or interfere with a return to some modification of the old system? I might add, 3rdly, do you, taking as large and impartial a view as possible, think that now under our altered circumstances in Canada, it is wise to make such a return? There are many things which it would be wise not to do, but which when done must be accepted.

¹ 31st October, 1874.

‘ The question of course remains, what actually can be done. In strict personal confidence I will tell you what is in my mind as regards some of the Australian Colonies. I am inclined to think that they might be willing to pay the entire expense of, say a regiment each—which would be an actual part of the Queen’s army, and officered by Queen’s officers, with little more than an understanding that it, or an equivalent for it, should always be stationed in the Colony. I do not know that such an arrangement could be effected ; but I have reason for thinking that it is not chimerical. Now this, which would have much to recommend it in Australia, would not, I fear, be applicable in Canada. One regiment there would be wholly insufficient, and yet the expense would seem to Canadians disproportionate to the object in view : and as a matter of fact, so long as we hold Halifax, probably the money that would maintain a regiment would be better laid out on such military purposes as those which your present Ministers have tried to effect. I do not therefore see my way to do anything in this direction. What, however, would be the effect of sending you, for some confessedly temporary object, a regiment ? for the mere purposes of a demonstration and parade ? as a compliment and an indication that Canada is received as a part of the Empire, and as a reminder of the old red coat that formerly went all round the world ? If so, should it be a regiment sent out from Halifax ? or one specially sent from England ? (Query a bearskin ?) and could its presence be coupled advantageously with any existing object or purpose, or should it be sent avowedly and professedly as a demonstration of policy ? How would it be received ? Where would it be quartered ? Would it be welcomed with acclamation ? and would some share of the expenses incident to this

“unproductive policy”, as it would be called, be taken off our hands by your Ministers and Parliament ?”

This letter, one of a series of private letters sent to the Colonial Governors, was intended to pave the way for a new scheme of joint Colonial defence, which had been carefully discussed with Mr. Herbert and Sir Charles Gavan Duffy and was very near to the heart of the Colonial Secretary. Nor was the Prime Minister otherwise than favourable to the general idea underlying Lord Carnarvon's plan. ‘I look upon the restoration of our military relations with our Colonies as a question of high policy, which ought never to be absent from our thoughts. The question involves social and political, as well as military considerations; and you may rely on my earnest support of any steps on your part to accomplish this great end. . . .’¹

There were difficulties with the War Office, and on the 16th March, 1876, Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Prime Minister:

‘Hardy on the part of the War Office is much opposed to the return of the troops to the Australian Colonies. I had hoped to have been able to come to some understanding with him at least in the present stage of the business: but he seems to think that a Cabinet decision is necessary on the subject: and as it is really most important to give a reply at once to a communication which has now been delayed for many weeks, I will ask you to let it be settled on Saturday.’

The question was accordingly brought before the Cabinet on the 21st March, 1876. Mr. Gathorne Hardy said that he could only recruit enough men for Great Britain and could not supply any Colonial demand, and that the Colonies must be left to themselves. This

¹ Mr. Disraeli to Lord Carnarvon, 8th December, 1875.

was most disappointing. The Conservatives had been in office for two years, but their inherited surplus had dwindled away, and no appreciable effort had been made to place the defences of the Empire on a sound basis. When the defenceless state of the coaling stations came up for discussion, the Cabinet was unwilling to consider a loan of a million pounds.

Against this preponderating military inertia, it was a certain consolation to Lord Carnarvon that mainly at his suggestion it was decided to consider the expense of fortifying Simon's Bay, our naval station in the Cape Colony. Little or nothing, however, was done. To Sir Bartle Frere, who remonstrated two years later on the defenceless condition of the Cape, Lord Carnarvon replied,¹ 'I have often of late been in despair: and I believe that if we ever go to War and our enemies have the slightest energy and "dash", we shall suffer terribly from the marvellous "incuria" of the last few years. The real vice of the situation is that it is impossible to persuade the Treasury to sanction any expense which is not at the moment popular with Parliament: and as Parliament cannot know what is necessary, the ordinary and essential precautions are neglected.' And in forwarding Sir Bartle Frere's letter to the Prime Minister, he observed,² '... If I remember rightly, £190,000,000 worth of our trade passes the Cape every year. It is these considerations which ought long and long ago to have led to a moderate expenditure, but they have been neglected and we are absolutely defenceless in this part of the world....'

The Russo-Turkish War brought further revelations of British weakness. When the Cabinet refused to contemplate Mr. Disraeli's proposals for seizing the Turkish fleet and possibly Constantinople, it agreed to increase

¹ 23rd July, 1878.

² 6th July, 1878.

the Mediterranean squadron by three more powerful ironclads and to push on the commission of others. Naval discussions arose frequently from 1876 onwards, and the advisability of buying 'at a bargain' three Turkish ironclads which were being built in England was frequently urged by Lord Carnarvon. But a decision was always postponed, the Foreign Secretary, whose dislike of armaments was as pronounced as his dislike of Royalties and religions, arguing that the country would not like the expense, and that reductions of the naval force would assist negotiations with Foreign Powers. But the fleet was so reduced that the Channel Squadron could only apparently be kept up to strength by the expedient of placing dummies, which could neither sail nor steam, in some of the harbours.

The different views held in the Cabinet on the subject showed how much Ministers were divided on questions of foreign policy.

V

On the 20th January Mr. Disraeli announced to the Cabinet that the Queen had resolved to adopt the title of 'Empress-Queen' of India. Eventually the title of 'Empress' alone was chosen, and the decision embodied in the Royal Titles Bill was endorsed by the House of Commons on the 16th March, 1876, in the face of considerable Liberal opposition.

This opposition was largely factious, for the novelty of the proposed addition afforded a good handle for attacking the Government, partly because there appeared no precedent for the act, partly because of the association of the title itself with despotic authority.

On the 17th March Lord Carnarvon was a visitor at Windsor. The Queen was very pleased with the majority

of 105 which the Bill had secured the previous evening, but equally displeased with the conduct of the Opposition. She asked what Lord Carnarvon thought was the cause of all the feeling, and he said that in Parliament it was mainly a party move, but in the country he thought it was a real, though absurd, idea that the title of Empress would not be confined to India. The Queen regarded any such suggestion as ridiculous, and seemed to regret that Disraeli had made so much mystery in the first instance. She asked Lord Carnarvon to give him a message that she hoped he would take the next opportunity of telling the House of Commons that it was altogether an ungrounded apprehension.

Lord Carnarvon had previously written to the Prime Minister on the 21st February, to suggest the inclusion of the Colonies in some form, if a new title were to be adopted.

‘The mention of the Colonies would I think facilitate the matter, as it would give the idea of a fuller, more comprehensive, and better considered change of style. Moreover, now that the affair has gone so far, I doubt whether there may not be some Colonial dissatisfaction if all allusion to them is omitted. . . .’

‘For myself, I do not much like the title of Emperor—its associations are at least barbarous—“barbarus Endoperator” as Juvenal says—and Greenwood’s suggestion is not without some merit. Philip II never I think called himself anything but King of the Two Spains and their Dependencies. However, I am quite aware that the difficulty does not consist in merely finding the best possible title. . . .’

On the 18th March he urged in the Cabinet that the Colonies should be included. The suggestion was very nearly adopted, but in the end the Prime Minister declared against it and substituted the rather fantastic suggestion of making two of the Royal Princes Dukes of Canada and Australia.

CHAPTER XXII

THE PROTECTION OF ANIMALS

1876

‘He prayeth best who loveth best
All things both great and small ;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.’

COLERIDGE, *The Ancient Mariner*.

LORD CARNARVON passed Easter at Coburg as Minister in attendance on the Queen, in piercing winds and clouds of dust. There was little work to be done there beyond the performance of the singularly ungracious duty of drafting a letter to his political chief on behalf of the Queen to ‘tell him of these points which annoyed her so much’ with regard to *The Mistletoe* collision.¹ But meanwhile troubles were piling up for him at the Colonial Office. Riots in Barbadoes and Tobago, difficulties in Griqualand and Natal, anxieties in connection with the Transvaal, negotiations with the Orange Free State. And to these sources of public anxiety there was added a grievous domestic sorrow. When Lord Carnarvon returned from Coburg he found his mother seriously ill at Pixton. On the 26th May all was over. ‘It was’, he wrote, ‘the gentlest and happiest end to a good life that I have ever seen.’

¹ *The Alberta*, the Queen’s yacht, had run down *The Mistletoe* in the Solent with fatal results. The Queen was displeased with the public comments, and the results of the inquiries instituted.

The Queen, whose inquiries had been constant, wrote to him on the 29th May : ‘ Though Lord Carnarvon has not himself confirmed the sad report of his new and irreparable loss, the Queen fears it is but too true—and that his dear and excellent Mother has passed away from this world.’

A few days later, 3rd June, she added, ‘ In the midst of his sorrow she *knows* that his heart will be with his *work*, and she therefore does not scruple to say how vexed she is at the *delay* of the Bill to regulate the horrible, disgraceful and *unchristian* vivisection.

‘ The Queen sends the Duke of Richmond and Gordon’s letter, and trusts that the shameful and *not* humane attempts of the medical profession will *not* be allowed to influence the Government in the *slightest degree*, and that every effort will be made to *agitate* in its favour. Does Lord Carnarvon wish the Queen to write to the Duke of Richmond on the subject, or will he undertake to communicate her *very strong views* on the subject ? ’

He replied : ‘ Lord Carnarvon assures Your Majesty that his heart does remain in his work—at this moment it is almost the only thing to which he can address himself—and especially the Vivisection Bill. He considers it a sacred duty to spare no effort to carry this measure, his own strongest feelings are bound up in its success, and though he is aware of the opposition, direct and indirect, which the Bill has to encounter, he hopes that he shall succeed in getting it through the House of Lords by the end of the month, which will allow Mr. Cross the whole of July. It may be necessary and prudent to admit some slight amendments when the Bill is in Committee, but Lord Carnarvon is fully determined to accept nothing which in his opinion can involve any material alteration. . . ’

The movement for the suppression or limitation of vivisection was first inspired by a letter published in *The Times* in 1873, describing cruelties alleged to have been committed in a physiological laboratory at Florence, and was strengthened by the appearance of a handbook which intimated that experiments on living animals, unalleviated by anaesthetics, were frequently performed with a callous indifference to their sufferings. Charges of horrible cruelty were made against Dr. Klein, a London University Professor of Austrian nationality, whose experiments were defended by his supporters on the ground of their practical utility. It was argued that similar experiments had assisted Harvey in his discovery of the circulation of the blood, and had been made by Volta and Salvani, who had tested the effects of electricity on animals.

When it was reported that animals were being dissected alive for scientific purposes, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals commenced an agitation.¹ Callous indifference to the suffering of intelligent creatures is degrading to those who cause it, and to those who witness it, and the demand for some restriction on vivisection became acute. In consequence a Royal Commission was appointed under the presidency of Lord Cardwell, then Secretary of State for War in the Liberal Government.

When the report of this Commission was published, the Disraeli Government decided to deal with the whole question by legislation, and Lord Carnarvon took charge of the measure in the House of Lords.

He had many friends among the medical profession, and it was not the first time that he had come in contact

¹ Lord Carnarvon's father was President of the R.S.P.C.A., and his own first appearance in public had been made on its behalf in 1848. (See Chapter I.)

with them legislatively. During his short Under-Secretaryship in 1858, he had been in charge of the Medical Practitioners' Bill, which aimed at distinguishing qualified from unqualified practitioners, and which established a Medical Council, empowered to regulate and govern the profession, and to raise the standard of medical education. The Profession had offered but little opposition to that Bill eighteen years earlier; but the Cruelty to Animals Bill was to receive much violent criticism before it finally became law.

Lord Cardwell's Commission, which included Lord Winmarleigh, Mr. Forster, Sir J. Kemble, Professor Huxley, and Mr. Hutton of the *Spectator*, recognized that it was impossible to prohibit altogether any kind of experiment on living animals, for to do so would only result in driving medical students to foreign schools. But the cruelties attendant on it could be mitigated by the exercise of a power of control and supervision by the Government.

It was on these lines that the Bill was framed, which Lord Carnarvon commended to the House of Lords on the 22nd May, 1876. The effect of his speech on its behalf was strengthened by the moderation of his language and by the recognition of the important scientific and humanitarian interests involved.

He recognized that the practice of vivisection brought into conflict the sentiment of humanity and the claims of science. Vivisection was a practice of foreign origin, and had been attended abroad with great cruelty, animals having been kept under torture, not for hours only, but for weeks and even months. These barbarities had been so far only feebly reflected in England: but experiments entailing much suffering had been undertaken by young and inexperienced students in private houses, and he

cited one case where the experiments had been inspired by mere curiosity, and where torture had been inflicted with no object that could claim the justification of serious research.

He then dealt with the evidence of Dr. Klein, who had admitted that he never used anaesthetics on animals, where these were not absolutely indispensable, and that when he had to make any experiment for pathological purposes, he never paused to consider how the animal would feel, thus avowing the view held by many continental scientists that animal suffering need not be considered. Lord Carnarvon described the effects of 'Curare', the hideous so-called anaesthetic, which prevented its victim from exhibiting any sign of the agonies endured by it, and he proposed to prohibit its use by statute. But he held that it would not be reasonable to forbid vivisection in any form. A mean must be obtained; which would permit useful scientific research while providing against real cruelty. This view had been taken in 1871 by a Committee of the British Association, and had been endorsed by the highest authorities including Darwin, Owen, Huxley, and Gull, who had recommended the performance of operations upon animals under the influence of anaesthetics, but who thought that such operations should never be permitted for the purpose of investigating facts already known, and that everything should be done to avoid the infliction of unnecessary pain.

He admitted that experiments inflicted by vivisection had contributed to prolong human life and to diminish human suffering. His Bill merely sought to provide certain safeguards and to secure a certain measure of Government inspection and control. It allowed operations without anaesthetics only in rare cases, and then

only with the sanction of certain higher professional authorities, as well as of a Secretary of State.¹ It enforced the destruction of an animal if it were suffering pain as soon as the effect of an anaesthetic had passed away. Any public exhibition of vivisection was forbidden by the Bill as illegal, and provision was made for the registration of all places in which experiments on live creatures were carried out, as well as for the issue by a Secretary of State of the necessary special licences, and for the inspection and reports of the various authorities appointed to watch over any breach of the law. The vivisection of cats and dogs was prohibited altogether, on the grounds that these animals were frequently stolen with this object. Legal proceedings against violations of the new law were to be summary, but a clause provided for an appeal from such summary convictions to Quarter Sessions.

Ever since Christianity was founded, he said, sympathy had been widening and spreading, and it had at length embraced the animal world. The manager of a reformatory had once told him that not infrequently the first gleam of better feeling amongst young criminals had been elicited by fostering among them a love of flowers and animals, and he reminded his hearers that Sir Humphry Davy had been converted from scepticism by reflecting on the qualities and properties of the lower animals. He concluded by quoting Coleridge's lines, 'He prayeth well who loveth well both man and bird and beast.'

The Bill passed its Second Reading, but a month later there was a deputation from the medical profession, then a strong resolution passed by the Medical Council demanding additional safeguards and alterations, then a resolution from the Senate of the University of London.

¹ Subject to exception under similar safeguards.

‘To-morrow’, he wrote,¹ ‘I have my terrible Vivisection Bill in Committee and a very long string of Amendments but I hope for the best.’ Nor was he disappointed. The result of the debate in Committee was most encouraging. ‘I thank God to have been allowed to do my work so far. I carried every point—resisted every objectionable amendment—and on the whole brought the Bill out in a satisfactory shape. The extreme party may perhaps abuse it as an unworthy compromise: but it is really neither a compromise nor unworthy. It is a good measure and a great blow to Vivisection. If enforced with proper firmness it will do all that is needed.’

The progress so far, he reported to the Queen,² was ‘entirely satisfactory’:

‘The only concession which he made to the scientific world of any possible consequence was by allowing the experiment to be made for a “physiological” as well as a “medical” object: but this really gives them no facilities of experimentation, and on the contrary tends to make a conviction under the Bill easier, by removing a very puerile element of controversy in any Law Court. Lord Carnarvon also adopted a slight modification in the clause which gives protection to dogs and cats, but without that modification the clauses would probably not have been maintained in the House of Commons—and in return he included horses, asses and mules under the protective part of the clause, which was a matter of clear gain.

‘He trusts, moreover, that whilst carrying the Bill through Committee in this shape he has been able by private and other communications so far to remove the opposition of the Medical and Surgical Profession, as to render its passage through the House of Commons all the easier. It is of course premature to count upon success, but he most earnestly trusts that this session may see this Bill become Law. He is more and more convinced of the urgent necessity of legislation.

‘Lord Carnarvon cannot conclude this report to your Majesty

¹ 19th June, 1876.

² 21st June, 1876.

without saying how largely indebted he has been to the steady support which Lord Cardwell has given him, both as Chairman of the Commission, and as a leading member on the opposite side of the House.'

On receipt of the resolution of the Medical Council, he added, on the 22nd June:

'Lord Carnarvon with his humble duty thinks it right to inform your Majesty that since he wrote last night, he has learnt that a very strong resolution has been carried at the Senate of the University of London, in favour of further amendments in the Vivisection Bill—which would entirely destroy the value of the measure. Lord Carnarvon has heard this with very great regret; as it will, if persisted in, involve a further and a serious struggle, but one in which he is convinced it is impossible to make any concession. He will have the honour of informing your Majesty further on this point as the matter develops itself. Meanwhile, it is probable that the discussion on Monday in the House of Lords will be a serious one.'

The last stage was accomplished on the 27th June. 'I passed my Vivisection Bill through the Third Reading,' he wrote; 'nothing was said except that Shaftesbury gave the Bill his blessing, and so I said nothing for fear of stirring up some sleeping lion. I thank God for allowing me to carry this good work so far.'

In the House of Commons the Bill was opposed by Mr. Lowe, instinctively impatient of a popular and emotional outcry, emanating as it seemed to him from uneducated sentimentalists, against a learned profession which was working for the conquest of disease. It was, however, defended by Mr. Forster, who had sat on the Commission, and who appeared to have been satisfied that there had not been much cruelty in England itself, and that the medical profession would gain by a regulation implying the legitimacy, so long as it was not abused, of the practice of vivisection under safeguards.

But the struggle was not yet over. The doctors were insistent. 'A conference at the Home Office, with Cross', wrote Lord Carnarvon,¹ 'and a sort of deputation of doctors on the Vivisection Bill. Not very satisfactory; and I see there is no chance of getting the Bill through this Session without some further compromise. . . . There were present, Sir J. Paget, Dr. Hooker, as President of the Royal Society, Dr. Burdon-Sanderson, and a Professor from Cambridge.'

'Got into Cowes early', he wrote on the following day, 'and found a letter summoning me to Osborne. I went there and saw the Queen at one. She began by talking very kindly about my Mother and then she went off into the Vivisection Bill. She spoke with a great deal of feeling and denounced the doctors roundly. She has not asked Jenner to come to Osborne on the ground that "it was too hot", but really because she is so vexed with him for the opposition which he has encouraged to the Bill.'

At the next Cabinet, a few days later,² when Ministers were engaged in the 'massacre of the innocents' the Vivisection Bill was excepted. 'If we can come to terms with the doctors, this is clearly—to my mind—due to the Queen's influence. She has pressed it strongly on Disraeli.'

The Bill carried through Parliament by Lord Carnarvon in June, 1876, and known as the 'Act to Amend the Law relating to Cruelty to Animals', applied to all vertebrate animals, and to all experiments on them of a nature to inflict pain, and prohibited the performance of any such experiment except by a person licensed by a Secretary of State, or in certain circumstances, by a Judge of the High Court. It prohibited all public exhibitions of vivisection. An animal undergoing an experiment

¹ 22nd July, 1876.

² 29th July, 1876.

must during the whole of its duration be under the influence of some anaesthetic sufficiently powerful to render it insensible to pain, or if pain is likely to continue after the effect of the anaesthetic has ceased, or if serious injury is likely to result through it, it must be killed before it recovers consciousness. The experiment, moreover, may not be performed as an illustration at lectures in medical schools or hospitals, nor without anaesthetics upon any dog, cat, horse, ass, or mule. But certificates may be given dispensing with anaesthetics if insensibility should frustrate the object with which the experiment is made, and a Judge of the High Court may grant a licence for this purpose when an experiment is deemed essential in the interests of criminal justice. 'Curare' is not to be deemed an anaesthetic for the purposes of the Act. Operations on animals not partaking of the character of scientific experiments, such as the castration of horses and lambs, remained unaffected by it.

With the exception of Denmark and the Swiss Cantons of Zurich and Geneva, Great Britain appears to have been the only State at that time to attempt legislation on the subject of vivisection.¹ Lord Carnarvon's moderation in advocating a measure in itself reasonable and practical had succeeded in reconciling the claims of science with those of humanity. And, although it requires urgent emendation, the Act of 1876 remains to-day the sole charter of the innocent beasts.

¹ To Auberon Herbert the first Act for the Protection of Wild Birds is due. Lady Portsmouth was the chief promoter of an Anti-Vivisection Hospital, and both Auberon and Lady Gwendolen Herbert were vegetarians on principle.

CHAPTER XXIII

IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATION

1874-1878

I

THE DOMINION OF CANADA

‘Greater Britain is not a mere Empire, though we often call it so. Its union is of a more vital kind. It is united by blood and religion, . . . they are strong ties, and will only give way before some violent dissolving force.’—SEELEY.

SEVEN years had elapsed since the Dominion of Canada had taken its pre-eminent position as eldest daughter of the Empire. New questions had arisen which demanded urgent solution—difficulties on the one hand with outlying portions of British America,¹ and on the other with the United States, whose aggressive commercial policy and connection with England’s irreconcilable enemies, the Irish Fenians,² had accentuated the danger of the long unprotected Canadian frontier. Newfoundland had its own problem in the claims of the French and the Americans to participate in the Fisheries.³

These questions were very familiar to Lord Carnarvon.

¹ British Columbia, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island.

² In May 1866, 1,200 Fenians crossed the border and endeavoured to raise a rebellion.

³ This controversy, two centuries old, had been aggravated by the entry in 1783 of the United States as a third party. The Treaty of Washington, 1870, had endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to determine the respective rights of Canadians and United States citizens.

On many of them he had spoken when in Opposition, and his correspondence with Colonial statesmen enabled him to bring much knowledge and experience to the difficulties of 1874.

Of the political temper in the new Dominion, Lord Dufferin ¹ sent him a gratifying analysis.²

‘ All active desire for Annexation seems to be annihilated. No public man would dare to breathe a word in its favour, and those who committed themselves a few years ago to such a policy are doing all they can to obtain oblivion to their opinions. There may indeed be a few individuals at Montreal, Bankers, Capitalists, and others, whose material interests are so implicated with various commercial undertakings of the States, as to make them wish for a change, but the whole current of popular sympathy runs in the opposite direction. But though union with the Republic has become an obsolete idea, I cannot help suspecting that there is a growing desire among the younger generation to regard “ independence ” as their ultimate destination. Nor do I think that this novel mode of thought will be devoid of benefit, provided it remains for the next twenty or thirty years a vague aspiration, and is not prematurely converted into a practical project. Hitherto there has been a lack of self-assertion and self-confidence amongst Canadians in forcible contrast to the sentiments which animate our friends to the South of us :—now, however, the consolidation of the Provinces, the expansion of their maritime interests, and above all the reduction to their sway of the great North West, has stimulated their imagination, and evoked the prospect of a National career far grander than as Nova Scotians, New Brunswickers, or Upper and Lower Canadians they would have dreamt of a few years ago.

‘ If then this growing consciousness of power should stimulate their pride in the resources and future of their country, nay even if it should sometimes render them jealous of any interference on the part of England with their parliamentary autonomy, I do not think we shall have any cause of complaint. On the contrary, we should view with favour the rise of a high-spirited, proud, national feeling amongst them. Such a sentiment would neither

¹ Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada. ² 25th April, 1874.

be antagonistic to our interests, nor inimical to the maintenance of the tie which now subsists between us. The one danger to be avoided is that of converting this healthy and irrepressible growth of a localized patriotism into a condition of morbid suspicion or irritability, by any exhibition of jealousy, or by the capricious exercise of authority on the part of the Imperial Government. Nothing has more stimulated the passionate affection with which Canada now clings to England than the consciousness that the maintenance of the connection depends on her own free will. . . .'

The most important problems in February 1874 were the proposed Reciprocity Treaty with the United States,¹ and the difficulty which had arisen with British Columbia over the Pacific Railway scheme.

With regard to the Reciprocity Treaty Lord Carnarvon wrote,² 'I am not only ready but anxious to secure the substitution of a Reciprocity Treaty for the present Treaty arrangements of a money payment, for I see advantages of all kinds in such a change. But I am still more anxious that we should not initiate it—that we should give our good offices, for it amounts to this, at the express desire of Canada, so that it should never be made a matter of reproach to us in the event of its not hereafter giving the satisfaction which is anticipated.'

Of no less importance was a serious difficulty between Canada and British Columbia.

'After the overthrow of Sir John Macdonald,³ and the consequent miscarriage of the Pacific Railway project which he

¹ The Treaty of Washington had provided a settlement of the Fisheries question in a money payment to be determined by Commission, but in January 1874 the U.S.A. had not agreed even in the nomination of the Commission. Both countries were now willing to settle the question by negotiations based on the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, whereby compensation should be settled by the establishment of reciprocal trade regulations.

² To Lord Dufferin, 26th February, 1874.

³ The Macdonald Ministry, which had carried Confederation, was succeeded by a Liberal-Radical Government presided over by Mr. Mackenzie. Of his integrity and exactness Lord Dufferin had a high opinion. But he was new to office life and easily bewildered by the official correspondence.

favoured, the inhabitants of British Columbia began to fear that my new Ministers might try to evade the pledge connecting their Province by rail with the Dominion within ten years, the time agreed upon, which was one of the conditions on which they confederated. Their misgivings were still further increased by a not very skilful statement of his railway policy which Mr. Mackenzie has made from the hustings ;—the consequence appears to have been the overthrow of Mr. “*Amor de Cosmos*” alias “*Smith*”, the Premier of B. C. and the invasion by a mob of the Columbian House of Commons under the pretence of presenting a petition.

‘Yesterday an emissary from the Canadian Government, a Mr. Edgar, started for Victoria with instructions to reassure the B. Columbian mind as far as it might be possible to do so, and to see in what way the spirit of the Agreement in respect of the promised railway can best be adhered to. Under the most favourable circumstances ten years was too short a period for the accomplishment of so vast a project, and of course the sudden overthrow of Sir John Macdonald, and the breakdown of his arrangements, render it necessary to take a new departure. I hope, however, in a few weeks to be able to report that the dispute has been amicably arranged.’¹

But the problem showed no signs of an early solution, and Lord Carnarvon telegraphed in June, offering his good offices as arbitrator. Lord Dufferin was away, and Mr. Mackenzie, whose ineptitude in drafting diplomatic papers he constantly deplored, curtly refused.

The negotiations, however, between Mr. Mackenzie and Mr. Walkem, the British Columbian representative, were not prosperous, and in July Mr. Mackenzie decided after all to ask Lord Carnarvon’s mediation in the settlement of the dispute. ‘He accompanies this information’, wrote Lord Dufferin,² ‘by a very proper expression of his appreciation of your kindness and solicitude in undertaking a troublesome and obnoxious

¹ Lord Dufferin to Lord Carnarvon, 26th February, 1874.

² 17th July, 1874.

duty for the purpose of helping himself and his Government out of a difficulty.'

The despatch asked for by Mr. Mackenzie was written from Highclere in August, and written to a great extent by Lord Carnarvon himself. 'It will at least show your Ministers', he wrote to Lord Dufferin,¹ 'that . . . I have it at heart so to solve it that neither they nor the Canadian Parliament would seem in public estimation to be placed in a position which would not be worthy of them. . . .'

But the difficulty was not yet settled, and many interviews and much correspondence preceded Lord Carnarvon's award, which was sent in November and accepted by the Dominion Cabinet in December. As soon as the Canadian Parliament met, however, the question was re-opened, and the Senate negatived the essential condition—the construction of the railway from Esquimalt to Nanaimo. Six months of silence ensued, followed by the virtual repudiation by the Canadian Government of their latest agreement.

British Columbia, passionately eager for its railway, began to gird at the delays and evasions of the Canadian Government. Were they not, it was asked, wriggling out of a plain contract? Feeling grew hot on both sides. Secession was threatened: defiance was defied. But a politic voyage by Lord Dufferin to Victoria, in the course of which the Governor-General secured the confidence of Elliott, the Provincial Prime Minister, materially assisted in the process of pacification; and eventually oil was poured on the troubled waters by the Colonial Secretary, who proposed in December, 1876, that a further delay should be accorded in order to enable the Canadian Government to complete its preparations. On the 22nd

¹ 16th August, 1874.

March, 1877, Lord Dufferin was able to report that the Western firebrands were extinguished, that the Province was prepared to give Canada a year and a half to prove its good intentions, and that in the event of the Canadian Government failing to inaugurate a *bona-fide* effort in the time, Mackenzie would agree to a conference in London under the auspices of the Colonial Secretary.

Meanwhile a serious incident on the Red River demanded urgent attention. The trouble was no new one. In 1870 Sir J. A. Macdonald had written to Lord Carnarvon¹ that it was 'in a fair way to being settled. The people are, I believe, as a whole, quite loyal, though they would have preferred their present wild and semi-barbarous life to the restraints of civilization that will be passed upon them by the Canadian Government and the new settlers. The affair has been a good deal complicated, however, by the barbarous murder of Scott. He was tried by a sham court-martial under the orders of Riel and condemned on the most frivolous pretexts.

' Scott was known in Canada and has relatives here, and the blood of the people is at fever heat. They are calling for retribution upon Riel and all connected with him. Indignant meetings have been held all over Canada, and the Government has been called upon by some of them to refuse to receive any delegates commissioned by Riel.'

When Lord Carnarvon took Office, the position of Her Majesty's Government was as follows. In Lord Kimberley's latest despatch, 24th July, 1873, the Canadian Ministers had been informed that H. M. Government would consent at the invitation of Canada to deal with the Amnesty question, and issue a proclamation condoning all offences committed during the Red River disturbances, *except the murder of Scott*. The Colonial

¹ 14th April, 1870.

Ministers took no action, for such an Amnesty would in no degree have relieved their embarrassments or satisfied their French supporters.

Since then the situation had been still further complicated by the election of Riel to Parliament, in succession to Sir George Cartier. Riel was expelled from the House by the English members in opposition to almost the entire French vote. He was re-elected, and 'he will be again expelled', wrote Lord Dufferin,¹ 'but as a consequence the present Government will be broken up. . . . When I tell you that these gentlemen belong to the Rouge and anti-Priest party . . . and that for Riel himself they have the greatest contempt, you will understand how intense must be the force of the nationalistic sentiment brought to bear upon them.

'Mackenzie's position is still further straitened by the violent language he and his friends held in regard to Riel, at the time the murder of Scott occurred. Being at that time a member of the Ontario Government he identified himself with the strong Orange feeling dominant in that Province, denounced Riel in very violent terms, and offered a reward for his apprehension, though the affair was, of course, no concern of the Ontario Executive.'

A few weeks later Lord Dufferin wrote ² that Lepine had been tried, and to the astonishment of everybody had been found guilty by the mixed jury of French, English, and Halfbreeds, and sentenced to death. This he thought modified the situation, as the sentence could now be commuted. The French Catholics were demanding a full and entire amnesty both for Lepine and Riel, for the French clergy were determined to use the occasion to destroy the French Ministers to whom they were bitterly

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 12th October, 1874.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 6th November, 1874.

opposed. But the Courts of the country having determined the execution of Scott to be 'murder', and nothing less, weakened their position and strengthened the Ministers. The Clergy would have to plead that mercy might be shown to a convicted criminal, instead of demanding reparation on behalf of a persecuted patriot.

But considerable difficulty remained as to Riel. Should he not be required to come in and take his trial, or at least plead guilty? Lord Dufferin was inclined to insist upon this condition before removing his present outlawry or extending the Queen's clemency to him in any shape, but it appeared that the French party would not be satisfied and it would not save the French portion of the Cabinet. Yet if the requirement were demanded authoritatively, not by the Canadian Ministers, but by the Imperial Government, 'I hardly think the Bishops would be able to withstand it. Should, however, the sons of Zeruiah prove too strong for us, the condition to which the affair has been reduced by Lepine's condemnation will enable us to bracket Riel with Lepine with a minimum amount of inconvenience. . . .

'I am afraid we must ask you to take the matter into your own hands.'

Lord Carnarvon answered on the 12th November :

'I have read every word of your very able and interesting letter on Riel's case, and, difficult and delicate as the question is, I will not hesitate to give my best offices—whatever they may be worth—to bring about a friendly solution. I must write briefly; for I am again rather severely pressed with business and sometimes can only just keep my head above water.

'First then—seeing as I do the dangerous nature of this matter—I will, if you think that good will come of it, intervene to the extent of granting an amnesty—or, which is I suppose the official mode of putting it, empowering you as Govr. Genl. to grant it. But in such case there must be a distinct request from your

Ministers. They must initiate the matter or else when things go wrong and party feeling runs high I shall be accused of interference and the blame will be very conveniently laid on my shoulders. . . .

‘Next, I am inclined to think that if an Amnesty is granted it should be coupled with the imposition of political disability to vote or sit in Parliament. It may be true that Riel is not as bad as he has been painted ; and certainly his crime has been in a certain measure endorsed by those in authority, but it would be a scandal—and worse even, a source of great danger—if he were to appear in the Dominion House of Commons—an object of hatred to one section and of triumph to the other.

‘You must say whether an amnesty coupled with such a condition would be sufficient to secure the objects in view. I hardly see how it could be given unconditionally. . . .’

Lord Derby, on being consulted, characteristically advised Lord Carnarvon to take as little responsibility as possible.¹ Disraeli on the other hand advised him to intervene if Lord Dufferin were unwilling to accept the burden—counsel which fell in much more nearly with Lord Carnarvon’s own views. ‘This is the great satisfaction of doing business with Disraeli’, he wrote, ‘that while he never worries or interferes unnecessarily, he has the imaginative faculty which enables him to apprehend the true state of the case in its broad outlines from a distance.’

A few days later, 18th November, Lord Carnarvon wrote to Lord Dufferin :

‘You will have had before this my telegrams on the Cables Act² and Lepine’s case, and by this mail my “award” on the B. Columbian controversy goes to you.

¹ 15th November, 1874.

² The Cables Act, after a contest between British Cable interests and an American monopoly, was passed by the Canadian Parliament, 26th May, 1874, but reserved by Lord Dufferin for the Queen’s sanction. Lord Carnarvon in his despatch of 29th October, while entirely in favour of terminating the monopoly, desired the fullest inquiry into existing rights and interests, and decided to leave the Bill in abeyance until the Canadian Government should on further consideration revise it.

‘They are all three questions of very great importance and magnitude, and have had no common attention from me.

‘As regards Lepine’s case, I apprehend, I think quite clearly, the dangers of the present state of feeling in Canada. I am aware that the old feud of R. Cath. and Protestant is only slumbering and that any mismanagement might lead to most grave results. This is the only justification in my eyes for not carrying out the just sentence of law for a horrible and cold-blooded policy. But I regard it as a case of “*Salus populi*” and against all my own better feelings I am ready to accept what I am conscious is in a certain sense a tampering with strict justice. But, for this reason I must say that it is most desirable if possible that he should not be set at liberty without some previous imprisonment. To put it on no higher ground it would have all the semblance of great timidity.

‘It may perhaps be impossible to treat Riel in this way—and Riel’s case must now evidently be dealt with—but Riel has rendered public service, his crime has been condoned, and we must accept facts as we find them. At this distance and writing under ignorance of many details I do not see that we must *necessarily* treat both cases in exactly the same manner. But what seems to be necessary is :

‘(1) That there should be no delay or suspense that can be avoided.

‘(2) That you should if possible act under the powers given you in . . . your instructions, knowing that you will have my full and hearty support to what you do. If indeed your situation is such, between the violence of local feeling and the weakness of your Government, that you really are unable to act, I will not shrink from personally intervening ; but I do not think this is the desirable course, because by the instructions it is plain that the action rests with you in this case. (Kimberley’s instructions perhaps make Riel’s a case where you ought to have my written and personal sanction.) But in this event, if I am obliged *for a great public necessity and in the last resort* to interfere, it must and can only be at the express request of your Government who should clearly intimate if they do not say that the problem is one beyond their strength to solve. . . .

‘P.S. Since writing the above I have received your private

letter of the 6th on the subject of Lepine : which on the whole seems to require me to make no change in what I have now said except as regards one particular passage in it. You say towards the end of it that the Imperial Government might authoritatively urge the French Bishops and Party to induce Riel to surrender himself to justice to be dealt with, on the understanding that he would, like Lepine, be treated leniently. But supposing—as indeed you contemplate—that the Bishops either will not or cannot bring Riel to this course, what would be my position ? I should have used language which I could not enforce by acts, and should become incapable of rendering real assistance should matters grow worse. Moreover, as I have already said, it is not my place to interfere unless your Government say plainly that so grave and exceptional a case has arisen that only a “*deus ex machina*” can solve it. You can act under your own powers and may act, knowing that you have my support. . . .’

But Lord Dufferin, while sending¹ the grateful thanks of his Government for Lord Carnarvon’s willingness to assist them in their embarrassing position, feared that if the Ministers were to leave the matter in his, Lord Dufferin’s, hands, they would be accused of weakness or of sheltering themselves behind the Governor-General. ‘Whereas a determination to invoke the intervention of the Imperial Government, would appear so natural a course, and so much in harmony with previous proposals, that they would not be exposed to any such criticism.’ He was anxious to appear to be acting, not merely as the ordinary head of the Canadian Administration, but as specially charged by Her Majesty’s Government to regulate the matter.

In January 1875 Lord Carnarvon wrote :²

‘ . . . I can understand the view which some of your Ministers take as to preferring a complete amnesty, but apart from the merits of the question it would hardly be possible for us here in England to agree to this course. The details of Scott’s murder

¹ 18th November, 1874.

² 7th January, 1875.

alone which at any moment may be republished would raise a storm of indignation, and the difficulty with which I have to deal is to satisfy people here that I am not weak in agreeing to the commutation of the sentence. But in order to meet any difficulties that you may have from the Ontario elections, I will have the despatch put under a confidential cover so that you may if necessary postpone the publication of it. This will be better than leaving it undated.'

Lord Dufferin wrote in answer :¹

'Your despatch has been very well received and has greatly strengthened my hands, and produced the effect you desired. I send you a report of the Amnesty Debate, from which you will see how largely it has been quoted and referred to. . . .

'When once it was decided that Archibald's intercourse with the criminals did not absolutely fetter the hands of justice, a mild commutation became the only alternative, and I think we may all congratulate ourselves upon the result. An open sore in our body politic will have been effectually closed, and a standing source of irritation and disturbance in our political system removed, and I hear upon all sides expressions of thankfulness and gratitude that the matter has been at last settled.

'The extreme mildness of the sentence of Lepine just enabled Mackenzie to retain the allegiance of his French supporters, whom a severer policy would have forced into opposition, and has reduced the irreconcilables to twenty-one. I have naturally great spirits at the result, and my Government feel that, thanks to you, I have been able to do them a very good turn.'

One difficulty was thus removed, but only to give place to others. In the following year Lord Carnarvon wrote² of what he termed Mr. Fish's 'very unprincipled move', with regard to the Canadian Fisheries agreement, which he refused to carry out unless Great Britain ratified 'three rules of International Law'.³ 'It is

¹ 17th February, 1875.

² To Lord Dufferin, 19th March, 1876.

³ Great Britain had paid the damages adjudicated against her for the depredations of *The Alabama*. But she had refused to ratify those clauses of the Treaty of Washington which attempted to stereotype as International Law the particular judgements of a special case. See Vol. I, p. 264.

a disagreeable and may prove a difficult matter and with the B. Columbian controversy, the Supreme Court Act, and other questions keep us all in hot water this summer.¹ If there were any one but yourself at the head of affairs in Canada I should be seriously anxious : but I have confidence that we shall somehow with patience and a little tact surmount the obstacles.'

Other questions were difficult and inconvenient : the Extradition Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, and the Merchant Shipping Bill, neither of which took Canadian interests sufficiently into account. Lord Carnarvon had to steer between wind and water.

On the 23rd June a Cabinet was called at his request to consider the Merchant Shipping Bill in reference to Canadian interests. It was a stormy meeting and the concessions he thought indispensable were combated with some acrimony by one or two of his colleagues. But with the help of the Chancellor of the Exchequer he was able to secure what was necessary, and in the evening he spoke in the House on the Bill.

In a carefully worded speech he pointed out that the chief difficulty which arose from a constitutional point of view was how far it was possible to draw a distinction in the matter between England and her Colonial possessions. It was a question of such a grave and difficult nature, that if it were at all necessary to discuss it, it would be preferable almost to do so on paper, so that no question might arise even as to a chance expression. The problem was inseparable from the maintenance of so great an Empire ; if approached temperately and in a proper

¹ In April 1875 Lord Dufferin sent home copies of 'An Act to Establish a Supreme Court and a Court of Exchequer for the Dominion of Canada'. Its 47th Clause appeared to impair the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Privy Council : and the terms referring to the Royal Prerogative were not considered to be an adequate safeguard. Mr. Blake came to England to discuss the terms with Lord Carnarvon.

spirit, he believed it to be capable of a satisfactory solution.

He wrote to Lord Dufferin on the 16th July :

‘We are to have an Extradition debate on Thursday. I do not much like the prospect, for between ourselves I believe the F. Office is wrong—and the inconvenience inflicted on Canada in a public point of view is so enormous that it is hardly in my own mind consistent with justice. . . . I must be in the House on Thursday, and if I possibly can avoid speaking, I shall do so. . . .

‘The Merchant Shipping Bill will leave the Lords in a greatly improved form, and I see no reason to think that there will be any opposition in the House of Commons to the amendments which have been introduced. *Entirely between ourselves*, I had a very hard fight to get it amended on the various points which affect Canadian interests, but I think now that the thing has been done the Cabinet are quite satisfied. . . .’

Meanwhile trouble was brewing in the Near East. Turkey and Russia were already at war, and England might be involved. ‘You must have been having a very anxious time in London over your Eastern question,’ wrote Lord Dufferin,¹ ‘and I hope sincerely we may keep out of the scrimmage, as I apprehend if England becomes involved in Eastern complications, we should have trouble here along our border.’

A point of considerable delicacy and constitutional interest, inasmuch as it touched upon the treaty-making power of a Dominion, was raised in the course of 1877. In the absence of Lord Dufferin, the Canadian Premier sent one of his Ministers on a mission to Washington.

‘I fear’, wrote Lord Dufferin,² ‘that it is at this point we shall eventually find the relations of the Dominion with the Mother Country work with the greatest amount of friction. Canada’s relations with the States are of course every day becoming more

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 3rd May, 1877.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 9th October, 1877.

intimate and more complicated, and I don't care how able or zealous the British Minister at Washington may really be, he will never quite satisfy the exigent requirements of the Canadian Government, and if, as might happen, he or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made less allowance for their sensitiveness or took less pains to "ménager" their "amour propre" than the Colonial Office invariably does in its dealings and communications with them, a great deal of bitterness and ill will might be generated.'

The point was the more important in view of the prospect of a resumption of the reciprocity negotiations between Canada and the United States.

Lord Carnarvon wrote on the 1st October :

'I do not look forward with much satisfaction to the renewal of negotiations for reciprocity. It is true that Mackenzie has declared against the scheme of a Zollverein : but other politicians may not be as prudent, and many embarrassing questions, as regards English manufacturers, may arise ; in which it may be hard to prevent Home and Colonial interests coming or being thought to come into collision.

'I am quite aware that if the U.S. Government and Canada desire these negotiations to be opened we must undertake the task however perilous it may be ; and if we do undertake it, there must be no semblance of unwillingness on our part ; but I own I shall not feel much regret if there is some delay, and I see no advantage in pushing on the consideration of a question ; which, to say the least, is a very difficult one to handle.'

A fortnight later Lord Dufferin answered : ¹

'I hope . . . that if the United States should eventually proffer an arrangement which may be at all compatible with the accepted principles of Imperial policy, we may be allowed to take advantage of it, for there is no doubt that the Chinese wall erected by our neighbours along our entire frontier has not only occasioned a great deal of commercial distress, but has stunted the legitimate growth of a good many of our industries. Moreover, if such a treaty is to be negotiated, I think we should be safer in Mackenzie's hands

¹ 15th October, 1877.

than any one else's, as he is by conviction a thorough Free-trader as well as a sincere believer in Imperial connection, and would hardly countenance any arrangement which would be thought inimical to our Home Trade.'

Lord Dufferin's term of Office was drawing to a close, but in answer to Lord Carnarvon's suggestion that he should stay on, he wrote :¹

' But though unable to take advantage of your most handsome proposal, I am not the less grateful for it, and I assure you I feel most deeply this and all the other acts of kindness and proofs of friendship you have shown me.

' And now that I am upon the subject I hope that you will not think I am taking a liberty if I congratulate you upon the success of your own administration, which has certainly been most remarkable ; in fact the Colonial Office is the only Department which our side seems to acknowledge to have been from first to last an unmistakable success. Certainly at no time has Downing Street stood so well with Canada, its Government and people as at present. . . . '

II

FIJI

' If you Plant where Savages are, doe not onely entertaine them with Trifles or Gingles, but use them justly and gratically, with sufficient Guard neverthelesse.'—FRANCIS BACON.

The Fiji Archipelago in the South Pacific consists of 200 islands and islets, some 80 of which are inhabited, their total area equalling about 7,500 square miles, with a total population of about 160,000 inhabitants. Two of


¹ 1st November, 1877.

the islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu,¹ are fairly extensive, their approximate joint area equalling about 6,400 square miles. The larger, Viti Levu, contains the town of Suva, the capital since 1882. The population is of Papuan and Melanesian blood, crossed with Polynesians from Tonga and Samoa. The ruling class—for the old government and social order, with which the English settlers were first brought into contact, were aristocratical—was fairer than the negroid masses; but all, and more especially the savage hill-tribes, who formed about a quarter of the population, were addicted to cannibalism, or, as they termed it, to the eating of ‘long pig’, and to the killing of widows and aged or useless members of the community. These barbarous practices had been abandoned owing to the devoted labours and wonderful influence of the Wesleyan Missionaries.

The inevitable followed. White settlers from the Australian colonies entered Fiji in increasing numbers and an agitation grew up in favour of the annexation of the Archipelago to Australia, or failing that of some form of self-government for white immigrants. Annexation was condemned and rejected as a solution by Lord John Russell in 1862; but it was once more discussed in 1870 at an Australian intercolonial conference. Lord Kimberley, the then Liberal Secretary of State for the Colonies, declined to entertain the proposal and the white settlers in Fiji thereupon prevailed upon the King

¹ There was for some time a question as to whether the name of Fiji should not be changed. It was, Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Queen, ‘a corruption of illiterate sailors and traders of the native designation of Viti (the original native name) and every consideration would seem to indicate the propriety of some change. Lying in the immediate neighbourhood of the New Hebrides, these islands might perhaps be named the “New Orkneys” or from the beauty of their climate and appearance, they might perhaps be fitly termed the “Fair Islands”’.

Lord Carnarvon himself suggested Oceania, but in the end, so strong is custom, the old barbaric name of Fiji displaced these competitors.



to establish a so-called Constitutional Government, and virtually to delegate his own authority to two Englishmen, Mr. Thurston and Mr. Woods, the latter a rough and overbearing man, the former a champion of native rights, more especially those of the powerful hereditary Chiefs. This administration failed to win the confidence or even the sympathy of the white settlers and appears to have been financially unsatisfactory, for, so far from developing the resources of the country, it was said to have emptied the Fijian Treasury.

But while the Gladstone Government was still averse to the assumption of any fresh Imperial obligations, the Colonial movement in Germany was beginning to betray dangerous ambitions, and was causing some disquiet in Australia.

Writing to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Goschen, a few months before the election which placed the Conservatives in power, Commander Goodenough, R.N., reported that the Chiefs had decided to cede the islands to Great Britain and 'to throw themselves on her generosity'. He hoped that the Government would accept, for he could not see 'the smallest hope of it being possible to get a local Government to work again'.

Reminiscent of some South Sea adventure of Stevenson's is his earlier description of an interview with the King and his two English advisers.

'In addition to the matters pro and con of annexation the gentlemen managing the Fijian Government have got themselves into a very pretty mess by an attempted *coup d'état* of which details have been sent officially, but in rather a disjointed fashion.

'One must give these gentlemen credit for a great deal of cleverness and energy, for they have succeeded in getting the aid of a British man-of-war to enforce their

authority for the last eight or nine months, and actually had the impudence to offer one of the Captains 240 acres of land in recognition of his services.

‘I have seen King Cakoban, who is a dignified, respectable-looking old man enough now, though one can’t help looking at his white teeth and remembering how he used to use them thirty-five years ago or less.

‘On my telling him that Mr. Layard and I should detain him and the chiefs to consider whether they do or do not wish to put his country under the British Government, he very naively said, “Oh, as far as I am concerned, I can answer at once, I should like to keep Viti (Fiji) for myself, but I will consult the Chiefs.” It was the exclamation of a semi-savage not liking to part with any power or dignity now that he had ministers to help him.

‘I said, “Then why did you ask the British Government whether they would annex your country or consider the question?” “Oh,” he said, “I only asked that we might talk about it.”

‘Mr. Thurston here interposed with an attempt at explanation that I was to remember that at the time that the question of January last was sent by telegram to Lord Granville, the Fijian Government was in great difficulties.

‘I said, “Then I am to understand that now that your difficulties are over, you no longer care to advise the King to ask for annexation?” He protested that this was not the case. . . .’

He then proceeded to report that he himself could see no solution but annexation. ‘Had things come to a crisis a few days ago, and had Mr. Thurston resigned, as he pretended to do to Captain Simpson, I should at once have hoisted the English flag beside the Fijian as a Pro-

tectorate for a time, and should have required all acts of Government to have the concurrence of our own and of such other Foreign Consuls as consented to the arrangement. . . . I should at once have cashiered half the servants of Government as the Treasury contains no money to pay them with, and they are keeping up absurd establishments.

‘The two things which I set before me are the maintenance of peace and quiet, and the continuance of the Courts of Law. All else is unimportant, and with the assistance of the Consuls, these can be maintained although the rest of the Government may be changed.’¹

Such was the situation with which Lord Carnarvon was confronted, when he was called upon to deal with the question of Fiji.

He took some months to consider it in all its bearings, and for this purpose obtained a full report from Sir James Fergusson, the Governor of New Zealand, who paid a special visit to the islands.

‘My chief wish’, wrote Fergusson,² ‘is to bring before you . . . my sense of the pity which it would be to stand upon a policy of non-intervention in the Pacific, on account of the disappointment to the Australasian Colonies, in their essence expansive and enterprising ; of the years of anarchy and suffering likely to be caused to the native communities, who are both capable and willing to be ruled by us ; and of the disadvantage at which our interests at this end of the world will stand, if we leave other nations, as probably we have done in the Samoan group, to step into the places which are at present open to us.’

The Queen, who was greatly interested, but alarmed at the idea of annexation on the ground of the barbarity of

¹ Commander Goodenough to Mr. Goschen, 2nd December, 1873.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 13th April, 1874.

Fijian customs, was eager for the latest information. Lord Carnarvon advised that the cession of Sovereignty must be complete and unconditional.

‘Your Majesty will have observed that in the appendix to that report certain conditions are specified, but in the opinion of Lord Carnarvon and his colleagues it would be unwise to recommend to Your Majesty the acceptance of the islands if subject to such conditions. There are amongst them some which are not open to serious objection, but there are others which would constitute an undertaking to maintain the hereditary rights of certain chiefs which would be wholly impracticable. . . . On the other hand, looking to the opinion of New Zealand and Australia and, as far as can be gathered, of Parliament and this country, and looking at the advantages which these islands possess as an intermediate station between America and Australia, and the chance of great disorders arising, unless some Government is constituted, it seems impossible to give a direct refusal to the cession, provided that the conditions of it are not open to objections. . . .

‘In these circumstances Lord Carnarvon proposes to direct Sir H. Robinson ¹ to proceed from Sydney to Fiji, and having assembled the chiefs and people and other authorities interested, to make them understand that only a wholly unconditional cession can be accepted. . . .

‘Your Majesty will doubtless have perceived from the paper on the question that there has of late years been a great improvement in the habits of the natives and that in most parts of the islands the old and barbarous customs have died and have been replaced by the profession at least of Christianity.’ ²

In a speech delivered in the House of Lords on the 17th July, 1874, Lord Carnarvon indicated briefly the principal reasons in favour of accepting the cession of the islands.

‘The geographical area of those islands is not very large, but they are of exquisite natural beauty. . . . No frost ever comes there. The temperature is at all times compara-

¹ Afterwards Lord Rosmead.

² 13th July, 1874.

tively mild. The internal resources of the islands are considerable, for the soil is very productive. Then look at the position of these islands. They are in the track of all ships passing between the New World and the still newer world of Australia. They possess unquestionably fine harbours, and one of them would be a desirable intermediate station for the coaling of steamers running between America and Australia.

‘ In the next place . . . we should not forget the labour trade which has grown up in the seas off these islands. Bishop Patteson, a true martyr, offered up his life in an effort against that atrocious kidnapping trade, and no Government, whether it sits on this side or the other, can view with anything but deep interest everything that offers a means of putting down that iniquity. . . .

‘ I hardly like to say that England has a mission to extend her policy of colonization in this part of the world, but at all events it does seem to me that there is an indirect duty which lies before us, as far as we can to take under our protection a place into which English capital has overflowed, in which English settlers are resident, in which, it must be added, English lawlessness is going on.’

New Zealand and New South Wales had offered cordial co-operation in carrying out the policy of annexation. The difficulties were very great, but provided the cession of the Islands was untrammelled by unworkable conditions, he was not afraid to encounter those difficulties and was confident of defeating them.

After his speech an unexpected hitch occurred. The first domestic storm in which the Disraeli Cabinet was involved had just reached a crisis, and in a fit of impatience the Prime Minister sent Lord Carnarvon a curt intimation that the Cabinet on Fiji would not be held. But Lord

Carnarvon vigorously protested, and the Prime Minister replied that he left everything to his discretion.¹

On the 30th September, 1874, Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphed from Fiji : ²

‘The King has this day signed an unconditional cession of the country. I am leaving to-day on a tour through the Islands to obtain the signatures of Maafu and other ruling Chiefs.

‘Have had some difficulties, but now anticipate a completely satisfactory issue to my mission.’

Mr. Gladstone was from the first strongly opposed to the annexation of Fiji, but it was not difficult to defend it in both Houses of Parliament.

The wisdom of the British Government in taking possession of Fiji in 1874 was made plain in the following year. The Germans, well aware that Great Britain was absorbed in the Eastern Question, were beginning to display those characteristics which have since marked their colonial policy. The following letter from Sir Arthur Gordon, the first High Commissioner of Fiji, dated Nasova, 17th July, 1877, describes an incident very typical of their methods :

‘I have sent you to-day a despatch with respect to the Germans in Samoa, founded upon what Capt. Hassenpflug told me when he called on me officially. As what he said to me on the subject of Tonga was only said to me after dinner at my own table, I think it should only be mentioned in a private letter.

‘He informed me that he was about to proceed to Tonga, and that he had little doubt he should be able to find that in some way the treaty made last year between Germany and Tonga had been broken ; and in this case he should exact a further treaty giving increased privileges to Germans resident in Tonga, and virtually bringing it under German control. He was quite aware that King George (the Tongan sovereign) would be very averse from

¹ Cf. p. 73.

² Received 16th October, 1874.

this and "hoped" that he would attempt to refuse, as he would have the greatest pleasure in burning down the King's new European villa. Terror was, according to him, the only way of ruling or dealing with these people, a point on which I ventured to differ from him.

'The coarse rough tone of all the officers with regard to Samoa was most painful. The enormous disproportion of force did not seem to strike them and they gloated over anticipations of burning and shelling towns, and shooting natives, as if they were anticipating a fight with an enemy of equal strength.

'I repeat, these islands will pass into the hands of *some* power before another year is over; they will certainly not willingly become German, so long as they have the slightest chance of being accepted by England. . . .'

Under Sir Arthur Gordon's 'energy, courage and administrative skill' ¹ the annexation of the Fiji Islands was subsequently justified by its success, and in two years the revenue rose from £16,433 to £49,050.

III

PERAK

The annexation of Perak followed shortly after that of Fiji. The principal difficulty of the Straits Government ² lay in the antagonism which existed between the Malay natives and the Chinese immigrants who worked the minerals, and on whom the Malay Chiefs levied tolls. This led to constant feuds, wars and piracies. Blood

¹ Lord Carnarvon's letter to Sir Arthur Gordon in sending him the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George.

² The Straits Settlement petitioned in 1858 to be transferred from the control of the re-organized Indian Government to that of the Colonial Office. This indicated a great change of feeling, for the Colonial Office had been till then a very unpopular department (Speech, House of Lords, 10th March, 1859). But the desired change was not effected until April, 1867, when he had charge of the Bill which brought it about.

was spilt, trade was being destroyed, and anarchy reigned.¹

The Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke (who succeeded Sir Henry Orde),² struck with 'remarkable energy, ability and discretion' at the root of the evil ; he concluded a treaty with the Chiefs of the Peninsula, which settled the question of disputed succession, appointed provincial residents, and, while conciliating the Chinese, inflicted due punishment upon such of the rioters as deserved it.

Lord Carnarvon had approved of Sir Andrew's rearrangements, but impressed upon him in successive despatches the importance of exercising the utmost caution in the affairs of the Settlement. Sir Andrew Clarke was succeeded as High Commissioner by Sir William Jervois, who reported the condition of the country as being everything that could reasonably be desired.

But difficulties soon arose in Perak. The new 'Sultan' was, according to the Resident, Mr. Birch, frivolous, weak and an imbecile—an opium smoker 'surrounded by his so-called doctor, a blackguard who smokes opium with him, fights his cocks, gambles and looks a thorough debauchee, and two or three others, and lots of women, all of whom are slaves and most of them prostitutes'.³

Sir William Jervois wrote :⁴ 'He bought a state coat for his coronation which cost him £1,000, but the ceremony was continually being deferred, for the conclusive reason that the deposed Sultan Ismael retained possession of the regalia, together with 50 royal elephants,

¹ Speech, House of Lords, 19th May, 1874.

² The expenditure of the Colony under Sir Henry Orde's Governorship never reached its income. No new taxes were imposed. The value of land increased largely ; the trade of the Settlement increased 27 per cent. ; shipping entered, 40 per cent. ; shipping cleared, 45 per cent., and when revenue and expenditure were taken the result was that the Colony which commenced its career without a balance had a credit at the commencement of 1874 of nearly 700 dollars.


³ Mr. Birch's *Diaries*, 8th November, 1874.

⁴ To Lord Carnarvon, 29th May, 1875.

MALAY PENINSULA

English Miles

0 50 100



worth in Calcutta from £150 to £200 apiece, and refused to give them up.'

Two months later ¹ he urged that the system of appointing British Residents to advise the Rajahs was a mistake, and that the predominance of the Chinese, who were friendly to British rule and who formed the great trading element in the Protectorate, afforded a good ground for the annexation of the Sultanate of Perak. This step he held would be popular with the masses of the people, and would be equally acceptable to the ruling Chiefs providing the latter were handsomely pensioned.

Lord Carnarvon considered this proposal premature and too sweeping. He wrote in answer from Balmoral on the 13th September :

' . . . In enumerating the various considerations which may affect the future policy to be followed with regard to the different States of the Peninsula, and especially Perak, you include them all in the very grave proposal to convert our present "Residential" system into one of direct control and sovereignty.

' I will not say that the time may not be at hand when such a step may become necessary. I am quite aware that the change would probably be one for the benefit of the people ; and it is possible that, as you say, no serious opposition or difficulty would arise on the spot. But I am clearly of opinion that this time—whether it be near or less near—has not yet come. The present position of affairs in Burmah and China seems to me to render it inexpedient to take any step in the direction which you indicate, and I think there would be fair ground of objection in England that before the system of residents has really had a trial and whilst great improvement is taking place under it, a very large change should be forced on without any strong and ostensible reason for it.

' It is only within the last few months that the fact that we are establishing a very large system of indirect control over the States of the Peninsula is becoming realized by the general public

¹ 10th July, 1875.

in this country. We must in all these things move in harmony with that public opinion : and as a matter of wise policy I desire to see our present system somewhat more consolidated and the results of it somewhat more clearly ascertained and understood before we take the next move.

‘ You mention in the early part of your letter certain heavy but not very definite financial obligations which have been incurred towards some of the Native States. This is new to me, and I should be glad to know more on the subject. Perhaps you will be good enough to send me an explanation of this at your early convenience.

‘ I should like also to have from you some description of the present life and state of things under native rule in different parts of the country, especially as modified by our new system of Residents. . . .

‘ Do not hesitate to write me on any question of policy or administration when you may desire my opinion, or where changes may seem to you expedient.’

This was clearly wise counsel. Unfortunately the High Commissioner, without waiting for the receipt of Lord Carnarvon’s despatch, and moved by the intelligence that some of the most influential of the Perak chiefs had expressed a desire to come under British rule, did the very thing which he was told not to do. He issued a proclamation annexing Perak.¹

The Colonial Secretary and the Cabinet disapproved of this unauthorized and important departure. For the moment, however, the ultimate political destination of Perak was obscured by serious local disturbances beginning with the murder of the British Resident, Mr. Birch, and leading up to a small colonial war, conducted by Sir William Jervois with the aid of troops extracted not without difficulty from the reluctant grasp of the Secretary of State for India.

¹ 15th October, 1875.

Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Carnarvon on the 20th November :

‘ This is a moment of great excitement in India, and any hasty movement which could lead to the impression that we were denuding the country of troops, might produce very perilous results. Perak can, if need be, be reconquered later ; a panic in India might be irreparable. 1,000 men, if Europeans are meant, may not be easily sent from India just now. At any time it would be a large deduction from a garrison reduced to its lowest point : just now soldiers are not easily spared. . . .’

At this critical moment the telegraph wire between Madras and Penang broke, which deprived the Colonial Office for the moment of all real control of the situation.

Sir William Jervois had shown great vigour and skill in the operations, and when hostilities were over, Lord Carnarvon defended the High Commissioner in the House of Lords,¹ while at the same time refusing to commit himself to the policy of annexation. The murder of Mr. Birch, he said, had taken the Government at Singapore by surprise. There were but few troops on the spot, while the telegraphic communication was at that moment interrupted. But in the course of a very few weeks 3,000 men from India and Hong Kong were collected, and it was to that rapid concentration of their troops at the point of danger, that their final success was due. Much as he regretted the necessity for sending out this expedition, it had been eminently useful. Three of the murderers of Mr. Birch had been brought to justice, and ‘ we had shown such nations as Burmah and China that English justice would pursue its object under all difficulties, and had given them to understand how great a power we were in the East ’.

¹ 28th February, 1876.

But although he paid a well-deserved tribute to the humanity, the readiness, and the efficiency of Sir William Jervois' military measures, and allowed that the annexation might under the circumstances have been inevitable, he did not fail to point out to the Governor ¹ the respective positions of the Imperial Government and the local authorities.

'An Annexation policy may or may not hereafter become necessary—but one thing I desire to lay down in the clearest language, that I will not sanction a great measure of State policy being adopted by a Colonial Government without the sanction and in opposition to the instructions of the Home Government. When Annexation has become expedient Her Majesty's Government must have the exclusive responsibility of the measure.'

Ultimately the Sultan Abdullah was found guilty of complicity in the murder of Mr. Birch, and was deported to the Seychelles. Perak, divided into two residencies, has flourished under British control, participating in the general development of progress and prosperity which has marked for the last thirty years the history of the various protected Native States in the Malay Peninsula.²

The conception of a Protectorate as distinct from a regular colony, though analogous to the constitutional position of the Native States of India, is at present so familiar to us, that few realize its comparatively novel character as a useful intermediate process in the development of a Colonial Dominion between the first state, called 'a sphere of influence', and the final development of a full and unchallengeable sovereignty.

In the first stage the annexing Power assumes few or no

¹ 10th February, 1876.

² Sir William Jervois was recommended by Lord Carnarvon for the G.C.M.G. for his services as Governor of the Straits Settlements, 1875-7.

responsibilities. It has pegged out a claim in a region which it intends at some future time to develop and administer, and in which it asserts a prior right of occupation, duly notified to all the other states. The next stage, the protectorate, compels it to defend the local native ruler, in return for the subordination of his foreign policy, and to some extent of his internal administration, to the wishes, disguised as friendly counsels, of the foreign protecting state. In the third and final stage, the protecting state usually absorbs the full functions of government. The protectorate system thus provides a valuable mode of transition in the case of primitive races between a mere alliance with Great Britain, concluded by dependent Native Chiefs, and an annexation, involving some application of European institutions and legal systems to insufficiently educated populations. When Lord Carnarvon was first Colonial Secretary it was only applied in tropical Africa. It has since received a far wider extension, and although purely English in its origin, has been adapted or copied by several other European powers.

IV

GAMBIA

One of the main difficulties on the West Coast of Africa arose from the conflict of jurisdictions. French and English trade stations had originally been established along the coast without any method, which resulted in much confusion of administration, loss in the fiscal system, and made the control of the importation and sale of arms most difficult.

The French coveted the Gambia River Colony, which

was entirely surrounded by French territory, and where there were but twenty white British subjects; and Lord Carnarvon recognized the advantage of a fair exchange. 'My leaning is, as I think you know,' he wrote to Lord Derby on the 31st August, 1874, 'in favour of the exchange being attempted mainly for the following reasons: (1) The exchange will certainly simplify Government on the Gold Coast, and probably increase the revenue. (2) I think trouble is very likely to arise at the Gambia if we do not part with it. The papers which I have sent you from time to time show how precarious are our relations with the tribes. We may easily have another West African War there on our hands. (3) Our recent annexation policy at Fiji and elsewhere will, I think, save us from the suspicions which our predecessors would have had to meet. . . .'


A few months later,¹ he sent Lord Derby a despatch on the exchange with the French, (1) for territory near Sierra Leone; (2) Grand Bassam and Assinee; (3) any claims, &c., on the line of coast between the Gold Coast and Lagos.

'These three cessions on their part would, I think, constitute a fair equivalent. I can fancy that "timid counsels" might deprecate No. 3, but *on the whole* if an exchange is to be proceeded with, I think we ought to have these shadowy rights and claims.' There did not seem much likelihood of opposition from the Gambia, where it seemed a question of merely a few thousand pounds compensation.

Reasonable as these proposals obviously were, they eventually foundered on the rock of timidity and distrust. 'As a general rule', replied Lord Derby,² 'all exchanges of territory are unpopular,' and the Cabinet, which was

¹ 12th December, 1874.

² 16th December, 1874.



very shy of the proposal, fearing a debate in the House of Commons, gave but a reluctant assent. The way was then free for the continuation of negotiations, which were carried on, not through the Colonial, but through the Foreign Office. Summer passed into autumn, autumn into winter, and nothing was concluded. In February, 1876, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce sent a deputation to protest against the proposed cession, and it became clear from this and succeeding deputations that there would be, in Lord Carnarvon's words, 'a great outcry that we are giving away territory and men to the French'.¹

It was accordingly agreed that the Colonial Secretary should raise the question in the House of Lords, and that in the event of further opposition a Select Committee should be appointed. So the case for the proposed transfer was explained in full by Lord Carnarvon on the 17th February, 1876.

He reminded the House that the French had now made a proposal to surrender all their claims between Sierra Leone and the easternmost extremity of Lagos, with the result that Britain could obtain exclusive rights over the waters of the Niger. The current objections were then refuted. It was not really an old Colony, as had been asserted, the actual settlement only dating from 1816. It was an exchange, not a 'cession'. Lord Kimberley, the previous Colonial Minister, had given no pledge that the question should not be re-opened. Had he done so, 'having regard to what the French call the *solidarité* which ought to exist between successive Governments, I should have paused before renewing the negotiations for the transfer.'

It was said that there was an unanimous objection on

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Lord Derby, 1st February, 1874.

the part of the colonists to the transfer : and ‘ If I for a moment supposed ’, he said, ‘ that there was any validity in this objection, I would not be the one to make this proposition ; I have a horror of trafficking in populations. I think such transactions are most foul, and can be adopted only in furtherance of the most base policy. To my mind nothing can be more reprehensible than to tamper with the feelings of populations in such a manner.’

But the facts were far otherwise. The population was stated to consist of 14,000 natives, and the European element had dwindled year by year, till it stood at twenty persons, and the petition against the transfer which had been sent to him was signed by 152 persons only, the petitioners being described by the Governor as mainly boys, ‘ men of straw ’, and many names written in the same handwriting.

For seven years the revenue had been in deficit ; the climate was bad, epidemics raged ; ‘ in the rains the Europeans die, and in the cold the Africans.’¹ The neighbouring tribes were far from amicable ; for two years the country had been on the eve of war with them, and wars had been of constant occurrence in the past.

The exchange proposed was, in his opinion, more favourable to England than any previous one, and it was at the moment also more important, having regard to the altered circumstances of the Gold Coast.

Two days later the matter was again discussed in Cabinet, ‘ which was as usual adverse to a bold course,’ wrote Lord Carnarvon. The discussion ended in the decision that Disraeli should announce the appointment of a Committee in the House of Commons.

Opposition, however, now came from another quarter.

¹ The Administrator in 1866.

The French Government suddenly withdrew their offer to cede the whole control of the coast east of the Gold Coast in exchange for Gambia. This changed the situation. Lord Carnarvon had been prepared to favour the projected transfer only on the terms of complete cession of this territory, and the negotiations, therefore, once more fell through, and a scheme fraught with much promise and open to no substantial objections was frustrated.¹

Many years afterwards, writing upon the subject, Lord Carnarvon referred with regret to the abortive ending of a project which must have resulted in strengthening and consolidating the British Possessions in West Africa. Had it been carried out, the German Colony of Togo and the French Colony of Dahomey would not have been driven like wedges between the Gold Coast and Lagos. Nor have the wars, which Lord Carnarvon foresaw, been lacking, and the deficit, although variable, is still to be lamented.

V

THE GOLD COAST AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY

When the Conservative Government took Office Lord Carnarvon found a war in progress on the Gold Coast against the King of Ashanti, who had made an unprovoked attack on the British Protectorate. The management of the war, now fast drawing to its conclusion,

¹ By a piece of carelessness on the part of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carnarvon was never officially informed of the change of attitude on the part of the French Government, and only learnt of it indirectly through the letter of a French merchant.

was the responsibility of the Gladstone Administration, and some members of the Conservative Cabinet were inclined to criticize. Lord Carnarvon, however, took the view that there was more to praise than to blame in the conduct of Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations. 'The mortality as yet has not been excessive—the expenditure is certainly moderate,'¹ and he advised therefore that attention should be concentrated on the difficult questions of policy which would arise on the conclusion of peace.

It was first of all necessary to explain to the public why the British colony in the Gold Coast should be retained.² There were two main grounds. 'One is that of trade, the other that of obligation. I do not think we can resolve the question of retention or abandonment into one of a mere balance sheet in the National ledger. It ought not to be settled on a mere consideration of profit and loss. There are many things which do not pay pecuniarily—honour, religion, morality, bring in no direct money return—but we do not treat these principles as of no account in the National consideration. A great Nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge disagreeable duties ; she must consent to bear burdens which are inseparable from her greatness ; but in this case the real question is, what are our obligations ? They are of two kinds, written and unwritten. Our written obligations in respect of the Gold Coast are but few in number. First the Treaty of 1831 . . . secondly, a bond entered into with the Native Chiefs on the subject of human sacrifices and barbarous customs ; and, thirdly, there was the poll-tax imposed for a time during the period when my noble friend [Earl Grey] held the seals of the

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Mr. Disraeli, 6th March, 1874.

² Lord Carnarvon, House of Lords, 12th May, 1874.

Colonial Office. There is doubtless something in those written obligations, but I do not think there is sufficient to make it necessary for us to continue our occupation of the Gold Coast.

‘ But there are unwritten obligations—moral ones—and these appear to me to be very strong. First, we have taught these people, by a very long system of protection, to lean upon us. They have lost their manliness and independence of character, and if we abandon them at this moment, the probability is that the Ashanti power would spread itself over the Protectorate. We should, in fact, hand them over to the tender mercies of exasperated enemies ; and to abandon them at this moment would be an act of virtual cruelty and treachery which this country would not, and ought not to sanction. Again, though our influence on that coast has not been as great as we could have wished it to be, it has not been without considerable and humanizing results. It has been the means of inducing these people to abandon some of their most barbarous customs ; it has mitigated and greatly softened the worst features of domestic slavery ; life and property have been rendered comparatively secure. . . . Lastly, we have given the people a system of education, though it is true a very imperfect one. Without exaggeration, we have led them a certain distance along the road to civilization.

‘ Now, it is the opinion of the soundest authorities that if we were to retire from the coast at this moment, our work would be undone, the wheel of progress would run backward, and even human sacrifices would be seen at Cape Coast Castle within a year. Under all the circumstances, I feel—and Her Majesty’s Government feel—that we are acting in accordance with the instincts of Parliament and of the country, when we come to the

conclusion that, at such a moment as this, especially, it is impossible for us to terminate our occupation of the Gold Coast.'

He now proposed to consolidate Lagos and the Gold Coast into one colony, very much on the principle of the organization of the Straits Settlements. Salaries were to be increased to some extent, but in no way disproportionately to the increase in the revenue of the Colony. A change would have to be made in the seat of government. Cape Coast Castle offered no advantages from a commercial or a sanitary point of view, and the choice of the future capital would lie between Accra to the east and Elmina to the west. It would also be necessary to establish a hill station. For the furtherance of trade, roads must be opened up and made secure by detachments of armed police.

It would be essential to maintain an adequate military force. The climate was fatal to British and even West Indian troops. The wisest policy would be to dispense with British troops and rely entirely on native forces, drawn not from one but from many different tribes, and officered by British officers.

Lord Carnarvon further drew attention to the evil consequences which had followed on the application to the Gold Coast of English law in all its technicalities and subtle processes. A great simplification was needed in the interests of trade, and in this connection another matter called for very serious consideration, namely, the importation of arms.

In the administration of justice also, changes would be necessary. It was proposed to appoint a Chief Justice, Magistrates, and a Public Prosecutor, instead of the one and only Judge then existing on the Gold Coast, and it was very doubtful whether the jury system ought not to under-

go material modification. It would obviously be the object of Her Majesty's Government to abolish slavery, but it would be impossible to do it at that moment by a stroke of the pen, without incurring heavy expenditure for compensation, and other complications.

While carrying out these alterations, Lord Carnarvon was determined at the same time to do away altogether with the slave-trade in those Colonies and Protectorates, and so far as possible to abolish domestic slavery, especially the custom which then prevailed among the tribes of treating wives and children as slaves who might be sold or pawned in payment of debt.¹

In British territory, as distinct from Protectorates, there was no difficulty, for slavery had been abolished by the Acts of Parliament of the 3rd and 4th of William the Fourth. But in Protectorates, where it had always existed by law and custom, Lord Russell had written in July, 1841, that 'We had no right to set aside those laws and usages, except by persuasion, negotiation, and other peaceful means'. But England had just saved the Fantee tribes from subjugation, and they owed her a debt of gratitude, to which Lord Carnarvon in his despatch to the Governor of the 21st August alluded,

¹ A Royal Proclamation defined the Queen's jurisdiction on the Gold Coast, thus :

1. The preservation of the public peace and the protection of individuals and property.
2. The administration of civil and criminal justice.
3. The abolition of human sacrifices and other barbarous customs, and of slave trading.
4. Measures with regard to the ultimate abolition of domestic slavery and pawning.
5. The protection and encouragement of trade and traders, including the construction and improvement of roads.
6. The maintenance of an armed police force.
7. The settling, by the authority of the Governor, of disputes arising between chiefs and rulers in those territories.
8. The establishment of municipalities.
9. Public education.
10. The raising of revenue.

saying that 'in return for the benefits thus conferred, their [the chiefs' and people's] co-operation is required in pursuit of one principal and paramount object, which Her Majesty's Government will employ their unremitting efforts to accomplish, and this is the immediate abolition of slave-dealing and the importation of slaves, to be followed by such regulations of the relations between master and slave as shall ultimately, and in no long course of time, effect the extinction of slavery itself'.

After instructing the Administrator to draft an ordinance for submission to Her Majesty's Government, by which full punishment should be awarded for the crime of slave-dealing, and by which every person brought under compulsion within the bounds of the Protectorate to be sold, or otherwise dealt with as a slave, should be declared free, he went on to consider the whole question of domestic slavery in the Protectorate, and to suggest various methods by which, without causing too great and general discontent or subversion of existing social relations, this evil also might be suppressed. Among other suggestions, he referred to a plan adopted by Lord William Bentinck in India which simply forbade slave-dealing, and provided that no Court should take cognizance of any right over the liberty or person of a servant, otherwise than under the ordinary rules of English law applicable to contracts for service between free men. He observed that there was no disturbance of labour relations ; where the slaves were content, they went on serving. There was no excitement and no occasion for compensation. But the emancipation was far more complete and immediate than in any other country, and probably affected many more millions of men than in America and the West Indies put together.

In reply to this despatch, Governor Strahan submitted two draft ordinances to Lord Carnarvon : the first, for the immediate abolition of slave-dealing by making it a penal offence ; and the second, for the abolition of slavery in the protected territories, by adopting the plan suggested by Lord Carnarvon, and referred to above. It was also provided that any person born after the promulgation of the ordinance was to be *ipso facto* free. On receipt of these draft ordinances, Lord Carnarvon, in a despatch of the 28th October, 1874, desired the Governor, provided the feeling of the chiefs and tribes was satisfactory, at once to summon the Legislative Council of the Gold Coast, and procure the enactment of the ordinance to abolish slave-dealing 'after such short interval only as may suffice to ensure its provisions coming to the knowledge of those principally affected by it'. He left it to the Governor's discretion to enforce the second ordinance at once, or to hold it over for a time : 'If, upon a review of the situation, you can see your way prudently to act, and if, as I think probable, you think immediate action clearly desirable, then you are not only at liberty, but you have my full sanction and authority for proceeding with the second measure. In the event of your deciding to take this course, you may rely upon every support that I can give you.'

The Governor urged that there should be no delay, and although no opposition was expected, it was necessary to take all precautions, and to add a naval force to the armed police on the Coast. The Prime Minister agreed with great satisfaction to all these measures.

The ordinances were passed and promulgated by the Legislative Council on the 17th December, 1874; and thus to Lord Carnarvon belongs the honour not only of having finally stamped out the slave-trade in the Gold

Coast, that historic haunt of the slave-trader, but also of having quietly and without disturbance procured the extinction of slavery in the British possessions in West Africa.

VI

THE COOLIE TRAFFIC

The striking success of the measures taken for the suppression of the slave-trade, and the abolition of domestic slavery on the Gold Coast gave rise to hopes of other reforms. The Admiralty Fugitive Slave Circular had brought the whole question before the public; and the annexation of Fiji drew attention to the kidnapping of Pacific Islanders.¹

The question of the supply and transport of Indian and Chinese coolies, and of the relations of employers and employed, had again become a burning one. Lord Carnarvon, who had long been interested in the problem, had spoken upon it as early as 1858.² By the Chinese Passenger Act of 1855 an emigration agent had been appointed at the Port of Hong Kong, whose duty it was to ascertain that every passenger ship was properly fitted out, and, above all, that the coolies themselves had full knowledge of the nature of the service they were entering. This rule had subsequently been extended to each of the five ports of China open to European commerce. The Act had worked satisfactorily in the trade with the English Colonies. But the trade with foreign Colonies had been subject to very grievous abuses. Coolies were induced

¹ On the 16th March, 1875, Lord Carnarvon moved the Second Reading of the Pacific Islanders Protection Bill.

² House of Lords, 21st June, 1858.

to emigrate under false pretences ; and no matter what contract they might have made in China, their future position was invariably one of unmitigated slavery. On board ship unjust and inefficient management led to frequent mutinies and disasters at sea, and the ordinary mortality among the emigrants was much greater than among the coolies shipped to British Colonies : indeed it was proved that the sick were often callously landed on the beach to die and rot there.

Once the coolies landed in a foreign Colony it was beyond the power of the British Government to interfere. It was, however, doing all it could to devise a remedy.

Subsequently the trade increased, the conditions became worse, and a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into it.

On the report of this Commission Lord Carnarvon based a despatch containing his recommendations to Governors for the regulation of the traffic.

In the Mauritius in 1876 there were as many as ten thousand vagrants of the coolie class. Their moral and sanitary condition was very bad, but the imperative necessity, Lord Carnarvon pointed out,¹ was not the suppression of the importation, but the regulation of the trade.


Deputations of the Anti-Slavery Society and the Planters of Jamaica waited on him with directly opposing views, the planters desiring that a moderate annual immigration should be ensured, partly at Jamaican Government expense, while the Anti-Slavery Society protested that the peasantry of Jamaica were driven out of work by the coolies, and that taxation laid upon them the partial burden of paying for the importation of their supplanters.

The difficulty was in part caused then, as it is caused

¹ House of Lords, 12th May, 1876.

now, by the difference of the rate of wage in factories and agriculture, but that the coolies were in some instances very well paid, is clear. The following letter from Governor Irving of Trinidad is an illustration :

‘ We are in the midst of our races. The Governor’s Cup was won yesterday by a coolie ! You imagine the excitement among his countrymen. . . . He ran his horse purely for sport ; gave his jockey a gold watch and chain for winning a first race, and all the stake for the Governor’s Cup. His whole ambition was the Cup itself, out of which he intends to take his milk every morning. A few years ago he was an indentured coolie on the estate of . . . one of the stewards, and his jockey was a former overseer and manager on the estate on which our friend . . . was driver. So much for immigration. It ought to be a grand advertisement for us in Calcutta.’



HISTORICAL MAP OF BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA

DATES IN CONNECTION WITH SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY

Discovery of the Cape of Good Hope by Bartholomew Diaz	1486
First occupation by Dutch	1652
First capture by British	1795
Retroceded to Dutch	1803
Second capture by British	1806
Finally ceded to British by Dutch Government in return for six millions sterling	1814
First British immigration to Cape Colony	1820
Abolition of Slavery	1834
First great Kaffir War	1834
Crown Colony Government granted to the Cape	1835
Great Boer Trek	1836
Annexation of Natal	1843
Second Kaffir War	1846
Battle of Boomplatz and annexation of Orange River Sovereignty	1848
Third Kaffir War	1850-2
Sand River Convention	1852
Representative Government granted to the Cape Colony	1853
Independence of Orange Free State	1854
<i>Lord Carnarvon Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies</i>	1858-9
<i>Lord Carnarvon Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 6,</i>	1866
<i>Resignation of Office March,</i>	1867
Discovery of diamonds on Vaal River	1867
Annexation of Basutoland	1869
Annexation of Griqualand West	1871
Responsible Government granted to the Cape	1872
Langalibalele's Rebellion	1873-4
<i>Lord Carnarvon Secretary of State for the Colonies for the second time Feb. 21,</i>	1874
Mr. Froude's mission August,	1874

Sir Garnet Wolseley's mission to Natal	.	.	.	1875
London South African Conference	.	.	.	1876
Sir T. Shepstone's mission	.	.	Autumn,	1876
South African Permissive Federation Act	.	.	.	1877
Sir Bartle Frere appointed to the Cape	.	.	.	1877
Annexation of the Transvaal	.	.	.	1877
Fourth and last Kaffir War	.	.	.	1877-8
<i>Resignation of Lord Carnarvon</i>	.	.	Jan.,	1878
Zulu War	.	.	.	1879
Recall of Sir B. Frere	.	.	.	1880
First Boer War	.	.	.	1880-1
Retrocession of the Transvaal	.	.	.	1881
Discovery of gold in the Transvaal	.	.	.	1886
Charter granted to British South Africa Company	.	.	.	1889
Grant of Responsible Government to Natal	.	.	.	1893
Jameson Raid	.	.	.	1895
Outbreak of second Boer War	.	.	.	1899
Second annexation of Orange Free State and Transvaal	.	.	.	1900
Union of South Africa	.	.	.	1910

CHAPTER XXIV

SOUTH AFRICA

1867-1877

‘The key to South African politics is the question of the treatment of the Natives.’—SIR HENRY BARKLY, 25th July, 1874.

I

THERE were present in South Africa in 1874, even more perhaps than in Canada before Federation, all those causes of useless friction and discontent which result from differences of race, tariffs, laws, and frontiers. Over all these difficulties towered the question of the policy to be pursued towards the vast numbers of coloured men who, numerically superior to the whites, were mostly warlike and often hostile.

In the Transvaal, an area as large as Great Britain and Ireland, the white population, numbering from 40,000 to 45,000, was surrounded by a black fringe of uncounted natives, estimated at something under one million. The laws of the Orange Free State kept strict order within its own boundaries, and drove the natives to overflow into Natal. Here the Blacks numbered 350,000—a number constantly increasing—while the white population was only ‘about 17,000 souls scattered over an area of 18,600 miles . . . a proportion of about five-ninths of a white human being to each square

mile of territory, or one able-bodied man to every ten square miles'.¹ Cape Colony, indeed, had no native question, the tribes having been broken up and placed under Residents.

In 1866 the native difficulties seemed to have found at least a temporary solution, and in consequence Lord Carnarvon had advocated the gradual withdrawal of troops from the Cape. He admitted,² however, that the burden of local military expenditure could hardly be required from the Colony without an accompanying concession of responsible government—an expedient which had been discussed in the Colony some years before, and rejected by a small majority. Cape Colony was divided into Western and Eastern districts. The latter was inhabited by persons of English descent, and the former by the Dutch Colonists. It was a curious fact that the English Colonists were averse from responsible government, while the Dutch were generally in favour of it. Lord Carnarvon did not consider that the Colony was yet ripe for such independence, but believed that responsible government should be granted when the Colonists were in a position to receive it.

With the advent of the Liberal Government in 1868 came a great change. Lord Carnarvon's withdrawal of troops from the Cape was made the excuse for a uniform reduction in all Colonies irrespective of the merits of individual cases.³ The relative positions of the different states of South Africa were also subjected to sudden alteration. In 1872, when Lord Kimberley was Colonial Minister, responsible government was given to Cape

¹ Despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, July, 1875. The calculation excludes the two towns, Durban and Pietermaritzburg.

² The House of Lords, 18th June, 1867.

³ Speeches, House of Lords, 14th February and 23rd July, 1870. But the Liberals recognized the importance of maintaining Simon's Bay, on which Cape Colony and the British Navy were dependent in time of war.

Colony. If it was not actually forced upon the inhabitants, it was certainly urged with great vigour, and was still highly distasteful to a large portion of them.

The Eastern Province—pronouncedly British—of which Grahamstown was the chief centre, favoured the idea of a sub-division of Cape Colony as an alternative to a complete severance of the two Provinces from one another. To the Eastern Province a Government with its seat at the Cape meant to some extent disfranchisement. Many members resided 600 miles from Cape Town, and the communications were uncertain and difficult. There was no leisured class, and business men could ill afford to leave their avocations in order to attend the four months' session of Parliament.

Cape Town, on the other hand, the largest and most powerful of the Cape constituencies, had twice as many members in the elective Cape Assembly as any other electoral division, and was the residence of nearly half the members of the Upper House of Legislative Council. It therefore preferred a state of things which rendered it the virtual metropolis of South Africa.

A better feeling had been growing up between the Dutch States and the British Colonies. There was scarcely a person in the Western Province of Cape Colony who had not a son or a brother settled, or a sister or a daughter married, in one or other of the two Republics. The irritation which had succeeded the Great Trek had died down, and closer intercourse had brought about a clearer desire for reunion.

II

The Orange Free State had considered itself aggrieved by the treatment it had received at the close of the Basuto War in 1868, when the Basuto Chief, Moshesh,¹ after various wars with the Free State, obtained British protection by ceding his territory to the Empire. But, 'if no further cause of distrust had arisen, it is probable, if not certain, that a majority of the inhabitants of the Orange Free State and of the Transvaal would before this time have petitioned of themselves to be allowed to return under the British Flag. At this juncture diamonds were suddenly discovered to exist in extraordinary quantities along the bed of the Vaal River, and in and near a spot on the left bank of the Vaal, a few miles distant from it, in a district over which the Orange Free State Government had exercised a *de facto* jurisdiction from the date of its establishment'.²

A large influx of diggers was the immediate result, and in 1870, during Lord Kimberley's tenure of the Colonial Office, the Diamond Fields, or Griqualand West, were annexed. Intricate land questions immediately arose. Both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal laid claim to portions of the annexed territory, and the native workers, who were frequently paid in rifles and ammunition,³ returned from the mines bringing with them, not only weapons, but information of the disunion and the weakness of the Whites.

The Diamond Fields were, therefore, the *fons et origo* of the immediate native danger. Not only had the diggers

¹ Moshesh appealed to Sir Philip Wodehouse for protection in 1865 and 1867. In January 1868 Sir Philip received authority to recognize Moshesh and his tribe as British subjects and to incorporate their territory. This was effected by a proclamation dated 12th March, 1868. In 1871 the country was annexed to the Cape.

² Mr. Froude's Report.

³ Up to 1874, 500,000 rifles had been sold to them at Kimberley alone.

armed the natives, but the annexation of the territory had destroyed the good relations which were gradually being established between the English and the Dutch.

A year before Lord Carnarvon came into Office another grave step had been taken by the British Government. The Cape Government had agreed to administer the Diamond Fields, but on receiving responsible government the Colony withdrew from this onerous obligation, and the Diamond Fields were erected into a separate province as the Crown Colony of Griqualand West.

Heré was a problem bristling with difficulties. There was scarcely an acre in this turbulent province to which there were not two or three claimants. The boundaries were in dispute both with the Orange Free State and with President Burgers of the South African Republic. The Dutch in the Cape Colony objected to the annexation as unfair to their relations in the Orange Free State. And the establishment of land claims was rendered difficult by the complicated knavery of a 'ring of land sharks'.

To these formidable difficulties there were added others hardly less serious. The Orange Free State vigorously forbade the importation of arms for sale among the natives. In Griqualand West, on the other hand, natives were attracted to the mines by the free permission which was accorded them to purchase guns and rifles. The Orange Free State resented this reckless disregard of what had hitherto been considered an indispensable precaution. The easiest road from the Colony to the Diamond Fields ran in places along the disputed boundary. Gangs of natives returning to their homes with their guns through the Free State territory were disarmed. Carts loaded with firearms were seized by the Orange Free State magistrates. Restitution was demanded and compensation at four days' notice, and the Governor of the

Cape informed the President that, pending the arbitration, any attempt of the Orange Free State to exercise jurisdiction within the line as laid down by the British Surveyor would be treated as an act of aggression, and a collision would be inevitable.

The position which confronted the Colonial Secretary was very serious, nor was he fortunate in the two Englishmen who were primarily concerned in the handling of the local situation. It is perhaps no great disparagement of Sir Henry Barkly, the Governor at the Cape and High Commissioner of South Africa, to say that he was unequal to a task calculated to tax the powers of the greatest statesman. His Ministers were new to the powers and duties of responsible government. The position of High Commissioner entailed the care of the natives as well as the most delicate diplomatic dealings with the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, and in his Colony he had to consider public opinion, which was always divided and sometimes intractable. He was not moreover a strong man. He seems to have afforded but little guidance to his Ministers, and he allowed his powers as High Commissioner to fall into abeyance.

As for Mr. Southey, the Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West, he was, for all his unquestioned ability, courage, and integrity, a failure in his difficult post. He permitted the finances in the Province to fall into disorder and incurred violent unpopularity among the diggers by the unwise recruitment of a native police. In April, 1875, he was obliged to telegraph for troops from Cape Town to put down a serious disturbance, so little was he able to rely upon local support.

Lord Carnarvon had from the first disapproved of the policy which made Griqualand West a Crown Colony, but the deed was done and the consequences had to be faced.

He wrote to Mr. Disraeli on the 23rd May, 1875 :

‘ I think you may like one line in case you have seen the reports of the disturbances in Griqualand. I believe few people know where Griqualand is, but questions may possibly be asked in the House of Commons.

‘ There has been resistance to the execution of a magistrate’s sentence, and there was at one moment serious risk of bloodshed. The Lt. Governor asked for troops, but on the 25th April the Governor of the Cape, Sir Henry Barkly, had *not* sent them and was doing his best to avoid sending.

‘ I hope that the worst of the trouble is now past ; though there is cause for anxiety with such a rough population of diggers and miners and Fenians and Germans as are collected in those parts. I have all along been apprehensive of this, and hence the reason for pressing my views as to a S. A. Conference. This I trust will give a solution to many of these difficulties, if only actual collision can be staved off. I do not feel really anxious, though there is margin for some trouble.’

While, however, the difficulties created by this situation were rapidly mounting to a head, another matter had called for urgent consideration.

III

Amongst the first news received at the Colonial Office after Lord Carnarvon came into office was that of the establishment of satisfactory relations with the Zulus by the instalment of Cetywayo as King, which was effected by the agency of Mr. Shepstone (the Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal). But before congratulations could be exchanged on this satisfactory achievement, a storm of controversy arose in Natal, provoking most violent emotions on either side, respecting the trial and sentence on a charge of high treason of Langelibalele, a Kaffir Chief and ‘ medicine man ’.

This chieftain, having failed to comply with a Colonial ordinance for the registration of firearms, was captured, brought to trial before an anomalous tribunal, convicted on evidence utterly inadequate, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Legislature of the Cape Colony thereupon came to the assistance of the Government of Natal and passed an Act under which the prisoner was transported and confined on Robben Island. The advocates of the natives, led by Dr. Colenso, Bishop of Natal, agitated for the condemnation of an illegal trial and the removal of an unjust verdict. On the other hand, it was strongly urged that the reversal of the sentence would be construed as an act of weakness by the native population, and would be an unwarranted interference with the Legislature of the Cape and the Government of Natal.

After a most careful consideration, protracted over nine months, during which everything that could be urged on behalf of the Natal Government¹ was studiously weighed, Lord Carnarvon came to the conclusion that the trial was improper and that the sentence should be mitigated. A motion by Lord Grey on the 12th April, 1875, that the Act of the Cape Parliament for the retention of Langalibalele on Robben Island should be continued in operation, on the ground, generally held by Liberals, that the Colonial Office should not interfere in the internal administration of a British Colony, gave him an opportunity not only of defending his action in this particular case but of unfolding some of the principles upon which his Colonial policy was founded.

He began by asserting that it was not only the right but also the duty of the Home Government to exercise

¹ Mr. Shepstone, the Colonial Secretary, was summoned to London for the purpose.

a certain power of control, more especially in regard to the rights and treatment of the native races. He then proceeded to portray the circumstances which led to the arrest and trial of the Kaffir chieftain and of the fierce primitive measures which were taken against his tribe. ' . . . It was broken up, its lands were harried, women and children were summarily expelled from their homes and placed in servitude, their property was confiscated by the State, and no less than £50,000 or £60,000 in cash was paid into the Colonial Exchequer. This was a severe punishment for a tribe which, as far as I know, had taken but little part in the disturbances. . . . '

Then followed a description of the judicial proceedings. ' The Court was a very singular tribunal. The head of it was Sir Benjamin Pine himself, the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces and Governor of the Colony, who combined in his own person the position of Judge and prosecutor, he being, in order to sum up the anomaly, head of the Court to which an appeal would lie. Then came the heads of the tribes which were hostile to Langalibalele, and who would naturally follow the ruling of the white judges, and in the next place certain Colonists formed part of the tribunal. Of them, however, I prefer to say nothing, except that it seems to me for the sake of appearances, to be unfortunate that one of those white judges should have been the father of one of the young men who had most unhappily lost his life on the frontier. . . . Lastly, I may observe, to complete the anomaly, the members of the Court did not sit continuously, some coming and going throughout the whole trial, some sitting only part of the time. Thus much for the composition of the Court. '

The trial was conducted under a mixture of native and English law. To have recourse to both was likely to be

productive of unfairness, 'for it scarcely seems right when you fail to reach a man by native law to have recourse to English law, and when you fail to reach him by English law to fall back upon native law. . . .'

The evidence had been utterly inadequate. 'Yet upon that evidence in a great measure the prisoner was convicted. . . . The prisoner was denied the assistance of counsel, and never even saw the indictment against him until the very morning of the trial. His plea of "Not guilty" was, moreover, construed by the Court as a plea of guilty; and I am perfectly lost in astonishment to find that a tribunal, partly composed of English gentlemen, could have thus acted.

'The result of the trial was that the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to confinement for life. I was advised that that sentence was one which it was wholly beyond the power of that Court to pass, and that it was illegal. . . .'

From the trial and sentence he passed on to the Act of the Cape Legislature. That Act gave effect to an illegal sentence. It could not, therefore, be recognized by the Home Government. It was proposed therefore that the prisoner should be released, but that since there might be a risk in bringing him back to Natal, he should be placed under surveillance somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cape Town.

Meeting the accusation that his despatches had been peremptory, he said that there was no expression or word in them which he would desire to recall. 'I cannot for one moment lament having expressed my strong view of the illegality, of the unwisdom, of the injustice of these proceedings. . . . If there be any truth whatever in our theory and idea of Empire, surely it is in this—that the servants of the Crown are bound to have a conscience

in these matters, and bound also to have a voice ; and when an act of wrong or injustice has been done in any part of the Empire, it is their duty to raise their voice in its condemnation. If the ties of Empire really will not bear that strain upon them, then I say the whole Imperial theory becomes an absolute fiction. . . .’

There remained, however, a large moral to be drawn from this painful incident, the need for a uniform, humane, intelligent native policy throughout South Africa.

‘ At the time my noble friend was Secretary of State there were not, I think, 100,000 natives in that Colony. Now there are between 300,000 and 400,000. The tribes live in a state of segregation, and are the centres of armed strength—it may be even of rebellion. Barbarous customs, which it was the intention twenty-five years ago gradually to get rid of, have been in some respects strengthened rather than weakened. In the interest both of the public safety and of civilization, it is important that this state of affairs should come to an end. Hitherto the interests and systems of all the States in South Africa have conflicted with each other. My wish is to see those interests and systems brought into greater unity. I desire, in the first instance, to see the development of those great resources which South Africa possesses. Secondly, I desire to see a uniform system adopted in these States, because as long as different systems exist among them these will be a perpetual source of danger. And, lastly, I look most earnestly to a better understanding being created between the two Dutch Republics and ourselves.

‘ None of the great objects which I have indicated can ever be realized unless they are founded upon justice ; they cannot rest on an Act which is tainted with injustice

and illegality, and it is on that ground, and on that ground alone, that I meet the motion of my noble friend with a direct negative.'

The speech made a deep impression. The motion was withdrawn. The Cape Parliament, moved by a considerate despatch,¹ revised their first *non possumus* attitude, and even the cautious Lord Derby gave his benediction.²

'Your despatches, if I may venture to say so, are very well done: the facts clearly stated: the language moderate: and the conclusions such as will be generally agreed in.

'I have no doubt that the chief with a long name ought to be detained for the present. This is a measure of security and, considering his conduct, fully defensible on the score of justice.

'It is equally clear that he ought to be removed from his present place of penal detention and kept under a mild *surveillance*. . . .'

The troubles in Natal clearly pointed to the need for constitutional revision, and Lord Carnarvon selected Sir Garnet Wolseley, just returned from the conclusion of a successful war in Ashanti, to carry out the necessary reforms, which included extensive alterations in native law directed to the abridgement of the power of the chieftain and the submission of all criminal cases affecting natives to English Courts.

In a debate on the new constitution, which was attacked as neither responsible government on the one hand, nor strict Crown Colony government on the other,

¹ Mr. Saul Solomon, who had moved the resolution against disallowing the action of the Cape, wrote to Mr. Froude: 'But Lord Carnarvon's despatch is so unanswerable, and the position he takes up urged with so much courtesy, that I doubt whether the Parliament will not feel that the less said the better, as it will not be able to deny that we gratuitously interfered in a matter with which we had no business, and are greatly responsible for the complications that have arisen. Undoubtedly the greatest difficulty might reasonably be expected from those who voted with me against Res. No. 3, 1874; but I hope they will see that Lord Carnarvon's action in the cause of justice has been so noble that he ought, as far as possible, to be supported by those who sympathize with his views on this question.' 25th March, 1875.

² 29th November, 1875.

Lord Carnarvon contended that it was adjusted to the actual needs and circumstances of the Colony.¹

He readily admitted the weight of criticism Lord Blachford offered, but entirely disagreed with his opinion that the change made was either a small or a barren one.

‘ My noble friend seems to think there can be but one or two modes of government applicable to a Colony under the conditions which exist in Natal—either total and complete freedom, such as is accorded by the grant of responsible government, or, on the other hand, absolute and direct control from the Home Government in England. Now the Constitution of Natal lies somewhat between those two extremes, and I am not disposed to quarrel with it on that ground. I value as highly as any man responsible government, and he is a dull man who has watched the progress for some years past of Canada and the Australian Colonies without appreciating the marvellous effects produced by responsible government in a congenial soil and under fair conditions. But its success depends on the elements from which it is to be drawn, and on the means by which it is to be worked ; and the conditions which exist in Natal render responsible government there totally out of the question.

‘ For many years past there has been a growing conviction on the part of all authorities, not only in this country but even on the spot, that the existing Constitution of Natal which is just passing away was not only highly unsuitable, but impracticable. . . . The Constitution has been tried, and has undoubtedly failed. There have been repeated difficulties between the local Executive Government and the Legislature. There have been equally numerous difficulties between the Colony and the Home Government. I could quote passages from the

¹ House of Lords, 23rd July, 1875.

despatch of my noble friend opposite and those of his predecessor¹ which point to the perfect hopelessness, in the existing state of things, of working that constitution. At the present moment, owing, no doubt, to the want of due administrative arrangements in the public offices, business of mere ordinary routine is to a great extent stopped. Moreover, I am satisfied that there has been a very large expenditure of public money on objects not always worthy of it, while, on the other hand, matters of vital consequence have been neglected; and, in spite of the ability and conscientiousness of Mr. Shepstone, whose name is well known in this country, there has not in my opinion been that control over native affairs which is required by the public interest. The result is that there has been a stagnation, so to speak, of many of the industrial interests of the Colony. . . .

‘ Meanwhile, there have been in that Colony questions of the very highest moment to be settled. The question of emigration is one of the greatest complexity. There is also the question of public works—such as those connected with roads, with the harbours of Natal, and with the railway, which, above all things, is required there. There has been, moreover, a force of 30,000 armed natives resting like a thunder cloud upon the frontier of the Colony. I must say it seems to me impossible that those questions can be satisfactorily or safely dealt with if you have not a strong government in the Colony itself. My Lords, that strong government you have not had. In a great measure this is owing to the fact that, in the Legislature at least, the Government has always been in a minority, and has been obliged to conciliate here and conciliate there in order, if possible, to satisfy contending parties. Not only has the Colony been often in

¹ Lord Granville.

danger, but that native element, which I agree with my noble friend in regarding as an element of great insecurity, is keen-sighted enough to perceive the weakness of the Government and has sometimes taken advantage of it. Under these circumstances, I felt that the time had come when the change could no longer be delayed.

‘ Now the question is, whether that change has been wise or not. . . . I think I have shown the House that responsible government is not suited to the present condition of Natal. As to the other alternative, I will not say that a strict form of Crown government would not work well, but I think it is prudent statesmanship never to insist upon more than is absolutely necessary—especially when the freedom of Englishmen is concerned. I would rather go upon the principle of trust than upon the principle of rigid restriction. The Colony has had its difficulties. The Legislature, like all other Legislatures, may occasionally not have been wise. But within the last few months it has consented to a change which must have been repugnant to the feelings of many of its members, and I think we shall be right in trying first the principle of trust. . . .

‘ At all events, this is a compromise which on the one hand strengthens the Executive, while it does not take away the representative institutions which exist. If, unfortunately, it should be found, after all, that the Legislature is incapable of dealing with the questions which will come before it, then, and then only, will be the time to tighten the knot and to take greater powers than are now exercised. In the first instance, however, I would rather accept the spontaneous and free gift of the Colony than impose in an uncompromising and, perhaps, ungracious spirit, fetters which I do not think are deserved. It may be satisfactory to the House to know that the result already achieved is considerable. . . .’

IV

On the 6th April, 1874, Sir Henry Barkly had written that the Cape Ministry had no troublesome question to deal with. The Parliament was just elected : there were no debates in the Cabinet, and the only possible cause for anxiety was another Kaffir War. But the Transvaal was disturbing the peace of the Batlapins and Baralong¹, and Sir Henry Barkly was anxious for further annexation of these two Bechuana peoples.

‘ I appreciate ’, Lord Carnarvon wrote on the 24th April, ‘ the pressure which such a Government and Parliament as yours are likely to endeavour to put upon you. They will, of course, be glad to see the native difficulty settled without any trouble to themselves and a further annexation made to Griqualand at Imperial cost : this obviously cannot be allowed. We stand in circumstances of great difficulty as regards the administration of Griqualand, and the difficulty would only be increased by the addition of further territory. In resisting, therefore, such a pressure as I have indicated, you may fully count upon any support that I can give you . . . but it is obviously no light matter to commit the Home Government to the risks of doubtful and highly unsatisfactory collision with the Republic.

‘ Whilst on this point I will ask you to let me have full and reliable details as to the real strength of the Transvaal State, the character of the country, roads, population, supplies, and all in fact necessary to give me a better idea than I now possess of the general conditions under which, if at any time such an unfortunate contingency should arise, military operations could be carried on. . . .

‘ I shall be glad to know what other means there are

¹ See p. 175 and Appendix I, p. 272.

available of putting the Transvaal State under pressure and bringing them to reason, short of the use of military force. Would any restrictions on the conveyance of arms to them, or any relaxation of this trade as regards the natives, produce an effect ? Or would any modification of the duties leviable on the frontier be possible ?

A few weeks later he wrote : ¹

‘ The present situation and relations of the various States that occupy South Africa are so full of difficulty and even political risk, that I should be prepared to make a decided effort towards placing them—as I conceive—upon a securer footing if the occasion were to offer itself : and in considering this question it has often occurred to me whether some form of federation might not solve many of the existing difficulties—I say “ some form of federation ” for these States as you are well aware are in such different degrees of civilization and political organization that a uniformity of constitution would I think be hardly practicable. In such cases I am aware how largely a question that may be on the highest grounds most desirable, is retarded or advanced by the personal interests of the main actors, and this would doubtless be so with the prominent politicians in the Free States. It might, however, be possible to secure their good offices by an understanding on their part that it would be for their interest to promote such an object, and by the knowledge that in forming part of a large South African Federation under the British Crown a wider field of ambition and personal advancement would naturally be opened to them.

‘ This is a question on which I will not now write further. You will understand from it how much S. African politics occupy my mind and how anxious I am

¹ 27th May, 1874.

to see any way to a somewhat more reliable and satisfactory relationship of the different States.'

Sir Henry Barkly thought the disposition of the Transvaal Republic already more favourable.¹ The Orange Free State on the one side, and the Gold Fields on the other had infused fresh European blood into the Republic since the time when Mr. Burgers won his election—partly through a fortunate discovery made by his agent. It appeared that his rival wore a wig and the Boers were so horrified to learn that he had 'a dead man's hair on his head', that very few voted for him.

'Mr. Southey', Sir Henry added, 'writes to assure me two thirds of the population of the South African Republic are really desirous of coming back under British rule, yet afraid to say so openly—there ought not to be much difficulty in the matter. I suspect that Mr. Southey is too sanguine on this head, but as he has lately been up at Potchefstroom in the heart of the Republic, he has had better means of judging than myself. . . .

'There will be no difficulty, whenever a scheme of Federation in South Africa is practicable, in Griqualand West dropping quietly into its place in the Union. The obstacle to such a scheme, as far as the British population are concerned, lies in the enormous preponderance of the Native population in Natal, which alarms the statesmen of this Colony. On the other hand the affinity between Natal and the Boer Republic is very strong, and a common danger tends to unite them in a common policy.'

Some weeks later he wrote : ²

'I by no means despair as regards the S.A.R.—and if

¹ Sir H. Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, 6th July, 1874.

² 25th July, 1874.

that would come under our Flag again the Orange Free State must, hemmed in as it would be on all sides, sooner or later follow. . . .

‘ A good deal . . . will depend on the course you pursue as to the Langalibalele affair in Natal ! It must always be borne in mind that the key to South African politics is the question of the treatment of the Natives. . . .’

Sir Henry Barkly continued in season and out of season to press on the Colonial Office the annexation of the Batlapins’ and Baralongs’ country. But an annexation policy was strongly discouraged by Lord Carnarvon, and he wrote frankly to Sir Henry that he did not desire to make any further annexations with Fiji and the Gold Coast on his hands, and thought some other arrangement might be made for the Batlapins without having recourse to this *ultima ratio*.

‘ Nevertheless,’ he wrote,¹ ‘ this does not absolve an English Government from doing its duty and giving what protection it can to the Natives who live under English rule : and whilst I am bound to speak and to act in that sense I must look to you who are on the spot and can exercise naturally great personal influence, whilst maintaining and supporting the policy which I feel bound to adhere to, so to soften any local irritation or ill-will as your experience and tact will enable you to do. . . .’

‘ I am far from having any decided opinion as to a possible federation of the S. African states. It is a measure which must, wherever it is tried, depend for its success upon the circumstances and feelings of the time, and it was rather with a wish to know how far, in your opinion, those circumstances and feelings were favourable that I made my inquiries of you. Federation would contribute to solve some of the native difficulties. Half the cruelty

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 22nd August, 1874.

and injustice to a native race arises from fear :—and the union of the States would give a consciousness of strength which *might perhaps* go some way to make a humaner and kindlier [policy] more likely. But it might also have another effect, and anyhow it would in another point of view be inexpedient if—as I gather from your letter—the institutions of the Cape are not yet consolidated and sufficiently ripe for this further change. . . .’

V

James Anthony Froude,¹ the historian, was an old friend of Lord Carnarvon, Lord and Lady Derby, and several members of the Cabinet. Writing on the 4th March, 1874, to congratulate Lord Carnarvon on his acceptance of Office, Mr. Froude told him that he had just finished the *English in Ireland* on which he had been engaged for three years. He was thinking of going round the Australian Colonies and seeing for himself ‘whether there is any possibility of drawing them closer to us and giving permanence to the relations which exist’.

In answer, Lord Carnarvon suggested that Mr. Froude should in the first instance pay a visit to South Africa, and give the Government what help he could to understand the condition of affairs there. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Derby, and Mr. Disraeli considered that such a mission would be well worth the expenditure, and, after some hesitation, Mr. Froude agreed to undertake it. He left England for the Cape at the end of August, just missing Mr. Shepstone, who was returning to lay the case of the Natal Government before the Secretary of State.²

Sir Henry Barkly gave Mr. Froude a friendly welcome,³

¹ A large part of this section is drawn from Mr. Froude’s letters and reports.

² Cf. pp. 164 ff. and 236 ff.

³ 23rd September, 1874.

and thanked Lord Carnarvon for the opportunity of making his acquaintance, and the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Molteno, was also friendly and communicative. It was clear, however, from the first that the two officials were not agreed among themselves. Mr. Molteno assured the British historian that he had nothing to do with Griqualand West and refused to regard the vote of the Cape Parliament in 1871 before the change of Constitution as binding upon himself; he regretted the annexation, and condemned the attitude of the High Commissioner.

To the quarrel with the Orange Free State over Griqualand was added a similar dispute with the South African Republic. In 1871 it was proposed to submit the boundary dispute to the arbitration of Mr. Keate, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, but his award¹ in favour of the British Government had been repudiated by the Transvaal Republic. Lord Kimberley declared that Her Majesty's Government intended to abide by it. Some two years later Matthew Smith, a British subject, refused obedience to a Transvaal magistrate exercising jurisdiction at a place fifty miles beyond the line assigned as the boundary of the Republic. Smith was carried to prison, and a house he had erected in contravention of Transvaal Police regulations was destroyed by fire. Sir Henry Barkly, citing the Keate award, demanded satisfaction from President Burgers. The President replied again repudiating the Award, and claiming jurisdiction founded upon both an alleged earlier title and a more recent cession from another chief, whom the Republic affected to recognize as the Supreme Chief in this territory.

'The refusal of the President of the South African Republic to submit to the ultimatum of the High Com-

¹ Received in England, 5th December, 1871.

missioner had just been published', wrote Mr. Froude,¹ 'when I visited South Africa at the close of 1874. I went from Natal to Pretoria; from Pretoria to the Diamond Fields; from the Diamond Fields to Bloemfontein. I returned afterwards through the colony to Port Elizabeth and thence to Cape Town. I had an opportunity of conversing with every one who had been concerned with the transactions . . . and of learning the general state of opinion about them in each of the different states. The evidence on matters of fact was hopelessly conflicting.'

Lord Carnarvon was much interested in Mr. Froude's account of his visit to Pretoria and President Burgers, and hoped perhaps that there was an opening for a better and safer policy. Local feeling in South Africa seemed less disinclined to Federation than he had supposed, but, 'short of actual Federation, there are measures which might place our relations with them [the Dutch States] on a better footing.' He had made his decision with regard to Langalibalele, and he had been careful to try not to humiliate Natal, and to act with consideration for Sir Benjamin Pine.²

After Mr. Froude returned from the interior he found the excitement about Langalibalele³ and the disturbance in Natal at its height. Opinion at the Cape had been in favour of the action taken by the Natal Government. The news had just arrived of Lord Carnarvon's decision that Langalibalele should be removed from Robben Island. Mr. Molteno had replied with a Minute, rejecting the suggestion as an interference with the constitutional liberties which the Colony possessed under

¹ Report to Lord Carnarvon.

² Lord Carnarvon to Mr. Froude, 24th December, 1874.

³ See pp. 163 ff.

responsible government; but he expressed his intention, although against his judgement, to submit his opinion to that of the Secretary of State, in order to prevent a collision between the Colony and the Imperial Government.

Another matter of great importance to England was then hanging in the balance. The acquisition of Delagoa Bay was one of the three objects which Lord Carnarvon particularly desired to carry out in South Africa, but it was barred by the failure of the Government to overrule the niggardliness of the Treasury.

‘This great harbour’, he wrote in 1889,¹ ‘was in dispute between ourselves and Portugal; it was referred to arbitration, and, as generally happens when England submits to arbitration, the decision was adverse to our claims. When I succeeded to Office I had reason to think that the offer of a moderate sum might have purchased that which a very large amount now could not compass. Unfortunately the means were not forthcoming, the opportunity was lost, and such opportunities in politics do not often recur. But as time has gone on the value to us of this possession has not only become obvious, but it has enormously increased; and the loss of this great harbour on the eastern coast, if followed by the presence in force of Eastern Powers on African soil and their intervention in African affairs, may one day make us bitterly regret the position in which this question was left.’²

It was certainly of great importance in 1876. The Portuguese Government were making a considerable revenue through the importation of arms. It excited the

¹ *The Cape in 1887*. The Delagoa Bay arbitration between Portugal and England was by Lord Granville placed in the hands of Marshal MacMahon, and was decided against England in June, 1875.

² If Great Britain had been in possession of Delagoa Bay, the great armaments which the Boer Republic amassed before the ultimatum of 1899 could never have existed, and the Boer War could never have been fought.

ambition of Mr. Burgers, to whom it was plain that if Delagoa Bay and his proposed railway¹ could be acquired, the independence of the Transvaal Republic would be secured from any interference by the British. To this end he ruined the country for his proposed loan, and to this end he made war on Sekukuni,² whose land was to furnish the million acres security offered by him in Holland.

‘It is quite certain’, wrote Mr. Froude,³ who had returned to England, ‘that as soon as the Delagoa Bay affair is decided, both Brand and Burgers will appeal for protection to Berlin, and you know what that will come to.’

It was known in February, 1875, that the State Secretary of the Transvaal Republic, Mr. Swart, had been charged with a mission to Bismarck. Correspondence between Mr. Froude and Lord Odo Russell elicited the fact that Bismarck had received their advances coldly.

Mr. Froude wrote :⁴ ‘He has accepted a large gold medal which they have sent him as a votive offering, but he has given them plainly to understand that Germany will not interfere in South Africa to the prejudice of Great Britain. This is very satisfactory, and I have let Burgers know that we are aware of what has passed. Both he and Brand will therefore understand that your conciliatory policy is not taken up from any motive except a desire to do them justice.’

But Bismarck gave moral support and substantial help ; and when the Transvaal requested the assistance of Berlin in organizing their artillery and ordnances, the Prussian Government sent a present of cannon taken from the

¹ See p. 186.

² See pp. 229 ff.

³ To Lord Carnarvon, 17th March, 1875.

⁴ To Lord Carnarvon, 20th May, 1875.

French in 1870. The Transvaal Government also obtained the services of an ex-Prussian officer, Von Schlickmann by name, already notorious as a chief instigator in the Diamond Fields Rebellion in April.¹ President Burgers placed him in command of the 'Ordnance', and to him and the Fenian, Aylward, were attributed most of the atrocities which disgraced the dealings of the Republic in the succeeding years.²

VI

It seemed clear that it was urgently necessary to obtain common action in native policy in South Africa. It was not less clear that the relations existing between Sir H. Barkly and the two Presidents were such as to produce a deadlock. In this difficulty Lord Carnarvon believed that a Conference on Native Affairs of representatives of Colonies and States held in South Africa itself might be productive of good.

'I might', he wrote,³ 'possibly *indicate* Federation as a contingency and leave the door open to it, but not *urge* it.' He proposed to name Sir H. Barkly as Chairman and Mr. Froude as representing himself and H.M. Government. Mr. Froude recognized the propriety of making the Governor Chairman, but he doubted his impartiality. 'He has made the quarrel a personal one between himself and the Free States; will he, or can he consent to take part in a policy of reconciliation?'⁴

The suggested Conference was to be merely advisory. It was to be summoned by the Imperial Government. It was to bring into closer communication men from every

¹ See pp. 162 ff.

² See p. 240.

³ To Mr. Froude, 21st April, 1875.

⁴ Mr. Froude to Lord Carnarvon, 22nd April, 1875.

Colony and State—English and Dutch—and its ‘Terms of Reference’ were the land question in Griqualand West, and native affairs and policy.

The despatch proposing the Conference was agreed to by the Cabinet in April 1875, and Lord Carnarvon submitted it to the Queen on the 29th April.

‘Should they [the Dutch States] accept the invitation to join this Conference, Lord Carnarvon sees a strong probability of ultimately securing a confederation of all the Colonies and States of S. Africa and of the reunion of the republics to your Majesty’s possessions. If this can be achieved—with proper securities for the just treatment of the Native races, which is a condition of paramount importance—but which Lord Carnarvon is inclined to believe to be practicable—the advantages gained will be in all respects very great, and much that is now in S. Africa a cause of difficulty and even danger, will, it may be hoped, be converted into a source of strength.’

The despatch of the 4th May was written to Sir H. Barkly in his capacity of High Commissioner. It dealt with matters beyond the competency of the Cape Government, which had no diplomatic relations with the Dutch Republics, no responsibility for Natal, and which had refused all responsibility for Griqualand West. It expressed Lord Carnarvon’s desire that by means of a Conference of representatives from all the States an attempt might be made to compose existing differences, to soothe animosities, and diminish the danger of native insurrections.

Lord Carnarvon instructed Sir Henry Barkly at once to publish and transmit the despatch to the various Governments, in order that it might be considered deliberately in every part of the country. Cape Colony, although it had least to fear from native insurrections, and thus had less direct concern with the subjects which were

to come under discussion, should certainly, he considered, take the leading and foremost part ; and he desired that the High Commissioner should consult the Ministers of the Cape.

The despatch set out the urgency of the native problems—the ‘ real and serious inconvenience, containing the germs of a great danger, in the continued maintenance, in close proximity, of widely differing systems of native treatment. . . . ’

‘ Even in the absence of any threatening combination, each Government is required, in order to maintain order among the natives within its own territory, and to guard against possible attacks from those without, to expend on police and other defensive organizations an amount of anxious thought, as well as of money, which might be better devoted to the general advancement of the community.

‘ It is then with regard to the native question that I conceive it to be most urgent at the present moment that there should be a free and friendly interchange of opinion among the neighbouring Governments in South Africa, and, if it were for the consideration of this question alone, I should conceive that the assembling of a Conference such as I am about to propose of Representatives of the Colonies and States would be productive of the greatest advantage.

‘ But there are other matters of importance and urgency, such as the sale of arms and ammunition, the arrest and surrender of criminals, as well as the various minor territorial questions, which might be beneficially discussed. . . .

‘ For these reasons Her Majesty’s Government is desirous that a Conference of delegates, representing the Colony of Natal, the Province of Griqualand West, the Orange Free State, the South African Republic, and the Eastern and Western Provinces of the Cape, under such Presidency and with such assistance as Her Majesty’s Government can give, should meet at the earliest practicable time at some convenient place within the Cape Colony, for the discussion of native policy, and of such other questions as it may be agreed to bring before the Conference. . . .

‘It will of course be clearly understood that this Conference will meet to deliberate and report, but not to take any action upon the subjects which might come before it. . . . If, in the free exchange of communications between the representatives of the different states concerned, the all-important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation should arise, Her Majesty’s Government will readily give their earnest and their favourable attention to any suggestions that may be made. . . . This great object is one to the achievement of which Her Majesty’s Government would be prepared to contribute their best and most cordial assistance. It is a measure which in their opinion would tend to develop the prosperity of South Africa, to sweep away many subjects of prolonged and unfruitful discussion, and to knit together the scattered communities of European race into a powerful and harmonious Union, valuable alike for the interests of themselves and of the whole Empire. I need only further observe, on this head, that I see no reason why, in the event of such a Confederation, the form of Government in each State or Province should necessarily be uniform, or why the local Governments might not be conducted on different systems. All this would be matter for consideration and arrangement, should the general question be favourably received on the spot, and be then brought under the consideration of Her Majesty’s Government.

‘I only desire to add—and there must be no misapprehension on this point—that the action of all parties, whether the British Colonies or the Dutch States, must be spontaneous and uncontrolled. It is a question for them to decide whether it is for their interests to enter such an Union, and I desire to place no pressure on that decision.’

The despatch was framed on most considerate and non-dictatorial lines, and accompanied by a private letter to Sir H. Barkly, which suggested the names of some of the gentlemen whom he thought would be best able to assist in such a Conference.

‘I wish’, Lord Carnarvon wrote, ‘to leave the decision of the Chairmanship . . . entirely to your own judgement and discretion. . . . I am confident that should you

decide to accept the duty, it will be in excellent hands . . . Should you, however, . . . be of opinion that you can by standing outside the Conference give greater support to the policy which I desire to see secured, or that former controversies with the Dutch States have placed you in such relations as to make the task a more difficult one, I shall readily understand your leaving the presidency of the Conference to Sir Arthur Cunynghame, Commander-in-Chief and Deputy High Commissioner. The real and essential consideration is to make the Conference succeed : first because I believe that the present happens to be an unusually favourable opportunity, secondly *because success is necessary*. . . .

‘ I am certain that you will in this important matter look only to the success of the undertaking, and with the greatest confidence I leave the decision in your hands, and as I cannot lighten the responsibility of that decision by anything further that I can say, I will add nothing beyond a confident hope that, with the skill which you will bring to bear, with the precautions that I hope will be taken, and with a moderate amount of good fortune—much that is now a source of weakness and even danger in S. Africa, may be turned into a cause of strength. You will, of course, give immediate publicity to the despatch, and in such a manner, I know, as will secure for it the most favourable reception. Probably you may think it well to see Mr. Molteno and Mr. Paterson first ; and if so, please to express to these gentlemen my persuasion that they will give me their hearty and loyal co-operation in a matter which is of Imperial and Colonial importance.’

It was ominous of Sir H. Barkly’s probable action that a despatch was received from him on the same day,¹ informing Lord Carnarvon that although perfectly ready

¹ 4th May, 1875.

to obey any special directions which might be issued to him as High Commissioner, he had ceased, since the introduction of responsible government, to exercise those independent powers.

The chief magistrates of the two Dutch Republics, President Brand of the Orange Free State, and President Burgers of the Transvaal, were likewise invited to the Conference. Both these statesmen were very superior in ability and general culture to the Boer politician of that time.

Thomas Francis Burgers was by birth a Cape Dutchman, by training a theologian, and by force of circumstance, talent, and ambition, the leading political figure in the South African Republic. His designs upon Bechuana-land, his state visit to the Amaswazis, whom the Zulus regarded as vassals, and lastly his efforts to finance a railway to Delagoa Bay, were symptoms of an ambition to render his State independent of the British coast Provinces. In the last he was not successful. During his stay at Amsterdam he endeavoured to raise a loan of £300,000 for the Transvaal section of this line, offering as security a poll tax of £1 on every burgher, a million acres of land, the good faith and honesty of the Boer population and 'the old Netherland virtues', which, with the language of their fathers, they had retained. These securities did not appeal to the Dutch money market, for the amount realized in cash was only £74,500 and to raise this sum Burgers had to pay £14,500 as discount and to contract with a Belgian Company to lay out a large part of it in the purchase of railway plant, which, when it reached South Africa, did not fit the gauge selected, and had therefore to be sold, to meet the claims of the shippers who brought it out and of the workmen sent from Europe to lay the line.

When Burgers came to London, he gave his hearty

approval to Lord Carnarvon's scheme for a Conference on South African problems,¹ undertaking not only to write to the Transvaal to urge co-operation, but also to President Brand of the Orange Free State to invite him to do the same. Lord Carnarvon talked to him with characteristic frankness. There might have been faults on both sides in the past into which he could not enter, but he hoped that a good understanding might now be arrived at, and it was for the interest of both parties that it should be so. He indicated Confederation as the ultimate object, and the President seemed, as Lord Carnarvon told Sir Henry Barkly, to reciprocate his views.

'I have explained to him', Lord Carnarvon wrote,² 'my views as to the Conference to be summoned on S. African matters, as stated to you in my recent despatch, and he has not only accepted them, but he has promised me his hearty and full co-operation. I cannot but hope that henceforward matters as regards the Dutch States may assume a very different and a far more satisfactory character; and though in this, as in all other matters, it is well to proceed with caution and to look all round the subject, it is also very important to throw away no chance of securing a more friendly connection than that which has for so long existed. . . .'

The despatch was published in England in June, about the time when its arrival at the Cape was expected. It met with almost universal approval. The newspapers recognized that common action towards natives, both for the sake of justice to the natives and the safety of the white men, was of the first importance. The discussion, it was said, could only do good, whether it lifted the Colonial mind to wider considerations of policy or aroused England from its apathy.

¹ 11th May, 1875.

² 12th May, 1875.

At the Cape the scene was very different. The despatch was sent to Sir H. Barkly as High Commissioner. He was desired to give it immediate publicity, in such a manner as to secure for it the most favourable reception, to talk to his Ministers and obtain their loyal co-operation, and to discuss the question with Mr. Froude who, as the Commissioner sent by H.M. Government, was on his way to the Cape. He did none of these things. Mr. Froude's augury proved only too true. The Colonial Ministers completely misunderstood the despatch, whether purposely or no. Perhaps the taunts of subserviency levelled at the Prime Minister when he acceded to the Imperial Government's desires in the matter of Langalibalele had had an effect. Without waiting for Mr. Froude's arrival, Mr. Molteno laid the despatch before the House on the 6th June, accompanied by a Ministerial Minute.

'The Minute complained of the introduction of an important proposal from the Secretary of State without previous consultation with the responsible Ministers. The nomination of representatives was unsatisfactory, and calculated to revive animosities between the eastern and western provinces ; and the invitation itself was ill-timed. The initiative, the Ministers insisted, belonged to the Colony, for which the Secretary of State ought to have waited.'¹

The Cape Parliament took fright. Members indulged in the wildest flights of fancy. The despatch was an insidious attempt to throw on the Colony the expense of defending Natal ; it was intended to provoke a Native War ; it was the step to withdraw responsible government from the Cape. The Upper House deprecated hasty action, but the Lower House, not content with the

¹ Mr. Froude's Report.

Minute, passed a resolution of a yet more violent character.¹

So extraordinary a misconception did not prevail without opposition. Twenty-three members of the Assembly out of a House of fifty-five adopted the more cautious views of the Council. The Provincial press expressed a general regret at the precipitate action of the Ministers, and called for fuller information. The Dutch in Cape Colony, hitherto Mr. Molteno's supporters, welcomed the despatch, and the English Eastern Province was eager for information.

The Governor, who could have explained, did nothing. The despatch arrived on the 2nd June, was laid before the Cape Parliament on the 8th, and the violent motion was carried on the 11th. The excuse for this precipitancy was that the Parliament was coming to an end. The Session, however, was not then expected to close until the first week in August, and it was known that the Commissioner from H.M. Government would arrive in ten days' time.

When Mr. Froude landed at Cape Town on the 19th June, he found a very difficult situation. He had left Cape Colony on friendly terms both with the Governor and the Prime Minister. He had written a personal letter to Mr. Molteno on the subject of the despatch, explaining the reasons for the Conference, and the motives which had led to his appointment. He could not conceive how Mr. Molteno could have been under any illusion. His own function was to be that of a listener only on behalf of H.M. Government. By the action of the High Commissioner and the Cape Parliament the concurrence of the Cape was refused, yet the Colony itself was calling loudly

¹ Proposed by Mr. Sprigg, later Prime Minister, and a great admirer of Lord Carnarvon. He afterwards became Sir Gordon Sprigg.

for further information on the subject, and the other Colonies and States interested had been given no direct information. Members of the Houses of the Legislature met him on the steamer to assure him of their conviction that the reception which had been given to the despatch was founded on some strange mistake.

Mr. Froude was so astonished that he could not at first decide on his course ; but he knew that though the Ministers might claim the initiative under their own constitution in their own province of domestic legislation, the subjects of the despatch were Imperial and external, and in them the Ministers of the Cape Colony had no more right to initiate a policy than in the relations of Canada or Australia. The Colony was, of course, at liberty to decline, but the reasons alleged for the refusal seemed incomprehensible. The Governor protested that Mr. Molteno had threatened to resign if he published the despatch in the ordinary way without the Minute, and he had therefore acquiesced.

Neither the Governor nor Mr. Molteno offered any explanation of their conduct, yet they told Mr. Froude that he was not to make any public utterance. He was in a very difficult position. He saw that a very serious mistake had been made, which the responsible High Commissioner had taken no steps to rectify, and he, who had been sent out for the special purpose of attending the Conference, was the only person who had it in his power to give the information which was being clamoured for. He assured the Governor that the Ministers were under a complete misapprehension as to the meaning of the despatch ; that Lord Carnarvon had only asked the Colony for advice ; and that if they had led the people to suppose that Lord Carnarvon was violating their Constitution or had other purposes in the

despatch which had not been avowed, the false and unjust impression ought not to be allowed to remain.

The Dutch in Cape Town had pressed Mr. Froude to go to a non-Party dinner to which the Governor and Ministers were also invited. The latter refused, and insisted that Mr. Froude was not to communicate with any one save through them.

The dinner, however, took place and Mr. Froude made the explanation which the Ministry had refused, with moderation—yet showing how entirely the despatch had been misunderstood, and how uncalled for was the Minute of the Ministers. Mr. de Villiers,¹ with whom he was staying, speaking evidently for Mr. Molteno, said he hoped Lord Carnarvon would not take offence at what had passed. Hasty action had been taken on the Langalibalele affair when his decision was first made known at the Cape, but Lord Carnarvon had replied so considerately and so gently that he had delighted every one; and so he hoped it would be in this instance.

Mr. Molteno himself, having received Lord Carnarvon's conciliatory letter of the 21st May, was beginning to mourn over his own folly and the opportunity which he had thrown away. He realized that the country was against him, and feared that he would have to resign. Mr. Froude endeavoured to reassure him. It was, he was sure, only a misunderstanding; Lord Carnarvon's confidence in him would not be lightly shaken by a momentary error of judgement, and some way out of the difficulty would open itself. Mr. Molteno wished to know what Mr. Froude thought could be done, and the latter replied that if the Prime Minister saw no objection the Conference might as well go forward. The Cape Colony had refused to take a part, but the other States had

¹ The Chief Justice.

accepted. It might meet at Maritzburg with Sir Garnet Wolseley in the chair, and if the Cape wished to join later, the door would be open. Mr. Molteno welcomed this suggestion.

Meanwhile in Cape Colony the scene had changed with a rapidity which was almost ludicrous. Every paper except the *Argus* condemned the Ministers with increasing emphasis, and welcomed the despatch.

The report of the Debate in the Cape Parliament had reached London in July. 'Poor stuff,' wrote Lord Carnarvon,¹ '... but a check to the policy which seemed to promise well.' At the same time he received a private letter, conceived in a repentant and obliging mood, from Mr. Molteno, to which he returned a conciliatory and reassuring answer. To Mr. Paterson,² the leader of the Opposition, who had assured him of a speedy and satisfactory answer from the Colony and his own most entire and complete support, he wrote, 'Two things only I may say, 1st, that I never have had the slightest intention of coercing or dictating to the Colony, and that I thought I had amply guarded against such an idea by the terms of my despatch; 2nd, that I do not abandon the hope of a Conference and that no temporary irritation and misunderstanding would have weight with me or incline me to do injustice to the good sense and real moderation of feeling which I am convinced exists in the Colony.'

The despatch, long delayed by Sir Henry Barkly, ultimately reached the other Colonies and States, and it met with a welcome reception in the Transvaal. The acting President at Pretoria stated that it had long since been the conviction of his Government that the many existing policies towards the natives, and the different modes of treatment to which they were subjected,

¹ 11th July, 1875.

² 22nd July, 1875.

exercised a prejudicial influence upon them ; and he hailed ' the nomination of such a Conference with much pleasure, as likely to lead to a full, friendly, calm, and just discussion of the topics alluded to, and to prevent in the future much of that unfortunate difference in the past, caused only, as has always been the opinion of this Government, by distance and local misunderstanding, capable of being removed '.¹

The attitude of the Cape Government with regard to Confederation and Griqualand West Mr. Froude believed to be one of pure selfishness. Mr. Molteno made no secret of his desire that H.M. Government should be useful in pulling chestnuts out of the fire. Griqualand, he said, was no affair of his, and he would not meddle with it. " " Why ", he added, and I confess ', wrote Mr. Froude,² ' I listened with surprise, " why do you not go on with your present policy up there ? We do not care, we shall make no objection." " You mean ", I said, " we are to enforce the arbitration award, annex all those territories and make clean work of it ? " " Yes, certainly ", he said. " It is your affair ; it is no business of ours." " I think I understand you now ", I replied. " I now know what you mean by saying that the movement for confederation is premature. We are to settle all that country, we are to bring the whole of it under the British Flag, and to bear all the odium and all the expense. When this violent work has been done, the fruit will be ripe, and you will take the country over and form a Dominion. A South Africa so united might be very convenient to you ; but after the feeling which would have been created in the process against ourselves, it would not be a desirable appendage to the British Empire."

¹ Acting President Joubert to Sir Henry Barkly, 16th July, 1875.

² Conversation of 19th June, 1875. Mr. Froude's Report.

Mr. Molteno neither denied nor acquiesced in the interpretation which I had placed upon his words.'

The personal antagonism between the two men was rapidly hardening. The refusal of the Ministers to attend the Cape Town Dinner had brought an outburst of support for the policy of the despatch. The Cape Dutch rejoiced to think of justice, as they termed it, being done to their brethren across the Vaal and Orange Rivers; the English hoped to find justice for themselves and safety from the native danger. Addresses poured in to Mr. Froude. He was invited and pressed to speak. He refused for some time; but ultimately, being, as he held, deliberately misrepresented by the Prime Minister, he gave way. He spoke at Port Elizabeth, Worcester, Stellenbosch, and other towns, and corrected the misstatements made as to the real intentions of H.M. Government, and begged Lord Carnarvon to disown him if he had done wrong.

In the meantime the difficulties in Natal had been overcome by Sir Garnet Wolseley's able and discreet intervention. The fresh Constitution was in being. The new Native Laws, which required much tact and consideration in their administration, had been formulated; and Sir Henry Bulwer, a man of sound and even judgement and conciliatory manners, was despatched to take over the Administration.

He arrived in Cape Town in August, and wrote that the Colony had shown its feeling unmistakably. .

'The curtain, so to speak, is down at the present moment, having dropped upon the act with all its scenes, in which Mr. Froude has played so prominent a part, from the Cape Town banquet at the end of June to the date of his departure from the Colony for Natal, since which time nothing more has been heard of his proceedings.

‘ There can be no question that his progress through the Cape Colony has been a triumphant progress and, in one sense, a great success. It has brought out or enlisted the sentiments of the greater part of the Colony in favour of the Conference, and it has so wrought that, whilst the Ministry and its parliamentary majority have expressed a strong opinion one way, the Colony has expressed, and most unequivocally so, an equally strong opinion the other way. . . .

‘ The general opinion outside, so far as I have been able to ascertain it, is that Molteno will give way to the flood of public opinion, accept the situation, and make the best of it. I do not myself feel so sure that this will be the result, though I am persuaded it is the result to be desired, and to be brought about if it possibly can be. . . .’¹

Lord Carnarvon’s explanatory despatch arrived in Cape Town in August, and save by the Ministers was warmly welcomed. The Colonial Secretary reaffirmed the right of the Imperial Government to take the initiative in questions which concerned the mutual relations of independent communities some of which were not British, and expressed a hope that his explanation would remove the objections of the Cape Ministry. But should it be otherwise, and should other Provinces desire to hold the Conference, he directed Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, to arrange and preside at the meeting, which should not then be held in the Cape Colony.

He then proceeded to justify those portions of his earlier despatch which had been the subject of criticism in the Cape—the allusion to the distinction between the eastern and western provinces of the Colony as furnishing a ground for federation, and the suggestion of names

¹ Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Carnarvon, 20th August, 1875.

(those of the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition) as suitable representatives at the Conference. Finally, he passed to the main objection which had been levelled against his action, i.e. that it was a violation of Colonial self-government.

‘ I trust it is needless for me to say that there is no one more anxious than I am to respect and support the right of the Colonies to exercise an uncontrolled discretion in the administration of their internal affairs, when once it has been deemed advisable that they should be placed under responsible government. But, on the other hand, I cannot too strongly and distinctly protest against any such doctrine as that Her Majesty’s Government, in courteously inviting a group of Colonial Governments and independent States to deliberate upon questions of common interest, because they do not previously obtain the consent of one single member of that group to such a proposal, therefore infringe the rights of that Government, should it not approve of the invitation. . . .’

He was not without hope, however, that the Cape Government and Legislature would feel disposed to take part in a Conference ‘ which I still trust may meet this year ’.

‘ I am well aware that so great a work as the Confederation of South Africa is not likely to be speedily completed, and it may be some time before even two or three of the Colonies and States can agree upon a union which H.M. Government can sanction. But that is no reason why any two or more who may agree to do so should not enter upon a consideration of the subject. . . .’

I trust that I am not to infer . . . that you have not formally communicated my despatch to the Presidents and Lieutenant-Governors, as, considering that it has been published and freely discussed, they were entitled to receive it at once in an official manner, and it was in consideration of the position which you hold as Her Majesty’s High Commissioner as well as Governor that I preferred to make the communication through you, but the time and manner of doing this was not a question left open to your discretion, or to be decided by the advice of the Ministers of one Colony. . . .

‘ There are at the present moment some very important matters more immediately affecting the Transvaal Republic and Natal as to which I should anticipate much benefit from an interchange of opinion, such as the result of the arbitration respecting Delagoa Bay, the course to be taken in consequence of the award, and the hostile attitude of the Zulus. . . .

‘ My object has rather been to explain to them [the Cape Ministers] (as it is very convenient to do thus early after the introduction of responsible government) the limits within which the authority and jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s Government on the one hand and of a Colonial Government on the other have been in some cases advantageously exercised.’

‘ Your “ Conference ” despatch to the Cape Government’, wrote Mr. Shepstone,¹ ‘ has fairly raised the question of federation; that question has been there all along, but it has been like a living seed lying in dry soil; the despatch watered it, the petulance of the Cape Ministry warmed and made it germinate, and now it is lifting the whole surface of the Cape Colony; what shape the plant may take when it emerges into light no one can tell, but it seems certain that the opposition of the Cape Ministry has done more to invigorate than weaken its growth, and judging from the tone of the Cape press, has made it a necessity that the Conference shall be held in the Cape Colony.’

Confederation had now become the main theme of political discussion throughout the Colony. Opinion was sharply, indeed passionately, divided, and the weight of the Ministerial authority was thrown into the scale opposed to change. The Cape Government represented to Lord Carnarvon that the two Republics did not desire Federation, that a uniform native policy was not in any case to be wished for, that the Cape Colony could not make itself responsible for Natal. Behind all the overt

¹ 26th August, 1875.

opposition was the fear that under a scheme of Federation Cape Town would lose its pre-eminent position as a political capital. Meanwhile Mr. Froude was writing home reports of the difficulties with the Orange Free State on the one hand, and the Dutch Republican feeling in the Cape on the other, the ambitions of Cape Town and the diverging tendencies of the western and eastern provinces of the Colony.

‘I enclose an important letter from *Brand*. You will see that although ready to advise the Volksraad to meet us, to a certain degree, about the Conference, he stands to his point about Griqualand West. He will meet no delegate from Griqualand till the question of our right to be there has been decided. He adheres to his demand for arbitration, which we cannot well refuse unless we are prepared to make concessions. . . . I asked him what he and the Volksraad wished to be done in the event of a decision, either by arbitration or by any other tribunal, that he had right on his side. Were they prepared, and did they wish to take the Diamond Fields back? for it was a very serious question, whether, even if the original annexation had been wrong, we could hand over to the Free State 30,000 English inhabitants who had settled in this place in the belief that it was lawfully British territory. He says that if you will send a Plenipotentiary properly authorized to treat with him, he will give that objection “every reasonable consideration”. In fact I know that he does not wish to have the Fields restored to him. . . .’¹

Again, he was present at a scene which proved what a storm had been raised. Merriman, a Minister and said to be a protégé of Sir Henry Barkly, had come to Port Elizabeth to raise a counter-agitation. He spoke at Uitenhage (a place 30 miles from Port Elizabeth) at the opening of the railway. ‘There was a great luncheon. 400 people were present. When the health of the Ministers was drunk, Merriman rose and broke into

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 19th September, 1875.

violent abuse of the Imperial Government, which he twice spoke of as a *foreign Power*. Uitenhage is one of the very few places in the Colony where the Ministers were supposed to have friends, but this was too much for them, and a scene followed of the wildest confusion. If ladies had not been present, Merriman would have been struck and hurled out of the room. After 20 minutes of violent uproar the chairman said he must break up the meeting, and went away.' Mr. Froude slipped out also. He begged Lord Carnarvon to note the words 'foreign Power'. It was no accident. It was the Cape Town construction of the Constitution. The Colony was now ready to repudiate it.¹

Later (30th September) :

'Cape Town is fighting the rest of the Colony to maintain the supremacy. It is a battle of life and death to the politicians there, for if Confederation is carried the seat of Government must be removed. . . . The sympathy with you in the provinces, which the Cabinet hoped had burnt down like a fire of straw, has blazed out more fiercely than ever. . . .

'I have had to act so much on my own responsibility and in so irregular a fashion, that any post, I am well aware, may bring me an intimation that I am blundering. . . . I do not think I have yet made any serious mistake. The fury and bitterness of the Cape Town Ministerial papers shows how clearly they know that the battle is going against them. It will be said at home perhaps that there ought to have been no battle, or that I, at least, should have taken no part in it. If I had remained silent, Molteno would have carried the day, to the infinite injury of the Colony. . . .'

Returning to Cape Town on board the *African*, Mr. Froude wrote,² 'If the Cape Parliament again supports Molteno *against* the Conference, and we go on without the Cape representatives at Maritzburg, *the Eastern Province insists that it will be represented separately*. On the

¹ 23rd September, 1875.

² 3rd October, 1875.

East fall all the burden and dangers from the natives. It is the East which is in contact with the Kaffirs and in real peril from them. They are determined, therefore, as far as any men can be, that they will not be left out ; and either the West will then be obliged to follow, or the long-threatened division of the provinces will be an accomplished fact. Thus obstinacy, vanity, wounded pride, and the petty interests and prejudices of a single town are allowed to menace the very existence of the Cape Colony.'

He added on the 4th October, ' Your letter to Barkly on the separation of the provinces is admirable. It is in fact really a question for the Colony to settle for itself. Molteno has endeavoured from the first to entrap me into saying that the Imperial Government would not sanction it, Molteno's object merely being to destroy the interest of the East in the Conference. When he could not extract any such declaration of opinion from me, he invented it. He sent Mr. Sprigg and Captain Mills to Port Elizabeth and to other towns to spread a private impression that they were to be sacrificed. . . . '

Although rebellion had been crushed in the Diamond Fields there was still cause for anxiety, and Sir Henry Barkly had travelled the 700 miles up to Kimberley with the troops in July. Notwithstanding his remonstrances, Lord Carnarvon had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to leave matters as they were. He recalled Mr. Southey, appointed Major Lanyon¹ as Lieutenant-Governor for the Colony, and sent Colonel Crossman at the same time to unravel the accounts.²

' Lanyon and myself—Villiers and Edwards, are living in a small wooden hut built us by Mr. Barry. There are 3 rooms in it ;

¹ Later Sir Owen Lanyon, K.C.M.G., C.B.

² It was estimated that the debt of the Province had increased by £80,000 *per annum*. At the same time the population had steadily decreased.

2 of them 10 ft. square (about), and the other somewhat less—with two canvas erections outside, and a mud kitchen. The sanitary arrangements horrible—but we have literally nowhere else to go. . . .

‘Fancy £8 or £10,000 worth of Diamonds travelling down 3 or 4 times a month from here to Cape Town in an open mail cart driven by Hottentot drivers, and occasionally carrying passengers of every description ; and not a single highway robbery. It says a great deal for the honesty, and perhaps very little for the enterprise of the Afrikanders. How long would it have run in Australia without being “stuck up”?’¹

‘I am much struck with the two Commissioners,’ wrote Mr. Froude,² ‘Lanyon clear, adroit and resolute—Colonel Crossman clear-headed and experienced, an admirable combination of the soldier and the man of business.

‘I am glad Major Lanyon will have the support of such a man as Col. Crossman at starting, for he will find his task not made more easy by the acquittal of the “rebels”. Under the circumstances the result of the trial was inevitable. No jury would convict men for resisting a Government so unpopular and so suspected as poor Mr. Southey’s, but Aylward and Co. are a bad set. Aylward has an Irish liking for rebellion as such, and no doubt Major Lanyon and he will form an acquaintance before long. Brand, happily, has behaved admirably. . . .’

The Colonial Secretary was dealing with this scene of conflicting stresses and rapidly shifting incidents and emotions under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty. There was then no telegraph beyond Madeira. ‘Not the least of my difficulties’, he wrote to Mr. Froude,³ ‘is that I am removed, so far as letters are concerned, by a distance of two months, and that I must write so as to meet various contingencies, which are all different in their kind, and require different handling. . . .’

¹ Colonel Crossman to Mr. Ommanney, 18th November, 1875.

² 9th October, 1875.

³ 26th October, 1875.

VII

As summer passed into autumn there were abundant symptoms of a growing tide of opinion in the Cape Colony in favour of the proposed Conference. 'The Colony', wrote Mr. Froude, 19th October, 'will insist upon the Conference. . . . The Cape politicians strut about with their Constitution as a schoolboy newly promoted to a tailed coat, and they imagine that they have the privileges of perfect independence, while we are to defend their coasts and keep troops to protect them in case of Kaffir insurrection. So one-sided a bargain cannot last, nor, I think, can the present condition of the military force here. . . .'

And upon the point of the Conference Sir Henry Barkly was now in agreement with the historian. 'The feeling of the country', he wrote,¹ 'has been so loudly expressed in most districts in favour of the proposals for a Conference, and the yearning of the colonists of Dutch descent for reunion with their kinsfolk beyond the Orange River has been so powerfully excited by the discussion, that I cannot but think that, if reciprocal sentiments exist in the Republic, such a Conference will ere long be held and the Confederation of S. African States and Colonies under the British flag for which your Lordship is so earnestly labouring, be accomplished, despite all the obstacles which, at the present moment, threaten to impede so important and desirable a consummation.'

On the 11th November, the Cape Parliament met in a special Session, and learnt from Sir Henry Barkly that Lord Carnarvon's suggestions respecting Confederation and a Conference as a means to that end, would be laid before the Assembly, together with a Minute of the

¹ 20th October, 1875.

Ministers. Mr. Molteno thereupon gave notice of a motion to reject the proposals as unlikely to further the interests of Cape Colony, and proceeded to censure the agitation on the subject of federation, declaring that Mr. Froude's action had been unconstitutional.¹ Mr. Philip Watermeyer, for the Opposition, moved an amendment pledging the House to the policy of a Conference.

In the course of the subsequent debates a new despatch arrived from Lord Carnarvon. The Colonial Secretary suggested that in view of the deep interest which had been evinced throughout the Colony in the proposal for a Conference between the Governments of South Africa, and the ample discussion which had been given to the question, it deserved consideration whether a full and satisfactory understanding might not be best attained by a Conference in England. The Conference and Confederation party took fright. Was not this another infraction of Colonial self-government? The perturbation was sufficient to enable the adroit Prime Minister to snatch a victory by a narrow majority of fourteen votes on a resolution which construed Lord Carnarvon's despatch as an absolute and unconditional withdrawal of the proposal of a Conference.

Mr. Froude, in a telegram from Madeira,² summarized the situation :

' Despatch of 22nd October arrived when debate in Assembly was in progress. Council had voted for Conference. In Assembly we had gained votes ; numbers would have been equal. . . . Soloman, to save Molteno, moved that the Conference was withdrawn, and that Molteno's resolution was no longer necessary ; but that the House must undertake to assist you in the Griqualand West difficulty. Molteno agreed, being told that he must drop

¹ Barkly had refused to allow his Ministers to attack H.M. Government, but compromised by allowing them to attack Froude.

² Received 13th December, 1875.

much of the resolution or fall. Our Western allies went over ; the Eastern fought on for Conference and were beaten.

‘ The result is good, perhaps on the whole the best. . . . ’

Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Prime Minister on the 14th December : ‘ You will probably be interested to know that there has been a crisis at the Cape and that Froude is on his way home, and will be I think in England by the end of the week. It is hard to say what the result really is. Froude telegraphs to me that “ it is good, and, indeed, the best that can be expected ”, but the skein is too tangled a one to be untwisted by mere telegrams. . . . ’

The telegram was shortly followed by Mr. Froude himself, very anxious about his own part in the transaction, and apprehensive as to its wisdom.

It was, however, impossible to have taken a line to which there might not be fair objection. The difficulty of the circumstances, great enough in itself, had been unnecessarily aggravated, and mistakes were inevitable. Thus Lord Carnarvon consoled him, and he himself saw reason to hope that with tolerably good fortune, and given the requisite time, a Conference in England might still be held and many important questions settled.

Before the Cape Parliament met in March, 1876, another despatch from Lord Carnarvon had reached the Colony, in which the action of Her Majesty’s Government was defended, Mr. Froude’s services handsomely acknowledged, and Sir Henry reminded that ‘ it may not at all times have been sufficiently remembered that your duties as High Commissioner cannot be subordinated to the local policy of your advisers, and that even in matters affecting the Cape alone, you have obligations to Her Majesty’s Government which no Colonial Minister can expect you to overlook.’ The despatch also expressed a hope that the Cape Government would see their

way to appoint a representative at a Conference in London, in favour of which Natal, the Free State, and the Transvaal had already declared themselves.

Nothing said or done at this Conference would bind any of the Governments represented at it. The paramount problem was confederation, and he particularly indicated, as an essential condition to its lasting success, a clear conviction on the part of the States that the measure was wise and beneficial. It would be useless to compel an unwilling State to adopt any such measure.

The Cape Government replied to the despatch in a Minute of the 14th March, which again disputed certain points but reiterated their desire to give counsel and assistance with regard to Griqualand West, for which purpose Mr. Molteno was to go to England at the earliest possible date during President Brand's visit. Mr. Molteno expressed his personal willingness to aid Lord Carnarvon in the discussion of the Griqualand West and other questions, but only, so wrote Sir Henry Barkly, the 16th March, 'as soon as his parliamentary duties will permit.

'I pointed out to him that President Brand purposed leaving for England about the middle of next month, and that your Lordship had suggested that some competent representative of the Cape Government should be present whilst his Honour was there; but the Ministry is not disposed to delegate the negotiations as to Griqualand West to another, and consider that Mr. Molteno will be able to go home early enough to admit of your Lordship consulting him as desired. . . .'

President Brand had accepted Lord Carnarvon's invitation with very great pleasure.¹ He was gratified by the 'noble sentiments, with regard to the Orange Free

¹ 25th December, 1875.

State and the South African Republic, to which you gave utterance in the debate of the House of Lords in the Langelibalele affair. . . .

‘ Personally I shall be most willing to do everything in my power, consistently with my duty, to assist in promoting the speedy and amicable settlement of our unfortunate controversy, and I sincerely believe that when that is done the cordial good feeling which is so desirable will be fully restored, and the harmonious co-operation of this Republic with the neighbouring Colonies for the general welfare of South Africa be secured.’

And later, at a special session of the Volksraad, it had been resolved that he was to proceed to England and endeavour by personal communication to bring their unfortunate differences to a speedy and amicable settlement.¹

John Henry Brand, President of the Orange Free State, the son of a distinguished father, Sir Christopher Brand, Speaker of the Cape House of Representatives, was a statesman of higher qualities than his contemporaries in the Transvaal. A Cape Colonist by birth, he had studied law at the Dutch University of Leyden as well as at the Inner Temple, and had been elected in 1873 to the Presidency of his Republic. In spite of many acute differences with several British Governors and Governments, he was, generally speaking, a good friend to England and desirous of maintaining cordial relations with her.

Apart from the Griqualand question, Brand had a variety of grievances. He wished to transact his diplomatic business through the Foreign and not the Colonial Office or Cape Government, and Lord Carnarvon found no small difficulty in explaining the inconvenience of

¹ President Brand to Lord Carnarvon, 16th February, 1876.

a system under which the English negotiators must be necessarily inexperienced in Colonial Affairs. He pointed out that the moment was hardly suitable for the transfer of such questions from the experienced hands of a Colonial to those of a necessarily less well-informed Foreign Minister ; and on Brand's returning to the charge, he illustrated the position by quoting the case of Persia, which, although an ancient independent Kingdom, had long transacted business with British Ministers or Envoys mainly selected by the Government of India.

At an interview on the 15th May, Lord Carnarvon begged him to state frankly what it was that as a practical man of business he desired to obtain for his State. Lord Carnarvon observed that the whole of the Diamond Fields was then in the occupation of the British and filled with British settlers, and asked the President to state, as an illustration of the line which he wished the discussion to follow, whether he wished to have the territory handed over to the Orange Free State, and was prepared to accept the responsibilities of government ? To this the President returned no direct answer, but appeared set upon obtaining an acknowledgement that the annexation of Griqualand West was an act of injustice towards the Boers ; and to this proposition he returned again and again in subsequent interviews.

Lord Carnarvon wrote to him on the 30th June :

‘ The experience of Great Britain in different quarters of the globe has shown that to unravel and make plain the conflicting claims of barbarous and semi-barbarous native tribes to the land they dwell upon or roam over, and to adjust the complicated questions which are sure to arise so soon as endeavours are made to transfer the possession of the soil to the ownership of civilized men, is a task which will always tax to the utmost the patience and sagacity of those who undertake the duty with the best and most single-minded intentions.

‘The sense of these difficulties has brought forcibly before my mind the necessity of accepting with the greatest circumspection the results of even the most honest and laborious investigation, and I was at one time not without hope that a similar experience, though limited to South Africa, might have produced in your Honour’s mind a kindred feeling of diffidence which would render more easy the attainment of a common understanding between us. . . .’

It was indeed a work of great difficulty, and needed patience and tact to arrive at a common understanding. But by the 6th July a financial compensation was agreed upon, the exact terms to be arrived at through a third person.

The terms agreed upon were, that a sum of £90,000 and a small rectification of frontier was to be given to the Orange Free State, with a further sum of £15,000 should the Free State construct certain railway lines to connect it with the Cape Colony and Natal ; and on the 13th July, 1876, the agreement was signed with the happy conclusion that, ‘The Right Hon. the Earl of Carnarvon and His Honour President Brand hereby express their cordial satisfaction with the foregoing arrangements as a just and fair settlement in full of the question referred to herein and heretofore in dispute ; and all grounds for controversy now being removed, the Right Hon. the Earl of Carnarvon and His Honour President Brand, for themselves and for Her Majesty’s Government and for the Orange Free State, agree to seek, by friendly co-operation hereafter, all that can advance the common interests of their respective countries.’

The sum was not to be made chargeable to the Mother Country, nor did Lord Carnarvon undertake to treat it as a lump sum, but it was to be supplied out of the revenue of the new province of Griqualand West.

From a financial point of view Lord Carnarvon’s

acquisition for the Empire of the Diamond Fields, including the future city of Kimberley, was undoubtedly a valuable one.

But he himself declined 'to limit the advantages of such a settlement to a mere money bargain. On the one hand, the Orange State lost little that it was for their interest to keep; for they had not the executive force necessary for the maintaining order in the mixed community which had sprung into existence on their frontier; on the other hand, it was for the honour of the British Crown that the sense of injustice should be removed and that grievances which had rankled for many years should be exchanged for a feeling of comity and goodwill.'¹

Mr. Molteno started for England by the July mail, ostensibly with the view of assisting at the discussions between Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Brand, but as Mr. Brand had arrived in England in May, and had arranged not to prolong his stay beyond the middle of August, this implied some lack of consideration. The Imperial difficulty had been settled before he arrived.

Mr. Molteno visited Lord Carnarvon on the 31st July, and this first meeting was friendly. The Secretary of State told him that he must not in any way consider that he or his presence in England had been overlooked. The questions which had been settled were questions between the Imperial Government and the Orange Free State, and Mr. Brand had declined to deal with any one but himself. There were, however, many other questions connected with the Province which were quite open for discussion between them, and Lord Carnarvon was anxious that he should learn all that had passed from himself and from no one else, knowing as he did how many inaccurate stories there were likely to be on the subject.

¹ Lord Carnarvon's article on *The Cape in 1887*.

Mr. Molteno 'accepted all this quite freely: said he felt it right to call immediately on me, and was at my disposal whenever I liked.

'I said that I was glad to hear that Mr. Shepstone and the Natal delegates had come over with him and, I added, "your old parliamentary opponent, Mr. Paterson", at which he smiled. I said I should hope to make his acquaintance too; I understood him to be a man of much cultivation, but that I desired to see him (Mr. Molteno) first and officially.

'In conclusion I added that I was glad to see him because I quite felt that half an hour's conversation was worth a great many letters, to which he cordially assented.'¹

VIII

The long-talked-of South African Conference was formally opened on the 3rd August, 1876. Lord Carnarvon occupied the Chair, President Brand, as the guest of honour, being seated on his right. Sir Garnet Wolseley was Vice-Chairman, Sir Theophilus Shepstone represented the Government of Natal, with Mr. Akerman and Mr. Robinson as Delegates of its Legislature, whilst Mr. Froude, without any special delegation, held a watching brief on behalf of the people of Griqualand West.

The Griqualand difficulty having been settled, President Brand expressed himself prepared to take part in the Conference, except as regarded confederation. His example unfortunately was not followed by Mr. Molteno, and the Conference lacked a representative both from the Cape and the Transvaal.

¹ Lord Carnarvon's Memorandum of his conversation with Mr. Molteno, 31st July, 1876.

In his opening address, Lord Carnarvon reminded the members that the Conference had always in his own view been connected with the problem of confederation. He disclaimed any idea of attempting to propose the application of uniform institutions. On the contrary, he reaffirmed the opinion that each distinctive Colony ought to retain its own policy and its own laws, reserving for the Central Legislature or Government a strictly limited number of special subjects. The ever-present native peril required, he thought, a certain unity of purpose on the part of all the European communities concerned.

The Conference sat seven times and adopted nine resolutions on native affairs : i. e. two on arms and ammunition, one on native passes, three relating to the sale of liquor to the natives, one relating to the occupation of land by natives, and two relating to the industrial training of native children.

It adjourned on the 15th August until October, but was not resumed.

The results achieved were not, indeed, a definite step towards confederation ; but the Conference had the effect of bringing together, for the first time, in united and friendly co-operation, some of the leading British and Dutch statesmen of South Africa, and of inculcating the idea of co-operation and collective action in presence of the ever-menacing native peril. It was, indeed, the first move in the direction of international discussions between European Colonial Powers which later produced the Berlin and Brussels Acts.

The parting between Lord Carnarvon and President Brand was marked by great cordiality, the President desiring the acceptance of his photograph as a recollection.

In view of President Brand's strong objection to dealing with England through the British High Commis-

sioner at the Cape, and his desire to be in communication with the Foreign Office, Lord Carnarvon suggested as a *via media* the appointment by the Colonial Office of a British Resident at Bloemfontein. This involved Treasury sanction, and he wrote ¹ to Sir Stafford Northcote, summing up what had been gained, and the importance of pleasing the President in this particular matter.

‘Half the trouble and difficulty in past time has arisen out of the relations of the Governor of the Cape and the Government of the Orange Free State, and those relations are, apart from the question of individuals, difficult in themselves to reconcile. We have now done a great deal towards bringing about a better understanding with the Dutch in and outside the Colony : we have removed all real cause of animosity : we have held a conference with ten or eleven sittings in which we have obtained on paper at least very creditable results which I think fully justify the Conference and which considerably exceed what I had anticipated as possible : I *believe* that I shall come to an arrangement with the Cape Government by which they will take the Province of Griqualand off our hands (liabilities included), and though the Transvaal Government have behaved scandalously I am not sure that their action will not bring about, and perhaps quickly, all that I have been aiming at. Confederation in fact is (accidents apart) not far distant : and I have even brought Molteno within the last few days to discuss it with me and to consider whether and how it can be carried into effect.

‘Under all these circumstances there is, with a little patience and a reasonable amount of good fortune, hope that a very great change for the better in South Africa may before long be achieved. And it is certainly in a public point of view worth attempting ; whatever happens, it will always be one of our most important stations in a military and naval point of view : and it is possible that the importance of it may grow considerably. I should therefore be sorry to take one brick out of the general edifice which would effect but a small economy but might jeopardize the whole construction. It is *possible* that in a short time we may dispense with the Resident altogether. . . .’

¹ 18th August, 1876.

The public intercourse between Lord Carnarvon and Mr. Molteno had been characterized by attacks on the one side and reproofs on the other, such as rarely have occurred in Colonial history. In private they had exchanged courteous letters, the one deprecating his own antagonistic attitude, the other willing to believe it was due to misapprehension. Even in his public despatches, Lord Carnarvon, whilst greatly blaming, as he was bound to do, the unconstitutional and intemperate language used in the Cape Parliament, had given a full measure of recognition to Mr. Molteno's abilities and position.

Lord Carnarvon, both by temperament and judgement, disliked being 'ill friends'; the welfare of South Africa was at stake, and he welcomed the opportunity of a personal acquaintance which might remove misunderstandings.

Mr. Molteno, on his side, had lost the support of the Cape Colony, and he knew it.¹ The Legislative Council had voted against him. He had only by adroit management obtained a small majority in the Assembly, and this at the price of reconsidering his often expressed determination not to undertake the Government of Griqualand West. Cape Colony, moreover, desired other annexations; thus many reasons induced him to meet the Secretary of State in a conciliatory spirit.

The first interview was friendly, and was followed by a visit to Highclere. But Mr. Molteno's mind moved slowly. The impetuous Italian nature which had seemed to govern his actions in South Africa became exchanged in England's colder atmosphere for his Scotch caution. The negotiations with Mr. Brand had been lengthy and diffi-

¹ Cape Colony proved it on the first opportunity. When in 1878 Sir Bartle Frere dismissed Molteno, his action was endorsed in the Parliament, and after the ensuing Dissolution, Mr. Sprigg was returned on the programme of Confederation.

cult. Those with Mr. Molteno were tedious in the extreme.

The Imperial difficulty in Griqualand West had been solved by the agreement with Mr. Brand. But the question of administration remained. Should Griqualand West be incorporated as an integral part of Cape Colony? Should it be associated in a federation with the Cape? Or should the constitutional relations of the Province with the Cape remain unaltered, subject to financial adjustments? ¹ It was to consider this matter in particular that Mr. Molteno had been commissioned to come to England.

He refused, however, to discuss the question. He was not empowered to enter into such an arrangement as had been outlined.

A few days later a resolution from the members of the Conference was transmitted to him, earnestly inviting him to take part in discussing the policy to be adopted in reference to the trade of arms. Lord Carnarvon endorsed this.

‘ Lord Carnarvon, while anxious not to put any undue pressure upon you, cannot but concur in this Resolution on general grounds, and I am further to acquaint you that in his opinion, and that of the Vice-President, the news received within the last few days respecting the hostilities between the Transvaal and the neighbouring native tribes has greatly altered the circumstances of the case and renders it still more important in the interests of South Africa that some general agreement should now be arrived at as to the policy to be adopted in relation to the trade in arms.’

Mr. Molteno again refused :

‘ I find that your Lordship urges the recent news of the outbreak of hostilities between the S. African Republic and the neighbouring tribes as augmenting the importance of a general

¹ Memorandum to Mr. Molteno, 5th August, 1876.

agreement among all the Colonies and States being now arrived at as to the policy to be adopted in relation to the trade in arms ; and I am certainly (although well aware of the great importance of the question, and of the very serious difficulties which beset it) not in a position, on behalf of the Colony which I have the honour to represent, to enter into any such agreement as that which appears to be in contemplation, however desirable it may be. . . .'¹

On the 13th August another interview was held. 'Repeatedly in the conversation Lord Carnarvon pointed out that Mr. Molteno came home to offer counsel and assistance, and that by treating the first mentioned alternative as out of the question on some supposed divergence of views between them, and by declining to give help on two others, he really rendered nugatory the resolution of the Cape Assembly, as well as his mission which was the result of it.'²

Mr. Molteno endeavoured to obtain a remission of the Colony's contribution of £10,000 for military expenses. Lord Carnarvon reminded him that the existing force was in excess of Imperial needs, and warned him that if the question were raised, the War Office would withdraw the surplus.

The Cape Government had pressed for leave to annex Walfisch Bay and Tembuland to the Colony. Lord Carnarvon intimated that he could not properly or safely advise the Queen to sanction this annexation unless Griqualand West were at the same time provided for, but if the Cape Government would undertake at the same time the three districts, Griqualand West, Walfisch Bay, and Tembuland, Lord Carnarvon was disposed to think satisfactory arrangements might be made, and he asked for an early and definite reply with regard to Griqualand West.³

¹ Mr. Molteno to Lord Carnarvon, 10th August, 1876.

² Memorandum of the conversation.

³ 6th September, 1876.

Mr. Molteno took more than a week to consider it, and then gave no definite answer.

On the 20th September, Lord Carnarvon made an appointment to see him on the following day, 'although', wrote Mr. Herbert, 'his Lordship fears that he must conclude that you are not prepared to make any such definite statements as would be of service to Her Majesty's Government, either of your own views or of the policy which you would be prepared to urge upon the Cape Legislature. Beyond, therefore, the satisfaction which Lord Carnarvon naturally feels at having had the opportunity of making your acquaintance, his Lordship fears that your visit to England may be found to have produced small results, and that he must consider as subject to a fresh postponement those offers of assistance which he had hoped to receive, under the Resolutions of the Cape Assembly, from you in person.

'Lord Carnarvon feels constrained to add that, if the delay which you deprecate in arriving at a settlement of the question of Walfisch Bay and Tembuland is open to so much risk,¹ the delay which you think yourself obliged to interpose in the settlement of the Griqualand West difficulties appears to his Lordship to be not less fraught with objection and danger.'

When they met on the 21st September Lord Carnarvon expressed his great disappointment at Mr. Molteno's last letter, and pointed out that the recent news from the Cape² had so altered the position that he could not reconcile it with his duty any longer to delay action in the

¹ See p. 298.

² On the 22nd August Burgers had been defeated by Sekukuni. Panic followed. On September 1st Sir Henry Barkly reported an unanimous resolution at Lydenburg, requesting the British Government to take over the country. On the 14th September he telegraphed that the cession of the Transvaal was imminent. See pp. 232 ff.

matter. Mr. Molteno admitted that he was favourable to the incorporation of Griqualand with the Cape, but that he did not desire to express publicly this opinion, lest he should be accused of desiring to grasp a reluctant province. 'I thereupon said that I was quite aware that this was his feeling, from his previous correspondence with me, and that in order to relieve him as far as possible from the difficulty and to facilitate his task, I had actually declared myself ready, in my last letter, to accept that view; and that I could not but feel very strongly that, after doing this to meet him and at his wish, he should now take up the ground of saying that he could be no party to the taking over of an unwilling Province.

'He replied to the effect that he had not so read my letter. I said that if he would re-read it he would find that there was no mistake on the subject. He then said that he would re-read my letter and reconsider the point. . . .'

Mr. Molteno again complained that the liability of £90,000 was greater than the Cape Parliament had contemplated,¹ and again asked for a remission of the £10,000 for Imperial Troops. Lord Carnarvon pointed out that this small sum was in regard to population and amount less than that which any other British Colony paid, and that when Mr. Molteno spoke of expense at the Cape for Police and other purposes, he must remember that the presence of English troops morally much more than quadrupled the police force maintained there.

'Lastly, I suggested that in the present critical state of affairs, I contemplated, independently of and apart from all question of the Conference, a meeting of certain S. African gentlemen of experience now in London and requested that Mr. Molteno would attend and give me the benefit of his advice. He declined to do this.

¹ For the settlement of the Orange Free State claims to Griqualand West.

‘ I then pointed out that as the matter then stood he had declined to give me either practical help as regards Griqualand or counsel as regards an informal meeting, the two objects which I understood to be contemplated in and embodied by the resolution of the Cape Assembly ; and I put it to him whether it would be satisfactory to him, or indeed to the Cape Legislature, if he were to return to the Cape with no result to show. It appeared to me that the Cape Legislature could hardly have contemplated so useless an errand, calculated only to waste his and my time. And I could not in all frankness refrain from reminding him that if, at this critical juncture when perhaps the safety of S. Africa depended upon the concert and good understanding between the different European communities, I could obtain no help from him, I might be constrained to look elsewhere and to consider whether some other combination might not be possible.’¹

The serious news received in September that the Transvaal Army had been repulsed by Sekukuni and that a section of the inhabitants had already petitioned for British protection, induced Lord Carnarvon again to ask for Mr. Molteno’s advice.²

He replied on the 2nd October that he must defer any detailed statement on the subject till he returned to South Africa, but added that he held that the mode in which the unification of South Africa could eventually be most satisfactorily effected and maintained, would be by the gradual annexation of the several minor Colonies and States to the Cape Colony.

¹ Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Molteno, 21st September, 1876.

² 30th September, 1876.

IX

Shortly after the receipt of Sir H. Barkly's telegram and despatches intimating that it might be necessary speedily to come to some decision with regard to the cession of the Transvaal, it was suggested by Mr. Herbert that it would be advisable to draft a Bill showing the main principles upon which the Imperial Government might sanction confederation, the details being left to the discussion and decision of the Colonies. He had indeed urged that this should be done four years previously, when Lord Kimberley was Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Lord Carnarvon agreed with the permanent Secretary, and wrote to the Prime Minister on the 15th October :

‘The progress of events in South Africa seems to bring a possible annexation of the Transvaal Republic and the consequent confederation of the various Colonies and States within sight. Much however will depend upon every preparation being now made to enable us to take advantage of the feelings of the time.

‘Under these circumstances I am preparing a *permissive* bill to allow these Colonies and States to confederate.

‘My next step must be without loss of time to bring South African opinion to bear upon it in such a way as to secure some criticism and expression of feeling on it. If this is, as I hope, favourable, there will be no difficulty in passing the measure through Parliament : but owing to the length of time required for communicating with the Cape and to the critical state of affairs there I do not like to delay my movements for the meeting and discussion of the matter in Cabinet.

‘Though the bill will not be immediately ready it seems to me desirable to give an intimation of my intentions at once : and every day is of value.

‘If therefore you concur in the general line which I believe is safe and expedient, I will act as I have described. . . .’

Lord Beaconsfield replied next day :

‘ I have just come from Q. S. and find your messenger waiting for an answer.

‘ I concur and with every hope and good wish must leave the matter to your good management.

‘ Yours, etc.,
‘ B.’

A deputation of residents, merchants, and others interested in the South African Colonies, waited upon Lord Carnarvon on the 26th October, and he then outlined the proposed measure.

He alluded to the Transvaal Republic and the rumours of a disposition to establish a closer bond of connection. The English and the Dutch population, he said, would both recognize in such an union a greater security for life and property. There were further inducements to the Dutch populations of the Transvaal and of Cape Colony and Natal to enter into a closer union with each other.

Answering the question what would be the course which H.M. Government would pursue in the event of Natal and Griqualand West and the Eastern Province desiring to form a Confederation of themselves, Lord Carnarvon said that he hoped and believed there would be a larger Confederation, and that he would greatly regret to see any of the South African Colonies standing apart at such a time. He desired to see Cape Colony enter into a general system of Confederation, but ‘ if, as is quite possible, the Colony should desire in entering that Confederation or after having entered that Confederation to be constituted as one, or two, or three provinces, that is not an arrangement to which the Imperial Government would raise any objection.

‘ Such a measure as I am now contemplating would in its nature be essentially a permissive one, and would be

open to the spontaneous acceptance of each of the Colonies and the States of South Africa.' It would provide the necessary power to confederate, giving an outline of the constitutional machinery, but would leave it as much as possible to local knowledge and experience to fill up the details of the scheme. It would be open to the Dutch States quite as much as to the English Colonies to take advantage of its provisions, but it would not be a matter of putting the slightest pressure on the Colonies and States, and action on their part was to be voluntary and spontaneous. The draft of the Bill was to be sent to the Colonies for them to consider, and fill in details. The Cape might invite the other Colonies and the Dutch States to consider with them any points in that scheme which might seem to them to require concerted action. Whilst he desired to see the Central Government and Parliament of the South African Confederation as strong as possible, he also desired to see preserved as far as possible the individuality of character and the old traditions and customs, and to give them as large a share as possible of power and control in administration and in the expenditure of money. There would be difficulties no doubt in adjusting the rival claims of two such bodies as a Central body and a Provincial body. That was one of the great difficulties with which they had to deal in Canada years ago. But taking all the circumstances and all the conditions into consideration, the conditions were more favourable in S. Africa than they were in Canada and he could see 'no insurmountable difficulty in striking a very fair balance, and arriving at a settlement equitable and acceptable to all parties'.

As soon as the Bill was drafted he sent it to Lord Beaconsfield. 'It is', he wrote,¹ 'an important, and as

¹ 5th December, 1876.

I have only revised and slightly touched it myself, I may say an extremely able one—drafted by Mr. Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary. No one but myself can fully appreciate the extreme skill with which this very complicated and difficult subject has been handled. I shall be much obliged if you will cast your eye over it—and if satisfied give it the approval of your initial and the sooner I can have it back . . . the better, as I am very anxious not to lose the next mail. . . .’

In sending the Enabling Measure to Sir Henry Barkly, Lord Carnarvon pointed out that the grave and critical condition of native affairs now demanded that nothing should be neglected which might conduce to the public safety.

‘It is, I trust, sufficiently elastic to meet all the reasonable requirements of the case. It will serve as well either for the more limited purpose, in the first instance, of uniting Griqualand West to the Cape, as for the larger object of confederating at any time hereafter the whole of South Africa.

‘I feel confident that all parties will acknowledge that in the step which Her Majesty’s Government has now decided upon taking there has been, first, an anxiety to leave no reasonable expedient untried to meet the serious, and I might even say threatening, condition of Native affairs in South Africa, and next, a sincere desire to consider to the utmost the feelings and wishes which have been from time to time expressed, from whatever quarter, on this most important subject.’

The High Commissioner was desired to send this communication to the Griqualand West and Orange Free State and Transvaal Presidents. A copy had been sent direct to Natal.

Sir Henry Barkly’s retirement took place in March

1877. His successor was Sir Bartle Frere, the 'great Pro-Consul', whose views were entirely in accordance with those of Lord Carnarvon, and he accepted the Office as a mission to assist in the building up of a great and united country in South Africa.

At a farewell dinner given in his honour at the Langham Hotel, London, on the 28th February, Lord Carnarvon, in proposing the toast of the prosperity of South Africa, paid a warm tribute to the new High Commissioner.

'Trained in the high school of Anglo-Indian statesmanship, he goes out ripe in years, in honour and ability. He goes out also with that kindliness of temperament, that geniality of disposition, and that social sympathy with the native races, which, in my opinion, constitute not weakness, but real strength. . . .' South Africa had need of all these qualities. 'As in the old fairy tales the princess is always supposed to be endowed with every gift under heaven subject to one single drawback, so in that great, that rich, that wonderful land, South Africa, there is one cause of much anxiety, and that cause of anxiety, as all South Africans know, is the native question. To that all other questions are subordinate. It is the question which underlies, which shapes, the whole policy, and which, though now a source of danger, I firmly believe may be made a source of strength and of future prosperity. . . .'

The Conference in London had brought an agreement on many principles of common action, and he counted among the means for the union of South Africa in closer bonds with England the Permissive Bill, which had been sent to the South African Colonies.

The strange power of misconception which seemed inherent in South African critics had led to the statement that the Bill was framed for the purpose of abolishing

representative government in South Africa. 'How', asked Lord Carnarvon, 'is it conceivable that anybody can suppose that to be practicable, or can imagine that I or any one holding the seals of office under the Queen could for one moment dream of such a ridiculous and absurd chimera as that? So far from weakening or shaking in the slightest degree the liberty of self-government which was accorded freely and cheerfully to the Cape, I trust for my own part that this Bill will strengthen that self-government and will be found hereafter to be one of the strongest buttresses that could have been built in its support. It is for the Colonies and the States of S. Africa to take it or leave it as they please. There is not the shadow of a shade of compulsion, for the Bill was framed with the view of eliciting reasonable and honest comment.' He trusted that Sir Bartle Frere's mission would be one more link in the chain to bind South Africa in still closer bonds with the great British Empire.

CHAPTER XXV

THE TRANSVAAL

1876-1877

‘It is impossible under present circumstances for the Government to carry on the administration and control of the country.’—*Resolution passed by the Volksraad of the Transvaal, 23rd February, 1877.*

THE Transvaal Republic was originally founded by the Boer Voertrekker, Andries Hendrik Potgieter, who had avenged upon the Zulu king, Dingaan, his treacherous massacre of Dutch emigrants, and had established a Boer commonwealth at Potchefstroom in opposition to that already founded by his countryman, Pretorius, in Natal. The Government of this primitive society was conducted upon very simple lines ; the farmers who composed it were men of great bravery and powers of endurance, devoutly attached to a stern Puritanical type of Christianity, which led them to regard the heathen natives much as Joshua had regarded the Canaanites. They had no knowledge of political economy nor of the science of government and administration, and were chiefly anxious to dwell peaceably among their flocks and herds and to exercise a patriarchal authority over their children and native dependants, avoiding the payment of all taxes and the interference of officials of every description.

Each Boer family was a free and self-sustaining unit, content to behold afar off—perhaps very many miles away, in the light of the clear dry African atmosphere—

the smoke of the remote and solitary homestead which was yet the nearest to its own.

The small towns of the veld were rarely visited except as markets—or in Christmas week for the ‘Nachtmaal’ or celebration of the Holy Sacrament, when the ‘Predikants’, the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Faith, administered it to the people, camped round the nearest church by the side of their ox-waggon.

Many of the Boers regarded the modern Church of Holland and of the Cape as of doubtful orthodoxy, and adhered to the ‘Dopper Sect’, of which President Kruger was a leader and lay preacher, and which taught the unadulterated doctrines ascribed to St. Augustine on the subject of predestination and preventive grace. The Doppers, indeed, are alleged to have approved the condemnation of Galileo by the Inquisition, and to have asserted, as clearly affirmed by Holy Scripture, the immobility and flatness of the earth. Many Dutch South African families—that for instance of de Villiers—were descended from French Calvinist refugees who fled to Holland after the repeal of the Edict of Nantes.

The first settlers in the Transvaal had established four small Commonwealths whose united flags became the ‘Vierkleur’ or national banner of the Transvaal, destined in the imagination of ambitious Afrikander patriots to float over the whole of South Africa—a new United States freed for ever from English rule—from the Zambesi as far south-west as Table Bay. These were welded in 1860 into a single State, under the Presidency of Martinus Wessel Pretorius. Citizenship was only granted to men of European race. The electoral franchise was, however, confined to members of the Dutch Reformed Church, which alone, among all other Christian denominations, was recognized and supported by the State. But

every able-bodied citizen or burgher could be called upon to render military service in a commando.

It was in its treatment of the natives that the Boer Government was brought into most acute collision with England. By the Sand River Convention of 1853 the Boers had bound themselves not to permit slavery; but either they connived at it, or were powerless to prevent it.¹ The British Government, fortified by public opinion, held it a solemn obligation to safeguard the interests of the native population throughout South Africa. And so when news came to London of Boer encroachments upon native territory, humanitarian sentiment, uninstructed it may be, but nevertheless genuine, mingled with the political instinct which prompted resistance. The problem, however, of averting the excursions of the Transvaal Boers was by no means an easy one, in view of the huge distances, the obstinate character of the people, and the fact that in the Cape Parliament a large proportion, if not a majority, were friendly to the Transvaal State. On the other hand, to desert natives under 'the pressure of an almost open and insulting compulsion', and to hand them over to the tender mercies of the Boers, 'whose dealings with native tribes have been and are as ruthless as any on record', would raise an extraordinary feeling of indignation in the country.²

The Government was compelled to face the problem in view of the claims made by the Transvaal to native territory assigned to Griqualand West under the Keate award, and by their contemplated hostilities against the Zulus and Sekukuni. Lord Carnarvon maintained that

¹ Khama, Chief of the Bechuanas, wrote, asking for protection. 'There are three things which distress me very much—war, selling people, and drink. All these I shall find in the Boers.'

² Lord Carnarvon's Cabinet Memorandum, July, 1875.

the Keate award should be upheld, that the Cape Government should be pressed to fulfil its undertaking to administer Griqualand West, and that the forcible annexation of native territory by the Boers should be resisted if necessary by force.

The Boers received full warning. On the 25th January 1876, Lord Carnarvon, writing to Sir Henry Barkly, said : ' As long as South Africa continues as at present, split up into several Provinces having no common bond of union between them, Her Majesty's Government cannot accept or be a party to any extension of territory by the South African Republic, more especially any appropriation of the lands now ruled over by Cetywayo, with which the Colony of Natal has so many direct and indirect relations. Any such action on its part, tending, as it undoubtedly would, to produce a native war on our frontier, could not but have a dangerous and disturbing effect upon the enormous native population of Natal. The Kaffirs of Natal, being of the same race as the Zulus, would probably sympathize with their kinsmen in Zululand, and a war between the Republic and the Zulus would inevitably draw this country and its South African dependencies into serious complications. . . . '

Yet the President assured Lord Carnarvon that he had some time since given instructions to the local authorities to maintain peace, and to be careful not to endanger the harmony of present relations, as it was not the intention of his Government to make war upon the Zulus.¹ This statement, however, was on a par with many others, and the Republic added to British annoyance by commandeering Englishmen in the Transvaal to fight in its commandos. In response to protests, M. Joubert only replied that ' every foreigner is bound

¹ 1st February, 1876.

to submit to the laws of the Republic, and the liability of military service of all able-bodied men is one of those laws.' ¹

On the 29th April, 1876, the Governor of Natal, Sir H. Bulwer, warned Lord Carnarvon that relations between the Zulu king Cetywayo and the Republic had assumed a threatening aspect and had been complicated by a movement on the eastern frontier of the Republic. A powerful native chief, Sekukuni, who had a grievance against the Boer Government, and was believed to be in practical alliance with Cetywayo, was reported to be threatening an attack on the Leydenburg district, where a number of British subjects were engaged in mining work.

President Burgers had endeavoured to extend his protection to the Amaswazis, whom the Zulu king regarded as his own vassals, and he had warned Cetywayo that he would not be permitted to meddle with these dependants and allies of the Republic. His claim to their allegiance was based on the alleged purchase of the Amaswazi territory from Cetywayo's predecessor Panda, which the Zulu king indignantly denied. Burgers had indeed advanced this particular pretension to Lord Carnarvon when in England,² and it appears to have been connected in his mind with the Delagoa Bay Railway project and other schemes of eastward expansion. But his assertion that Sekukuni was a rebellious subject of the Republic was entirely indefensible, and Sir Henry Barkly was able to show that his territory had never been included within the limits of the Republic until the publication of a map by the Transvaal in 1875.

At a Cabinet held on the 8th July Lord Carnarvon brought before his colleagues the danger arising from the

¹ Sir Henry Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, 4th February, 1876.
² February, 1876.

aggressive policy of Mr. Burgers, and it was agreed that he should express the displeasure of Her Majesty's Government.

In a despatch to Sir Henry Barkly, 12th July, 1876, Lord Carnarvon said that the consequence of any ill-judged aggression upon native tribes might be extremely serious, not only to the Transvaal Republic but to neighbouring European communities, and might easily involve them in all the difficulties and complications of a general native war; that the danger to Natal was immediately threatening; that Natal had already been much embarrassed by the great influx of natives forced across the frontier, in a great measure through the policy of the Transvaal Republic; and that the outbreak of war at that time would undo all that had been effected for the improvement and pacification of the native tribes both within and adjacent to the Colony.

Her Majesty's Government could not view passively or with indifference the engagement of the Republic in foreign military operations, the object or necessity of which had not been made apparent, and they desired that the President should be strongly warned that in adopting an aggressive policy he was subjecting Her Majesty's possessions to the danger of very grave evils for which, if they arose, the Transvaal Republic would necessarily be held responsible.

'I request you', it ended, 'to communicate a copy of this despatch to President Burgers. I regret that I should have been under the necessity of taking this notice of his proceedings, but I endeavoured, when he was in this country, to impress upon him the great anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government with regard to native affairs in South Africa, and the obligation under which all the local Governments are placed of using the utmost

caution to avoid causing any injury to their neighbours by pursuing a policy calculated to unsettle or provoke the native tribes. . . .'

By a letter of the same date, Lord Carnarvon desired Sir H. Barkly to issue a proclamation warning all British subjects to abstain entirely from assisting the Transvaal Republic in its operations against the natives.

He wrote also to Sir Henry Bulwer : ¹

'President Burgers, as far as I can see, is behaving very ill, and if not checked may place us in a very difficult position. I am extremely anxious not to quarrel with the Transvaal, if it can possibly be avoided—but under no circumstances can we permit any further undefined and indefinite annexations of territory towards the sea-coast. The Dutch policy is clear enough in this respect, and we cannot allow it.'

Before this remonstrance could reach Pretoria the Boer Army had already commenced operations against Sekukuni. At first it appeared likely to succeed, for on the 5th July it captured his stronghold in the Drakenburg, known as Matheve's or Mazepa Mountain,² a village built on a flat plateau surrounded by rocky hills, themselves defended by a series of strong walls, which could only be entered by two narrow passes.

But the Boer success was not maintained. On the 22nd August, Sir Henry Bulwer reported serious news from the Transvaal. Burgers had been defeated, many of his men had fled and deserted him, and he was then in camp with the remainder of his force. 'There is a strong feeling growing in the Transvaal which no doubt derives all its force and its very existence from personal

¹ 12th July.

² 'We think we may be certain', writes Burgers in a despatch, 6th July, 'of having conquered Sekukuni's most formidable stronghold. We will retain firm possession of this Kaffir Gibraltar, fortify it, and provisionally make it a hospital for the wounded. . . .'

apprehensions, of the necessity of coming under the English Flag ; and I doubt not that a practical movement will be made in that direction before long by representations addressed to your Lordship through the High Commissioner. . . .’

The Boers’ reverse produced panic in the Transvaal. On the 1st September, Sir Henry Barkly reported that a meeting had been held at Leydenburg on receipt of the news of President Burgers’ defeat, at which it was unanimously resolved to request the British Government to take over the country.

A fortnight later ¹ he telegraphed to the Secretary of State that the cession of the Transvaal seemed imminent, and asked for instructions. Mr. Herbert at once forwarded this important telegram to Highclere. ‘ It will show you ’, he said, ‘ that our anticipations as to President Burgers’ failure and the consequent desire of the Transvaal to come under British rule are being fulfilled very rapidly.

‘ We could telegraph a reply . . . but I would not at all recommend any telegram being sent. We cannot be too careful at this juncture, and it might be awkward to desire—or to refuse—assistance to the Transvaal, or to show anxiety to get the territory—or reluctance. In fact it seems to me dangerous to move at all until we have the written despatches next week and have considered them with Shepstone.’

He suggested that Lord Carnarvon, in sending a copy to Lord Beaconsfield, should tell him that ‘ you may have to act promptly with regard to taking over the Transvaal and are of course confident that you will have his full concurrence in doing so if necessary. . . .’

‘ I do not however think it a case for acting in a hurry,

¹ 14th September, 1876.

especially as we shall have to wait some time for the resolution of the Transvaal Volksraad, and that will very probably be adverse to annexation in the first instance. . . .’

Shepstone and Wolseley were both in England and could be seen at once. In a second letter on the same day, Robert Herbert added : ‘ It may be necessary to confer with War Office, etc. And we shall have Molteno and other Africans desiring a hearing. I merely throw this out for your consideration. . . . I think it a dangerous thing to telegraph to Barkly in answer to his question whether he should accept cession of Transvaal until after seeing the despatches and hearing Shepstone, and if possible Wolseley. Would it be well to send Wolseley out ? ’

Lord Carnarvon informed the Queen on the following day, and to Lord Beaconsfield he wrote : ¹

‘ The enclosed most important telegram from Sir H. Barkly has just reached me. It is a singular fulfilment of what I anticipated at our last Cabinet.

‘ The juncture is really a serious one, for if there is delay in acting or if matters take a wrong turn before instructions can reach him, we may have a great Kaffir war in South Africa. But I do not anticipate this—and my hope is that by acting at once we may prevent war and acquire at a stroke the whole of the Transvaal Republic, after which the Orange Free State must soon follow and the whole policy in South Africa for which we have been labouring be fully and completely justified.

‘ I propose therefore to telegraph at once to-day to Sir Henry Barkly enjoining caution and consideration of the whole situation, warning him against undue eagerness and the acceptance of any conditions that can be avoided, desiring him to make everything conditional to my consent, but telling him subject to all this to act on his best judgement and to lose no chance of acquiring the Transvaal. I feel confident that in this I shall have your entire support, but I shall be glad to know that you do concur. . . .’

¹ 15th September, 1876.

Lord Beaconsfield answered concisely on the 20th September :

DEAR CARNARVON,

In all these affairs I must trust to you, and you are a person in whom I have much trust. Do what you think wisest. . . .

Yours sincerely,
B.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone advised that whatever negotiation had to be undertaken would have a better chance of success if it were conducted by Sir Henry Bulwer, who had the confidence of the white and black population alike. The problem would be to word the telegram so as not to offend Sir Henry Barkly.

In view, however, of the difficulty of entrusting operations to the Governor either of the Cape or of Natal, neither of whom could leave their seats of Government, it was decided that no better person could be selected than Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself.

Lord Carnarvon had already prepared Sir Henry Barkly for the new developments which he foresaw.

‘The state of affairs is very serious and it needs as far as possible the laying aside of small local and party jealousies and a clear, temperate, vigorous action on the part of those who are in authority and responsible for the safe and satisfactory conduct of affairs. . . . My telegram of the 21st will have given you, as I hope, all the necessary guidance should the question of a cession of the Transvaal either arise or become possible. I attach to a cession the greatest importance. It closes a legion of difficult questions, it relieves us from many real and pressing dangers, and it places us as regards African politics in a position far more favourable than any which we have yet occupied.

‘The freer such a cession can be of all terms and conditions the better, but under no circumstances should the chance if it presents itself be allowed to escape. The present reverses of Mr. Burgers, the panic of the population, the natural instincts of the English population in the Transvaal, are strong elements

in favour of what I desire and will I doubt not with skilful handling be made greatly to contribute to the objects in view.

‘Owing to all the circumstances and possible contingencies of this case I have thought it desirable to send back by this next steamer Sir Theophilus Shepstone, whose knowledge of and influence with the native tribes on the frontier of Natal may enable him to exercise a most salutary influence at this moment. But I have also felt that his general acquaintance with the Dutch, their feelings and language, also greatly qualify him to render assistance in any dealings with the Transvaal. He carries with him not only a personal knowledge of my own views derived from conversations with me but also confidential instructions empowering him provisionally to assume the direction of affairs in the Transvaal, should circumstances, as I trust may be the case, be favourable. He will communicate them to you and confer fully with you, and I feel sure that I may count upon your giving him in every way the utmost assistance by counsel and other help that may be in your power.

‘I propose to give him the title of Special Commissioner with general but I hope adequate powers.

‘I have only further to add that I am arranging with the Secretary of State for War to send out with the least possible delay a strong battalion ostensibly to relieve the 32nd, but really to be available for all purposes and in the first instance to stop at Natal, where, with the complications that are possible in the case of Cetywayo and Zululand, its presence will be most useful. Sir Theophilus Shepstone will go direct to Capetown to confer with you and to have that frank and cordial co-operation on all these questions which their great importance requires.’¹

When later despatches were received, Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Queen :²

‘. . . It is, however, clear that a panic exists in most parts of the Transvaal Republic and that the very large majority of the British residents are anxious to come under your Majesty’s sovereignty. Of the disposition of the Dutch it is more difficult to speak ; and it is evident that Sir H. Barkly in his latest letter to

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 20th September, 1876.

² 25th September, 1876.

Lord Carnarvon had no certain information on the point. The situation is one which is extremely critical : for any further provocation or mischance might produce a great Kaffir war of which it would be difficult to measure either the magnitude or the calamities. Every precaution which in Lord Carnarvon's opinion was possible has been taken. Sir Theophilus Shepstone ¹ is already on his way to the Cape and by his great personal influence with the natives he may be able to give a right direction to events. Lord Carnarvon has also arranged with Mr. Hardy for the despatch of an additional regiment with a large supply of camp equipment and extra saddles and bridles on October 3rd. This will proceed direct to Natal and the report that it is on its way may be useful. . . .'

And again on the 6th October :

'We are still uncertain whether Cetywayo the Zulu king is really moving. He has an army of at least 30,000 men regimented and armed with more or less organization and discipline, and any rash move on his part would be a very serious matter. I am very glad that I did not lose a mail in despatching Shepstone to the scene of action, for if any man can guide these wild men, it is he. . . .'

II

By his Commission ² Sir Theophilus was directed to make full inquiry into the origin and nature of the disturbances which had arisen and the measures to be adopted for preventing a recurrence, and authorized in

¹ 'He was the son of a missionary and is English born, but went out to S. Africa as a child and there he spent his life. His knowledge of the Kaffir language and customs led to his employment in the native war of 1835 and his subsequent service in many different capacities. His ability and skill were such that he gained a vast influence with the natives and a corresponding influence with the white people, and since 1856 he has held the office of Secretary for native affairs in Natal, where his policy, in spite of very great difficulties, has been attended with remarkable success. He is known among all the native tribes as the "Great Father", and that we have escaped a great and serious war up to this time is in my opinion entirely due to him.'—Lord Carnarvon to the Queen, 5th June, 1877.

² Signed at Balmoral on the 5th October, 1876.

case of urgent necessity to administer and annex provisionally any district, territory or state, 'provided that no such Proclamation shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory or state, unless you shall be satisfied that the inhabitants thereof, or a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof desire to become Our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting Our power and authority therein are sought to be imposed.'

No Proclamation was to be issued until it had been approved by Sir Henry Barkly in his threefold capacity as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and High Commissioner.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone left England shortly after, and in addition to his Commission Lord Carnarvon gave him the following private caution on the 4th October :

' . . . If they [the Dutch population] think they have it in their power to say that they have been coerced into union much of the good of the annexation will be lost ; for they will remain a discontented element in the body politic, allying themselves with everything that is factious, troublesome, and anti-English. You will of course remember that in South Africa we have to deal not only with the Dutch in the Dutch States but outside of them—and that any real feeling of anger within is likely to communicate itself to those without, especially at the Cape. . . . The question is one, I am sure, of the highest importance ; it is certainly desirable to have the consent of the Volksraad to the cession of the State and it would be dangerous to take over the country *against* their desire except under circumstances so grave as to justify us on the ground of unquestionable general safety. I hope that you may secure this even if on your arrival you find that the vote is not what is desired. It may be possible to get a second and a more satisfactory resolution. . . .

' I imagine that the neutrality proclamation will not be popular with the Dutch : but I see no help for this.

' Mr. Molteno took his leave of me yesterday : he expressed

himself in the most friendly terms and as extremely desirous to co-operate with me. I have urged him to consider the question of confederation, and I have pointed out to him that now under the very altered circumstances of the case he can very properly take a fresh departure. He inclines to *incorporation* with the Cape as against confederation: but I think the latter the most practical and expedient principle at which to aim. . . .’

Meanwhile native incursions into Transvaal territory had recommenced. The Leydenburg district, which had been constantly raided, became extremely impatient, whilst petitions for the conclusion of peace with Sekukuni were sent in increasing numbers to the Volksraad.

On the 2nd October a public meeting was held at Leydenburg, censuring the President and the Volksraad, declaring the maintenance of the new forts to be impracticable and for the purposes of border defence useless, and finally suggesting the mediation of the British Government, and an armistice with Sekukuni.

‘ We were surprised to notice ’, ran the Petition, ‘ that Confederation with the British Power, so nobly offered, was not accepted, inasmuch as we have all to gain and nothing to lose thereby, the more that it continually appears that the Government is not in a position to properly protect us, as is evident from the unpunished incendiarism and thieving by the Kaffirs.’

These complaints were re-echoed in the capital, where both Burgers and the Raad were openly attacked by the Press. ‘ A pleasant prospect verily ! ’ wrote the *Transvaal Argus and Potchefstroom Gazette*, 13th October. ‘ An empty Treasury, an unsuccessful war, an increasing debt, a total loss of credit, an obstinate President, a discontented people, a partly sycophantic rebellious press, and a set of non-representing representatives. Could anything more black and gloomy be described ? ’

Sir Henry Bulwer wrote a fortnight later :

‘ On the receipt of the news that the commando under President Burgers had failed in its attack upon Sekukuni’s town, and retreated in confusion, the greater part breaking up and dispersing, I felt what everybody here felt, that a crisis of some gravity had arrived. . . .

‘ The Defence Committee had written, on the part of the English community, to solicit my assistance, though they did not explain the nature of the assistance they wished me to give them, or make any suggestion. . . .

‘ So far, however, as an opinion could be formed at the time, the crisis seemed to be one in which the safety not only of the Leydenburg district but of the Transvaal Republic itself might come before long to be seriously endangered. . . .’

The news sent by Sir Henry Barkly was very similar :

‘ I am afraid that, if Her Majesty’s possessions are not to be rescued from the dangers incident to such a chronic warfare of races until President Burgers has time to “settle these matters” (the inclusion of Sekukuni’s territory in the Republic) with the means at his command, they will have to wait a very long time. . . .

‘ I cannot help, under such circumstances, regarding Mr. Burgers’ proposals for the continuance of the war with great apprehension ; nor, considering the response from his Honour to your Lordship’s remonstrances, which I herewith forward, otherwise than as extremely unsatisfactory.

‘ Most earnestly do I trust, for the sake of the peace and happiness of the white population throughout South Africa, no less than for that of the further progress in civilization of its native races, that effectual means may be found for bringing the Government of the Republic to adopt, with as little delay as possible, a more humane and prudent native policy than it is now pursuing.’¹

A check to Sekukuni caused a lull in the expressions of desire for annexation,² but Lord Carnarvon had again to remind President Burgers that the Republic had never

¹ Sir Henry Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, 2nd October, 1876.

² ‘ The pear is not yet ripe,’ wrote Sir Henry Barkly, 17th October, 1876.

at any time exercised jurisdiction north of the Steelpoort River;¹ and again to refuse to recognize the right of the Transvaal Government to any sort of suzerainty over the Amaswazis.²

Lord Carnarvon, sending a letter from Sir Henry Barkly for the information of the Queen, added some of the enclosures.

‘They give a very horrible picture of the atrocities which are now going on in the Transvaal, and I am afraid that there is no exaggeration in them. . . . The evil is becoming so great that the time seems to me to be at hand when some greater risk must be run, and that on the ground both of humanity and of self-preservation, we must actively interfere. I for my own part desire this. The cruelty and baseness of this little wretched Government ought not to be allowed to continue to the misery of those whom they oppress, and the danger of their neighbours.’³

The principal authors of these atrocities were the young Prussian officer named Von Schlickmann⁴ and Aylward, a Fenian, both of whom had been implicated in the Griqualand West riots. These men deliberately made war on women and children; they flogged the Auxiliary Kaffirs to make them destroy kraals and shoot and hunt out those who took refuge in the bush. Von Schlickmann of set purpose murdered the Kaffir women who ‘picked’, i.e. were the labourers, as without them the soil would not be tilled. He had them ‘put out of his way’, which he held would break the Blacks up as soon as anything. The President himself was accused. That slaves were offered for sale on his farm was the confident assertion of the *Cape Argus*. It was said that captives, taken from Sekukuni’s country, were exchanged at the rate of a child for a heifer, and that the President had countenanced

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 30th December, 1876.

² Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Bulwer.

³ To General Ponsonby, 12th November, 1876.

⁴ See p. 181.

and witnessed the execution of a native by the slow and cruel method of stabbing him to death by throwing assegais.

Not once, but repeatedly Lord Carnarvon protested in the strongest language. When this last story reached him, he wrote:¹

‘I cannot yet permit myself to conclude that the facts can have been exactly as represented, and that President Burgers, the head of a civilized State, who but a short time ago, strongly and repeatedly assured me that the stories of the cruelties alleged to be practised by the Boers were unfounded, can have brought discredit alike upon himself and his Government, by ordering and presiding in person over so atrocious an act.

‘I shall be greatly relieved if, after making further inquiries, you are able to assure me that the circumstances were not such as have been reported, and I need hardly add that Her Majesty’s Government are determined that, so far as lies in their power, European civilization in South Africa shall not be disgraced and endangered by such brutalities as that to which it has become my painful duty to refer.’

A week later² he repeated his instructions to Sir Henry Barkly.

‘It is necessary that I should inform you that not only Her Majesty’s Government, but the press and the public generally have noticed with indignation the accounts of further atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated by the Transvaal Commando. . . .

‘I do not, of course, without further confirmation, allow myself to believe that there is not some explanation or palliation of these reported acts of brutality, nor am I willing to conclude that, if actually committed, they have had the approval of President Burgers. . . .’

Sir Henry Barkly answered³ that there was no doubt of the accuracy of the report, which letter crossed another

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 12th October, 1876.

² 19th October, 1876.

³ 14th November, 1876.

despatch from Lord Carnarvon ¹ desiring him to 'satisfy yourself by all means in your power of the truth of these reports, and, should it unhappily appear that they are well founded, to express in the strongest language the horror with which Her Majesty's Government view a prosecution of hostilities on such principles, and the extreme peril in which they are convinced the best interests of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa are placed by such a course of proceeding. . . .'

Meanwhile Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had arrived in Natal in November, was endeavouring to check the warlike propensities of the Zulus.

'The Zulus are evidently in a restless state and it is not easy to tell what their great annual war festival, the dance of the first fruits, will end in ; I am, however, inclined to think that Cetywayo's policy will be to await events. . . .

'I infer that even the invasion of the Amaswazi, a very popular Dutch project, is for the present given up. But the dance is not yet over, and there is no certainty until it is ended, how it may end. Natal is not likely as yet to be the object of any warlike scheme, but at no very distant date the Zulu difficulty will be what we shall have to face. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the loss of prestige which the white man has sustained in Zululand from the folly of Mr. Burgers and the cowardice and insubordination of his "Army".' ²

Sir Henry Barkly gave a full report of Sir Theophilus' proceedings : ³

'Finding, however, on his arrival that negotiations were going on between the South African Republic and the Zulu King, in which the Government of Natal had not been requested to intervene, he deemed it better to remain at Maritzburg for a time, and it was not until after the utter failure of the Transvaal Pleni-

¹ 16th November, 1876.

² Sir Theophilus Shepstone to Sir Henry Barkly, 23rd December, 1876.

³ To Lord Carnarvon, 15th January, 1877.

potentiary, Mr. Rudolph, to come to terms with Cetywayo transpired, and rumours of the warlike preparations of the tribe became rife, that he decided on moving forward to Newcastle, with the view of proceeding thence to Pretoria, the capital of the South African Republic, in order to confer with that Government as to the alarming aspect of affairs.

‘To pave the way for the mission entrusted to him, Sir Theophilus, on the 20th ultimo, despatched a letter to President Burgers, notifying officially his intended visit and explaining its objects to be to make special inquiry into the origin and nature of the existing disturbances, and secure, if possible, a settlement of the disputes with Sekukuni, Cetywayo and other Native Chiefs which have led to them. In order to obviate all possible offence, intimation is given that he will be escorted by 25 of the Natal mounted police, a small enough escort certainly, considering the disturbed state of the country. It is hardly likely, however, that any objection will be taken on this score, for it would seem that when the Governor of Lorenzo Marquez formerly visited Pretoria he was accompanied by a detachment of Portuguese soldiers, who mounted sentry at his door during his sojourn there.

‘Sir Theophilus left Maritzburg on the 27th ultimo, and was at Newcastle at the date of the last accounts. As his baggage is conveyed in bullock waggons his journey thence will probably occupy upwards of a month. . . .

‘The Zulu difficulty will, in any event, remain to be solved ; and, considering the loss of prestige which the Republic has sustained, the exhausted condition of finances, and the divided counsels which seem to prevail amongst its inhabitants of European descent, there will be abundant scope for such co-operation as Sir Theophilus Shepstone may be able to afford in restoring order and putting a stop to further effusion of blood.’

‘16th Jan. P.S. Since writing as above, intelligence brought by the steamer *Stettin* from Natal has been telegraphed from East London, to the effect that “the Zulus have actually made two attacks, attended with considerable slaughter, upon Natives living within the Transvaal Republic, and that 60 families have trekked from Assegai River, where the second attack was made”.’

Shepstone entered Pretoria on the 22nd January, and was enthusiastically received.

‘ On our way we were met by most of the inhabitants of the seat of Government on horseback and in carriages, who welcomed us with enthusiastic cheers and accompanied us to town. On reaching the first street the horses were taken from the carriage by men who had stationed themselves there for the purpose, these men drew the carriage to the market square opposite the house of Mr. Lys. . . . Mr. Lys read an address of welcome, to which I replied. . . . The assembled crowd then heartily sang the first verse of “ God save the Queen ”, then gave three cheers for Her Majesty. . . . We proceeded to a lunch which Mr. Lys had prepared. In the afternoon the usual civilities were exchanged between the President and Her Majesty’s Special Commissioner.

‘ On Tuesday we all attended an official lunch to which we had been invited by the President, where every evidence of cordiality and goodwill towards Her Majesty’s Government and her representative was shown.

‘ This afternoon I met, by special appointment, the President and his Executive Council for the purpose of satisfying them officially of the validity of my credentials ; this being done I was invited to state the objects of my mission ; I did so in general terms, saying that in 1852 Her Majesty’s Government had gladly consented to grant the request of her subjects then residing north of the Vaal River to be allowed to rule themselves ; that no interference with them had been made or desired so long as they appeared to be successful in their government, but that, lately, events had occurred in the Transvaal which very much compromised the safety and peace of Her Majesty’s dominions in South Africa ; that the weakness of the Republic had become a source of danger to itself and its neighbours, and that the object of my mission was to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal with the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee security for the future. Mr. Paul Kruger, who is a member of the Executive Council, and the only opponent of Mr. Burgers for the position of President, did not object to the discussion of the causes which are said to produce insecurity or inconvenience to neighbouring States or Governments, but posi-

tively declined to enter upon the discussion of any subject that might involve in any way the independence of the State as a Republic. The result of the meeting was the appointment by the President and Executive Council of two persons to discuss with two to be appointed by me the condition of the country which causes uneasiness to Her Majesty's Ministers and injuriously affects Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa.

'The President and Executive Council appointed Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen, the State attorney, and I appointed Mr. Henderson and Mr. Osborn, and their deliberations commence to-day.'¹

He wrote to Sir Henry Bulwer on the 31st January, 1877:

'I have to-day had a long personal interview with the President; he is in a great dilemma, appears nervous and timid; he sees and acknowledges the condition of the country, but does not yet see his way to act in the direction of my mission, except that he has called a special Session of the Volksraad to lay the state of the country before it. It is not possible to judge what view this body may take, but if Mr. Burgers will throw his influence into my side of the scale, the issue may be favourable, and as far as I can judge he is that way inclined. Last night we all attended the grand reception dinner, and the toasts of the "Queen of England" and myself as guest and Commissioner were very enthusiastically received. Of course I could say but very little except that I intended by the help of God and the assistance of the Government and people of the country, not to leave it until I had done some good to it. Pretoria itself is for annexation, but the community is mercantile and not Boer, while the surrounding district is the stronghold of the malcontents. The Volksraad is to meet on the 13th. This morning I received a deputation from Potchefstroom, the largest town in the State, welcoming me and inviting me to pay their town a visit, but I cannot at present be away from the centre of action. . . .'

¹ Sir Theophilus Shepstone's Report to Lord Carnarvon, 26th January, 1877. Sir Henry Barkly suspected that Burgers had deliberately selected Kruger for this difficult task, in order to discredit his rival for the Presidency.

The divisions among the burghers were very deep and very bitter. Four hundred armed Boers rode into Pretoria¹ and memorialized the President against any Confederation, after which they rode off as if the matter had been finally settled, though some of them looked askance at the Union Jack flying over Sir Theophilus Shepstone's house.

On the 13th February, President Burgers opened the Volksraad. He laid before the burghers the two great questions which at that time occupied the whole country and the people, upon the settlement of which incalculable results depended for the future of the country and the people. The first question was financial. Their expectations when passing the annual estimates had not been realized. 'Extraordinary conditions demand also extraordinary actions, and you will feel with me that this is not the time to take half measures.'

He next brought before them the despatch of Her Britannic Majesty's Colonial Minister on the subject of Confederation, and fervently hoped that Providence might guide their deliberations in this matter in a way that would tend to the prosperity of the country and the people.

'In close connection with these two matters was the mission of Her Britannic Majesty's Special Commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to the Government, and I trust the Legislature will enable the Government to enter into such agreement with His Excellency as will lead to the prosperity and security of the whole of South Africa.'

While Burgers was using this ambiguous language, Sir Henry Barkly warned Lord Carnarvon² that civil war in the Transvaal might be regarded as imminent, and the administrator of Griqualand West telegraphed from Kimberley to Cape Town that the Dopper Party, of

¹ 7th February, 1877.

² 20th February, 1877.

which Kruger was the favourite, and which hated the heterodox President, were holding meetings and voting resolutions against Federation in whatever form. Any step involving either closer relations with Great Britain or any change of President would, he thought, be the signal for civil war.¹

With this view Sir Henry Bulwer was inclined to agree. Writing from Durban on the 19th February he reported that Kruger's chances of the Presidency had suddenly improved and that he had become the acknowledged leader of the unyielding Republicans. This had more than ever persuaded Burgers that the objects of Shepstone's Mission deserved consideration. 'Of the latter's reception at Pretoria,' he continued, 'you will no doubt have received full accounts. It was an enthusiastic one, but it must not be lost sight of that it was English and not Dutch. However, Burgers received the Mission well, as well, perhaps, as could have been expected, and is inclined to believe that his interests and the interests of his country lie in forwarding the objects of the Mission, however much the other way his heart may lie.'

The President in his speech, as reported in the *Volkstem* on the 20th February, again addressed the Volksraad, and deplored their 'fatal blunder' in mixing his two articles (Reform and Confederation) in one resolution. He alluded to the pressure exercised by the 400 Boers, and reproached the members for saying one thing in public and another in private. 'In listening to such speeches I imagined seeing an unfortunate victim on the scaffold, who, quite unconscious of his position, is even there joking with the hangman, who is by and by to deprive him of his life. And, alas ! such is the present condition of this country, although happily not in the position of a

¹ Major Lanyon to Sir Henry Barkly, 17th February, 1877.

miscreant, but nevertheless of one whose fate is sealed by the judgement of history, that revenges a nation's unfaithfulness.'

He rejoiced that they wished to maintain their independence, but they need not repeat it so often. 'We are here for a different purpose. We have to take the bull by the horns. We must put our shoulders to the wheel. It is a question which cannot be put off by any oath, we cannot get rid of it in that way. If it is put out by the door it will come in by the window, with even greater proportions. Throw it under the table and it will rise stronger than before. Put it off until the May Session, and then it will come back not as a child but as a giant. You have been advised to clear it off the table by one single resolution. Oh, gentlemen! Let me tell you that a great fact cannot be undone by a Volksraad Resolution! We may resolve as often as we like that we will have nothing to do with Confederation, but, let me tell you, Confederation has a great deal to do with us. . . .'

The burghers had memorialized the State asking for Confederation for two causes: the Sekukuni war, and the financial embarrassment and helplessness of the Government. 'The people want to know whether the offer as laid before us here in the despatch of Lord Carnarvon is rejected or accepted. What is the meaning of the petitions for Confederation, of this despatch, and that permissive bill that have been sent us? . . .'

'He who reads merely what is written [in the permissive bill] reads only half. The other half is to be read between the lines. . . . These documents testify to deliberate study. It will not do to sweep them off the table. . . . Whatever might have driven some here to ask for Confederation, I myself cannot believe that Lord Carnarvon desires anything else than the welfare of South Africa. . . .'

‘ We cannot wage war with England. Neither is it necessary. Our weapons must be order, obedience to the law, unity and advancement. Only by self-denial and self-sacrifice, by abandoning our prejudice against reforms which civilization requires, shall we be able to save our cherished liberty and independence. . . . I tell you openly, matters are as bad as they ever can be ; they cannot be worse. . . . ’

He ended with a somewhat ambiguous statement of his own views : ‘ People from whom I would not have thought it, deemed it advisable to spread the report that I was secretly in favour of confederation. I do not contradict this slander, and only mention it in accordance with the wishes of many. As long as I am bound by my oath, and the people are indeed with me, I shall do what I can for our liberty. . . . ’

The *Volkstem* reported again on the 3rd March that Burgers had submitted the proposed reforms to the Volksraad. Two days after, he warned his hearers that their country could be saved only by a miracle. The people were completely demoralized ; they would not reform their own Government.

Not only had they moral obligations but also monetary obligations towards the civilized world ; to them had been entrusted the penny of the widow, the farthing of the orphan, the mite of the poor. In Cape Colony people had invested their little capital in the debentures of this State, because they had hoped to get the interest faithfully paid by a Christian and honest people.

It was no use asking the people—the Raad must decide. He urged them not lightly to discard the hand held out to save them ; to fight was nonsense ; to draw the sword was to draw the sword against God. Let them agree to join their hands with their brethren in the South,

‘and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great people. There was something grand in that, grander even than their idea of a Republic, something which ministered to their national feeling. It would be miserable for those who would not be under the law, for the rebel and the revolutionist, but welfare and prosperity for the men of law and order.’

He then blew cold, and said that the Cape was more of a Republic than the Transvaal, for it had a Government. The Transvaal was really governed from England without a Volksraad or Legislature. When they planted a beacon anywhere, Barkly threw it down; if they made a line, the British ignored it. But the problems of the South-western border, the Zulu, the Gold Fields, and other questions, showed that it was their duty to come to an arrangement with the British Government, and to do so in a bold and manly manner.

A week later the Volksraad adjourned, after adopting by a large majority, under duress from Kruger, a resolution to maintain the independence of the State, but to submit the question of Confederation to the people. Burgers’ proposal to declare himself dictator for five or seven years was rejected.¹

Sir Theophilus sent a further report on the 6th March :

‘I had frequent conversations with Mr. Burgers as to the condition of the Government and the country, all of which were remarkable for his outspoken frankness, and for the earnest desire which he showed to maintain, as far as possible, the independence of the State.

‘It was patent, however, to every observer that the Government was powerless to control either its white citizens or its native subjects ; that it was incapable of enforcing its laws or collecting its taxes ; that the Treasury was empty ; that the salaries of officials had been . . . for months in arrear . . . that the white

¹ Sir Henry Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, 6th March, 1877.

inhabitants had become split into factions, that the large native populations within the boundaries of the State ignore its authority and laws, and . . . that . . . Cetywayo is anxious to seize upon the first opportunity of attacking the country. . . .

‘The President was fully aware of all this and much more, and needed no argument to convince him of the perilous position in which the Republic stands, and of the danger with which such a position threatens the neighbouring British Colonies. He, moreover, felt persuaded that under the present system of government the independence of the State could not be maintained; but he was of opinion that if the Volksraad would consent to so change the constitution as to confer upon the Executive Government the necessary power to control the people, the Republic might yet be saved.

‘Mr. Burgers appeared sanguine that he could carry these changes through the Volksraad, and that if he did he would be able to right the State; I told him, however, that I could not share his anticipation as to either result. . . . I urged that my observation had convinced me that the inherent weakness of the State was such as to preclude all hope that the remedy for the evils by which it is prostrated could be furnished by the country itself in the presence of the perils by which it is surrounded, and that the safety of the neighbouring British Colonies forbade Her Majesty’s Government from permitting a white Settlement, situated as the Transvaal is, to fall into a state of anarchy that would deliver it an easy prey into the hands of surrounding and nominally subject savage tribes.

‘I had not been many days in the Republic before it became evident to me that the Sekukuni war was but an insignificant item among the many difficulties and dangers within and without which beset the Republic; the Sekukuni storm, small though it was, had been enough to show that the Transvaal barque was unseaworthy, and to make it unmanageable, and the discovery that such a serious effect had been produced by so small a cause had sent the thrilling intelligence through all the immense masses of natives . . . that the relative positions of the white and the black man had become seriously changed, and had prompted the thought that the supremacy of barbarism was no longer hopeless, provided only that the effort be well planned and simultaneously executed.

'The Volksraad met on the 13th February,¹ and was opened by a speech from the President, of which I enclose a copy. He introduced his Reform Bill, copy of which I also enclose, later on. He enforced the necessity of adopting this measure very strongly upon the Volksraad as the only possible means of saving their independence, but the Raad threw it out, even without discussing it ; the Permissive Confederation Bill had been considered out of its turn in obedience to pressure from a body of Boers (about 400) who entered the town to overawe the Raad, and although the rejection of the measure was perhaps due to the influence thus exercised, there can be little doubt that the powerless condition of the State renders Confederation with other established Governments on anything like equal terms out of the question. I enclose Mr. Burgers' speech on that occasion.²

'The financial condition of the country was referred to a Committee of the Volksraad, and when the report was brought up the Raad authorized the Executive by resolution to take exceptional measures for the collection of the taxes ; the introductory words of this resolution are as follows : "The Volksraad resolves, that whereas it appears from the report of the financial Commission that the taxes have not for the greater part been paid, and it has thus become impossible under such circumstances for the Government to carry on the administration and control of the country," etc. . . .

'During my stay in Pretoria I have had numerous interviews with all classes of the inhabitants of the Republic. None have denied the unfortunate condition of the country, or the state of collapse into which the Government has fallen in consequence of that condition. In all these interviews the most friendly feeling has been exhibited ; the great majority of the people with whom I have spoken see no remedy that can be extracted from the country itself. A few, such as Paul Kruger, the only opposing candidate to Mr. Burgers for the position of President, express "a strong hope" or a "confident belief" that all will come right in time ; but no one has any plan, and the state of affairs is daily growing worse.

'On the 1st inst. I met the President and Executive Council,

¹ See p. 246.

² See p. 247.

and further explained the objects of my mission and the views that had been forced upon me by my observation of the state of things in the Republic. . . . I could not but say plainly that in my opinion the only remedy lay in accepting the supremacy of Her Majesty. I pointed out that sooner or later such a step must be taken ; that the material to maintain independence did not exist in the country, and that Her Majesty's Government dared not, with a due regard to the safety of British subjects and territories in South Africa, suffer a neighbouring white State to become subdued by the coloured races. I urged that an opportunity was afforded by my presence to make the most favourable arrangements ; that as I had come among them, not only as a friend, but with the personal assurance from Her Majesty's Ministers of their friendly intentions towards the people of the State, I should feel justified in consenting to such fair and reasonable arrangements as might not interfere with Her Majesty's prerogative.

‘ The subject of this interview with the President and Executive Council has since been daily discussed by the Volksraad, to whom the substance of what passed was communicated. I am unable to say what the ultimate decision of that body may be ; a system of terrorism represses every independent utterance, even in the council chamber, and I must expect that it will be unfavourable. Many of the members have warmly but privately wished success to my mission, and declared their conviction that it is the only possible solution of their difficulties, but they dare not utter such sentiments openly. Even the President, whose brilliant speech to the Volksraad, delivered yesterday,¹ I append, is obliged to guard himself against taking too definite and pronounced a course in the direction of what he sees is inevitable. He puts the alternative of at once accepting and passing into law his reform bill, which he says, however, will require miraculous life and energy, or grasping the friendly hand that is held out to them by my mission.

‘ There are other considerations which I am bound to take into account. I have not thought it necessary as yet to touch the Native question ; it is to the people of this Republic an irritating subject, and there appears to me to be abundant grounds for pressing my mission without alluding to it, except in so far as the

¹ 5th March, 1877.

position and feelings of the natives are a perpetual menace to the very existence of the State. Whatever the charges may be of ill-treatment of the natives, or bad faith towards them by the people or the Government of this Republic, I could not prudently examine into them now without intensifying antipathies which are unfortunately already too strong, and giving encouragement to the natives to resent their experiences of the past ; and in point of fact it is the white population who now require shielding from the black. The latter are, I have reason to know, looking with the most intense anxiety to the result of my visit to this country, and would hail with delight the establishment of Her Majesty's authority ; and when this is happily done, as done it must be, a new era may be commenced that will, it is to be hoped, cause what cannot now be remedied to be forgotten.

‘ Since my arrival in the Transvaal numerous addresses have been sent to me describing the wretched pass which matters social and political had reached, and begging for the intervention in some form or another, of Her Majesty's Government. Other addresses and memorials have been forwarded to the Government of the Republic, setting forth the same difficulties and dangers, and praying the Government to treat with me as Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for their amelioration or removal. The signatures to these documents, over 2,500, out of a total male population of about 8,000, represent every class and interest and nationality in the State. . . .

‘ All the towns and villages in the country without any exception that I know of, desire the change, and it is natural that they should, because the mercantile interest prevails in them and commerce is wellnigh extinguished.

‘ I find from inquiries I have made that the boundaries of this Republic include from 800,000 to 1,000,000 natives placed like a dark fringe round a widely spread white population of from 40,000 to 45,000 all told. All these tribes are said to entertain resentment against the Boers for past grievances, and possibly most of them do : on the south and south-east are the powerful and warlike Amaswazi, and the still more formidable Zulus. The Amaswazi have since the Sekukuni affair become impatient of restraint, and even aggressive towards the Transvaal. The Zulu King, Cetywayo, is well known to entertain a great antipathy

towards this state, and the 800,000 natives it contains will, from the fear they have of him, act as he may direct. He is watching the progress of events here, and while I am in the country will, I believe, commit himself by no aggressive act; but if I am obliged to leave without accomplishing my mission, he will at once claim the right of independent action.

‘Nor could I abandon those who, feeling convinced of the impossibility of the country righting itself, have declared their conviction and begged for Her Majesty’s intervention in the interests of civilization and peaceful progress. My departure would be the signal for the exhibition of resentment towards them; the strife of factions would follow, and the result be anarchy and civil war, which the Government is as powerless to suppress as it has been hitherto to enforce the payment of its taxes, or obedience to its other laws; such a state of things would be a pleasant spectacle for Cetywayo to contemplate.

‘I feel, therefore, that I am in a position from which I cannot retreat. I am anxious to exhaust every means of enabling the people to see the hopelessness of the position they are in, and the only remedy that seems open to them to escape from that position. I am not without good hope that I shall succeed; I perceive a daily change in public opinion; in proportion as the facts become discussed and examined, the idea gains ground that the only practical alternative open to the country is to accept the service offered by my mission.’

On the 12th March Sir Theophilus despatched a further report in which he reviewed ‘generally, but briefly, the condition of the Government (1st) in relation to its white subjects, (2nd) its financial position, and (3rd) the relations in which the Government and white race stand towards the masses of Natives inside and outside the boundaries of the State.’

‘With regard to the first two points very little need be said; it is impossible for any people in a state short of positive anarchy to show signs of greater weakness than are apparent among the white inhabitants of the Transvaal; they are split up into factions on various questions, social and political, all are dissatisfied with

the existing state of affairs, the Government has neither power nor influence, one party believes in Mr. Burgers, another in Paul Kruger, while a larger section than both put together believes in neither, and will obey neither ; the natural consequences of such a condition are estrangement, mutual distrust, and civil war ; and the last, I have heard from the lips of many, they expect and dread.

‘ Financially the country is in a state of bankruptcy ; commerce can scarcely be said to exist, the taxes are in serious arrear, some will not, some cannot pay them, and the Government offers to take promissory notes for such small sums even as £10 on bonds upon the debtor’s land. The public treasury is absolutely empty, the most pressing demands cannot be met, except by promises and compoundings which but increase the debt. . . . The Volksraad, which had been in session, broke up last week, and the members were much inconvenienced because there was no money in the treasury to pay their travelling expenses.

‘ These instances, and the action of the Government, show that there is no probability that the larger engagements of the country are likely to be met. Claims of all kinds are daily being presented which cannot be liquidated, either wholly or in part, and the interest on the Railway and Commercial Bank loans is already in arrear.

‘ To estimate correctly the inherent weakness of the State with reference to the Native races, it is but necessary to consider the position, strength and circumstances of the white population, as compared with the position, strength and temper of the black.

‘ The white strength consists at the outside of 8,000 men capable of bearing arms, of these about 1,000 live in towns or villages, and 350 are the foreign and fluctuating population collected at the gold fields ; the remaining 6,650 are all farmers, widely scattered in isolated homesteads over a surface equal to that of Great Britain and Ireland put together.’

These farmers were the only producers and the only military strength. When Native demonstrations or rebellion arose, they had to become soldiers ; and the immediate effect was that the income of the State was cut

off at a moment when its expenditure had indefinitely increased. The Sekukuni war was a notable example of this. This little episode in the history of the State proved serious enough to bring about utter bankruptcy and collapse, and had not the farmers mutinied against their President and other leaders the calamity of famine might have been added to the other disastrous consequences.

‘The boundary line of the Republic which abuts upon outside savage tribes and nations, all unfriendly to the Boers, is 1,200 miles long. For a further distance of 400 miles it abuts upon the Orange Free State and Natal . . . so that out of a frontier line of 1,600 miles, only 400 abut on friendly neighbours. . . . The native population living within the Republic numbers from 800,000 to 1,000,000. These are legally subjects of the State . . . and are in close contact and communication with the still greater masses outside. . . .’

Tribe after tribe successfully resisted the authority of the Boer Government, until the most fertile districts, containing 38,000 square miles, had to be abandoned to them. The Boers who lived in these districts were content to pay annual tribute to the Native Chief to be allowed to live there.

Outside, the tribes were more formidable, and some more decidedly hostile.

The Amaswazi had 10,000 men, well drilled and disciplined; they had fought for the Boers in the Sekukuni war, which destroyed their respect and made them both defiant and aggressive, and they were showing signs of intending to occupy by force lands which they considered to have been wrongfully alienated by the Republic.

Cetywayo was the most formidable and the most hostile. It was believed he could send 30,000 soldiers into the field, well disciplined and organized, mostly with fire-arms of a superior description. Since Sekukuni’s

affair, he had assumed sovereignty over a portion of the Transvaal territory.

‘The Transvaal has not, therefore, for many years past, maintained its independence by its own strength or prestige ; and taking into account the rapid increase which of late years the almost universal possession of fire-arms has given to the offensive and defensive powers of the Natives, while those of the Republic have been on the decline, it is not probable that if left to itself it ever could.

‘The resources of the country for every class of farming, its mineral wealth, and its healthiness of climate can scarcely be overstated ; these attract thousands of Europeans in South Africa who would purchase and settle upon farms in the Transvaal but for the weakness of its Government. . . .

‘With regard to the difficulties of ruling the country when that change takes place . . . there would be a section, more or less important, of malcontents among the white inhabitants of the State, but . . . I am of opinion that a little experience of the effects of . . . benevolent intentions, aided by conciliatory treatment, will overcome their prejudices and reconcile them to what cannot be avoided.

‘With regard to the native population within the State, immense though it be, double that in Natal, I see no great difficulty in its management. Fortunately the reputation of British rule stands high with all the tribes, and they would hail its introduction as a positive blessing, and besides this the great majority of them are unwarlike.

‘We have already paramount influence with the most warlike of the native powers outside the Transvaal boundary, and the position of the two most likely to give trouble, the Zulus and the Amaswazi, is such that the possession of the Transvaal by Her Majesty’s Government would at any moment checkmate them both.’

Notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the state, the dissensions of the people, and his promises to the British Government, President Burgers did not cease to pursue his policy of annexation. He had loudly proclaimed

that Sekukuni was a rebel, which Sekukuni and the British Government had firmly denied. Sekukuni had been induced, however, to negotiate for peace, but his signature to the Treaty of Peace was fraudulently obtained. The restless little Boer State now claimed paramount jurisdiction over the territory of the Chief Montsioa. He appealed for British protection. His lands, water, and crops had been taken away from him unlawfully. 'I am perplexed to know what to do, for I am like one bereft of all helpers. For the present I am just sitting down in the desert but disputed country without water.'¹ And again, 'I have much trouble in my country. I have no food for my people. I have no place to plough. I have much trouble with the Boers. . . .

'I want the British Government to take my people and land under their protection.'²

The news spurred Lord Carnarvon to a fresh declaration. President Burgers was explicitly informed that the Transvaal would not be permitted to annex the Batlapins and Baralong, and that should the Republic again attempt to do so, it would be necessary to take these tribes formally under the protection of the British Flag.³

Meanwhile the movement in the Transvaal towards Confederation gained ground. Sir Theophilus wrote :

'On the 11th March last I met the President and Executive Council to discuss some resolutions regarding my mission which had been passed by the Volksraad. When the official discussion was over, Mr. Burgers suggested to the Executive Council that it would be well for them to look at both sides of the question, and ascertain upon what terms the State could be admitted as a portion of Her Majesty's dominions. I supported this suggestion,

¹ Montsioa to Major Lanyon, 11th January, 1877.

² Montsioa in conversation with Major Lanyon (Major Lanyon to Lord Carnarvon, 3rd February, 1877).

³ Despatches, 20th February (see Appendix) and 26th March, 1877.

and said I thought that this might be done without committing either side, i. e. that neither should be bound by the questions or answers until both agreed to be bound thereby, and it was agreed that the President should submit to me some questions on the subject.

‘On the 13th March I received the questions annexed.¹ They were unsigned, but forwarded to Mr. Osborn, my secretary, in a letter from the State Secretary, and on the 16th I caused my answers, also annexed, to be transmitted to the President in the same manner. On the 10th April, Mr. Burgers called upon me, being aware that I was writing my proclamation, and personally handed to me the third appended document, which proposes amendments to four, and adopts without reserve six, of my answers to the 10 questions submitted to me on the 13th March previous.

‘The President intimated that, as it had been decided that he was to occupy the position of a protestor against my act of annexation, he could not propose terms, but that as he knew I had the welfare of the country at heart, he gave me the remarks contained in the paper as suggestions which he felt sure I would accept. I of course promised him that I would adopt, as indeed I had already adopted, most of his suggestions, and your Lordship will observe that I have been careful to embody all the pledges which I had given on the 16th March in my proclamation of the 12th April.’²

The moment had arrived when the annexation of the Transvaal seemed inevitable. On the 3rd April Sir Theophilus wrote :³ ‘As far as I am concerned, it is impossible for me to retreat now, come what may. If I were to leave the country, civil war would at once take place, and the Natives would consider it the sunshine in which they should make hay in the Transvaal ; the Goldfields are in a state of rebellion against the Transvaal Government, and they are kept from overt acts only by my warnings and entreaties.’

¹ See Appendix.

² Sir Theophilus Shepstone to Lord Carnarvon, 1st May, 1877.

³ To Sir Bartle Frere.

Writing to Lord Carnarvon on the 17th April, he related what had happened :

‘ On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing the South African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s dominions. . . .

‘ Every step I have taken towards the accomplishment of my object was taken with the knowledge of the President. I thought it my duty to be perfectly open and frank with him from the beginning, and on the last occasion of my meeting with him in Executive Council, he took the opportunity to acknowledge and thank me for what he was good enough to call my considerate and frank behaviour to him and the Government.

‘ After this meeting, and in compliance with a request made thereat, I addressed the letter of the 9th April, copy annexed, informing Mr. Burgers of my intention. He subsequently called upon me and informed me that he should be bound to make a protest, the draft of which he read to me. I agreed with Mr. Burgers that, from his point of view, he could take no other course, and you will observe that the wording of the protest is as moderate as was compatible with the object it was intended to attain.

‘ On Wednesday, the 11th instant, the Attorney-General and Chief Clerk came and officially read the protest to me, and at the same time handed in a resolution of the Executive Council from which it appeared that . . . a Mission to Her Majesty’s Government, and contingently to other Governments, which had acknowledged the independence of the State had been determined upon. The resolution appointed the Attorney-General, E. J. P. Jorissen, D.D., and Mr. Paul Kruger, Vice-President, to be members of this mission, with power to add a 3rd person if required. I received these papers, but as they contained nothing to make me change the view I had taken of my duty, I said that while I recognized the propriety of their discharging what they conceived to be incumbent upon them, I must ask them to do the same with regard to me ; they expressed their acquiescence, and the interview, which had been friendly throughout, ended.

‘ Mr. Burgers called upon me shortly afterwards, and explained to me the object of these documents.

‘ The following day at 11 a.m., the proclamations were read to a small crowd of the inhabitants, mostly English, in Church Square, by whom, of course, the most hearty cheers were given for Her Majesty. Mr. Burgers’ protest and proclamation were immediately afterwards read by Mr. Juta, one of the members of the Executive Government, and were received in respectful silence. No excitement whatever followed. . . .

‘ Every effort had been made during the previous fortnight by, it is said, educated Hollanders, residing at the seat of Government, and who had but lately arrived in the country, to rouse the fanaticism of the Boers, and to induce them to offer “bloody” resistance to what it was known I intended to do. The Boers were appealed to in the most inflammatory language by printed manifestoes and memorials ; agents were sent out to excite them by violent speeches at public meetings, and every possible means were used to intimidate individuals, and stifle the expression of real opinion ; it was urged that I had but a small escort, which could easily be overpowered, and that there would be no difficulty in putting the Mission across the border ; but, as I had judged from the first, the daily accumulating pressure and personal distress which the circumstances of the country were bringing upon them had created in the minds of the people a conviction that the State did not possess inherent vitality enough to relieve them, and that the only prospect of relief lay in their accepting my proposal. . . .

‘ Immediately after the issue of the proclamation Mr. Burgers addressed the assembled officials, and, in taking leave of them, urged them to loyally serve the new Government ; he directed Mr. Swart, the State Secretary, to hand over formally to me the key of the offices, a direction which he (Mr. Swart) at once came to the house I occupy to comply with, and upon his doing so I handed it back to his charge.

‘ The officers of the late Republic, including every member of the Executive Council except Mr. Paul Kruger, one of the delegates appointed to go to Europe, have all signified in writing their willingness to serve under the new form of Government. There has not been time for the notification of the intentions of the Land-drosts . . . to reach me, but I have good reason to believe that all will follow the example of the officers at the seat of Government.

‘ With regard to the protest and the points urged in the minute of the Executive Council, I have very little to say, my proclamation and address to the people show clearly the state of the country, and the impossibility of my leaving it without at once precipitating its destruction, first, by the anarchy which civil war would have at once produced, and next, by the attacks from Natives which that anarchy would at once have invited ; I dared not, therefore, entertain such a thought. None of the points urged by the Executive Council are left unanswered in the documents I have issued, none show the existence of any hope in the Councillors themselves that the country could raise itself by means within itself from its depressed condition, and they afford no certain prospect for the future except the annihilation of the State, and the placing of all the white communities in South Africa in the utmost peril.

‘ The protest, the minute and decision of the Executive Council, as well as the proclamation by Mr. Burgers, were necessary to calm strong feeling here and there, but the great value of them has been that of furnishing an excuse to the great body of the people to accept quietly what they feel is the only means of saving themselves and the country.

‘ In the resolution or minute of the Executive Council my act is described as one of “ violence ”. It seems to me to be unnecessary to state that the Transvaal is about the same size as Great Britain and Ireland put together ; that it is believed to contain a population of 40,000 whites and 800,000 natives ; that I entered this territory with my personal staff only and an escort of 25 Natal mounted policemen on the 4th January, and after a slow progress reached Pretoria, the capital, on the 22nd January last ; that I have never hesitated during these three months and more to explain to both the Government and the people the condition of the State, and the only remedy that appeared to me capable of saving it from immediate ruin ; that I have again and again expressed my willingness to at once withdraw if any plan or action or latent power in the country could be shown me by which its independence could be saved and maintained, and the danger to its neighbours averted, but without result ; that I have invariably been and still am treated with the utmost deference and respect by all classes of the people ; and that the only means by which

I could have used violence in carrying out what I have done, i. e. Her Majesty's troops, were four weeks' march from me in the Colony of Natal, and cannot be here even now within a fortnight, or very nearly a month after the issue of my proclamation, and of my having assumed the Government. These facts will, I think, show your Lordship conclusively that I have acted in accordance with the real convictions and feelings of the people, and that for an officer, accompanied as I was by a staff of 12 gentlemen and an escort of 25 men, openly and avowedly to attempt to subvert the Government of a country and place himself at its head against the true wishes of such a people would have been an act of madness.

'There is also another expression in this same document regarding which I wish to make a few remarks. The Natives are spoken of as a "common enemy" to the whites; this may have been the case in the Transvaal under its late form of Government, and the history of past transactions with coloured races will probably support this view, but I desire to state my conviction, earnestly and deliberately based upon an experience of 42 years' duration, that this need not be the case, and will not be the case under Her Majesty's rule; that these people are, as compared with the Zulu race, unwarlike and inclined to peaceful industry; that in their readiness to adopt civilized ideas and habits they are also unlike the Zulus, who are a proud conservative people, and are naturally opposed to the encroachments of civilization.'

Sir Theophilus Shepstone reported again on the 18th April:

'My first administrative act was to publish simultaneously with my proclamations annexing the territory and assuming the Government, another proclamation suspending the payment of the war levy. Annexed is the scale upon which that tax was adjusted; your Lordship will perceive that it pressed heavily upon the poor man and left the rich and great landowners comparatively free. . . .

'Looked upon in the light explained to me by Mr. Paul Kruger, that it was the ransom a man paid to free himself from personal military service, and not a land tax, it is equally difficult to justify, because it would seem that to the State every man's personal service should be of equal value.'

Again on the 25th April :

‘The troops have crossed into Transvaal territory, and are being visited by the resident Boers in a friendly manner, indeed it is reported to me that not a few Transvaal waggons have been engaged for transport by the Commissariat. The troops cannot, however, reach this earlier than 12 days hence, and I have notified to Colonel Pearson, the officer in command, that there is no necessity for inconveniently hurrying them. In the meanwhile nearly every officer of the Government has sent me notice of his desire to continue to occupy his present position, not one has as yet declined, and I am receiving daily visits from influential Boers to make the acquaintance, as they describe it, of the “new head of the State”, and to offer me their support. I have therefore no doubt that the great change of government which I have inaugurated in this country will be effected not only without opposition, but with the concurrence of the great majority of the people, although it would be unreasonable in me to expect that such concurrence should be very demonstrative at first. . . .’

The annexation of the Transvaal was announced by Lord Carnarvon in the House of Lords on the 7th May in answer to an inquiry from Lord Kimberley.

‘I have received a telegram from Sir Bartle Frere, at Kimberley, which leaves no doubt whatever that the Transvaal has passed under British protection. The telegram states that news arrived there on the 16th of April to the effect that on the 12th April Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed the Transvaal Territory to the British Dominions, that he had abolished the War Tax, and that no opposition was expected to the measure. According to the Press telegrams, the news had been received with general satisfaction from Kimberley to Pretoria. . . . I had for some time expected that this event would come to pass. I have repeatedly, during the last twelve months, given most serious warnings, encouragement and promise of support, but all in vain. Recently, the situation became

. . . perfectly deplorable. Not only had the Transvaal State lapsed into a chronic state of anarchy, in which its Government was incapable of fulfilling the duties of the government of a civilized country, either to its own subjects or its neighbours, but the country itself was split up into factions ; the peace patched up with the Native Chiefs turned out to be a delusion and—what constitutes the greatest danger—the Zulu King, who can command an army of 20,000 or 30,000 Kaffirs, has shown undoubted signs of hostility and made a movement on the borders. I can only say that, in those circumstances, the danger seemed to be—and is now, perhaps—very serious for all parties. I am satisfied that it has been owing to the great influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone that peace has been preserved up to this time. . . .

‘ If annexation has been resorted to, I have little doubt it has been as a measure of self-preservation so far as we are concerned far more than anything else. It is stated that there has been a protest from President Burgers, but I have reason to think that it is a protest of a most formal character, because, certainly, a very large portion indeed of the community of the Transvaal, and that representing the intelligence, wealth and respectability of the country, has for some time past, in presence of those serious dangers desired the incorporation of their Territory with the British Dominions. . . .

‘ Your Lordships will not expect me to express any precise opinion as to the grounds on which Sir Theophilus Shepstone has taken the step. This seems to me peculiarly a case in which we are bound to withhold an opinion until we have knowledge of the particular circumstances, which I expect to receive before long. At the same time, it would be unfair to Sir Theophilus if, for one moment, I allowed the impression to go abroad that I thought he

was wanting in judgement and discretion in the step he has taken. My impression is that he carried forbearance to the last point, and that it was only the extreme emergency of the situation, and the conviction that the peace and the lives of the whole of the white inhabitants of that part of South Africa were involved, that induced him to adopt the measure he is reported to have taken.'

III

As in England, so on the Continent the news of the Annexation attracted very little attention. The sole exception was the 'ancient ally' Portugal. Mr. Morier, then Minister in Lisbon, wrote¹ to Lord Derby that the Annexation had excited public opinion in Portugal to an extraordinary degree, and the papers were filled with anathemas against the devouring ambition of the British Crown.

It was difficult, he said, for Englishmen engaged in fashioning present realities to future use and comfort to understand or sympathize with those for whom there was neither present nor future, and whose lives were spent in lazily dreaming of the past. The question of Lourenço Marques (Delagoa Bay), which to the British public scarcely touched as it were the hem of the Imperial garment, filled the whole political horizon of Portugal. In successfully rescuing this pearl of great price from the British leopard, she lived again in the days when the galleys and carvels of Vasco da Gama and Castro swept the Indian Ocean, the Lisbon fainéant even took to dreaming of the future, and indulged in a strange flight of fancy as to the golden harvests which were to result from the railway to Syderburg, and the treaties concluded

¹ 17th May.

and the courtesies exchanged with the leading inhabitants of the Transvaal Republic. These day-dreams had been rudely dispelled by the *sic jubeo* of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and the Lusitanian public believed that the acquisition of Lourenço Marques would be the next object of British ambition.

The Boer delegation which had been decided upon received little support in the Transvaal, where members of the Volksraad, landowners and others, deprecated their action, and in June sent a Memorial to the Queen, praying that the annexation of the territory, 'now known as the Transvaal, may receive Her Majesty's sanction and approval.'¹

As Sir Theophilus Shepstone, however, had agreed to President Burgers' protest against the Annexation, so he now sanctioned the mission of the delegates and the payment of their salaries during their absence.²

'Mr. Paul Kruger and Dr. Jorissen, who together form the deputation, called together to take leave of me the day before their departure. I have felt it to be my duty to interpose no obstacle or difficulty in the way of these gentlemen carrying out their mission, and although the departure of Dr. Jorissen, the Attorney-General, at this juncture is a serious inconvenience in carrying on the Government, I have preferred to get on as best I can rather than even appear to be obstructive. I am glad to say that both delegates expressed to me their satisfaction at the course I had taken. . . .

'Mr. Kruger is a member of the Executive Council, for which he receives £200 a year, but holds no executive office. Dr. Jorissen is a Doctor of Divinity, but nevertheless occupied the position of State Attorney or Attorney-General in the late Republic, with £600 a year salary; he requested to be allowed to retain his office under the altered form of Government, in terms of my proclamation, and that he might return to it on coming back from Europe.

¹ Sir Theophilus Shepstone to Lord Carnarvon, 9th June, 1877.

² Sir Theophilus Shepstone's report to Lord Carnarvon, 14th May, 1877.

‘ Both these gentlemen told me they were going to Europe to discharge an obligation which had been imposed upon them, and that if their mission failed they would at least have done their duty, and Mr. Kruger added, with the frankness which has always characterized his intercourse with me, that in case of failure I should find him as faithful a subject under the new form of Government as he had been under the old. Dr. Jorissen with equal frankness admits that the change was inevitable, and expresses his belief that the cancelling of it would be calamitous.’

The two deputies reached Cape Town in June, and Sir Bartle Frere endeavoured to discover whether they really represented any considerable section of the Transvaal population, or had in their own minds or instructions any definite course to submit to Her Majesty’s Government for adoption or sanction. They gave him to understand however that they had no commission from anybody subsequent to the annexation, and the opinions he gathered pointed to one conclusion, namely, that it would be very difficult at that present moment to find in the Transvaal any one to avow a wish adverse to the acceptance of the annexation as the best solution of their difficulties, and as a fact which every one recognized and desired to remain irrevocable.

‘ Mr. Paul Kruger ’, wrote Sir Bartle Frere,¹ ‘ is about 55 years old ; he was about 10 or 12 when his father “ trekked ”, and has always been a typical “ Dopper Boer ”. I am assured by those who know him well that he is a very shrewd fellow who veils under an assumed clownish manner and affectation of ignorance, considerable ability—that he has great natural eloquence and powers of persuasion. There is certainly nothing in what is visible to a stranger to indicate a possible regenerator of the Transvaal. . . . I can safely say that I have not

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 5th June, 1877.

heard an opinion adverse to the annexation from any one of responsible position here, nor from any one substantially interested in the Transvaal, the deputation, or rather Mr. Kruger, excepted. . . .'

The ex-President, Mr. Burgers, did not seem much cast down when he came to the Cape in July. 'I am told', wrote Sir Bartle Frere,¹ 'he has not been well received here, by any but advanced "Liberaals"'. He accepted an invitation to our Queen's birthday ball, danced as if he had never been either President or "Predicaant", and drank Her Majesty's health with the most loyal of Her Majesty's British subjects.

'He was shown the Enabling Measure, and asked whether the provincial councils were to be elective or nominee? If elective he had no single fault to find nor suggestion to offer, and thought the Bill an admirable suggestion. . . .'²

'I think', commented Sir Bartle Frere,³ 'he is not deliberately or of purpose untrue or treacherous, as he is often described; but very unreliable, from the impulsiveness of a clever vain man of no fixed or abiding principles, and little experience in any public life but one of temporary expedients. But he has very considerable ability, and rhetorical power of a kind likely to make an impression here and elsewhere. . . .'

Mr. Paul Kruger and Dr. Jorissen arrived in England early in July with a request for a plebiscite, or if that were impossible, for some form of self-government, as provided for by the Confederation Bill. They also desired a reduction of customs duties on imports into the Trans-

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 2nd July, 1877.

² President Burgers, who seems always to have entertained friendly feelings towards Lord Carnarvon, published in July, 1878, an article in the *Daily Telegraph*, which was described by Lady Derby as 'exceedingly eulogistic'.

³ To Lord Carnarvon, 10th August, 1877.

vaal at British Colonial ports, or, in lieu thereof, some substantial bonus.

Lord Carnarvon replied to them in sympathetic language.¹ He declared himself willing to introduce a Liberal Constitution into the Transvaal and to ask Parliament for a generous grant in aid. 'I wish to secure to the Dutch, as far as possible, all that they have had in the past, and all that they can reasonably desire in the future ; I desire to make them feel that, though the form of government has changed, their interests are quite as much consulted under the Crown of England as they were when they were a Republic in South Africa, and there is no reasonable proposal that you or they can make, that I will not take into full consideration. . . .

The Delegates paid him a visit at Highclere, where they lunched and spent the day. The weather was wet, but he took them over the house, showing them the library, the muniment room, the cellars, the kitchen, and the stables. Mr. Kruger once more impressed his host as a very interesting specimen of the Dopper Boer, obstinate, narrow, rough, unlettered, and prejudiced, but homely, and except in regard to natives, not unkindly. His chief praise was reserved for the stables, and when a breaking-in bit was put into the mouth of one of the horses, and a dumb jockey placed on the animal's back, he was extremely interested.

The visit led to a result which appeared important and satisfactory. Both the Delegates pledged themselves to serve the Queen faithfully on returning to the Transvaal and to persuade their fellow burghers to follow their example.

¹ 5th July, 1877.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV

I

The Policy of H.M. Government with regard to Annexations of Native territory.

Lord Carnarvon to Sir H. Barkly, 20th February, 1877.

2. H.M. Govt. have always desired to act with the utmost forbearance towards the S.A.R. in this matter, and have never evinced any desire either to occupy this territory on the part of Great Britain or to prevent the tribes uniting themselves to the Republic. In proof of this I would refer to my Despatch No. 26, of the 14th March, 1874, in which I stated that I was not prepared to interfere with the peaceful and unconstrained union of the tribes beyond the boundary fixed by the Keate award with the Transvaal Republic, a line of policy which I have from that time consistently adhered to.

3. It would, however, be impossible not to perceive that since the date of that Despatch a great change has taken place in the relations of the Republic to the Natives within and around its borders, and that an aggressive spirit has been shown, dangerous alike to the liberties of the tribes and to the prosperity of the Republic itself, and which may at any moment result in serious and widespread disasters to the whole of South Africa. H.M. Govt. therefore think that the time has arrived for warning the Republic that no movement can be permitted, having for its object the annexation of the Batlapin or Baralong tribes, and that the Govt. of the Republic should understand that under present circumstances H.M. Govt. must resist, as an infringement of the Keate award and a departure from sanctioned boundary arrangements, any

absorption of these Tribes, or portions of them, into the Republic.

4. In making this intimation to President Burgers you may remind him that applications have on former occasions been made by the Batlapin and Baralong Chiefs for the protection of Great Britain, and for the incorporation of their territory with H.M. S. African possessions, and that, although these petitions have never yet been acceded to, they are still under consideration, and that any attempt on the part of the Republic to annex the territory of the Chiefs, or the occurrence of any disturbances within that territory, would leave H.M. Govt. no alternative but to take them formally under the protection of the British flag.

II

Table of the Questions, Answers, and Amendments which passed between Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Mr. Burgers previous to the Annexation of the Transvaal.

<i>Queries received by Sir T. Shepstone, 13th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Sir T. Shepstone's Answers (abridged) to questions, 16th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Mr. Burgers' pro- posed amendments (abridged) received by Sir Theophilus, 10th April.</i>
1. Can the Transvaal remain a separate State, retaining its autonomy, with a legislature elected by the people?	Yes—'in the sense that it will become a separate British Colony, with its own laws and legislature. . . . The Transvaal should enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people.' But much must depend on the way 'Her Majesty's benevolent intentions are received'.	'The Transvaal shall remain a separate distinct whole, retaining its autonomy and legislature elected solely by the people.'
2. Will the Dutch language remain the official language?	'Arrangements will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as much the official language as the English. . . .' (See Proc., 12th April.)	The Dutch language to be the official language until the legislature orders otherwise. All laws and notices to be in Dutch and English.

<i>Queries received by Sir T. Shepstone, 13th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Sir T. Shepstone's Answers (abridged) to questions, 16th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Mr. Burgers' pro- posed amendments (abridged) received by Sir Theophilus, 10th April.</i>
3. Will the principle be acknowledged that equal justice will be granted to the natives, but no equal rights of voting, etc. ?	' Unquestionably equal justice must be guaranteed . . . but the adoption of this principle does not and should not involve equal civil rights. . . . '	Adopted.
4. Will the debts of the State be guaranteed ?	' All the just debts of the State will be guaranteed. '	Adopted.
5. Will all obligations of the State as defined in treaties with foreign powers, and contracts, concessions to companies and individuals, and the construction of the Delagoa Bay Railway be maintained ?	Being unaware of the nature of the State's existing treaties, ' it is impossible to say more than that all <i>bona fide</i> concessions and contracts . . . not prejudicial to the interests of the country will be maintained, and that treaty arrangements . . . will have to be considered with reference to the altered circumstances of the country. ' The railway must be decided upon with reference to pending negotiations, but agreed that every exertion should be made to secure its construction.	Adopted, but added that all contracts with the Portuguese Government and the Lebombo Co. with regard to the railway, shall be respected and carried out.
6. Will all officials retain their positions and claims to promotion ?	Yes, if they are ' willing to serve under the altered circumstances of the country ', and ' so long as they may continue honestly and faithfully to discharge ' their duties.	Adopted.
7. Will the boundary lines of the country be maintained as defined in treaties with native chiefs, proclamations, etc. ?	Yes, ' subject, however, to such local modifications as may be found necessary '.	Adopted.
8. Will all private rights of property be respected ?	Yes, except in cases ' where the owners of such property offer . . . seditious opposition to Her Majesty's Government. . . . There are, however, questions of right to land which cannot be brought under the operation of any general principle. . . . '	Adopted, with certain omissions.

<i>Queries received by Sir T. Shepstone, 13th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Sir T. Shepstone's Answers (abridged) to questions, 16th March, 1877.</i>	<i>Mr. Burgers' pro- posed amendments (abridged) received by Sir Theophilus, 10th April.</i>
9. Will the laws now in force be re- tained till altered by the legislature ?	Yes.	Adopted.
10. Will all appoint- ments of attor- neys, land sur- veyors, etc., be maintained ?	Yes.	Adopted.

III

Proclamation of Annexation of the Transvaal by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G.

WHEREAS at a meeting held on the sixteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two, at the Sand River, between Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners, Major Hogge, and C. M. Owen, Esquire, on the one part, and a deputation from the emigrant farmers then residing north of the Vaal River, at the head of which was Commandant General A. W. J. Pretorius, on the other part, the said Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners did 'guarantee in the fullest manner, on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers north of the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without interference on the part of the British Government :'

And whereas the evident objects and inciting motives of the Assistant Commissioners in granting such guarantee or permission to persons who were Her Majesty's subjects were 'to promote peace, free trade, and friendly intercourse' with and among the inhabitants of the Transvaal, in the hope and belief that the territory which a few years afterwards, namely in February 1858, became

known by the style and title of 'The South African Republic', would become a flourishing and self-sustaining State, a source of strength and security to neighbouring European communities, and a point from which Christianity and civilization might rapidly spread towards Central Africa :

And whereas the hopes and expectations upon which this mutual compact was reasonably and honourably founded have been disappointed, and the circumstances . . . show that increasing weakness in the state itself on the one side, and more than corresponding growth of real strength and confidence among the native tribes on the other, have produced their natural and inevitable consequences, as will more fully appear from a brief allusion to the facts that, after more or less of irritating contact with aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867, gradual abandonment to the natives in that direction, of territory settled by burghers of this State in well built towns and villages, and on granted farms ; that this was succeeded by the extinction of all effective rule over extensive tracts of country included within the boundaries of the State, and as a consequence by the practical independence, which still continues, of large native tribes residing therein, who had until then considered themselves subjects :

That some few farmers, unwilling to forfeit homes which they had created for their families, and to which they held grants from the Government of the Transvaal, which grants had, however, ceased, and still fail to protect them in their occupation, made terms with the native chiefs, and now occupy their farms on condition of periodical payments to those chiefs, notwithstanding the acknowledgement which such payments involve ;

That this decay of power and ebb of authority in the north is being followed by similar processes in the south under yet more dangerous circumstances, people of this State residing in that direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the bidding of native

chiefs, and at a moment's notice to leave their farms and homes, their standing crops, some of which were ready for reaping, and other property, all to be taken possession of by natives, but that the Government is more powerless than ever to vindicate its assumed rights, or to resist the declension that is threatening its existence. That all confidence in its stability once felt by surrounding and distant European communities has been withdrawn. That commerce is wellnigh destroyed. That the country is in a state of bankruptcy. That the white inhabitants discontented with their condition are divided into factions. That the Government has fallen into helpless paralysis from causes which it has been and is unable to control or counteract. And that the prospect of the election of a new President, so far from allaying the general anxiety, or from inspiring hope in the future, is looked forward to by all parties as most likely to result in civil war, with its attendant anarchy and bloodshed ;

That the condition above described affords strong temptation to neighbouring native powers, who are known to be anxious and ready to do so, to make attacks and inroads upon the State, which from its weakness it cannot repel, and from which it has hitherto been saved by the restraining influence of the British Government, exercised from Natal by Her Majesty's representative in that Colony, in the hope, yet unfulfilled, that a friendly understanding might be arrived at between the Government of the Transvaal and the complaining native chiefs ;

That the Sekukuni War, which would have produced but little effect upon a healthy Constitution, has not only proved suddenly fatal to the resources and reputation of the Republic, but has shown itself to be a culminating point in the history of South Africa, in that a Makatee or Basutu Tribe, unwarlike, and of no account in Zulu estimation, successfully withstood the strength of the State, and disclosed for the first time to the native powers outside the Republic, from the Zambesi to the Cape, the great change that had taken place in the relative strength

of the white and the black races ; that this disclosure at once shook the prestige of the white man in South Africa, and placed every European community in peril ; that this common danger has caused universal anxiety, has given to all concerned the right to investigate its causes and to protect themselves from its consequences, and has imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled civilization from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity :

And whereas the inherent weakness of this Government and State from causes above alluded to, and briefly set forth, and the fact that the past policy of the Republic has not only failed to conciliate the friendship and goodwill, but has forfeited the respect of the overwhelming native populations within and beyond its boundaries, which together probably exceed one and a half millions, render it certain that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer from the consequences of a pressure that has already reduced its political life to so feeble a condition :

And whereas the ravaging of an adjoining friendly State by warlike savage tribes cannot for a moment be contemplated by Her Majesty's Government without the most earnest and painful solicitude, both on account of the miseries which such an event must inflict upon the inhabitants of the Transvaal, and because of the peril and insecurity to which it would expose Her Majesty's possessions and subjects in South Africa, and seeing that the circumstances of the case have, from the inherent weakness of the country already touched upon, become so grave, that neither this country nor the British Colonies in South Africa can be saved from the most calamitous circumstances except by the extension over this State of Her Majesty's authority and protection, by means of which alone oneness of purpose and action can be secured and a fair prospect of peace and prosperity in the future be established :

And whereas I have been satisfied by numerous addresses, memorials, and letters which I have received,

and by the abundant assurances which personal intercourse has given me, that a large proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal see in a clearer and stronger light than I am able to describe them, the urgency and imminence of the circumstances by which they are surrounded, the ruined condition of the country, and the absence within it of any element capable of rescuing it from its depressed and afflicted state, and therefore earnestly desire the establishment within and over it of Her Majesty's authority and rule ; and whereas the Government has been unable to point out or devise any means by which the country can save itself, and as a consequence relieve the other white communities of South Africa, from the danger of the dire events certain speedily to result from the circumstances by which it is surrounded, and can entertain no reasonable hope that it possesses, or is likely under its present form of government to possess, the means to raise itself to a safe and prosperous condition :

And whereas the emergency seems to me to be such as to render it necessary in order to secure the peace and safety of the Transvaal territory, as well as the peace and safety of Her Majesty's Colonies and of Her Majesty's subjects elsewhere, that the said Transvaal territory should provisionally, and pending the announcement of Her Majesty's pleasure, be administered in Her Majesty's name and on her behalf :

Now therefore I do, in virtue of the power and authority conferred upon me by Her Majesty's Royal Commission, dated at Balmoral the fifth day of October 1876, and published herewith, and in accordance with instructions conveyed to me thereby and otherwise, proclaim and make known, that from and after the publication hereof the territory heretofore known as the South African Republic . . . shall be and shall be taken to be British territory, and I hereby call upon and require the inhabitants of the Transvaal of every class and degree, and all Her Majesty's subjects in South Africa to take notice of this my Proclamation and to guide themselves accordingly.

And I hereby further proclaim and declare that I shall hold responsible all such persons who in the Transvaal shall venture opposition, armed or otherwise, to Her Majesty's authority hereby proclaimed, or who shall by seditious and inflammatory language, or exhortations, or otherwise, incite or encourage others to offer such opposition, or who shall injure, harass, disturb, or molest others because they may not think with them on political matters, and I do warn all such that upon conviction of any of the above offences they will be liable to the severe penalties which the law in such cases ordains; and I hereby appeal to and call upon the orderly, right-thinking, and peace-loving people of the Transvaal to be aiding and supporting Her Majesty's authority.

And I proclaim further that all legal courts of justice now in existence for the trial of criminal or civil cases or questions are hereby continued and kept in full force and effect, and that all decrees, judgements, and sentences, rules and orders, lawfully made or issued, or to be made and issued by such courts shall be as good and valid as if this Proclamation had not been published; all civil obligations, all suits and actions, civil, penal, criminal, or mixed, and all criminal acts here committed which may have been incurred, commenced, done, or committed before the publication of this Proclamation, but which are not fully tried and determined, may be tried and determined by any such lawful courts or by such others as it may be found hereafter necessary to establish for that purpose.

And I further proclaim and make known that the Transvaal will remain a separate government with its own laws and legislature, and that it is the wish of Her most gracious Majesty that it shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people. That arrangements will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as much the official language as the English; all laws, proclamations, and Government notices will be published in the Dutch language; in the Legislative

Assembly members may as they do now use either language, and in the courts of law the same may be done at the option of suitors to a cause. The laws now in force in the State will be retained until altered by competent legislative authority.

Equal justice is guaranteed to the persons and property of both white and coloured; but the adoption of this principle does not and should not involve the granting of equal civil rights, such as the exercise of the right of voting by savages, or their becoming members of a legislative body, or their being entitled to other civil privileges which are incompatible with their uncivilized condition.

The native tribes living within the jurisdiction, and under the protection of the Government must be taught due obedience to the paramount authority, and be made to contribute their fair share towards the support of the State that protects them.

All private bona fide rights to property, guaranteed by the existing laws of the country, and sanctioned by them, will be respected.

All officers now serving the Government, and who may be able and willing to serve under the altered circumstances of the country, shall be entitled to retain their positions, and such rights as their positions now give them.

All bona fide concessions and contracts with Governments, companies, or individuals, by which the State is now bound, will be honourably maintained, and respected, and the payment of the debts of the State must be provided for. . . .

God Save the Queen.

Given under my hand and seal at Pretoria in the South African Republic, this twelfth day of April in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven.

(Signed) T. SHEPSTONE,
Her Majesty's Special
Commissioner.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE CAPE AND CONFEDERATION

1877-1878

‘Divided command is at least as dangerous as delayed action.’—
SIR BARTLE FRERE.

I

THE Permissive Bill was accorded a mixed reception in South Africa.¹ Natal was eager for Confederation, and willing to confer on the subject with the other South African communities. Griqualand West also desired it. The Orange Free State refused the invitation but with an amiable expression of its desire to maintain good relations with Great Britain. The Government of the Transvaal had referred the question to the people.

Sir Bartle Frere, who had arrived in Cape Town on the 31st March, wrote a few days later describing opinion at the Cape : ²

‘Mr. Molteno volunteered a very complete confession of faith, on the part of himself and his colleagues, as to Confederation, which he promised to give me on paper as soon as this Mail is gone. They seem to accept it as settled that Confederation is to be, and that the only question is as to the process and form. He intimated that they would here prefer indefinite annexation of all South Africa to the present Cape Colony ; but when I began to point out, that whilst you are most willing to hear argument on every detail, there were manifold and evident difficulties in any considerable departure from the general lines of the measure you

¹ See pp. 219 ff.

² 4th April, 1877.

had sketched out, he acquiesced in a manner which assured me that I was only stating what had already occurred to him. . . .

‘They evidently move very slowly here, as much from remains of old mistrust as from any other cause; but they have great confidence in all you do and suggest, and will not willingly run counter to “Lord Carnarvon’s policy”.’

But in a Minute on the Permissive Bill the Molteno Ministry again showed their curious distaste for plain facts. They complained of a lack of decision in the Bill, and at the same time objected that its proposals were too distinct. What they really desired was ‘unification’—in other words the substitution of a single South African legislature at Cape Town for a Federal Constitution based on the autonomy of the various South African States.

The measure, as amended in accordance with colonial opinion, was sent to Lord Beaconsfield, who wrote characteristically on the 6th April: ‘I approve of the Permissive Bill; indeed, I don’t see we have any other course to take. I also return private correspondence, which I read with interest. Paul Kruger is an ugly customer. . . .’

On the 23rd April, eleven days after the annexation of the Transvaal, but before the news had reached England, Lord Carnarvon moved the Second Reading of the Bill.¹

The Confederation of Canada, he reminded the House, had been accomplished under very different circumstances and the condition of South Africa justified an alteration of method. This Bill was one of outline and principle, containing the framework of a future Confederation, but leaving its details to be filled up after free communications between the local and Imperial Governments. It was essentially permissive, one by which no sort of

¹ See Appendix, pp. 309–24, for speech in full.

pressure would be put upon the Colonies, while it would at the same time give every opportunity for confederating should they think it advisable to do so.

‘The principle of Confederation’, he said in conclusion, ‘is not a new one. It existed, indeed, in ancient times under many forms and combinations, but there has been a remarkable tendency towards it of late years; connected, as it would seem, with feelings of nationality and race. The drift of the political current has certainly been towards aggregation rather than separation. We have seen it in Italy, in Germany, and even, I think, in the United States. In some, indeed, of the Colonies there seemed at one time to be a fluctuation of feeling. A process of disintegration appeared to be setting in, in the Australian Colonies and New Zealand. In Australia, however, there is no evidence to show that this was a true indication of public feeling, whilst, as regards New Zealand, we have lately seen a remarkable proof of the strong feeling towards aggregation. The separate Governments of that great and prosperous Colony have passed away, in order to make room for a stronger and, as it is supposed, a more economical central Government.

‘A distinguished writer, indeed, has lately denied the applicability of the principle of Confederation to Dependencies under British rule, but, with all deference to him, his reasoning seems to me to be founded on mere hypothesis, nor can I see any reason why in the nature of things, and apart from those fugitive causes which do not belong to the fixed and unchanging principles of political life, the Dependencies of the British Crown, should any more than any other States be incapable of Confederation. It is quite possible that Confederation is only one stage in the political journey of the Empire and that it may even

lead in the course of time to a still closer union. But, be this as it may, the reason why I now urge this measure for the adoption of Parliament is that such a principle of Confederation must add strength to these Colonies, give larger objects, a higher policy, a wider political life, and, as I earnestly hope, a better security for the right treatment of the native races. And if so, all this means a greater prosperity and peace, and a closer consolidation of Imperial interests.

‘The British Empire is no doubt vast, various and disconnected; and yet when all allowance and deductions have been made, it is, I am prepared to maintain, one of the most wonderful pieces of human administration the world has ever seen, both in what it does and in what it does not do. Other countries have founded colonial empires: France, Spain and Portugal, have left their mark in the Colonial History of the World, and yet as Colonizing Powers they have virtually ceased to exist; and, among other reasons, for this, that they were founded upon a close principle of restrictions. We have adopted a different system; we have discarded restrictions; we have looked to freedom of government as our ultimate object and we have been rewarded by an almost immeasurable freedom of growth. And I look upon this measure as one more step in that direction. I have not said, and I do not desire to say anything that may revive the controversies that have arisen at the Cape on this subject. I, personally, am satisfied with the course of proceedings, and with the spirit in which my proposals have been met. The criticisms and comments upon them have not been other than fair and reasonable, and I consider that with this Bill closes, so to speak, the most important era of the modern history of Africa.

‘If Parliament should pass the Bill, Confederation

becomes possible in the Colonies, and it is for them to say whether they will accept it. My duty is then at an end; but I believe that they will accept it, for policy and interest alike dictate such a course. And then I have every confidence that under this Bill these communities, now scattered and isolated by conflicting interests, will at no distant day, form a strong, peaceable and loyal Confederation under the British Crown. I beg to move the second reading of the Bill.'

Lord Kimberley gave his hearty support to the scheme; observing that while in 1854 it was deemed the wisest course to abandon all claim to Sovereignty over the Dutch States, it was now a general opinion that they ought to be united in a single Federation under the British Crown. The policy of Confederation had been raised by Sir Henry Barkly at the time of the Commission appointed to report on the grant of responsible government to the Cape, and he himself had instructed the Governor of that Colony to summon a consultative meeting of delegates from all the South African States and Colonies.

After Lord Grey and Lord Cardwell had briefly criticized the Bill, it was read a second time and sent down to the Commons, through whose House its passage was for some time obstructed by the Irish members, led by Mr. Parnell.¹ But the long debate in Committee turned more frequently on questions of order than on the real merits of the measure and the Confederation Bill passed the House of Commons on the 9th August, 1877, with a number of

¹ 'All night long the battle raged over and round the body of the South African Bill. I got a note dated 8.15 this morning, from Lowther, saying that the Irish obstructionists had fought every point, and by 9.30 I had ordered my horse and ridden down to the House, where I found them obstinately contesting the ground inch by inch, reporting progress, dividing, etc. The temper of the House was excellent: the obstructives were reduced to seven, and it was perfectly clear that the House and Government must win: or that there would be complete parliamentary and legislative anarchy.' (Lord Carnarvon's Journal, 1st August, 1877.)

amendments, to none of which its author entertained any serious objection. The Bill as amended by the Commons received the Royal Assent on the 10th August, 1877.

The Act, Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir Bartle Frere,¹ had received in a very remarkable manner the support of the leading men of whatever party. In England its policy had been 'throughout warmly advocated by those statesmen whose experience has specially qualified them to advise Parliament on Colonial Affairs'. A fresh and gratifying proof had thus been given not to South Africa only, but to the Empire at large, that important Colonial questions would be discussed in no narrow or party spirit by Parliament.

Meanwhile in the Transvaal all was tranquil, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone augured well of the prospects of the new member of the Empire. The danger from the Zulus seemed exorcised for the moment.

He wrote in June ² that Cetywayo's attitude had been so hostile in March that he had despatched a message to him the day before the annexation, for he judged that any further delay in announcing to him the immediately pending change would prove disastrous. Cetywayo's answer ³ showed clearly the pinnacle of peril which the

¹ 16th August, 1877.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 5th June, 1877.

³ Cetywayo's answer, sent through 'Kabana', the head man, to the Acting Resident Magistrate of Newcastle, 15th May, 1877, ran: 'I thank my Father Somtseu' (Sir T. Shepstone's native name) 'for his message. I am glad that he has sent it because the Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once, and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana, you see my "Impis" (armies) are gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I will send them back to their homes.

'It is well that two men ("amadoda amabili") should be made "izinla" (fools). In the reign of my father, Umpande, the Boers were constantly moving their boundary further into my country. Since his death the same thing has been done. I had, therefore, determined to end it once for all. . . .

'I thank my Father Somtseu for the promise of sending his son to me. . . .

'I shall wish to ask his permission to fight with the Amaswazi for their wrongdoing. They (the people of Umswazi) fight together, and kill one another. This is wrong, and I want to chastise them for it.'

Republic and South Africa generally had reached at the moment when the annexation took place : it also fully justified the description of the dangerous condition of the country which Shepstone's Proclamation and Address set forth.

Again, on the 23rd July he wrote to Lord Carnarvon :

' . . . When I look back at the whole matter I do not feel anxious to pass through such an ordeal a second time. I dare say it would have been possible to get the President and the Raad themselves to propose the annexation of the country if the pressure of surrounding circumstances had not been so great ; but the tension was so extreme that one accidental shot might, and most probably would, have annihilated the Republic and cost England millions to gain the position she now holds, and may firmly hold, over the natives of South Africa.

' The Transvaal commands South Africa as regards position, and soon will do so otherwise. Cetywayo is checkmated and he feels that he is. It is natural that he should chafe because he has encountered a double disappointment, he has long been anxious to "wash his assegais", that is to do some military exploit that would be in the opinion of his people sufficient to enable him to take rank with his predecessors ; the Amaswazi have been hitherto the favourite objects for this experiment ; but since the result of their encounter with Sekukuni, the Boers have been promoted to the preference, because it is believed that they could be more easily dealt with than the Amaswazi, while the glory of washing his weapons in white blood would be greater. The annexation of the Transvaal baulks both his purposes and condemns him to the ignominy of being a non-combatant Zulu King. He will continue to chafe under this, but in my belief his chafing will end in destroying himself because it will take the form of domestic blood shedding, and that will sooner or later produce revolution. . . . '

Great Britain had taken over a bankrupt State and had guaranteed its 'just debts'. There was no reason to fear for the future, for the country was as rich as it was large, provided that the management and control of the

Natives by Magistrates and Commissioners was secured. Effective government was economy, and Transvaal administration was extremely hampered by the old and incompetent Boer officials. 'From the patriotic tone they talked in before the annexation, I thought and indeed hoped that a large proportion of them would have declined to serve under the altered circumstances which my proclamation brought about, but I was mistaken and must make the best of it. The only way of overcoming the difficulty is to get a really competent Colonial Secretary and an equally competent Secretary for Native Affairs, and I have robbed the Colony of Natal of two of its most able officers to fill these places. . . .'

The new Constitution to be given to the Transvaal would essentially affect the question of Confederation, but at this moment the Conference of all South African States was again deferred owing to the Cape War with Kreli.

Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir Bartle Frere : ¹

'Between an Union composed of members elected to the Cape Parliament, by the Cape, Natal, and the Transvaal with subsidiary municipal Governments, and an Union composed of members elected to a Federal Parliament, by the Cape, Natal, and the Transvaal with subsidiary provincial Governments, there *may* be no difference but one of name ; and if by preserving old names and forms we can eventually secure all the new strength that we desire, it may be worth considering whether in this way we do not smooth away difficulties and antagonisms. . . . My acquiescence in Union, as opposed to Confederation, is qualified by two considerations which I know you will carefully weigh—1st, Imperial reasons of State—amongst which are the Native question and the retention of everything that is valuable in a military point of view to make the Cape an Imperial station for military and naval purposes. 2nd, the securing for the Provinces a full measure of local self-government.'

¹ 11th September, 1877.

‘The Union is geographically too large and scattered to allow of local affairs being safely decided by the Central Government and Parliament ; the Eastern districts would not endure to see such a settlement of the matter : Natal will under any circumstances be indisposed to the administration of their affairs in Cape-town, and the Transvaal would break out, I imagine, into fresh opposition. We have indeed promised to maintain the individuality and life of these different members of the common system : and we are bound to do so. At the same time it is of great importance to transfer to the Central Body the administration of many of the larger questions, and as regards—for instance—the Transvaal, we must I think either make the local institutions purely municipal and subordinate ; or we must (which will be very awkward) give the Province an entirely different constitution from that of the other members of the Union. This last method of solving the difficulty would probably create dissatisfaction and be only temporary—and when the time came for placing the Transvaal on the footing common to all others, the Dutch population would come into the general system with angry and irritated feelings.

‘There is of course a great question whether the Transvaal will like annexation to Natal—and still more whether Natal will like to come into close union with the Cape—whilst it is certain that the Cape politicians will be opposed to any arrangement which does not leave the “old Colony” in a position of recognized superiority. The advantages materially are, I suppose, great to Natal and the Transvaal, from either of the Unions which I have indicated : but there is probably much sentiment in the matter which may overrule considerations of mere interest. All this, together with the fact, which your last letters bring out strongly, that Molteno has won the parliamentary battle, and that the opposition to him has for the present at least collapsed, obliges us to consider whether we must not attain our end by Union rather than Confederation. I hope therefore to have your opinion on the point, and as you will perceive from what I have written above I wish to leave it to your discretion—should circumstances be such as to require immediate action or to make delay inconvenient—to take an initiative in the discussion locally of the question. . . .’

Of the Transvaal, he wrote,¹ ' I suspect that for some time to come, whatever are its resources, it will cost money; and that is exactly where I find my main difficulty to be. I hardly know how I have succeeded as well as I have done in providing for the Gold Coast—Fiji—Griqualand, and now the Transvaal. On the other hand, to send the Transvaal into Confederation with a preponderant Dutch vote (and it may be with some angry and anti-English feeling on the part of the Boers) raises the prospect of another set of difficulties. . . . '

His inclination was to hold his hand, and not commit the Home Government to any step which would be irretrievable, until it was possible to see what was likely to be the course of events.

II

Meanwhile ominous clouds had been sailing up swiftly along the horizon. There was trouble brewing on the Natal border, and trouble again open and manifest in the Transkei regions of the Cape, the source in either case being the same, the presence of a warlike Kaffir population, still sunk in barbarism and offering to a handful of white settlers the ever-present menace of preponderant numbers and an uneasy temper.

Natal, indeed, had enjoyed immunity from the war of races for thirty years, but under a clement and lax administration the natives had multiplied and prospered, and in despite of the express letter of the law were possessed of fire-arms. Moreover, on the north-eastern frontier of the colony lay the powerful Zulu kingdom under an ambitious chieftain backed by a well organized army of some thirty or forty thousand spears.

¹ To Sir Bartle Frere, 12th September, 1877.

To obtain additional troops from the War Office was like drawing blood from a stone. 'The *state of the colony is not safe*,' wrote Lord Carnarvon to Mr. Gathorne Hardy in October, 1875,¹ 'and if war with Zululand (as is possible), or any combination from within should occur, I cannot answer for the consequence—Wolseley's language and despatches are such that they leave me no option but to press this as a matter of absolute necessity. It will be also necessary that a mountain battery and some engineers should be sent, as I have explained, but this force of 1,000 men is simply indispensable and was, as I believed, on the spot.'

These strenuous representations were successful. Reinforcements were despatched later from England, but to the vexation of Sir Henry Bulwer were intercepted by the Governor of the Cape Colony to facilitate operations in the Transkei district.

The change of plan was naturally questioned by the Colonial Secretary, who on the 3rd January, 1877, wrote to Sir Henry Barkly a temperate despatch of expostulation. While he understood from the Cape Ministry that there was an 'uneasiness' and an 'unquiet feeling' on the part of the Chief Kreli and his tribe, and that the Government desired to adopt a firm attitude, it was not alleged that there was any actual danger of an outbreak. The tribes surrounding Kreli were loyal and peaceful, and the partial disturbance to the North seemed completely quelled and the whole country absolutely quiet.

The Cape Government had, however, diverted the 3rd Buffs from Natal, where it was intended to place them.

He had no desire to find fault with the Cape Ministers' action in Native Affairs. But 'the fact that when it is desired to move a force of 500 men into the Transkei

¹ 21st October, 1875.

district, the Government of the Cape are unable to effect this object without diverting Her Majesty's troops from their proper destination . . . appears to show that there has been a failure on the part of your Ministers to provide effectually for one of those safeguards against Native disturbance. . . . ' Yet this was a duty which of necessity devolved upon responsible government.

Meanwhile the operations, imperfectly conceived and inadequately carried out, only served to increase the disturbances.

Matters had reached this point when Sir Bartle Frere took over the reins of office.

The new High Commissioner was a man of quick and energetic resolve, and his personal weight was immediately and decisively felt. ' I cannot attempt ', he wrote on the 5th September, ' to give you any idea of the helpless headlessness of almost everything.'

Kreli's Galekas experienced a decisive defeat on the 29th September, but it was some time before the War was brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

Sir Bartle had repaired without delay to the seat of disturbance, and his correspondence with Lord Carnarvon gives a very vivid impression of the situation as he saw it. The experienced Governor with his broad Imperial views, the shrewd but ill-balanced Prime Minister, the conflict of views on native policy, the difficulty of adjusting the claims of Imperial and Colonial authority, the march of opinion on the federation question, are all aspects of the situation which are thrown into bold relief.

To save ' time and friction and money ' Sir Bartle proposed that he and Merriman and Brownlee should have daily meetings with General Cunynghame to make arrangements.¹

¹ Sir Bartle Frere to Mr. Molteno, 1st October, 1877.

On the 8th October, 1877, he wrote to Lord Carnarvon :

‘ . . . Merriman and Brownlee were, at first, aghast at such an innovation as a daily council at which the General would sit as Comr. of Forces—where we could interchange intelligence and suggestions, and settle the orders to be given, which could be issued at once, and communicated to Cape Town without further correspondence. They had evident misgivings as to the view their colleagues would take of such an intimate relation with the military authorities ; but they concurred when I pointed out its necessity, and Merriman came into Barracks with me to enable us better to carry out our system of united action, and now he is most fully sensible of its advantages. I am quite certain that, without it, some great disaster must have occurred.

‘ Merriman is extremely able, quick, intelligent and thorough. His short experience of public life and his marriage to a very sensible and amiable woman, have gone far to correct the roughness of self-assertion which marred his early essays in public. He is the only very rising young man I see among promising Colonial politicians. . . .

‘ During the first panic Molteno was glad enough to leave all to his energetic colleague, Merriman ; but he has now for two or three days past resumed his habitual arrogant dictatorial tone, and begun interfering in minute details—and showing his usual jealousy of Sir Arthur Cunynghame. He has just announced to Merriman by telegram his intention to come up here, embarking at Cape Town to-day.’

This letter crossed one to Sir Bartle Frere from Lord Carnarvon : ¹

‘ . . . I can do nothing till I know more, but I hope that you have forces enough on the spot. I cannot think it would be safe to withdraw a man from either Natal or the Transvaal : for with the inflammable material which you have in South Africa a fire of this kind will easily spread anywhere and everywhere. The two objects in view are, first to put the insurrection down *effectively* and *rapidly*—and then to see that there is none of the cruelty or

¹ 25th October, 1877.

retaliation which is so common and likely—and on both these grounds I am very glad that you are on the spot. Your presence will be a security for the first and a guarantee against the last : and if the outbreak is dealt with in this manner and spirit it will I hope show that we are entering on a new stage of South African policy. . . .’

After Mr. Molteno’s visit to the frontier, Sir Bartle wrote : ¹

‘ . . . His natural shrewdness showed him something of how entirely he and his colleagues had been in the dark about Native affairs, and how insufficient, ill-manned, and ill-organized were all their establishments, especially their Police. He felt that he and his colleagues were in a great mess ; and after a fashion, I think, he was sensible of what the General and I had done to get them out of it. But his is neither the age nor the temperament for learning, for acquiring new ideas, or habits of thought or action ; and the old Adam would break out, in a way which, had less been at stake, would have been very comical.

‘ He soon made up his mind that the presence of the General at our daily Councils was unavoidable, and that it was no use treating him with half-confidences. Had Mr. Molteno remained longer I think he would have appreciated, as Merriman and Brownlee did from the first, the real value of the General’s experience and knowledge of his own business. As it was, he saw we could not do without Sir Arthur and his Regulars, and he was extremely polite to him as he has always been to me. But he made up for any self-denial in this respect by losing no opportunity of paying off his own colleagues in the most ludicrous fashion—jumping, with almost childish glee, at any instance of their mistakes or inconsistencies, and behaving to them with a want of consideration which often more than approached to rudeness. His colleagues showed much more command of temper than I expected in dealing with him, and treated him, not exactly as a Prime Minister ought to be treated, but much as they would a petulant old invalid. . . .

‘ He came up with the wildest notions, of which you will find

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, 22nd–24th October, 1877.

abundant traces in the Cape newspapers, of "hurling" Volunteers and Native allies into the Galeka country, and "crushing" Krelis, without thought of distance, of absence of supplies, and similar sublunary considerations. A few days here showed him something of the infirmities of the Volunteer system—especially where the Volunteers are not even ready armed or drilled—have none of the self-supporting simple habits of the old Dutch Boers—have no intention of submitting to discipline, or to the hard, distasteful work of soldiering. One of the ideas he brought up, and pressed most strongly on us, was a sort of general uprooting of the Galeka nation—who were to be transported by thousands westward to Saldanah and St. Helena Bay, etc.—he would listen to no argument of the impossibility, or folly if it were possible, of such wholesale national deportations. He would borrow £50,000 for the purpose of sending them round by sea and fill up their place in Galekaland with the Fingoes who were to be transplanted from districts in the old Kaffir country, where by sixteen or twenty years of good management they have become partially civilized and loyally disposed. Whilst we were trying to show him the innumerable difficulties and objections to his plan, Brownlee returned from a tour to some Kaffir "locations" and reminded him that the scheme had been fairly tried by Sir George Grey, and had very signally failed, owing to the difficulties of keeping a Kaffir in the West, unless he is imprisoned or put on an Island.

'He then dropped the idea, but continually started something equally impracticable. . . .

'I confess he has left on my mind a very uncomfortable feeling that between his growing infirmities, his jealousy of his colleagues and of the General, and his original want of breadth of view and education, he will not aid us as much in such a settlement of this question as you have a right to expect.

'As to Confederation, he was more reasonable than I had expected; and led me to believe, that if a Conference assembled, he would join it with every disposition to settle the question in the way you desire. I hope he may continue in this frame of mind.'

11th November:

'Griffith considers the fighting, in the Transkei, to be "nearly

over", and we might, by this time, have made good progress in resettling the poor deluded wretches, but for the obstacles interposed by Mr. Molteno.

'When he left us, more than 3 weeks ago, he was certainly converted, if I might judge from what he said to me, to our view that, however speedily hostilities might be concluded, the General and I and his two colleagues, Merriman and Brownlee, must of necessity remain hereabouts, till we had started Griffith on the re-settlement of Kreli's country. He was not a willing convert; but he had not a word to say in answer to our arguments that a speedy and complete conclusion was the first requisite; and that it could only be accomplished by our remaining here, and working on, in concert, as we had done hitherto.

'He was still in this frame of mind when he first returned to Capetown—convinced that we must stay and finish the work, and glad, and, after a fashion, grateful, that we should take the trouble to do it.

'But, after a few days, Captain Mills, his Under-Secretary, who had at first been charmed with the improvement in Molteno's health and spirits during his visit to this Province, and with his contentment at all we were doing, telegraphed and wrote to his colleagues here that the Prime Minister seemed relapsing into his former irritable and discontented frame of mind; Brownlee and Merriman had sundry telegraphic conversations with Mills as well as Molteno, which they treated as Cabinet discussions, and to which they seemed to feel unable, though not unwilling, to make me a party—but which evidently disturbed them greatly.

'From the little they said I gathered that they believed that Mr. Molteno's suspicions had taken another turn. He was not so much jealous of what we might do, or of who should get the credit for it, as apprehensive that, if I did not call their Parliament together in the East, which he thought very possible, we should certainly, if we all stayed here, give the world a strong argument for saying that the Capital ought to be in the East, and that the Parliament ought to be here also!

'At Merriman's and Brownlee's repeated request I wrote to Molteno, urging an early expression of his opinion on propositions which his colleagues did not like to act on, without his written assent. . . .

‘Merriman seems to think the only result will be a further excuse for drifting. I hope it will not be so ; for that would oblige me to see what can be done, without Molteno’s aid, to secure what has been gained, in the Transkei, against a relapse. I see great danger of this, and so does every one here whose opinion deserves weight, and danger, not only to our own Colonial border but to Natal, Zululand, and the Transvaal. Judging from what Bulwer and Shepstone write, and from what we hear through officers with Shepstone, they are not all satisfied with the results of Shepstone’s interviews with Cetywayo’s messengers, or their proposals about the Transvaal Frontier. . . . Krelî’s signal defeat and discomfiture will certainly disincline Pondos or Zulus to be troublesome ; but half measures, which allowed him to claim a drawn game, would certainly encourage them to be hostile. . . .

‘Men like Griffith and Blyth will carry out admirably a good work once begun, and fairly planned out for them—but it will be difficult for them to do anything if Molteno’s favourite plan of referring everything to Capetown be adopted—as before. . . .

‘I should greatly regret his retirement just now—for he had been lately coming round, I think, to a wish to reckon the Confederation of South Africa among the results of his political career. This sounds odd, but I have seen many indications of such a wish both in what little he has said on the subject, and in the view I find taken of the question by those who follow his lead.’

The annexation of Walfisch Bay and Tembuland had in the meantime been sanctioned by Lord Carnarvon.¹ But delays were many.

‘I send you at last the Despatch about Walfisch Bay and Damaraland, which ought to have reached you months ago. You will see that, after this long delay, Mr. Palgrave has gone back with very meagre instructions. Before leaving Capetown I had given Mr. Brownlee a sketch of the instructions which I thought

¹ The wisdom of this course was undoubted, for had they not been forestalled, Walfisch Bay might have been occupied by the Germans when, in the fervour of their enthusiasm for Colonial expansion, they suddenly seized the Namaqualand and Damaraland coast. By establishing a British post there, at its only good port, that coast was rendered a useless possession to its Teutonic occupants ; and the territory immediately adjacent to it, extending from 14 to 18 miles inland, was simultaneously annexed to Cape Colony.

should be sent, and which included amongst other things, such directions as I thought necessary for hoisting the British Flag, and taking possession in Her Majesty's name of the Bay, so as to prevent a repetition of the Delagoa Bay difficulties. His only explanation was that they had long discussions in the Cabinet on the subject, and that "they saw difficulties" in doing what I thought necessary. He did not himself see any, nor did he like to tell me what others had seen—and he listened very patiently and without reply to all I said on the impropriety of their dealing with questions affecting foreign policy, as if they were Bills regarding Market fees or Cattle Pounds, adopting or ignoring, or neglecting the Governor's opinion as they thought fit.

'The fact is, the Office of High Commissioner had of late years fallen so much into abeyance that, when I first came, the Attorney-General described it to me as a kind of honorary obsolete office—which had little present meaning or practical utility. Soon after, the Chief Justice's remarks in the trial of Nehemiah Moshesh showed my Ministers that it was not easy to say what of their acts in the Transkei were legal, without the expressed concurrence of the High Commissioner; and since then I have had little trouble in making the Native Secretaries consult and inform me, as fully as in the days of Sir Philip Wodehouse; but the Department is so weak and ill organized, that it is impossible to say what omissions are due to intention, and what to the slipshod habits of the office. All this, I have no doubt, will come right in time. . . .

'For the future I can think of no other safe course than that proposed in my Despatch, i.e. to extend the protection of our Flag up to the Portuguese Frontier to the North, to the Transvaal Frontier to the East, and to an arbitrary line connecting the two via Lake Ngami.

'Your moral responsibilities in the shape of white settlers, Missionaries, and traders, already extend quite as far as the proposed frontier. No chief considers himself safe without your countenance and recognition—all fear that any massacre or flagrant ill treatment of white people would expose the perpetrators to severe punishment from you. . . . All feel that you protect them from Slavery and Slave Trade, and from ill treatment by lawless white people. The English Flag and English influence are already the symbol and guarantee for such peace and order as prevail. . . .

‘ There can be no doubt that this last war, with all its bloodshed and suffering, might have been avoided, had Krelī been treated from the first as the Fingoes have been treated during the past ten years—had he been told that we knew of no King, nor “paramount Chief”—save Queen Victoria—that he could only be allowed to govern according to our ideas of law and justice, and not according to the dictates of Witch Doctors—and that killing the Queen’s subjects involved hanging at Tyburn—and not exile to Elba or even honourable beheading on Tower Hill.


‘ You are now more or less pledged to annex to the Cape the greater part of the whole area between this and the Natal frontier. . . . ’¹

Lord Carnarvon, after consultation with Lord Beaconsfield, endorsed the action of the Governor. ‘ Krelī ’, he told a South African Deputation,² ‘ was repeatedly warned by friendly messages as to the course on which he was entering ; the Governor himself had gone down to the frontier and had invited him to a friendly conference ; he had received every opportunity that could be given to him for explanation or for placing himself in a position which would have obviated the course taken ; but he refused all these overtures. He immediately afterwards allowed his people to cross the border and to carry fire and sword into what may be termed English territory, slaughtering the native subjects of Her Majesty. In these circumstances, no doubt, it was necessary to act very severely, and, as Sir Bartle Frere had distinctly stated in one of his despatches to me, the deposition of Krelī was necessary in order to check the spread of this insurrection and determine all those who were wavering and uncertain in their allegiance. . . . ’

But the Colonial Government were now bent on carry-

¹ Sir Bartle Frere to Lord Carnarvon, 14th November, 1877.

² 16th November, 1877.



(I) Colony with Colonial Laws. (II) Colony with Basutoland Laws. (III) Annexed to Colony by Order in Council and by Act of Council, Parliament (1877) awaiting approval of H.M.'s Government. (IV) Annexed to Colony by Order of Secretary of State with Colonial Magistrates, awaiting Order in Council to enable Legislature to pass Act of Annexation. (V) Semi-dependent chief with Resident. (VI) Semi-dependent chief with no Resident.

ing the war into Pondoland. This caused great anxiety both to Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer.

The former wrote :¹

‘That there has been very bad management is clear ; but who is to be blamed for it is not apparent—nor can we tell, for a day or two, whether the consequences are likely to be serious. But I find a very serious difference of opinion, between myself and Mr. Merriman, as to the mode in which the questions are to be treated. He is for carrying matters with a very high hand, in a manner which must bring about a collision with the Gaikas, a result which he avows he would not regret—as enabling us forcibly to break up the present Gaika Location, and to deprive Sandilli and the other Chiefs of the power hitherto accorded to them by our act or negligence.

‘I cannot see the legality, necessity or justice of such violent remedies. . . .’

Sir Henry Bulwer was also dissatisfied. After expressing his doubts as to the wisdom of the deposition of Kreli he told Lord Carnarvon² that he disapproved of the policy of annexation to the Cape of the whole Pondo country, that the Pondos had always behaved well, that they deserved the most favourable consideration from the British Government and the British Colonies, and that the annexation of their territory without the consent of the people would be an act of the greatest wrong and injustice.

Lord Carnarvon always welcomed the frank and unreserved confidence of his subordinates, and he well knew that nobody had a greater right to be heard upon the native question than the Governor of Natal, seeing that in the event of a general public conflagration it was his colony which would be exposed to the greatest danger, and that Natal was at the moment gravely menaced by the Zulus.

¹ Sir Bartle Frere to Lord Carnarvon, 21st November, 1877.

² 26th November, 1877.

III

Cetywayo, the ambitious chief of that wild and barbarous race, had not been unmoved by the annexation of the Transvaal.¹ Ambitious of military glory, and inclined to look upon the Boers as his destined victims, he now found himself deprived of his prey. His early promises to Shepstone were forgotten. The book of the new law solemnly accepted from the British officer weighed light against the fear that he might be condemned to live in inglorious apathy, a Zulu King who had not bathed the spears of his 'indunas' in human blood. An ominous sign of his ugly intentions was the erection of a new military Kraal between the Black and White Umfolozi Rivers, which was completed by the 5th June, 1877, and named 'Impikaize'—'Let the enemy come'.²

'I do not overlook the very grave nature of Cetywayo's act in building this fortified kraal in defiance of Shepstone's warnings on the disputed territory,' wrote Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Bulwer,³ 'nor am I insensible to the risk we run in seeming to submit to the insolence of this ill-conditioned and aggressive barbarian: but I have told Shepstone that if the worst comes to the worst he must temporize and avoid a collision—for which the present time is entirely and absolutely inopportune. The time may and will come when we shall be able to settle the controversy in our own fashion; but we cannot quarrel now and therefore some way out of the difficulty *must* be found. . . .'

It will readily be imagined that this news was extremely disquieting. It could only have one meaning, that Cetywayo was meditating war, and this at a moment when

¹ See p. 288.

² See Vol. III, p. 22.

³ 2nd January, 1878.

the Home Government was confronted by a most menacing situation in the East.

To Sir Theophilus Shepstone¹ Lord Carnarvon said, ' . . . I see plainly enough the aggressive character of the act and the defiance of authority which it implies : but somehow or other you must avoid all collision. I do not doubt that your experience and knowledge of native character will enable you to find some satisfactory way of effecting this, and my official despatch of to-day will show you that I am looking to you to do this : but I think it right to add these few lines privately to say that *a native war is just now impossible ; that you must avoid it ;* and trust to the future to pay off scores and settle the frontier difficulties in a satisfactory manner. . . . '

After receiving Sir Theophilus' letter despatched on the 11th December, 1877, he added, ' I see however that incongruous, perhaps antagonistic, elements are daily approaching each other and that they must sooner or later produce the inevitable result ; if we were prepared, the sooner this result is produced the better, this frontier war with Kreli has revealed weak points, and has very much advanced the chances of events occurring unexpectedly ; so that the sooner the root of the evil, which I consider to be the Zulu power and military organization, is dealt with, the easier our task will be.

' The Transvaal is however in a most defenceless state, no portion of its boundary is in a satisfactory condition, and irritating processes will be necessary along hundreds of miles of it before things are properly settled. These processes will be dangerous in proportion to the belief of the natives in our want of power to coerce, and they will gauge this by the issue of our present difference with Cetywayo. With all this staring us in the face our whole

¹ 3rd January, 1878.

military force is under 800 men ; I think that, for a time at least, a very much larger force than this is really necessary, if only as ballast to our craft. . . .’

The state of agitation into which all Europe had been thrown by the Russo-Turkish War, and the possibility that Great Britain might be dragged into hostilities, made those who were interested in South African trade anxious that the Cape should be put into a state of complete security from foreign attack.

A deputation of merchants and others interested urged Lord Carnarvon to send out additional forces.

Lord Carnarvon said in answer, that while the news from the Cape was sufficient to create much anxiety, great confidence might be felt in Sir Bartle Frere. The Zulu King was the most serious danger. The construction of the fortified Kraal had been made in a disputed territory which abutted on the English soil, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone had not been able to induce him to desist from this purpose. Sir Theophilus Shepstone had asked for reinforcements which had been sent, but Lord Carnarvon hoped he would be most cautious in using the forces which had been placed at his disposal. They looked to their fellow-subjects at the Cape to take a full and complete share of the burden also upon themselves, but in the meantime the 90th regiment and a battery of artillery were about to leave the country, and the preparations had been made with all possible speed at the War Office.

Her Majesty’s Government was fully alive to the interests of the Cape, and ever ready to afford in the event of emergency protection for the Colonists. The total amount of trade which passed by the Cape amounted to not less than 160 million sterling a year, and these large figures brought home the perils and responsibilities of

war. A telegraph cable was urgently needed, and he had pressed it upon the Treasury, but it had been impossible so far to come to terms. He had long been anxious about the defence of Simon's Bay, and the War Office had now sent a sufficient army to secure it against all ordinary risks.

Referring to the European War,¹ he said there had been no great alteration in the circumstances since the last days of November when Lord Derby had given a reassuring answer to the Deputation at the Foreign Office, and he begged the commercial world to use its utmost endeavours to allay public excitement. Whilst the Cape interests were no doubt very large, it was always to be remembered that they represented a mere fraction of the aggregate interests of the country and of the whole Empire. It was the duty of the Government to keep all this in view, and to remember that there were not only interests in the East, but at numberless points of the enormous Empire. Whilst the Government would uphold the honour and self-respect of the country, he hoped they would never do anything to encourage alarm or would allow that diplomacy had, even in those critical and difficult times, become so exhausted and barren as to be incapable of affording a peaceful solution.

IV

The events which led to Lord Carnarvon's resignation of office are recounted in another chapter.² Two days before it took place he wrote to Sir Bartle Frere :

' The anxieties of the Eastern War have swallowed up every superfluous moment and energy and have prevented me from writing as I desired to you on South African matters. I still hope to be able to write before the

¹ See p. 368.

² Chapter XXVII.

mail of Thursday leaves—meanwhile I send you a line to say that I have got another regiment from the War Office which I hope may sail as soon as the transport can be taken up and the necessary arrangements made in about a week's time. This with the regiment and the battery which went on the 10th inst. will I trust be sufficient to enable you to do that which is the first and pressing concern, restore the peace in the Keian and Transkeian districts and maintain it on the Natal and Transvaal Frontier.'

He felt indeed that the danger there was of such an overwhelming character as to claim priority over every other danger or risk, and the despatch of reinforcements was almost his last official act. On the 24th January he wrote to Sir Bartle Frere :

'You will I know be sorry but possibly not altogether surprised to hear the news which I will not allow to reach you except through myself—that I have this morning felt myself obliged to tender my resignation.

'The differences in the Cabinet on Eastern Affairs have so grown that they have proved at last incurable : and I have though with the greatest regret seen no alternative but to leave the Government. I let all my letters of yesterday and the day before go as they stand. It is not likely that my successor will make any change in the lines of the policy that we have conjointly pursued, and I need not tell you that he—whoever he may be—shall have every support and help that I can give him. You also know I hope that any assistance that I can give you is entirely at your command.

'I sincerely trust that my last request in the shape of another regiment will enable you to surmount the present difficulties—no one more earnestly desires a satisfactory conclusion than I do.'

It can never be a light matter to sever abruptly political ties, and to interrupt the course of a life's work ; and Lord Carnarvon's sacrifice was a considerable one. His

sincerity and whole-hearted devotion to the welfare of South Africa had won the appreciation even of those who differed from him; and he could feel that he had done his part—the preliminary work which Mr. Cardwell had achieved for Canada had been accomplished for South Africa.

‘Will you tell Lord Carnarvon,’ Sir Bartle Frere telegraphed to Lady Frere, ‘I feel his resignation as one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall the Colony just now.’¹

He wrote a week later :²

‘... I know what such a separation from work, and still more from fellow workmen means, and how much it must have cost you. I feel sure that in this, as in every other act of your public life, duty and honour were your first thought; so I cannot object to the sacrifice, deeply as I regret its necessity. I only wish that my regret were on merely selfish grounds, for my own loss of a main cause of confidence and satisfaction in my work; but I cannot conceal from myself that the loss to my work is greater than to me, and that I have diminished ground for hope in its success. . . .

‘I hope you will let me go on telling you how the work prospers.

‘In some respects it looks more promising now than at any time since I came out. I thought latterly that Molteno had begun to think that Confederation *must be*, and that he might as well have a share in the credit of carrying it; but I never felt sure of what he was going to do in this, or on any other question, and he would have done nothing heartily or straightforward.

‘Sprigg has, however, as he assures me, always been an advocate of your general principles of Confederation, though he misunderstood, as he now admits, your intentions when Froude came out—not from any fault of Froude’s—and said much, which he told me very frankly he now wished unsaid. In other ways the question has made good progress, and if we have a Conference, when our Parliament meets, I hope to be able to tell you of good work done.’

¹ 19th February, 1878.

² Sir Bartle Frere to Lord Carnarvon, 27th February, 1878.

The prospects of Confederation were more hopeful than they had ever been. Even President Brand could write that when the brotherly feeling he hoped for was brought about, 'the time will not be very far distant when the different parts of South Africa will feel the advantage and necessity of an Union for the purpose of mutual defence, and the promotion of their common interests. . . .'¹

For three years the possibilities and the advantages of Confederation had been discussed in every part of the country and by every class of people. The fortunes of South Africa were in the hands of its white settlers, and to his successor Lord Carnarvon confidently left the work of establishing the Dominion of South Africa.

¹ President Brand to Sir Bartle Frere, 6th December, 1877.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVI

Lord Carnarvon's Speech, moving the 2nd Reading of the Permissive Bill, 23rd April, 1877

‘ It is now, my Lords, ten years since I had the honour of moving the second reading of the Bill for the Confederation of the Dominion of Canada, which Bill became law from that time. The Bill now before your Lordships is founded in a great measure on that statute, but there are both analogies and differences which, though I cannot explain at length, I may in a very few words indicate. Analogies will be found in the variances of race, language, creed and laws ; the difference consists in that great Native question which has long been, and must be for many years to come, the hinge upon which South African policy must turn. But in Canada, since the time that the Confederation Act passed, there has been a great development of population, of revenue, of the exports and imports, of all in fact which marks the advance of a great country ; and yet, with this development, and with the growth of those large Imperial questions which call for the exercise of high constitutional qualities, and which, in their absence, would cause grave political friction, happily the relations between the Canadian Colonies and this country have become still closer. My noble friend who preceded me in the Colonial Office, 1867 [Lord Cardwell], and who had with no common patience and ability brought the Canadian measure into such shape that I was enabled to bring it to a practical conclusion, will remember that

for a very long time before that measure was introduced the subject of a confederation of the Canadian Provinces had been much discussed in this country and in Canada, and that before the Bill was brought before the Imperial Parliament almost every point of difficulty and controversy had been brought into the way of settlement by personal explanation and preliminary discussion. The same thing cannot be said in respect of this Bill. Although the question of confederation in South Africa has been much discussed, many matters of opinion are necessarily still left in doubt. Consequently, as Her Majesty's Government thought that a measure for Confederation ought not to be longer delayed, they have been compelled, when framing this Bill, to pursue a different course from that which was adopted in the case of the Canadian Act. The Bill before your Lordships is one of outline and principle. It is one containing the framework of a future Confederation, but leaving the details to be filled up after free communications between the Imperial and local Governments. It is essentially permissive—one by which no sort of pressure would be put upon the Colonies, while it will at the same time give them every opportunity for confederating, should they think it advisable to do so.

'It is, however, hardly possible to consider this measure, without recalling the present political circumstances of South Africa, which may be said, in relation to the scheme, to fall into three groups—the British Colonies, the Native Tribes, and the Dutch States.

'Of those English Colonies, you have, first and foremost, the Cape, with its broad area, its great resources, its varied interests, its mixed population, and the traditional pre-eminence which its past history confers. As showing the advance made during the last five years, I may, in passing, mention, that whereas in 1871 the revenue of the Cape was £750,000, it has risen since then to £2,250,000, and that nearly 800 miles of railway are in course of construction. Next, you may look to Natal,

with its great natural capabilities in climate, and soil and mineral wealth, and its equally great causes of Native anxiety. Yet here, too, the revenue has risen from £125,000 to £260,000 within the same period.

‘Lastly, we may turn to Griqualand with its strange mixture of as yet uncultivated land, and its almost fabulous products. In that province, the value of the diamonds found in the five years ending February 1876, has been estimated at £12,000,000 to £20,000,000, whilst the output of diamonds is supposed to be not less than £2,000,000 per annum.

‘But besides these English Colonies, there are outlying districts, inhabited by Native tribes, with some few and scattered English officers resident amongst them, gradually civilizing them and bringing them under the mild influence of English law.

‘So much as regards our Colonies. It remains now to consider the native tribes, who within and without those Colonies constitute the greatest and most pressing of South African problems. It is difficult to form any reasonable estimate of their numbers. In the English Colonies there are not fewer than a million, and there are about that number in the Transvaal State. Of the natives beyond our frontier, who by some impulse from the far interior are continually pouring southwards upon us, I do not attempt a calculation. . . . I will only say that, numerous as they are, they are still increasing in numbers. Formerly indeed the state of the barbarous warfare in which they lived kept down their numbers, but our civilization and gentler treatment have multiplied their strength and have induced them to come over the boundaries. During the last two years they have swarmed by thousands into Natal, till it has been said that the natives increased more in one day than the whites did in a year. But they are increasing also in intelligence, and unfortunately that intelligence is too often directed to the use and the possession of arms. It is estimated that not fewer than 200,000 arms have been

purchased in Griqualand, and I read an account the other day of a trader over the frontier, whose stock in trade for arms amounted to not less than £30,000. On his return home from that country Sir Garnet Wolseley gave it as his deliberate opinion that among the many sources of danger in South Africa there was none so great as this extensive possession of arms by the natives. Lastly, they are increasing in wealth; and here I recognize a better side to this picture, for the possession of wealth implies a certain kind of civilization, and a certain element of political stability.

‘So much then as regards our own Colonies and the Native Tribes. I now pass to the Dutch States, and when I recall the history of those States I own I do so with regret. There was doubtless right and wrong, intermingled as it always is in human affairs, on each side, but whatever that right and wrong, and however distributed, I think with regret of those communities going out into the wilderness, alienated from English feeling and policy, alienated too under the sense of injustice and wrong. I will not now revive the recollection of that unfortunate period, I will only venture to lay down two propositions which are, I think, as important as they are true: first, that the main European population of South Africa, in its original element is Dutch rather than English; and, secondly, that it would be a grievous mistake to confound the steady, peaceful, prosperous and conservative Dutch people of our settled Colonies with a factious, turbulent minority which has lately come into prominence in the barbarous war of the Transvaal.

‘There are, as your Lordships are aware, two Dutch States. Of these, the Orange-Free State is the largest, oldest, most prosperous and soundly organized. There have been here causes of irritation and suspicion, but I trust that these have now been removed by the agreement which I was fortunately able to conclude last summer, with the President, Mr. Brand. That arrangement has been the means of bringing about a much desired

reconciliation. In the Transvaal, on the other hand, there is a still larger area, a smaller white population, and a very much larger native population, with a far less soundly organized Government. But large and thinly populated as is the territory, there is, as so often has been seen in other countries, a hunger for land ; and so it came to pass that last year some very unwise claims to native lands were set up on the part of the Government of the Transvaal. I felt it my duty to protest repeatedly and strongly against the proceedings in reference to those claims ; but these warnings were disregarded ; war, and a disastrous war, ensued, which actually placed the whole State at one moment in the most imminent peril. Peace was patched up for a moment, but of a most unsatisfactory character ; so much so that if peace is to be had on such terms in South Africa, a great inducement for other Chiefs to follow in the same course will be given.

‘ Under such circumstances it became necessary for Her Majesty’s Government to take what precautions were in their power. They sent additional troops to the frontier, and they sent also as a Special Commissioner, and armed with the authority which they could give, Sir T. Shepstone. But no authority which Her Majesty’s Government could delegate to him is so great as that which his capacity, his knowledge of the natives, and his great experience had given him. . . . It is, I believe, due to the influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone that hostilities are not now raging along the whole frontier of the European settlements.

‘ Reports, indeed, reached this country that he had announced his intention to forcibly annex the Transvaal State. It appears to me that the language ascribed to Sir Theophilus has been very grossly exaggerated. His language has been frank, but at the same time conciliatory and temperate ; and it has been received in the most friendly spirit by the local Government. Thoroughly understanding the nature of the dispute between the natives and the authorities of the Transvaal, he did not

hesitate to point out the extreme danger of the situation, to tell them that Her Majesty's Government cannot view with indifference the acts or circumstances which may involve a general conflagration, but that though treating them with all friendship and forbearance, and though for the present waiting to see what they could do for their own preservation, he recognized limits beyond which it would be impossible to protract a mere attitude of expectancy.

' I, too, may now state to your Lordships that, knowing as I do how large a portion of the people of the Transvaal desire to come under British rule, I cannot but anticipate that in the end the Transvaal will become a British State. I have no desire, if it can be avoided, to take over that State. We have territory enough and to spare in South Africa ; nor need I say that I desire no unwilling members in this Confederation. The Bill before you is a sufficient proof of this ; but if there is any calamity which I more deprecate than another, it is the breaking out of a native war which would not only involve vast loss of life and property, and throw back for years to come the civilization of the South African frontier, but would impose liabilities and difficulties which it is hard to measure upon this country. It is at present difficult to do justice to the confusion, the anarchy, the political chaos of that country. The Whites are divided into factions, taxes are not paid, the exchequer is empty, laws are as if they were not written, terrorism in some parts prevails, the coloured races are discontented and watching for the first opportunity, the Zulu King, with his 30,000 or 40,000 men, is ready to intervene for his own objects and interests. Now if the danger were confined to the Transvaal alone, we might, perhaps, run the risk of it : but we cannot view the kindling of great political fires in our neighbourhood any more than the farmer can bear to see the prairie blazing all round his homestead.

' It is, my Lords, hardly necessary, perhaps, to give special reasons why a Confederation of the South African

Colonies is desirable. The subject is one on which public opinion locally has veered towards the present conclusion, whilst in England it has never wavered. It is, however, manifest that great difficulties must present themselves as long as different systems in important branches of administration prevail in the different Colonies. Let me for the sake of mere illustration take three points—the Franchise, Real Property, and Arms. As regards the franchise, in the Cape the natives have it and use it; in Natal there are restrictions such as prevent the use of it, and in the Dutch Colonies there is none. As regards real property, in the Cape the natives are on an equal footing with the whites; in Natal they hold land by trustees or tribes; in the Orange Free State they possess only small plots; while in the Transvaal the natives occupy at pleasure and without regulation waste land. As regards arms, in the Cape there is a duty of £1 per gun but no register; while in Natal there is no duty, but there is a register.

‘Now if there were a united Government by means of a Confederation, there would be probably better, more uniform and more even arrangements. A strong Government would respect itself and be respected by the natives. Under such a Government there would be less danger of insurrection on the part of the natives, and less chance of panic on the part of the Colonists. In Canada the treatment of the North American Indians has been liberal, kindly, and humane; it has formed the subject of just praise alike by traveller and politician. But there is another advantage which may be fairly mentioned; and it is this. Under a large and common system of government in South Africa, many public works, which are now neither undertaken nor dreamt of, would become possible. That which is not the business of any one individual member of the family politic is the business of none, and considering her great resources, and, indeed, her great necessities, it must be owned that in this part of the race of civilization, South Africa is somewhat, though very

excusably, in arrear. But perhaps of all the changes which this measure may produce, I anticipate with the advent of political and administrative union none more hopefully than a real union in sentiment of the Dutch and English race. The old quarrel to which I have alluded is dying out, and is fast becoming a thing of the past : real friendliness exists under the crust of political discord. One of the most graceful writers among modern travellers says, that the Dutchman at the Cape, when speaking of England talks of it, no less than the Englishman, as "home". All must gain in general political strength, as in material prosperity by combination, and I will only add that my highest object has been to restore the union of sentiment between the two peoples.

' I am hardly obliged to anticipate objection to my own measure ; but I have heard it said that there is coercion lurking under its provisions. I absolutely deny the fact. There is not the shadow of a shade of coercion. I may even go further and point out that the earlier history of the question not unreasonably leads me to the belief that Confederation is no uncongenial idea to any of the Colonies or States of South Africa.

' On the 22nd December, 1858, this resolution was adopted in the Orange Free State :

" "This Raad is convinced that an union or alliance with the Cape Colony, whether on the basis of Federation or otherwise, is desirable, and therefore resolves to request His Honour the President to correspond with His Excellency the Governor upon that subject . . . for the purpose of planning the approximate terms of such union."

' Later, in 1871, a Commission on Federation at the Cape was appointed, which could and did only consider the question with reference to the Cape Colony alone, but in whose report I find, amongst other remarkable matter, the following language :

" "Some, whose opinions are entitled to great respect, are of opinion that until the Free State, the Transvaal Republic and Natal show a disposition to federate with the

Cape, and until West Griqualand and the country between the Kei and the Bashae, or between the Kei and Natal, shall have been annexed to the Colony, no change of any kind proposed will be either necessary or expedient. . . . The time may come when the advantages of an union among South African communities for the creation of a strong Government, powerful to protect, and to a certain extent to control, its several members, will become apparent to all."

' Later again, in 1875 when I had proposed, with reference to this question, a Conference of the Colonies and States of South Africa, the following resolutions were adopted by the Legislative Council of Natal :

" " That such a Conference will conduce to a future and closer union between the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, the South African Republic, the Province of Griqualand West, and this Colony ; an union that may be of material benefit to each, of disadvantage to none. To express a hope that our elder and sister Colony will yet regard with greater favour the prospect of a more friendly intercourse and closer union with Colonies and States whose interests are by nature and circumstances inseparable from her own, and which are peopled by a race, not only of common origin, but of kindred blood ; and that delegates from the Cape, the Orange Free State, the South African Republic, Griqualand West, and Natal may meet in friendly conference."

' In the same year and on the same subject, this resolution was passed by the Legislative Council of Griqualand West :

" " That in the opinion of this Council it is desirable and expedient that a Conference of Representatives of the South African Colonies and States should assemble for the consideration and discussion of questions of common interest with a view to the formation, if possible, of a Federal Union."

' And within the last two months the Volksraad of the Transvaal have agreed to this resolution :

“ That it is impossible, under present circumstances, for the Government to carry on the administration and control of the country.”

‘ I hear that considerably more than a fourth of the male population of the Transvaal have signed a petition praying for an intervention by Her Majesty’s Government in the affairs of that distracted province. Nor even yet is this all. In the autumn of last year I held a conference in London in which the President of the Orange Free State, and representatives of Griqualand West and Natal took part, and in which they unanimously agreed upon the expediency of a common system of police, of the regulation of arms, of the sale of spirituous liquors, of industrial education—in fact of many of the primary and most important elements of a common government.

‘ But if I am asked why the Government has not delayed this Bill for some clear and unmistakable indication of the exact feelings of the various States and Colonies, such as would enable us to bring in a Bill framed on the precedent of that for the Dominion of Canada, my answer is, that we feel that a positive duty is imposed on us of at once placing within the reach of the South African communities a power to unite under the protection of the British Crown. To delay this to some future and perhaps indefinite Session of Parliament would be to invite calamity for those communities and for the Imperial Government.

‘ It may, however, perhaps be objected as against this Bill that it leaves too much to an Order in Council to decide. But if there must be no delay, then there is no other course than to adopt this method. Let it also be remembered that the various points of controversy—if indeed it can be admitted that controversy there is—are mainly matters for internal regulation, respecting which the Imperial Parliament would hardly desire to interfere. They are, in fact, questions which must be left to be adjusted by the Imperial and local Governments. The Bill as originally prepared has now been before the

various Colonies and States of South Africa for a considerable time : objections have been made to various provisions : the objections have been considered, and the provisions have either been amended or omitted from the measure as it now stands.

‘ And now in explanation of the Bill itself. About two months ago, in redemption of a pledge given at an earlier period, I sent out a Bill for consideration in South Africa, which will be found in the Blue Book which last week I laid on the table of the House. That Bill met, as I consider, with a fair and favourable reception in South Africa. At the same time there were comments and criticisms, some of which I thought so reasonable that I have in a great measure recast the Bill so as to bring it to the shape in which it is now before your Lordships. It will not require much explanation. The first part deals with the voluntary union of the various Colonies and States ; the next with executive power ; and the next with the Legislature and the distribution of legislative powers. The third clause enables the union of Colonies or States under the British Crown ; and it deals with such confederation on general principles. The details will be considered by the Imperial and the local Governments, and having been duly adjusted will be announced by Order in Council from Her Majesty. It is I think the best and simplest course to pursue in such a case ; but if any doubt be entertained there is a very sufficient precedent for this in the case of Queensland and New South Wales. Several years before the great Colony of Queensland came into existence power was taken by Act of Parliament to cut off the northern districts of New South Wales, and to form them with all the machinery of civilized government into a separate Colony, leaving authority to the Crown to fill up and supplement all details by Order in Council.

‘ Next, as to legislative authority. I propose, as will be anticipated, and in conformity with the usual course, the system of a double Chamber. In the original draught

I thought it best to propose that one of the Chambers should be a Council nominated by the Crown, but considerable objection to that proposal has been taken in South Africa, and I feel no difficulty in leaving the question in abeyance. In the arrangement of Colonial Constitutions there is no question more complex or difficult than the organization of the Upper Chamber. In modern times there have been but two Upper Chambers of authority and political prominence—the English House of Lords and the American Senate—the House of Lords legislative and hereditary ; the Senate executive and elective. But it is simply impossible to create either in a Colony. The immemorial tradition of the one, the surrounding constitutional framework for the other is wanting. In the English Colonies, however, the form has considerably varied. In New South Wales the Upper Chamber is nominated for life with a *minimum* ; in Queensland it is nominated for life with an understanding that it should not exceed two-thirds of the assembly ; in Victoria it is elective (a certain proportion periodically retiring by rotation) ; in Canada it is nominated for life, with a limited power of addition. But whatever these variations may be, I apprehend that the two principal and practical objects are, first, to secure such an authority for the Upper Chamber as to enable it to check hasty and imprudent legislation ; and, secondly, so to constitute it as to avoid those deadlocks which are fatal to all legislation, and which have sometimes occurred in recent years. The Legislative Council at the Cape, under its present constitution is elective, and if there be a strong inclination in South Africa generally to adhere to that principle of organization I certainly should not care to oppose it. And now as to the Assembly. In the original draught of the Bill I went into considerable and minute details, founded very much on the Canadian precedent ; but I have thought it better to submit this part of the Bill at present in outline and to leave the Constitution of the Assembly to be a matter of discussion between the local and the Imperial

Governments. This is in a great measure due to that most difficult and all-disturbing cause, the Native question. Let me give an illustration. The Colony of the Cape has a very large number of natives, and to them it accords the franchise. The Colony of Natal has proportionately a larger number of natives, but from them it virtually withholds the franchise. But if representation under the Confederation is to be based on numbers exclusive of natives, it is clear that the Cape would obtain an undue share of parliamentary power, and the interests of Natal would be placed at a disadvantage. It is necessary, therefore, to look for another principle, which I think may with patience be found, but which it will be necessary to have fully discussed between the parties concerned. It is proposed that the Assembly should be quinquennial, and that there should for obvious reasons be a decennial readjustment of the franchise.

‘ I next come to the Provincial Governments. The Bill provides that each Province shall be presided over by a chief executive officer, to be designated and appointed in such manner as the Queen may determine. If the union of these Colonies is desirable, it is equally desirable that we should not sweep away the life and individuality of the different Provinces. They have a very distinct and remarkable character of their own, they cherish their history, traditions and customs, and from them I would desire to tear no portion of their past existence. There is nothing in this Bill which injuriously touches this important matter. The next few clauses are in themselves very important, as they refer to the distribution of legislative power. They are in a great measure founded on the Canadian model, with such modifications as are necessary. The principle is that there shall be certain powers reserved exclusively for the Central Government, certain others reserved exclusively for the Provincial, and certain which are concurrent between the two. Whilst, however, is assigned to the Central Authority the consideration of native questions, every law on such subjects will be

reserved for the sanction of Her Majesty at home, and that control over native affairs which must under present circumstances still be preserved to this country will be upheld. As for the remainder of these clauses, there is nothing in them to which I need call special attention. They contain provisions for consolidating revenue, for apportioning charges, for the abolition of all customs duties between the Confederate States, so as to secure complete union in commercial matters, and, finally, for the admission of other States that might desire to enter the Union.

‘ I have now, my Lords, gone over the principal points in the Bill, and need say but little on the general question. The principle of Confederation is not a new one. It existed, indeed, in ancient times under many forms and combinations, but there has been a remarkable tendency towards it of late years ; connected, as it would seem, with feelings of nationality and race. The drift of the political current has certainly been towards aggregation rather than separation. We have seen it in Italy, in Germany, and even, I think, in the United States. In some, indeed, of the Colonies there seemed at one time to be a fluctuation of feeling. A process of disintegration appeared to be setting in in the Australian Colonies and New Zealand. In Australia, however, there is no evidence to show that this was a true indication of public feeling, whilst, as regards New Zealand, we have lately seen a remarkable proof of the strong feeling towards aggregation. The separate Governments of that great and prosperous Colony have passed away, in order to make room for a stronger and, as it is supposed, a more economical central Government.

‘ A distinguished writer, indeed, has lately denied the applicability of the principle of Confederation to Dependencies under British rule, but, with all deference to him, his reasoning seems to me to be founded on mere hypothesis, nor can I see any reason why in the nature of things, and apart from those fugitive causes which do not

belong to the fixed and unchanging principles of political life, the Dependencies of the British Crown should any more than any other States be incapable of Confederation. It is quite possible that Confederation is only one stage in the political journey of the Empire and that it may even lead in the course of time to a still closer union. But, be this as it may, the reason why I now urge this measure for the adoption of Parliament is that such a principle of Confederation must add strength to these Colonies, give larger objects, a higher policy, a wider political life, and, as I earnestly hope, a better security for the right treatment of the native races. And if so, all this means greater prosperity and peace—a closer consolidation of Imperial interests.

‘The British Empire is no doubt vast, various and disconnected; and yet when all allowance and deductions have been made, it is, I am prepared to maintain, one of the most wonderful pieces of human administration the world has ever seen, both in what it does and in what it does not do. Other countries have founded Colonial Empires. France, Spain, and Portugal have left their mark in the Colonial History of the World, and yet as Colonizing Powers they have virtually ceased to exist; and among other reasons for this—that they were founded upon a close principle of restriction. We have adopted a different system; we have discarded restrictions; we have looked to freedom of government as our ultimate object, and we have been rewarded by an almost immeasurable freedom of growth. And I look upon this measure as one more step in that direction. I have not said, and I do not desire to say anything that may revive the controversies which have arisen at the Cape on this subject. I, personally, am satisfied with the course of proceedings, and with the spirit in which my proposals have been met. The criticisms and comments upon them have not been other than fair and reasonable, and I consider that with this Bill closes, so to speak, the most important era of the modern history of Africa.

‘ If Parliament should pass the Bill, Confederation becomes possible in these Colonies, and it is for them to say whether they will accept it. My duty is then at an end ; but I believe that they will accept it, for policy and interest alike dictate such a course. And then I have every confidence that under this Bill these communities, now scattered and isolated by conflicting interests, will, at no distant day, form a strong, peaceable, and loyal Confederation under the British Crown. I beg to move the second reading of the Bill.’

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MAKING OF THE BALKANS

1875-1878

I

‘ Vien dietro a me, e lascia dir le genti ;
Sta, come torre, fermo che non crolla,
Giammai la cima per soffiar de’venti.’

Purg. v. 13.

IN 1875 an insurrection broke out in the north-western region of European Turkey, and spread from the Herzegovina, a portion of the vilayet of Bosnia, over a large part of that extensive province. Its inhabitants were all of Slavonic origin and speech ; but at the time of the Ottoman conquest most of the landowners had accepted the religion of the Turkish invaders, and thus retained, as the new guardians of the Mahommedan ascendancy, the privileged position which their ancestors had previously held as Christian semi-feudal magnates. They were never indeed entirely forgetful of their race and of their earlier traditions. Some of them kept carefully hidden in their castles the *ikons* inherited from their forefathers, which, as a Bosnian Beg once explained to an English traveller, might again become available and useful, should times alter and new rulers arise. The Christian population, which numbered about 60,000 out of 1,000,000,

was three-quarters Orthodox, but included a considerable Catholic element in those western portions of the province which had long come under Venetian influence. The Catholics looked with hope and sympathy to Austria : the Slavs of the Orthodox faith to their kinsmen and co-religionists in the vassal states of Servia and Montenegro—the one fragment of the old Servian monarchy where the Turks had never trampled on the Cross.

When the news of the fighting arrived, Lord Derby suggested, and the Prime Minister reluctantly consented to the mediation of the local consuls of all the great Powers, but the intervention had little or no effect. Lord Derby wrote :

‘ . . . News from Turkey confused, indecisive, and probably inaccurate. The insurgents are better hands at burning villages, and murdering unarmed people, than at fighting : the Turks have by their laziness and apathy allowed the disturbance to become serious, when in the first instance it might have been crushed with ease.

‘ I saw the Premier on Friday : he was well, in good spirits, but I thought rather feeble in body. He is, however, perfectly happy and satisfied with the past, present and future. . . . ’¹

In October, however, the bankruptcy of the Porte rendered any hope of efficient administration futile, and was a powerful encouragement to the insurgents. And this had its reaction in England, when on the occasion of the Lord Mayor’s dinner² Mr. Disraeli’s speech, though guarded, had a bellicose ring in it.

Count Andrassy, the Foreign Minister of the Dual Monarchy, at the end of 1875 drew up a note to the Turkish Government, recommending a programme of

¹ Lord Derby, Fairhill, Tunbridge, to Lord Carnarvon, 13th September, 1875.

² 9th November, 1875.

reform as the best method of reconciling the insurgent populations, and checking the spread of their revolt. His proposals were not immoderate. He merely asked that that legal equality between Christians and Mussulmans, which so many high-sounding proclamations had announced, should be made a reality; that the leasing of the collection of taxes to farmers, who used it as a means of extortion, should be abolished; that a guarantee should be given that Bosnian and Herzegovinian taxes should be employed for the benefit of those provinces; that the condition of the agricultural population should be materially improved, and that a provincial council composed both of Christians and Mahommedans should assist the Turkish authorities to establish an efficient administration. He forgot, like so many other would-be Turkish reformers before and after him, the old saying *quid leges sine moribus*.

Although this note was circulated to the Powers on the 30th December, 1875,¹ it was not brought before the Cabinet till about three weeks later, on the 18th January, 1876. Lord Derby believed that Austria and Russia had not encouraged the disturbances, but had really feared them, and that they desired the concessions urged in Andrassy's note in order to tranquillize their own populations. On the whole he desired to support the note, and Lord Carnarvon strongly urged that in so doing, he should reserve the power of judging the details, so as not to be tied to the three Great Powers.

The Cabinet decided to accept the Andrassy Note, and the Queen in her speech of the 20th January, 1876, declared: 'I have considered it my duty not to stand

¹ At this juncture the Prime Minister apparently resolved to keep the management of Turkish and Central Asian affairs in his own hands and those of his colleagues at the Foreign and India Offices, and not to bring them before the Cabinet. (See *Disraeli*, vol. vi, p. 15.)

aloof from the efforts now being made by allied and friendly Governments to bring about a pacification of the disturbed districts, and I have accordingly, while respecting the independence of the Porte, joined in urging on the Sultan the expediency of adopting such measures of administrative reform as may remove all reasonable causes of discontent on the part of his Christian subjects.'

But three months later a fresh revolt broke out among the Bulgarian population of Roumelia—occupying the southern slopes of the Balkans, and the northern slopes of the Rhodops. The leaders of this movement had their head-quarters at Bucharest, where they were in close touch with the Russian Panславists. The outbreak began at Tatarbazardjik on the 2nd May, 1876, and was suppressed with great rapidity and horrible cruelty by the local Turkish forces, who were supported by irregulars—the so-called Bashibazouks. The atrocities culminated at Batak, where 5,000 persons of all ages and both sexes were alleged to have been barbarously massacred by these undisciplined and savage auxiliaries. Some 6,000 or 7,000 more were apparently exterminated in other parts of the disaffected district during the remainder of the month of May; and this atrocious repression was successful, in so far as it had the effect of preventing a rising of the Bulgarians to the north of the Balkans, and the union of these insurgents with the Servian army, which was waiting to invade Turkey from the side of Nish.

While these events were taking place, but before any information of the Bulgarian massacres had reached London, the situation was further complicated by a riot at Salonica,¹ which resulted in the murder, at the hands of a fanatical mob, of the French and German Consuls, the latter an Englishman named Abbott. The French and

¹ 6th May, 1876.

German Governments immediately despatched warships to Salonica to support their demands for the punishment of the offenders ; and this step, followed by a good deal of effervescence among the *softas* or theological students at Constantinople, increased the general feeling of tension and excitement throughout Turkey.

A great panic arose among the Christian population in Constantinople. On the 13th May an alarming telegram was received from Sir Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador, and the Cabinet decided in consequence to send the fleet, which was coaling at Smyrna, to Besika Bay for the protection of British interests, although the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty would have preferred to keep it where it was.

Bismarck meanwhile had drawn up, in concert with Gortchakoff and Andrassy, the Berlin Memorandum, proposing a two months' armistice between the Porte and the Bosnian rebels; the reconstruction by the former, at its own expense, of buildings destroyed by Turkish troops ; the concentration of these troops at certain definite points; and the carrying into effect of a reform scheme, under the supervision of Consuls or other delegates of the Great Powers.

At a Cabinet ¹ called to consider what reply should be made, Mr. Disraeli strongly deprecated the adherence of Great Britain, and the Cabinet agreed, though with some hesitation. Lord Carnarvon noted that there was very little inclination to look ahead. In a subsequent memorandum ² he wrote :

17th May :

'We came to the Berlin Memorandum with an uneasy, doubtful, and above all divided Cabinet. I at this time was anxious to assert ourselves more plainly, and to insist upon a right to

¹ 16th May, 1876.

² August, 1879.

a voice in any European settlement that might be impending—both for the sake of the Christians, and also that Russia might not be under any misapprehensions as to our real intentions.

‘ And as I now look back on the past, I believe I was right, and that firmer language then might have averted what has since happened in Europe. Be this however as it may, we reached the period of the Berlin Memorandum. We have been accused here of making our first great mistake, and in reviewing the past by subsequent events, I am inclined to believe that we did err ; with most of us there was, I think, a desire to resist what we considered insolent dictation, and there was also a sort of reaction against Derby’s extreme irresolution—to which must be added that Disraeli by this time was strong in opposition to Russia. But neither the feeling nor the insight into the case were clear enough to make us take a positive course : and we fell back upon a merely negative line of action.

‘ The Cabinet was very—entirely—ignorant of the real nature of the question which was coming on us. I, though I had some opportunities which others had not, was not I think fully alive to the bearings of the then . . . circumstances, and I am sure that a large majority . . . such as Cross, Richmond, Hunt, J. Manners were . . . totally ignorant. . . .’

A week later ¹ the question of an increase of the Navy was brought before the Cabinet by the Prime Minister, who further hinted that they might seize the Turkish fleet, and even Constantinople, if necessary. The Cabinet was rather startled by these large proposals, but finally agreed to increase the squadron by three ships and push on the commissioning of others.

A telegram bringing news of his mother’s dangerous illness ² forced Lord Carnarvon to leave London that night, and he wrote the following day to the Prime Minister from Pixton : ‘ . . . It is of no great use to discuss a question such as ours without hearing the opinions of others, but

¹ 22nd May, 1876.

² Henrietta, Lady Carnarvon died at Pixton on May 26th, 1876.

it is perhaps well to say that I am satisfied that we ought to push on *all* naval preparations with as little delay as possible, though not necessarily with ostentation, and that the Turkish fleet is for the moment at least the object to be constantly kept in view. . . .'

On his return to London news arrived of the deposition of Abdul Azziz, and the proclamation of his nephew Murad.

The fallen Sultan, who died a few days after his dethronement, by suicide or secret assassination, had been ready to listen to Ignatieff's insidious suggestion to invite the Russian Black Sea fleet to pass the Bosphorus, thus balancing the effects of the presence of a British squadron at Besika Bay. His deposition was welcomed in Turkey with enthusiastic demonstrations of patriotic and religious sympathy, on the part both of the *softas* and of those reforming elements among the Turkish upper classes who professed sympathy with more liberal principles of government.

Murad, or Amasath the Fifth, a Prince of attractive personality, but weak intellect, accepted as Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha,¹ one of the ablest and most progressive of Turkish statesmen. Except for the advent of a stronger and far more capable Grand Vizier, the new Sultan's reign was an unimportant episode. Long a prisoner under close supervision, and living only among spies, his unexpected accession appears to have unhinged his mind, and four months afterwards he was removed from the throne, and his youngest brother, Abdul Hamid, was proclaimed his successor.

Lord Carnarvon was unable, owing to indisposi-

¹ He eventually died in prison at Taif in Arabia by poison or starvation, charged by Abdul Hamid II, amongst other crimes, with complicity in the murder of the Sultan whose dethronement he had helped to bring about.

tion, to attend the next Cabinet, but learnt from Lord Salisbury :

‘The Cabinet was quite uneventful. Derby had nothing to tell us. The Prime Minister carried the question as to our policy in case the Dardanelles was violated by any of the numerous vessels now stationed in Besika Bay. It was agreed that a representation should be addressed to each of the Powers, assuring them that we had no intention of violating the Dardanelles, and asking them for a similar assurance. Nothing else was done ; and we separated early.’

On the 10th June the question of purchasing the three Turkish ironclads was discussed, and Lord Carnarvon again strongly urged the increase of naval force, whether by purchase, or by pressing forward the construction of British ships.

Soon after this there was a cessation of Cabinets, which Lord Carnarvon remarked was very strange in the midst of the Turkish crisis, and there was no meeting until the 23rd June, when one was called at his request to consider Canada’s position with regard to Mr. Plimsoll’s Merchant Shipping Bill.¹ The same day the report of the Bulgarian atrocities was published. An enterprising American correspondent of the *Daily News* had visited the charnel house at Batak, and described its awful horrors, which—after every allowance had been made for their possible exaggeration—surpassed those of Cawnpore. His account produced throughout civilized Europe, and especially in England, a resistless storm of popular indignation.

Disraeli, however, cast doubts ² on the reported torture of Bulgarians on the ground that ‘Oriental peoples usually terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious fashion’, and his cynical language gave

¹ Cf. p. 124.

² House of Commons, 10th July, 1876.

offence to many. Mr. Walter Baring was, however, despatched to report on them, and the Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, was severely censured by the critics for the doubts which he had at first cast on the truth of these appalling revelations.

On the 7th August the massacres were discussed in the House of Commons 'in a very damaging debate', as Disraeli wrote to Lord Derby,¹ the effect of which was only dispelled by the dexterous management of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bourke. Four days later a fresh attack was opened by Mr. Evelyn Ashley, and supported by two front bench Liberals, Forster and Harcourt, the latter clamouring for the expulsion from Europe of the Turks. Disraeli now described the atrocities as 'a horrible event, which no one can think of without emotion',² but he deprecated any hasty departure on that account from treaty engagements and traditional principles of policy.

Meanwhile Turkey was actually fighting with Servia and Montenegro, which had declared war six weeks previously,³ when crowds of Russian volunteers, amongst them General Tchernayeff, had flocked to join the new Orthodox crusade. To this serious development Mr. Disraeli called attention at the Cabinet on the 9th August.

The only measures agreed upon were the despatch of a military officer to Turkish head-quarters, and a Consular Officer to the chief centre of the atrocities, Philippopoli. 'I have little feeling of confidence', Lord Carnarvon wrote, 'as to the management of our affairs during the recess.'

Immediately afterwards the impending withdrawal of Mr. Disraeli from the House of Commons (which Lord Carnarvon had long known) was announced by letter to

¹ *Disraeli*, vol. vi, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³ 30th June, 1876.

his colleagues. 'The characteristics of it', wrote Lord Carnarvon, 'were its fullness and its absence of all the usual veneer and stage effect which he generally puts on and over all his writings. I think that for once he wrote with genuineness: but he is a most singular man with so many sides to his character that it is very difficult to know what he really thinks and means. And his love of mystery is so ingrained in him that he cannot resist it. It comes out even in this letter.'

When the House rose, Lord Carnarvon cruised for some time in the Solent, and then with Robert Herbert as his companion, sailed in *The Alruna* to the Channel Islands.

He wrote from Guernsey to Sir Stafford Northcote, 30th August :

'... I cannot but feel anxious at what I have from time to time seen in the papers of these Turkish abominations, that are daily coming to light. You must, as you know, accept my opinion... as being one which has been for very long extremely adverse to the Turkish view on this question. I look upon them as mere barbarians. I do not believe—as I remember saying to you in the Botanical Gardens this summer—that they have improved in the slightest degree upon their ancestors when they stormed Constantinople 400 years ago ; and I do not believe that there is any material exaggeration in the stories which have so long been coming home to us. But if this is so, the facts of the case are too horrible, and we are bound *at least* to bring every pressure of the strongest kind to bear upon them. There are even limits beyond which political consideration ought not to be carried, and we seem to me to be in danger of fast approaching that point.

'When we parted rather more than a fortnight ago no representation, as far as we know, had been made to the Turkish Government in other than the usual and conventional language, and the feeling generally in Turkey and on the Continent undoubtedly was that we were giving the Porte our support. We shall, I feel sure, be later driven into a much stronger line of

action : but we shall then be acting under obvious constraint and more and more of these horrors will have been perpetrated.

‘Of course much may have been done at the F. O. since the end of the Session, but it is just this which I should like to know. I regret now, as I regretted at our last Cabinet, that we do not take a distinct initiative in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. As far as the newspapers throw any light on the subject that initiative seems to be falling into the hands of some of the other great Powers. But however this may be, I am clear that no language can be too emphatic and no action too strong to make the Turkish Government understand that we will not tolerate the commission of barbarities and atrocities on their part. It is no excuse to place the blame on irregular troops. If Turkey cannot maintain herself without such auxiliaries her cause is condemned—and (though I hate to use the argument of mere popularity in such a case) I believe the country will very soon pronounce the condemnation. The feeling has entirely changed in many important respects with regard to Turkey since the Crimean War, and I dread to see the Government swept along at the tail of public opinion rather than leading and guiding it. . . .’

On his return to Highclere he received Sir Stafford Northcote’s answer.¹

‘Now as to Eastern affairs, the same bag which brought your letters brought also a print of the recent telegrams. You will, I suppose, have received your copy by this time, and you will see what has been done. . . . The difficulties seem to me to be very great ; and they have been considerably increased by the imbecility of Elliot, and (in the profoundest secrecy be it said) the unfortunate levity of our chief, in the matter of the atrocities.

‘The stupid brutality of the Turks has gone far to justify the Servian attack in the eyes of the world, and has made it difficult for us to say a word in their favour ; and we have insanely doubled that difficulty by allowing the idea to get abroad that we are indifferent to the cruelties which have been committed. It is now almost impossible to remove that impression, unjust as it really is, and we run great risk of proving that a darn may be

¹ 4th September, 1876.

worse than a rent. If you have the printed telegrams, look at that of August 29th (No. 23), in which Derby tells Elliot, truly enough, that the state of feeling produced by the atrocities is such that, if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, England could not interfere. This is of course confidential; yet the substance of it seems to have become known, or at all events to have reached the Austrians as a rumour; and they are naturally alarmed lest its effect should be to encourage Russia. Well, but, if we attempt to clear ourselves in the eyes of the public here, we can hardly avoid saying what will amount to nearly as much; and then what mischief may not ensue! . . .

‘I cannot understand why we have not got the Baring report yet. His private letters show that it will confirm the worst anticipations. What I hope is, that on receiving it Derby will write a stiff letter insisting on the punishment of the principal instigators of the massacres, and on such reparation as is possible being made to the survivors. Some display of energy in this direction on the part of the new Sultan, and a readiness to come to a settlement including arrangements for the better government of the Christians, and the partial autonomy of some of the Provinces, might save us from what will otherwise be a fearful catastrophe.’

On the 6th September Mr. Gladstone published his famous pamphlet on the Bulgarian atrocities. Indignation was mounting rapidly in the country and Lord Carnarvon gave expression to a sentiment of anxiety which was shared by many of his colleagues, when he wrote ¹ to the Prime Minister to ask that those members of the Cabinet who were in the south should be called together to consider the situation.

Lord Beaconsfield's answer did not arrive till the 12th September, when the Prime Minister expressed his belief that the Government had acted wisely and firmly, and would not strengthen themselves by hysterically modifying their policy.

¹ 6th September, 1876.

Baring's report had not arrived, but Lord Derby was to receive a deputation, and his utterances might carry weight, but when the country went mad he considered it best to let agitation have its course and wait for the reaction.

'It is fortunate for England that it is only the beginning of September; so there is time. None of these brawlers have a practical or precise idea: even Gladstone has exposed himself. He writes a pamphlet to show, for ethnological reasons, the Turks should be expelled from Europe, and when the absurdity of his advice is pointed out to him, he writes a letter to say he meant only the Turkish Ministers. That he wanted to expel some Ministers I make no doubt, but I don't think they were Turks. Of course it is very vexatious that Derby's hands at this moment should have been weakened: otherwise we should have had a peace satisfactory to Europe and honourable to our own country.'¹

The speech to which Lord Beaconsfield alluded was delivered by Lord Derby to a deputation of working men at the Foreign Office. He told his audience that in the internal affairs of Turkey England had no more Treaty rights of interference than any other state, and that no other state had so far moved. There were two questions, the Turkish treatment of subject races, and the territorial integrity of Turkey, the latter involving the possession of Constantinople, which no great power would be ready to see in the hands of a rival. The Government was doing all it could to bring about an armistice and peace between the Porte and the Slav principalities as well as the punishment of the authors of the crimes in Bulgaria.

'I wish', Sir William Heathcote wrote,² 'I could guess

¹ Lord Beaconsfield to Lord Carnarvon, 11th September, 1876.

² To Lord Carnarvon, 13th September, 1876.

from Lord B.'s letter what "practical or precise idea" the want of which he attributes to others, was present in his mind, or Lord Derby's. . . .

'Lord Derby seems to have answered the deputation very skilfully, and I should think has thrown dust in their eyes successfully. . . .

'I should think from what Walpole, who is here, tells me, that Disraeli does not know the extent of the feeling in this matter among quiet men of his own party. The violence of the Liberals keeps these men silent, for fear of being identified with them, but it does not extinguish their own feeling. . . .'

A fresh blow to the prestige of the Government was averted when the election to the seat in Buckinghamshire, which Disraeli's promotion to the Upper House had vacated, was retained for the Conservatives, but only after a sharp fight. Lord Carnarvon held it to be one of those Pyrrhic victories, ominous of an uncomfortable state of public feeling.

Shortly afterwards,¹ speaking at Derby, he alluded to the 'somewhat pitiless storm' which had fallen upon the Government. He did not complain of it. On the contrary, he rejoiced that the country had shown its feeling and believed that nothing had tended to strengthen the hands of the Foreign Secretary more than the outburst of indignation over the horrors enacted in the very heart of Europe. But he reminded his audience of the difficulties of securing the concert of the great European Powers, aggravated by the fact that Turkey was 'half dead, and the Christian States half alive, in such a condition, indeed, as calls to mind the words of the old Roman historian, "At nec mala nec remedia ferre possunt" . . .

¹ 3rd October, 1876, Derby School.

The crisis, no doubt, is very grave ; a great war, it may be, hangs at this moment in the balance. . . .

‘ It behoves, therefore, Englishmen of every class and every walk of life to be careful at such a moment as this, and it is not too much for a member of the Government to ask, that—in these critical, these almost supreme moments—patience should be accorded, and a fair and liberal construction given, not only to their words, but still more to their intentions.’

In 1879, while all the incidents of the struggle in the Cabinet were still fresh in his mind, and yet could be reviewed from a wider standpoint, Lord Carnarvon drew up some memoranda of the events which led to his resignation. Although they were intended for reference rather than publication, and were not revised, some portions of them cannot be omitted.

Memorandum. ‘ I think it may certainly be said that in the early part of ’76 there was no real difference of opinion in the Cabinet. In January of that year it was Derby’s opinion that Austria and Russia were not encouraging disturbances,¹ but were really anxious for reforms in the Government of the Christian subjects of the Porte ; and subsequent events tend, I think, to corroborate the justice of this view.

‘ There were, in fact, few serious difficulties or disagreements to disturb the harmony of the Cabinet, and I think the general feeling amongst us was that there was hardly enough of action and legislation in prospect to preserve us from stagnation, and the political consequences of it.

‘ But this state of things came to an end in the summer of ’76. The first beginning of real trouble was in the dis-

¹ 18th January, 1876.

turbances in Montenegro and the disorders in Bulgaria. Here I think Salisbury was the first who seemed to take serious alarm. He spoke very strongly on the subject, and from this time to the Conference at Constantinople no language or opinions in favour of the Christian nationalities, or in opposition to the claims of Turkey, could be more strongly expressed. I constantly discussed the position of affairs with him in every stage of the question, and if I became confirmed and strengthened in my own views, it was very much from my conversations with him. His sympathies were with Russia—his antagonism to Turkey was of the strongest, not to say the bitterest kind, and I understood and believed him to consider the case of the Christians to be one of absolute, essential, vital importance—in which morals as well as politics were involved—and on which no real sacrifice could be accepted without a personal sacrifice of honour and right from our point of view.

‘Derby held a very different opinion—he had formerly seen the political impossibility of long maintaining the *status quo* of Turkey, and had so expressed himself in public speeches, but as the present difficulties thickened, the traditional policy of the Foreign Office affected him more and more, and his original contempt and dislike of the Turks gradually gave way to a kindlier feeling to them, and a less friendly one to Russia as the protector and champion of the Christian races.¹

‘During the earlier and indeed considerable part of

¹ Lord Derby scoffed at a request of Cardinal Manning, transmitted through Lord Carnarvon, with regard to the possible difficulties in Rome at the next Papal election, but approved of the Cardinal himself, ‘whose lot’, he said, ‘have behaved very well in the Turkish row; I suppose because they love a Mahomedan better than a heretic’. Commending Lord Carnarvon’s answer, he wrote: ‘Your letter to Manning is as safe as it can be, but you had better keep a copy. There is evidently some intrigue intended. At the same time, these fellows must be treated civilly; they are good Turks!’

this time, Disraeli manifested little strong feeling in the Cabinet—but what it was was decidedly friendly to Turkey. But when in the summer of '76 the first news of the outrages arrived he affected to disbelieve and ridicule them in Cabinet.

' Then I spoke strongly several times, both in Cabinet and to particular members of it, and it was owing to my private remonstrances that Derby in June telegraphed for information which momentarily allayed the growing irritation in the H. of Commons.

' My impression is that it was at this time that the real public mischief in this matter was done—and mainly by Disraeli's attitude and speeches in the House of Lords. The Turkish Government were encouraged to believe that they would be supported in any outrages however gross—and this mainly by Disraeli's speeches. If the course taken in Syria in 1860, when Fuad Pasha under European pressure shot over 130 Turkish officers and men and hung 50 citizens who had taken part in similar outrages in Damascus, in one day, had been followed, all or much that has since followed would I believe have been averted. Russia would have had no excuse for further action; Turkey would not have played the part she did at the Conference, and public feeling in England, both on one side and on the other would probably not have taken an active form. . . .

' By May and June serious questions as to the increase of our naval force were being discussed, and Disraeli threw out hints for seizing the Turkish fleet and even Constantinople itself,¹ which received no support in the Cabinet, and seemed to most of us as rather romantic than well-considered effusions.

' So far as the strengthening of the Navy was concerned,

¹ 22nd May and 10th June, 1876.

I was always in favour of it—and on one or two occasions I initiated the consideration of the question : I had a clear opinion of the inadequacy of our naval force, but the very large majority of the Cabinet were against any such measures, and when on one occasion the question of giving Turkey advice as to her position and attitude was discussed,¹ not only was it resolved in the negative, but Cairns, I remember, suggested “an ornamental letter to fill up the vacuum” in the forthcoming Blue Book. So little did he, the clearest and ablest head in the Cabinet, appreciate the true position and tendency of affairs !

‘The atrocities in Bulgaria, the news of which reached us in the latter part of the Session, marked, I think, the turning point, and the first serious difference of opinion.

‘My own views all through this time were in neither extreme, I hated as much as ever Turkish misgovernment and barbarity, I was on every occasion anxious to strengthen our military and naval resources—feeling very safe in such an increase with so pacific a Foreign Secretary as Derby—and I had no sympathy with many of the violent and, as it seemed to me, extravagant denunciations of the Porte which were expressed both in speeches and leading articles.

‘After the prorogation of Parliament, during September and October, the feeling in the country rose. It was no doubt in a great measure a violent and unreasonable feeling : but it was also one greatly founded in a righteous indignation and fostered by the belief that the Government were secretly sympathizing with the Turks. Anyhow, the Government, or at least a considerable section of it, was altogether out of accord with the public feeling, as then generally expressed.

‘I attributed this at the time mainly to Derby : and

¹ 10th June, 1876.

I wrote once or twice to him on the subject, but got no satisfactory answer. I spoke and wrote to Northcote and got the usual assurances of agreement. I wrote to Salisbury, who agreed substantially with me, and who, when later we met, was not sparing in his expression of feeling against Disraeli—to Hardy, who was strong in his dissatisfaction with the conduct of affairs, but had little to offer in the way of suggestion : and lastly to Disraeli, who wrote to me a full letter, saying that the feeling as to the outrages was hysterical, that it would pass and that fortunately we were in the month of September.

‘ All this tended to disturb me, and when I met Barrington in September at Cowes, I said a good deal in this sense. He has since my resignation said to me that “ he saw then that the differences between me and the Prime Minister were almost insuperable ”, but of course he did not hint at such an idea at the time—nor indeed did I so think. I doubt if Disraeli had any feeling of the kind. He disliked the Christian cause from his Jewish sympathies and also in part from a political point of view, and from the influence which the Court was now beginning to exercise upon him in this matter : but I do not believe that he at all foresaw the serious nature of the difficulty which was now drawing near. . . .

‘ On the 12th September I wrote in my journal : “ The wave of public agitation is spending itself from its extreme violence.” . . .

‘ I now accidentally learnt that Salisbury and Disraeli had been communicating, apparently very fully and confidentially on this subject after the Prorogation. . . .

‘ When the Cabinet again met in the autumn, matters had grown to be more serious. But Salisbury and I were acting closely together, and communicating daily. Derby was a great difficulty, as he would agree to no decisive step,

objecting to almost everything—as far as I remember resting his objections on the necessities of an European Concert which seemed impossible.

‘Meanwhile things in the East grew worse—war seemed threatening, and—to pass over minor events—the Conference was decided on. Then to my surprise one day at the Cabinet, Disraeli proposed to Salisbury to go out : but it was clear that the proposal was only a form and that the measure itself had been prearranged. I cannot even now understand why S. should have kept this back from me . . . and when afterwards he admitted to me that it had been arranged previously between D. and himself he seemed to feel that he had acted oddly. . . .’

‘Our political intimacy, as I have already said, had been singularly close and unreserved—we had differed on nothing since we had been members of the same Cabinet, except the Vivisection Bill ; the confidence which existed between us of very many years—and quite as much personal as political—was such, that I certainly should have thought myself bound to communicate any similar proposal to him had it been made to me. . . .’

‘Before he left England I offered to undertake for him any work at the India Office that he desired. He accepted this . . . and I had during the last four weeks of his absence, during which time the first anxieties of the Indian famine made themselves severely felt, as heavy a task as I ever remember at any time of my official life. . . .’

Lord Salisbury anticipated that the work would only involve signing despatches once a week. He did not anticipate the disaster that ensued.

Another great famine was impending. ‘I have only within the last few days had the information,’

Lord Carnarvon wrote,¹ 'but I am doing all I can. . . . The thought is constantly in my mind and engrossing everything else : but I am contending with these great difficulties, not being quite my own master and not having the absolute control of the office as I should have if it were my own. . . .'

A Cabinet was at once called at his request, and agreed that he should preside over the Indian Council. 'The evil is of very great magnitude. . . . The information at the I.O. was on many essential questions small till I began telegraphing : and the Indian Government, by their latest telegrams, seem to me curiously ignorant of many things which I think they ought to know. . . .'²

Meanwhile to Lord Salisbury, who had left England on the 20th November, he wrote :³

'As regards the opinions of our colleagues . . . there is, with one exception, a very strong desire to avoid war by every reasonable expedient. I do not think that you will find that they—or a majority—would shrink from very considerable concessions in the way of "securities" if these are seen to be absolutely inevitable. Derby seems very strong against "Occupation". I think he considers himself in some way pledged on the subject—but many, I believe, would agree to a joint occupation, taking what precautions can be taken to prevent Russia's preponderance. Cairns would go further—but to this I have the greatest objection. A joint occupation seems to me, under certain contingencies and with certain precautions, to be possible, although I should wish to see it as the last expedient : but a single and separate occupation by Russia would be as serious a danger and as complete a defeat as anything could be. I consider, however, that even with the despatches alone which you have, you are free to "entertain" any proposals which may seem *necessary*. So long as you do not

¹ To Lady Portsmouth, 7th January, 1877.

² Lord Carnarvon to Lord Salisbury, 18th January, 1877.

³ 29th November, 1876.

actually settle such a question as this, you may, in one form or another, refer the subject home. It is not, however, certain that where so referred the question will receive the consideration of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is in tendencies decidedly Turkish, Derby is so also, so far as he has any; the F.O. is distinctly Turkish, and Schouvaloff is in my opinion extremely able. . . .

‘The Prime Minister meanwhile is revolving schemes which have nothing to do with Eastern affairs, and which I sincerely trust will never pass beyond the region of thought and fancy. . . .

‘The Queen seems to me to be divided between her mistrust of the Russians and some new-born pity for the Turks. . . .’

Lord Salisbury in answer ¹ expressed his alarm lest they might be involved in a policy which neither he nor Lord Carnarvon approved, and requested him to communicate by a cipher (which he sent him) should confidential communications prove necessary.

Nor was the Chancellor of the Exchequer less perturbed. ‘You cannot feel more uneasy than I do. I am anxious to the point of feeling ill. We seem to have arrived at the turning-point of the whole affair, and I have not the least confidence as to our taking the right road. . . .’ ²

Shortly after writing on the 14th December, Lord Salisbury telegraphed home announcing that he had agreed provisionally with the Russian Ambassador, Ignatieff, for a series of local reforms and the employment of a small neutral force as an escort to the Commission, and asking for the decision of the Cabinet, which met on the 18th December.

Lord Carnarvon on the 14th December wrote to the Foreign Secretary :

‘It would be a horrible mistake to reject Ignatieff’s proposals. The last two telegrams of Salisbury’s which have been circulated

¹ 14th December, 1876.

² Sir Stafford Northcote to Lord Carnarvon, 15th December, 1876.

seem strongly to corroborate this view, even if the facts of the case did not do so. But it is obviously a question now of war or peace—with this difference, that if it be war on our rejection of Ignatieff's proposals the responsibility of it—apparent or real—will in a great degree rest with us. If, indeed, we intend to impose practical reforms on the Porte, I do not see how we can hope to do so by any much gentler method. . . .'

To Lord Cairns he also wrote ¹ pressing that Ignatieff's proposals should be accepted.

'It would be both wrong and highly impolitic to break off the negotiations on any one of the three main points—disarmament—Executive Commission—Belgian troops. If indeed it is really intended to enforce any practical reforms on the Porte I hardly see how this can be accomplished in any different way. . . .'

On Christmas day Lord Carnarvon gave his friend an account of what had passed :

Most Private.

Highclere Castle.

MY DEAR SALISBURY,

. . . I must, however, tell you that I am extremely anxious, first because I see pretty plainly that the negotiations are almost certain to break down—next, which is still more serious, that Lord B. contemplates and as far as it depends on him intends us to take part in the war, and on behalf of Turkey. He hardly, indeed, makes any secret of this. In the last Cabinet he spoke of the difficulty of distinguishing between British interests and support of Turkey ; he is evidently pushing on some military preparations, and he speaks in the tone of a man who believes that we are in honour bound to give all the support we can to the Porte. I can hardly doubt that extremely perilous language is being used outside the Cabinet, in more ways than one. Derby, starting, as you know, from very different principles, is drawn along at his chariot wheels as if fascinated—whilst strange to say Cairns, on whom I mainly counted for support in this particular question, has become for some reason or other somewhat malleable.

Our last Cabinet was a rather disagreeable one. I found myself

¹ 13th December, 1876.

nearly alone, though Northcote agreed with me, and indeed most of the others were evidently uneasy. Cairns did indeed support me, but less than I had hoped : and after making myself I suppose very disagreeable in standing out alone against the original proposals, which would have left you almost powerless to carry on negotiations with any chance, I at last got the telegram into the shape in which it finally was sent to you.

Lord B.'s desire was to avoid any pressure on the Porte, and it has been so for some time past ; but it has, I observe, gained considerably in intensity of late. As the telegram finally was agreed to, it left you free to use a considerable moral pressure. I can hardly think that he is disposed or ready to break up the Cabinet on the point : but had he been ten years younger I almost think he would have done so—I may do him wrong : but his mind is full of strange projects, and I feel uneasy as to what he intends and what he may be able to do before there is time or knowledge enough to stop him.

The scheme of reforms which you agreed on, and to which the Cabinet assented, was very distasteful to him : the guarantees (if at all effective) I think he is determined to resist. I have now told you all that I think is likely to be of use to you by the time that this can reach you. It is not very pleasant to write all this, and of the members of a Cabinet of which I form one : but if you were in England we should discuss the question in all its bearings, and there can be no moral reason why we should not do this by letter when you are absent. Only I must ask you to take very great care that no one should see this. It is solely for your own eye.

It is not easy to fight these questions in Cabinet, for I have but little information, no real support, and do not know till I get into the room the exact point which is for discussion. I hardly understand Derby's mental position. I think he is uneasy, and so far as he is concerned, inclined to wait upon events. I wrote to him some time since two very strong letters : but never received any answer to them. He is, however, very civil and ready to argue in the Cabinet. My impression is that he is entirely in Disraeli's hands. . . .

Yours most truly,

CARNARVON.

Lord Salisbury on his side urged him to give all possible support to any request he might make for 'squeezing the Turk'.¹ Russia could not concede more without endangering the Emperor's position, and she had already offered better terms than Lord Salisbury had expected. If the Turks refused, a war, which could not be localized, must follow.

The first plenary meeting of the Conference had taken place on the 23rd December. The conditions of the Turkish armistice with Servia and Montenegro were formally settled on the 28th December; but the Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha, attempted to shelve the reforms and guarantees suggested by Lord Salisbury, by announcing that the Sultan had just granted to his subjects a democratic Constitution and Parliament, under which complete civil and religious equality would be enjoyed by Ottoman subjects of every race and creed.²

On the 30th December the Turks gravely proposed to refer to this Parliament the whole scheme of administrative re-organization in the disaffected provinces. Lord Salisbury warned Turkey that this proposal was inadmissible; his letters to Lord Carnarvon became increasingly pessimistic, and on the 13th January he telegraphed to warn his friend that the Conference was about to play its last card, and that unless Turkey accepted by Thursday the Conference must terminate. He begged him to prevent the Foreign Office from encouraging the Turks. It was the only chance; but no pressure was brought to bear on Turkey by the Government, the Porte refused any concession worth considering, and the Conference, having failed, was formally broken up *re infectâ*.

¹ 22nd December, 1876.

² It was proposed to divide Bulgaria, the 'Vilayet of the Danube', into two separate Provinces, each of which was to be administered by a Vali, appointed with the approval of the Signatories to the Treaty of Paris.

II

‘ Etiamsi omnes non ego.’

The renewed fear of a war in the West now influenced Eastern diplomacy. The joint intervention of England and Russia in the spring of 1875 had prevented Bismarck from declaring war on France,¹ who had thus been able to continue her open preparations for revenge. In 1877, however, Russia, engrossed in an Eastern policy, was no longer an obstruction to an assault on France, and Bismarck devoutly hoped for the diversion of a Russo-Turkish War. But a war between England and Russia he did not want. In such a war a neutral would have a difficult part to play, and he feared lest Germany should incur the enmity of either country before ‘ the great day of the *revanche* ’.²

Parliament opened on the 8th February, and two days earlier Lord Salisbury arrived. He dined with Lord Carnarvon the same night, and after dinner they discussed the situation till nearly midnight. Lord Salisbury’s view of the Franco-German danger was confirmed by a letter from Lord Odo Russell to the Foreign Secretary which came before the Cabinet a few days later.

The French military preparations were very advanced, Bismarck suspected that France was aiming at an alliance with Russia, and was disappointed and vexed that England made no response to his overtures for a hearty German and English alliance.

The anxiety felt by Lord Salisbury and Lord Carnarvon with regard to a possible Western war side by side with the Eastern one was now shared by their colleagues, including

¹ Cf. Chapter XXI.

² *Life of Lord Salisbury*, vol. ii, pp. 96 ff.

even the Prime Minister, and Mr. Froude after a visit to Lady Derby wrote :¹

‘ She amused me greatly afterwards with telling me that the Chief and those who went with him, have now utterly forgotten that they ever had a Turkish sympathy, that they are not only Russian now, but are under a profound impression that they have never been anything else. She very cleverly took off a speech of Lord B.’s to the Russian Ambassador : “ A bridge, my dear Schouvaloff ! We will build you a bridge of diamonds and emeralds—” and all this because they are scared about a new German invasion of France. . . .

‘ Lord B. had not spoken to Lady Derby for two months ; but made it up yesterday. She is again the “ Guardian Angel ” of the Cabinet.’

But this mood did not last long.

In his retrospect of this period Lord Carnarvon thus analysed the situation which had then been reached.

Memorandum. ‘ The language of Disraeli and of those who agreed with him became vehemently Turkish and even warlike. Moreover, at one moment there seemed to be a very great disposition to discredit Salisbury and to throw him over—and my impression is that, up to this moment at least, Disraeli had no absolute fixed intentions of supporting and ultimately using Salisbury. He was evidently growing very impatient of Derby’s line of action, and of the obstacles which I occasionally thought myself obliged to interpose to proposals and measures which seemed objectionable. Derby, I am bound to say, did not as far as I could see behave unfairly or ungenerously by Salisbury, little as he liked the general course of policy at Constantinople : but he was beginning to feel anxiety at Disraeli’s warlike tendencies, and as a result was

¹ 13th March, 1877.

occasionally by the force of circumstances drawn into a sort of co-operation with me.

‘Later this involuntary and almost unconscious co-operation ripened into a recognized alliance. But this was after Salisbury’s return, and when it became clear that S. for some reason was giving Disraeli a support that was previously inconceivable. Meanwhile during the progress of the negotiations at Constantinople, I made the best fight I could in the Cabinet in support of Salisbury and of the policy which I believed he was labouring to carry out : I was generally single-handed, the majority of the Cabinet being inclined to side with Disraeli. Through the whole of that time I continued to communicate with Salisbury as far as I could, not only by letter, but by telegraphic cipher. It was very hazardous work, and from the secrecy to be observed . . . as disagreeable a task as I ever undertook. . . .

‘On the night of Salisbury’s return to London he dined alone with me, and he then detailed to me the whole history of his negotiations at Constantinople. . . . He appeared, in talking over with me all that had passed, to have but one feeling—viz. a rooted belief in Disraeli’s untrustworthiness, and a dread of the policy which he thought D. intended to pursue.

‘I do not think at this time there was much hostility on his part to Russia, though there was some soreness. . . .

‘With the Conference at Constantinople came another and a clearly marked stage in our discussions. Schemes and proposals for intervention in favour of Turkey were continually brought forward by Disraeli, sometimes the occupation of the Dardanelles, sometimes the fortification of Gallipoli, later the seizure or purchase of an island in the Eastern Mediterranean.

' From that time forward . . . there was . . . a recognized divergence of opinion amongst many of us. Salisbury, who was smarting under the supposed failure of his mission to Constantinople, did not conceal his irritation with Derby at the return of Elliot to Constantinople, or his suspicions of Disraeli, or Cairns. . . . Northcote deplored the state of things to me as very dangerous. . . .

' Lady Salisbury, when on Ignatieff's visit to Hatfield she wrote hurriedly to beg me to come there, made it a most urgent request on the ground not to seem to let S. stand alone.

' In a Cabinet held on the 23rd March, language was used by Disraeli which pointed in no doubtful way to Salisbury and myself as the disturbers of the peace of the Cabinet, and pressed for unanimity in the face of great coming difficulties. It had all the character of a deliberate attack on us. . . .¹

' Disraeli was probably at this time ignorant of the "Jingo" spirit, as it was afterwards called, and the latent power on which he could draw. He was doubtful of the extent to which he could depend on the H. of C., and he could not anticipate the vacillations, divisions and blunders which characterized the conduct of the opposi-

¹ Lord Salisbury wrote on the 24th March: 'I trust the close of the scene is not appropriate. Lest it should be, read Norfolk's advice to Buckingham, 1st Scene, *Henry VIII.* I cannot find out that any one knew what was coming.' The passage runs:—

' The state takes notice of the private difference
Betwixt you and the cardinal. I advise you—
And take it from a heart that wishes towards you
Honour and plenteous safety—that you read
The cardinal's malice and his potency
Together; to consider further that
What his high hatred would effect wants not
A minister in his power. You know his nature
That he's revengeful, and I know his sword
Hath a sharp edge: it's long and, 't may be said,
It reaches far, and where 'twill not extend,
Thither he darts it. Bosom up my counsel,
You'll find it wholesome. . . .

tion. Had he known all this, he would probably have got rid of me—and I must suppose, of Salisbury. . . . As it was he feared to break up the Cabinet, and he merely continued to manœuvre towards his object by detaching first one and then another element of resistance—circumstances, it must be added, largely contributing to aid his own ingenuity and courage.

‘An illustration of this occurred at an important Cabinet meeting on the 21st April, about a month after the last to which I have alluded.

‘There—after a debate on the now probable success of Russia and her possible advance on Constantinople, Cairns, who had been in favour of a peaceful and very cautious line of policy, suddenly veered round and advocated the seizure of Gallipoli, under circumstances that showed that secret communications had passed, and that his views had undergone an alteration.

‘This did not indeed settle the controversy, powerful as was the new auxiliary: for on the following day I had a long conversation with Northcote, which, so far as he was concerned, was of a very satisfactory character. He was however convinced that Disraeli would go to war, if only he could carry the Cabinet with him, and he had written, he told me, to him to say that he would not be a party to war.

‘In reviewing this period of the controversy I can see that those of us who were convinced that war was intended, and who were, I believe, desirous of averting this misfortune, made mistakes in some of the points which we selected for resistance, but I am also struck by the continuous and successful nature of that resistance, made as it was under almost every conceivable difficulty and disadvantage. I myself had no illusions as to the ultimate result of the struggle: I repeatedly entered

in my journals my opinion that we were "fighting a losing game". And I fully recognized the ultimate preponderance of the forces which were arraying themselves against us. Not only indeed was the party of resistance in the Cabinet being gradually disintegrated, but actual preparations for war were being made.

'Hardy, who was entirely on Disraeli's side, was pressing on the preparation of a corps d'armée, and a very curious illustration of what was being done by means of secret instructions in the dockyards occurred about this time.¹ On the 26th April, Disraeli called upon Hunt for a statement of certain matters in the dockyards, evincing a knowledge himself very much in excess of what Hunt was possessed. Hardy however appeared to be aware of what was being done: and the impression left on my mind, and on that of some others, was that he and Disraeli had discussed, and given orders on certain points without informing Hunt.

'As different members of the Cabinet wavered or changed sides in this obstinate struggle, Derby, whose fears, and distrust of Disraeli's intentions, were now aroused, grew firmer in his determination not to go to war: on the other hand as Derby's opposition to a war policy became plainer, Salisbury seemed to draw somewhat more towards Disraeli. In looking back calmly on the time, I think the two events synchronized—how far they bore on each other it is harder to say. Anyhow the tension was extreme; very grave and heated discussions were of constant occurrence, schemes for various measures of active intervention were brought forward almost every Cabinet during May and June, and were I think only

¹ At this Cabinet Lord Beaconsfield made the curious observation 'that he preferred some unexpected act to the constant writing of State papers'.

staved off by the firm alliance of Derby¹ and myself, by my good understanding with Northcote, who was thoroughly sincere in his desire for peace, and by the occasional but somewhat declining support which we obtained from Salisbury.

‘Meanwhile Disraeli’s language and his proposals in Cabinet grew more and more distinct in favour of assistance to Turkey and of hostility to Russia. On this latter point Northcote² and Cross both admitted to me several times that they entertained the greatest fears that he intended war: and Derby passed into acknowledged alliance with me through a distinct apprehension which he several times expressed to me that war was intended.

‘A new and very great power now too made itself felt. For some time the Queen, in personal communications with various members of the Cabinet, had brought her influence to bear—I have little doubt that the original impulse proceeded from Disraeli, but that as the war proceeded and grave and exciting questions arose, he was no longer able to control the force which he had called into being for a much more limited purpose. He on more than one occasion in Cabinet described himself as unable to check or moderate the pressure exercised by the Queen upon him and the Government, and though this was not the whole truth, I am disposed to believe that it was partly true. Be this however as it may, the personal impulse was exercised much more strongly

¹ On the 1st May Lord Derby drew up a note defining vital English interests in the East. Gortschakoff replied on the 30th May, undertaking to abstain from any interference with the Suez Canal or the route to India, and stating that the Czar had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, ‘which in any case could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers’.

² Sir Stafford Northcote wrote to Lord Carnarvon on the 28th April, 1877: ‘I will come to-morrow if I feel up to a walk. Just at this moment I feel as if I had come to the end of my powers, and I am terribly anxious about the situation, and do not see my way clearly.’

on individual members of the Government, and in some instances with remarkable effect; letters were written, and occasionally even direct messages were addressed through the Prime Minister to the Cabinet. The object and purpose of these communications were all in the same direction—active and armed support of Turkey . . . I often spoke privately with Salisbury on the subject : and he, accepting what then seemed certain, admitted repeatedly that Disraeli's intention was armed interference in the war, and that it must be our business to thwart this intention both for moral and political reasons. So far this language reassured me as to S.'s own views : but when once or twice I said that nothing would tempt me to be party to a war which I—and he—believed to be unnecessary, impolitic, and criminal, he reminded me of our secession in '67 and said " this was a card which could not be played twice by the same persons ". . . .

' One further consideration there was which, I believe, weighed with almost every member of the Cabinet and contributed to hold us together, but which has been signally falsified by the course of events—viz. a belief that Disraeli was fast breaking in health.

' I observe this rather curious entry in my journal on the 28th June, which recalls rather vividly the picture which was constantly before us, and it must be added the frequent tenor of conversation, amongst many members of the Cabinet.

' " Disraeli in the H. of Lords this evening looked like a corpse—his face drawn, his breath laboured, his arms and hands rigid, his whole appearance and attitude ghastly." I add, " Can he possibly last ? And how will this extraordinary melodramatic tragedy end ? "

' Still both as I look back now on the course of events, and even as I looked at it then, it was plain that the party

of resistance was fighting a losing game, and that unless some unexpected intervention occurred, we must in the long run be beaten. The defections of some, the irresolution of others, the ambition again of others, the constant scheming of Disraeli towards one end, and the pressure of royal influence on all in turn, made the struggle a virtually hopeless one. Had the war party been quite aware of their own strength it would have been much earlier decided. But on the 16th June, the Cabinet at last decided in favour of asking for a vote of credit of £2,000,000 for military and naval preparations. A vote of only £2,000,000 indeed was too small to do much harm, but the position of the dissentients from that time became and was felt to be one of greater difficulty.

‘A few days later Northcote, Cross and I had a private meeting in Northcote’s room at the H. of C., but after an anxious conversation of more than an hour, we separated with no common conclusion arrived at, and with the impression on my mind that they would yield, though reluctantly, to the forces now set against us.

‘About this time another element, destined later to play a considerable part, entered into combination against us. The wire-pullers of the Carlton . . . impatient of what they called the irresolution of the Government—got up meetings, and addressed protests and remonstrances, and began even to circulate personal attacks upon particular individuals such as Derby.

‘Their influence made itself occasionally felt upon some members of the Government as at a Cabinet on the 11th July, when J. Manners, supported by Beach, made a proposal to send the fleet to Constantinople in the event of the passage of the Balkans by the Russians.

‘This, which at the time I did not quite understand, which was unexpected by some at least of us, and which

I have described in my journal as a rebellion in the Cabinet, was, I have since had reason to think, pre-arranged. It was anyhow the point of a new departure. From this time forward the sending up of the fleet to Constantinople became a critical and constantly recurring question. It was resumed in successive Cabinets and in many forms—sometimes the highest military authorities pronounced it utterly useless for its purpose, sometimes they were induced to qualify their opinion, sometimes the Admiralty declared it dangerous to the fleet, sometimes they were persuaded to say that it might be done under such and such circumstances: and it was generally on the utility or the risk of the proceeding that the opposition to the measure was conducted. But all this was destined to undergo a change in a very remarkable and unexpected manner on the 21st July.

‘On that day the question had again been revived by J. Manners . . . and curiously enough there was an unusual consensus of opinion against the proposal. Cairns said he thought the question had been settled, and even Disraeli thought the measure would now be too late: when Salisbury to my utter astonishment, expressed himself in favour of sending up the fleet to Constantinople in the event of the Russians effecting an entrance into Constantinople, and then, as it seemed, gathering further courage as he proceeded, he added that he was ready to send it at once. The result of this marvellous conversion was extraordinary. It revived the drooping spirits of the Turkish section of the Cabinet, it turned the balance of parties, and it is not too much to say that it led directly to the important changes in the composition of the Government which subsequently followed.

‘It certainly indicated a very great alteration in S.’s own views. A few days afterwards he admitted to me that

he had since been in conversation with Disraeli on the subject, that he was taking active measures through and with Lytton in India, to prepare for military measures there, and that "war was necessary to blow up the whole unsound foreign policy of this country"—whether this last extravagant and rash proposition was a deliberate outcome of his judgement I do not know: but on several occasions he made somewhat similar declarations. . . .

'From this time then, as I have said, the question of sending up the fleet in the event of an occupation of Constantinople by the Russian army, was constantly discussed. A distinction was often drawn by many of us between a temporary and a permanent occupation. Disraeli generally argued that there could be no such distinction and the Russians once in Constantinople would be like the French in former times in Ancona: and to a certain extent this was true: on the other hand, when once we sought to obtain from Schouvaloff some assurance on the subject, he replied, and not unreasonably, that though there was no intention on the part of Russia to acquire Constantinople; yet that on purely military grounds it was impossible to bind the Russian army never, whatever might be the strategical necessity, to enter Constantinople, and that if he should give a confidential promise to us that not even as a temporary and strategical necessity would the Russian army enter Constantinople, the assurance would not long remain a secret from the Porte, and would then become a source of fatal embarrassment. This latter statement was also well founded, for at this time (whatever the cause) many important Cabinet secrets had crept into the papers. For some time however this distinction between permanent and temporary occupation was much discussed by us—and many of us were prepared to allow, under the exigencies of war, a military parade of the

Russian army in Constantinople, on the same principle and in the same way as the German troops had marched through Paris at the end of the Franco-German war. Later the question of sending up the fleet assumed somewhat larger proportions, and was made no longer to depend on the actual occupation of Constantinople, but was to be in anticipation of a Russian advance on the City : and this was the proximate cause of my resignation.

‘ Our position towards the Russian Government was all this time one—to my mind at least—of great difficulty. We had the moral certainty that as a Government they had no desire to quarrel with us : equally, we knew that the Emperor’s strongest personal and family feelings were bound up in the maintenance of peace—further, I at least was satisfied that on public grounds he had no wish to continue to war with the Turks—we had received, at various stages of the war, the most earnest requests to state our views and objects, and the plainest promises that every British interest that could be specified should be respected, and early in August, a special and secret mission had been despatched to renew all their assurances through our own agent, Col. Wellesley, who himself seems to have been confident of their sincerity and good faith. I am quite aware that the Russian Government cannot always enforce on its subordinates, especially its distant subordinates, the precise course of action which it may desire honestly itself to maintain : and again, I am aware that the Russian Government, like most other foreign Governments, is not invariably consistent, or scrupulous, or truthful : but my own firm impression (which subsequent events have confirmed) was, and still is, that they were sincere in desiring to meet us on every possible point—and my belief further is that if ever the confidential communications are made public, their assurances and

offers to us will contrast very unfavourably to us, with our tardy, irresolute, and often equivocal, answers to them. . . .

‘The fear of the Cabinet at this time was that the Russian army in its advance on Constantinople, would detach a division to seize Gallipoli, and so cut off the city from all succour from the Mediterranean.

‘It was not an altogether unreasonable apprehension : but when at last we applied to R: for an assurance on this point, if not to my surprise, yet certainly in proof of her strong desire to meet our wishes, she agreed not to occupy the Dardanelles. Meanwhile all sorts of possible and impossible schemes were proposed in the Cabinet to counteract this supposed danger : and one very foolish measure was actually adopted. A Captain Fraser was sent out in a private capacity with a bag of gun-cotton and with instructions under certain contingencies to land and blow up the Turkish guns that command the entrance to the Straits ! Happily this unwise expedient, which curiously combined evidence of our own panic, insult to Russia, and an aggression on Turkey, passed into the limbo of incomplete designs, and was never even known to have been contemplated.

‘Such was the general condition of things and of feeling in the Cabinet when we separated at the end of the Session.

‘The recess passed uneasily, but with nothing to affect materially the balance of parties in the Cabinet. But on the 5th October we were called together to consider what our course should be. The question proposed to us (which was very important, and showed that we had since the summer taken many and large steps in the controversy) was substantially an alliance with the Porte. Much and serious discussion followed on these proposals,

and it was clear that the Cabinet was greatly divided in itself. In my journal of this date, I observe that out of the twelve members of the Government there were for an alliance with Turkey 6, neutral 3, against 3, of whom it would have been more correct to say that there were in reality only 2. The 3rd had become so doubtful that no reliance could be placed on him. No decision of importance however was taken: we separated and only met again on the 4th November: when after further discussions of much the same character as before, it was agreed to give R: a solemn warning against an advance upon Constantinople. . . .'

Lady Derby¹ was still hopeful that the moderate party, if united, would prevail. She wrote to Lord Carnarvon on the 8th October:

' . . . Is it not quite certain that even a majority of the Cabinet could not prevail against you and Cranborne and Lord Derby? Northcote and Cross, though they may have seemed somewhat "trimming" on Friday, would not desert the three most powerful men in the Cabinet.

' I think Lord D. is quite as strong as you are against the proposal, and seems to hope that a kind of dogged resistance will prevail against the wonderful chief. We may trust Lord D. to work that line of policy—I mean dogged resistance, it will hardly be the first time he has tried it; and hitherto it has answered. Cranborne will not make any sudden change of front, will he? . . .'

Meanwhile the Prime Minister's mind was obscure even to an intimate colleague. ' I met the Premier last week at Woburn ', wrote Lady Derby on the 26th October, ' and had much talk with him. I must confess he did not seem determined upon any particular course, he was more in the line of casting about for " something "

¹ Lady Mary Catherine Sackville-West, daughter of 5th Earl Delawar; married 1st, 2nd Marquis of Salisbury; 2ndly, the 15th Earl of Derby.

to do : *Something must be done.* He gave me clearly to understand that the Queen had insisted on that proposal being made to the Cabinet, and I could hardly disbelieve the long story he told of her pressing him to put it before his colleagues. (Perhaps he may have invented it !) He told me he had 6 parties in his Cabinet ;—" how could they be reconciled ? " If any member or members resigned, rather than split up into sections he should go to the Queen himself and resign. . . . I fancy the great man grew a little calmer after what he called " thrashing out the diplomatists " . . .

Memorandum : ' So matters stood for rather more than a month till the 14th December when Disraeli, determined apparently to bring this long struggle to an issue,¹ made three distinct proposals to us. 1, the immediate assembling of Parliament. 2, an immediate application for an increase in our military and naval forces. 3, negotiations for peace.' Consideration of these proposals was deferred for three days, and Lord Carnarvon wrote to Lady Derby on the 15th December :

' You will have heard the result. Your anticipations were justified, and I think that we have at last reached a critical point. If however we must separate as a body, perhaps it is as good an issue as any other on which to divide. There are many troubles and difficulties ahead. I should like to know your own opinion on the position.

' I suppose you heard of the extraordinary, and I should think unparalleled communication from the Queen which we received ? . . .

' *P.S.* I cannot deny that I am sorry and perhaps more than sorry at the approach of this crisis. I have often contemplated it, but in the midst of every difficulty I always hoped that some way of escape would be found. This I am afraid is now impossible

¹ Plevna had fallen on the 10th December, 1877.

without a total surrender—and with the consequences which such a surrender involves.’

Lady Derby wrote the same day :

MY DEAR LORD CARNARVON,

I have thought of nothing else since I came yesterday morning.

I believe Lord D. holds the key of the position and I believe he can save the country from war by remaining. I think I see the way to a compromise. Northcote has written most strictly confidentially (so much so I ought scarcely to tell it even to you) saying he and others will defer to Lord D. if he will make a counter proposal, and I fancy Lord D. is less gloomy ; my own view is that Parliament might meet earlier than usual, and that we might make a show of a few preparations at once, by way of backing up our note to Russia—we have said we might have to use precautions—we begin to prepare for them.

‘ Lord D. and you and R. might I believe make all safe against a trick. And the question of mediation should be kept utterly distinct from preparations or threat. You will I think understand me, but I have had but a moment for writing.

Yours affly.,

M. D.

To Sir Stafford Northcote Lord Carnarvon wrote : ¹

‘ Though I fear after the discussion of yesterday in the Cabinet that we have reached a stage when it is vain to attempt to reconcile opinions which have long been so divided and are now so divergent, I do not like the next twenty-four hours to pass without saying to you that I deplore the division which I now see imminent . . . you know well that I do not oppose the proposal for an increase in armaments because I oppose all war and am anxious to maintain peace at any cost ; I have both in private and in the Cabinet on former occasions advised very strong measures ; I desired that we should consider the occupation of Egypt, and should have been perfectly ready to incur considerable risks in such a case ; but any such suggestion, whether proceeding from me or others, has as you know been always put aside, because competing with the insane scheme of undertaking the defence of Constantinople and

¹ 15th December, 1877.

as a consequence a Turkish alliance. My opposition, therefore, does not arise from a desire to do nothing or a fear of attempting large things if circumstances require them : but it results from a conviction that in the course which is now proposed to us for adoption, there are nine chances of war as against one of peace. It is idle to deny that what is proposed is a threat to Russia and an encouragement to Turkey : and though it is just possible that Russia, who does not desire the continuance of war, may accept our armed mediation, yet she cannot accept it unless she is guarded against humiliation ; and who that has sat in the Cabinet the last twelve months and knows the temper in which these matters have been discussed, will say that there is any guarantee on this point with a reconstructed Government ? The chances are at least very unfavourable.

‘ As regards war itself I think it is difficult to exaggerate the folly of it. We should go into it not only with inadequate resources and without allies—perhaps even with serious opposition to expect from Germany and Italy, if not Austria—but we should certainly open the door wide to European disturbances of every kind if there are any persons who desire to disturb the peace of the world.

‘ Nor have we the miserable excuse of being able to save and restore even to its former position the Turkish Empire. It is breaking to pieces past all remedy, and as [we] are simply shutting our eyes to facts that are as clear as noon-day, I cannot therefore knowingly be a party to the idea of a war with Russia and a Turkish alliance which finds so much favour in many quarters : and it really seems to me a matter of little importance how we arrive at such a result—whether by plainly and distinctly throwing in our lot with the Turks, or whether we adopt some circuitous method of reaching the same end. I believe this to be Derby’s view and holding it to be the right one, I cannot see any reason for refusing my support to it : but I do not the less deplore the fatal tendency of present events.’

Memorandum :

‘ On the 17th December we met again to consider these proposals, which with the exception of the first were virtually agreed to, and possibly the matter might have here ended, but that Disraeli went on to state

that he considered the occupation of Constantinople, whether temporary or permanent, was a "casus belli". This proposition stirred up the embers of a controversy which some at least of us did not consider by any means settled—much and stormy discussion ensued, and Disraeli found himself in a minority. He then said that he could no longer be responsible for the conduct of affairs and that he should go down to Windsor to place his resignation in the hands of the Queen.¹ No one offered opposition to this, but Salisbury—I think—proposed that we should meet again next day before any further step was taken. This proposal also it was impossible to oppose, and on the following day, 18th December, we met.

'The night's consideration did its work—the courage of one man failed, the manœuvres of some succeeded, the fears of many prevailed. The question of a "casus belli" was staved off and it was decided as a matter of compromise to summon Parliament for the 17th January. The Christmas holidays now brought a short respite, but we met early in London for the resumption of Cabinet business, and the tension on the Eastern Question became if possible more severe than ever.

'Hitherto my opposition to the war policy had been confined to the four walls of the Cabinet : now I took a course which provoked much criticism and which led to important results.

'Rightly or wrongly, I thought it possible that some step might be taken, even before the meeting of Parliament, which would have the effect of committing us to hostilities ;

¹ The resignation was to be, however, only a matter of form. It is curious that the same position had been reached in '68, when Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir William Heathcote on the 1st April: 'Matters seem to be approaching a crisis. I suspect from all I hear that there must be dissensions in the Cabinet : but I am told that the Queen is entirely in D.'s hands and is even prepared in the event of the Government being beaten to go through the form of receiving a sham resignation, and re-establishing him as Minister.'

our relations with Russia were growing very strained, our relations with Turkey were becoming, through secret communications of which many of us were kept ignorant but the existence of which could not be doubted, dangerously intimate : our fleet was near the mouth of the Dardanelles, not to speak of Captain Fraser with his gun-cotton, and other such elements of possible collision ; the tinder was prepared and only needed the spark. Under such circumstances I made, on 2nd January, my famous speech to the S. African Deputation at the Colonial Office.'

The South African Deputation,¹ which consisted of landowners, commercial and professional men, urged that additional forces should be sent to South Africa in view of the menacing attitude of Cetywayo and the disturbed outlook in Eastern Europe. Lord Carnarvon recognized the gravity of the situation in South Africa, and told them that the 90th regiment and a battery of artillery would leave England for Capetown within the next few days. The question on the Russo-Turkish war would have been more fitly addressed to his colleagues at the Foreign Office ; but, although Plevna had fallen, no material change had, in his own view, occurred in the European situation, and the attitude of the Government remained much the same, ' watchful of all real British interests, friendly as regards other nations, neutral as regards the belligerents. Though we are not prepared to bolster up Turkish interests as such, we are resolved now, just as we were in the beginning, to have a voice in the settlement of this question, whenever it comes on for settlement.'

He then recalled how we had drifted, Russia through

¹ See p. 305.

self-deception, England in a great measure through extreme excitement, into the Crimean War. 'I apprehend', he said, 'that there are now very few people who look upon that war with satisfaction : and I am confident that there is nobody insane enough to desire a repetition of it. . . . there are not only interests in the East but interests at numberless points of this enormous Empire, and whilst, of course, we shall uphold . . . the honour and self-respect of this country, I hope we shall never do anything to encourage alarm, or allow that diplomacy has, even in these critical and difficult times, become so exhausted and barren as to be incapable of affording a peaceful solution.'

Memorandum : ' . . . 'The effect at the time was outstanding.

'Outside it gave an extraordinary encouragement to the whole peace party, and it brought upon the Government a flood of memorials and addresses, some to me, some to Derby, who was looked upon with me as a representative of peace policy, thanking me (and H.M. Govt. !!!) for my assurances and expressing confidence in them.

'It was not possible for the war section in the Cabinet to make any move in the face of this remarkable outburst of feeling, and for the moment the party of resistance was strengthened. But soon another result became apparent.

'The success was too great : for in these public ebullitions much of the real peace feeling in the country (which had been wound up to so high a pitch of anxiety) was discounted : it could not be reproduced at a later period when it was needed, and the extraordinary success of the speech was in a certain sense the undoing of the cause which we had in view.

‘ Inside the Cabinet, however, on the following day,¹ a very different scene occurred. There I had to encounter a storm of attack from Disraeli, black looks from all my colleagues with the exception of Derby, and a very general censure. . . .

‘ I . . . said that I had said nothing but what I had said both in and out of the Cabinet on former occasions, that I claimed as much liberty for my view of the case as Hardy and J. Manners had lately exercised on the Turkish side in some speeches which they had made, and offered, if my action was disapproved by my colleagues, to resign.

‘ This was generally deprecated, a sort of half apology was made by Disraeli to the effect that if he had expressed himself ill, he regretted it, and the matter dropped for that day.

‘ During the next three or four days I had time to reconsider the position, and I communicated with several of my colleagues on the subject.

‘ The result of this was a memorandum which I drew up, and at our next meeting on the 7th January read to the Cabinet.

‘ It was accepted by all parties ; Disraeli replied in a fair and temperate manner, and so ended this stage of the business.

‘ In reviewing the whole transaction, I feel now, what I felt at the time, though perhaps in a rather stronger degree—that such a speech at such a time by a single minister without the concurrence of his colleagues, was a somewhat lawless act, and under ordinary circumstances would have been a very unfair one. I am not now satisfied, on a calm consideration of everything, that it was even then fair. Nothing indeed but the extraordinarily critical state

¹ 3rd January, 1878.

of the case and the conviction which not *only I but many of my colleagues entertained* that Disraeli was determined to force us into an alliance with Turkey and a war with Russia, and that therefore almost any sacrifice was worth making to avert an act of injustice, immorality, and grave impolicy, could justify me in what I did. I am however now inclined to doubt whether even all these considerations did afford me an adequate justification for departing from what undoubtedly was the regular and approved course which a minister is bound to pursue.

‘Be this however as it may. Events now moved rapidly towards the conclusion, which in spite of many oscillations had been for long inevitable, and which indeed I had for months foreseen.

‘Cabinet succeeded Cabinet at short intervals, crisis followed upon crisis, discussions and debates often very stormy and revealing irreconcilable differences of opinion, though all the time the outside public was assured that we were an harmonious and united Government.

‘On the 9th January we met to prepare the Queen’s speech, which had been drafted in a strong pro-Turkish sense : and after a long and severe struggle we succeeded in greatly modifying the phraseology. In my journal I call it a real victory, but it was the last success gained by the dissentients in the Cabinet, and it was also the last time that Salisbury acted with Derby and myself. After this he was acting openly and consistently with the Prime Minister.

‘Three days later we met, and so critical were the circumstances, that it seemed that it might be our last meeting as a Government. My entry is to this effect : “We have been again in the breakers but are still afloat, though it is hard to say for how long—we are living on compromises which are full of danger.”

‘ The business opened with a communication from the Queen urging us very strongly to stand by the principle “ which we had declared, that any advance on Constantinople would free us from neutrality ”, and appealing to our “ traditions ” and “ the policy of centuries ”.

‘ The discussion which was long, vehement, and irregular, turned on three points :

1. An expedition to Gallipoli, either with or without the consent of the Sultan, and to this, under one or other alternative, all except Derby and myself, were inclined.

2. A proposal to the Sultan to hold Gallipoli for him to the end of the war, which after a brief debate came to nothing.

3. To send the fleet into the Dardanelles : but though the discussion on these several questions was very one-sided, and the minority really consisted only of Derby and myself, we succeeded in preventing an agreement on any one of the three. Then at last Disraeli said, it was plain that the Government could no longer be carried on, and that the only thing now to be done was to issue a proclamation to prorogue Parliament, to enable the formation of a new Government. On this Derby said he was sorry, but there was no choice : and Salisbury made a curious and complimentary speech to Disraeli in the sense of a leave-taking—when with a comical change of purpose, some one started a new point, the debate revived, and the Cabinet once more came to life. Then Salisbury proposed a telegram to Layard, asking the Sultan if he would allow the fleet to anchor within the Dardanelles, it being understood that we did not depart from our neutrality.

‘ I objected on various grounds, military, diplomatic, political ; but Derby reluctantly gave way, and knowing

that the Sultan, who was very suspicious of our intentions, might after all decline the proposal, I felt that the time at all events had not yet come for my resignation, however close at hand it might be.

‘ On the second day after this critical scene, we met again, and, as far as I was concerned, under great personal difficulties. I had been very ill during the last week, in bed much of the time, and now, though better, sometimes scarcely able to crawl from one room to another.

‘ Derby now broke down from much the same cause, overwork and nervous exhaustion. . . . He now was unable to attend the two next Cabinets. I went to talk matters over with him, and our communications were very friendly and explicit, but his illness and absence from the next two Cabinets left me absolutely single-handed, and greatly aggravated the difficulties of our position.

‘ Of these two Cabinets, however, the first on the 14th passed over more easily than might have been expected ; but the second on the 15th brought up once more the old and crucial question of sending the fleet to the Dardanelles. There ensued a somewhat disagreeable scene. Salisbury strongly supported the movement of the fleet—I objected. Disraeli interposed with some rudeness, and said that it was a matter already settled by the Cabinet. I denied this flatly, and pointed out that all we had done had been to request leave of the Sultan to bring up the fleet, and that to this request the Sultan had declined to accede. Disraeli then asserted that Derby, who was still absent from illness, believed it to be settled. As I knew for certain that this was not so, having talked the whole question over with him a few hours before, I gave a plain but civil contradiction.

‘ The question was then discussed without reference to Derby’s opinion, and after some further debate, I

stated that I could be no party to the proposal now made : but it was unanimously agreed :

‘ 1. That orders should be sent to Admiral Hornby to take up the fleet to Gallipoli :

‘ 2. That Austrian co-operation should be invited.

‘ It was however settled that the orders to the fleet should be suspended till the Austrian answer arrived, but that then, whatever that answer might be, the fleet should sail. We then broke up. I saw Tenterden and told him how matters stood, and I went on to Derby, whom I found better but still ill and nervous. He entirely agreed in all my objections, but gave me to understand that he had not actually made up his mind to leave the Government.

‘ I went home and drafted a letter to Disraeli, requesting him, as soon as the order to the fleet was given, to tender my resignation.

‘ On the next day, the 16th January, I despatched my letter, and later in the same day we again met in Cabinet : but as my resignation could not yet take effect, I thought it right to attend.

‘ Meanwhile a very important communication had been received from Russia . . . which certainly strengthened my view as to the fleet in the highest degree. That communication contained a distinct assurance that the Russian troops should not occupy Gallipoli, thereby, unless we absolutely disbelieved the promise, releasing us from the apprehensions—which were so constantly put forward as a justification for the movement of the fleet—that Russia would seize the mouth of the Straits, and either prevent the passage of our fleet or endanger its return if it did pass. On coming into the House for the Cabinet, I was met by M. Corry, who on Disraeli's part told me this, said that the case was altered and

that it was now unnecessary to send the fleet, and that he hoped I should withdraw my letter. On looking back at the whole transaction, I doubt a little whether I was quite right in declining this overture. . . . I considered this new phase as merely one more of the many dissolving views of the last few weeks . . . and so I rather coldly replied . . . that as I had mentioned the fact of my having written my letter to one or two of my colleagues, I could not now withdraw the communication. I then went into the Cabinet : and when after some time had passed no allusion was made by Disraeli to what had occurred, I said I thought it right that my colleagues should know that I had requested the tender of my resignation, in the event of the fleet being sent up the Dardanelles. . . .

‘ On the 18th January a reply came to me from Disraeli, very dexterously evading the real points at issue, and saying that he should not submit my resignation, as the differences between us were not such as to justify this action.

‘ Once more therefore there was a truce, but an armed truce, broken by a desperate fight in the Cabinet on the 21st, mainly upon the proposal to enter into a defensive alliance with Austria—not indeed to be limited to the present juncture, but for a period of several years. This Derby and I opposed, on the ground that it would be a return to the old and now condemned doctrine of continental alliances with even more than the inconveniences and risks which formerly attached to them. For the time we succeeded in adjourning the discussion, but on the 23rd January the crisis at last occurred, and my connection with the Cabinet was definitely severed.

‘ Disraeli read a letter . . . which bore some traces of being manufactured to order, and which purported to express the “ indignant discontent ” of a large body of

the Conservative members of Parliament at the undecided attitude of the Government : and he proposed to send the fleet at once to the Dardanelles.

' Then followed a discussion in which I repeated briefly my well-known objections, and in which with the exception of Derby I found myself absolutely alone.

' The order to the fleet was then drafted, the Cabinet broke up, and I walked home, calling on my way in St. James's Square, where Derby ¹ begged me to suspend at all events the sending of my final letter of resignation till the following day. This I promised to do, and on the following morning (24th) I wrote to the Prime Minister, definitely placing my resignation in his hands : and in the course of the evening I received his answer, saying that my resignation was accepted by the Queen. On the following day I made my statement in the H. of Lords.

' Between my final letter of resignation on the morning of the 24th and my statement in the House of Lords in the afternoon of the 25th, more than one change of purpose had taken place, and counter-orders had been sent to prevent the fleet sailing.

' As it happened the fleet had sailed before the counter-order arrived : but had I known that this counter-order would be given, I do not think it would have altered my decision. . . .

' So ended my connection with the Government. To me personally the separation has brought very important changes—how important I cannot now fully estimate. I gave up Office with the feeling that I probably gave it up for life. But—be this as it may—I have never regretted the step which I then took ; nor now that in writing this memorandum I have had to reconsider

¹ For Lord Derby's resignation see Chapter XXVIII.

the past in a quieter and calmer manner than was then possible, do I see anything which I did or said that seems to me worthy of serious regret. There are, as I have stated here, various matters of detail in which I was possibly in error, some in which I am now disposed to wish I had acted somewhat differently : but all these are essentially secondary questions, and in the main issue I see nothing to lament or to vary.

‘ I have drawn up this memorandum whilst the facts are still fresh in my mind, for my own satisfaction in after years. . . . The break of personal relations, and in some cases of old and intimate friendship, has been complete and very painful. . . .

‘ But after all I have here written, I think I am bound as a matter of justice to place on record that, taking everything into account, the conduct of Disraeli was not really unfair to me. He manœuvred of course for his own ends, and perhaps too he felt and showed on several occasions some unfriendliness to me : but this was only natural when I was—reluctantly but on principle—opposing him on matters in which his notions and his feelings (so far as he allows any in politics) were engaged.

‘ During the earlier part of our official connection I found him fair and steady in the support which I needed departmentally : wise in never interfering in the administration of my Office : courageous when it was desirable to take a decided course—in a word immeasurably superior intellectually to every one else in the Cabinet : and up to the end of my tenure of Office I believe that he sincerely desired to retain me in the Cabinet. . .

‘ I think that also from the very beginning of the troubles in Bulgaria, he alone of all my colleagues was tenacious of purpose and consistent.

‘ I received when I left Office the Queen’s permission

to state whatever was necessary for the justification of my conduct. At the time I used the permission most sparingly, as I was desirous of avoiding anything which could reasonably embarrass the public policy of the Government at a difficult crisis. I do not now contemplate the probability of this memorandum ever seeing the light . . . but I consider that . . . I am still free to avail myself of the Queen's permission to state anything that occurred in the Cabinet, and from that point of view I have now drawn up this memorandum. My speech of the 25th January in the H. of Lords on resigning Office should be read with it.' ¹

In the preface to his published speech Lord Carnarvon wrote, 'I have merely justified my conduct in taking the serious step of a resignation of Office, and indicated the disastrous results, which, in my opinion, would, at this juncture, have arisen from any action leading to a departure from our neutrality. But I have thought it right to avoid any reference, however indirect, to confidential communications with Foreign Powers, and to that largest question of all—which it is my unceasing hope this war will solve—the fuller liberty and the better government of the Christian subjects of the Porte.'

Memorials were drawn up in all parts of the country, praying for adherence to strict neutrality, and much gratitude was expressed to him personally for his efforts to maintain it.

Mr. Fawcett wrote : ²

'Although I hesitate to intrude a letter upon you, yet I am very anxious, as one differing from you on many political questions, to express how deeply I think the country is indebted to you for the course you have recently taken. In connection with thousands

¹ See Appendix, pp. 380-91, for speech in full.

² Henry Fawcett, M.P., to Lord Carnarvon, 30th January, 1878.

of others I shall always believe that if the country escapes the crime and misfortune of being involved in the present war, it will be to a great extent due to the patriotism and wisdom displayed by yourself in the recent crisis.'

The news of Lord Carnarvon's resignation was received with deep and widespread regret amongst men of the most varied opinions, both in England and the Colonies.

Lord Dufferin wrote from Ottawa on 12th February :

MY DEAR CARNARVON,

I cannot say with what dismay and sorrow I have learnt the news of your resignation. I have refrained from writing to you upon the subject until the report of your speech in the House of Lords should have reached my hands, but having now read it, I must now say that I, in common with every one else, can only admire, more warmly than ever we have hitherto done, your high-minded and honourable nature.

It must have cost you a severe struggle before you took so momentous a step, but the generous unselfishness which you have displayed will not fail to meet with its reward. The loss I individually sustain by your ceasing to be my Chief is quite incalculable. You were always so sympathizing and indulgent, and ready to put the best construction upon everything that I did and said, and you had the whole business of this colony so thoroughly at your fingers end, that I should never be able to feel towards your successor, whoever he may be, anything like the same comfort and content that I experienced in my relations with yourself. I am more than ever glad that my time is drawing to a close.

All that I can say is that in common with every one else in this country, I regard you as the best and ablest friend Canada has ever had, and the principal men of both the political parties here have expressed themselves to me, with a sincerity of manner which was really touching, their sorrow and vexation that you should no longer preside over their destinies. . . .

Ever your most affectionate and
grateful friend,

DUFFERIN.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVII

A Speech delivered by the Earl of Carnarvon in the House of Lords on Friday, January 25, 1878, on his resignation of Office.

MY LORDS,

I feel it my duty, and a painful one, to ask your Lordships' indulgence for a short time while I make a personal explanation. My Lords, I have found it my duty to tender my humble resignation of the office with which Her Majesty has been pleased to honour me, and that resignation has been accepted ; therefore, I only hold office until my successor is appointed, and speak from my accustomed seat on this bench. What the noble Earl, the Prime Minister, has just stated, affects of course the explanation which I wish to make to your Lordships ; but I do not think it modifies materially anything I am about to say.

My Lords, explanations of this sort are painful to make. It is necessary, on the one hand, for a Minister to say enough to justify himself in the course which he feels it his duty to adopt ; and, on the other hand, it is equally incumbent on him not only to avoid saying anything that can embarrass Her Majesty's Government at a period of critical negotiations, but as far as is possible to say nothing that can give reasonable offence, or that seems to impute unnecessary blame to those who have been his colleagues and his friends. My Lords, in the peculiar position in which I am placed, I am precluded from entering into one important branch of that self-justification, because, looking to the critical nature of present or possible negotiations, I do not consider it right to say a single word

with regard to those communications of a confidential character which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and foreign nations. If, therefore, the course of my conduct, as now explained by me, seems incomplete, I shall be content to accept the burden and responsibility of that incompleteness.

There are two reasons which have induced me to adopt the step I have taken—first, the order that was given for the fleet to proceed to the Dardanelles, on which I will say a few words presently; secondly, and taken in conjunction with this order, the Vote for an extraordinary sum which my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given notice of moving on Monday. I will not anticipate anything my right honourable friend may state, nor do I desire to attempt to controvert the arguments which he may then use. I will only say this: In common with every one else, I understood my right honourable friend, on the first night of this Session, to say that he would not make any money proposals on the part of the Government until the conditions of peace were received, or unless those conditions were unsatisfactory. My Lords, at the time that my right honourable friend gave that notice in the House of Commons the conditions of peace were not in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and they could not have known whether they were satisfactory or unsatisfactory. I am glad now to hear from the noble Earl, the Prime Minister, that the conditions are in the hands of the Government, and the expression of his opinion that they indicate, at all events, a satisfactory basis. It was always my expectation that by delaying the order to the fleet for a few hours the Government would have been satisfied that even from their own point of view that order was unnecessary.

With these observations I will now endeavour to make my own position clear by referring to one or two matters which have passed with relation to myself. I have no desire to go back to past differences which may have existed on the subject of the Eastern war. In every

Cabinet there must be differences. It is impossible to place ten or twelve men round a table to discuss so grave and complicated a subject without a variety of opinions ; but in order to justify my own conduct, it is necessary to refer to matters with which I have been personally concerned. On the 2nd of this month, as some of your Lordships may remember, I addressed a reply to a deputation which waited upon me in reference to certain questions, in which I spoke of the war and the general attitude of Her Majesty's Government. My Lords, I do not desire to repeat what I stated upon that occasion ; it is sufficient for my purpose to say that on the following day in the Cabinet, the Prime Minister thought himself at liberty to condemn very severely the language that I had used. I need not re-state the terms of that controversy on either side : I took time to consider the course that it was my duty to take ; and then, in a memorandum which I had drawn up, but with which I think it unnecessary to trouble the House, I recapitulated what had passed, and having vindicated the position I had taken, I re-affirmed, in the hearing of my colleagues, and without any contradiction, the propositions that I had then laid down. . . . The Prime Minister was good enough to ask me for a copy of it, and so this matter ended ; but no public or private disavowal was uttered or hinted at with regard to what I then said. (Hear, hear.) I have therefore felt myself justified, and I still feel myself justified, in believing that, when no such disavowal was uttered, I had not misrepresented the opinion of Her Majesty's Government at the time. (Opposition cheers.)

My Lords, the next episode to which I must allude occurred about a fortnight later. On the 12th of January the question was discussed in the Cabinet as to whether it was desirable to send the fleet into the Dardanelles, and I expressed a very decided opinion against it. No decision, as I understood, was then come to, but on the 15th the discussion was renewed, and it was then decided to move the fleet into the Dardanelles. My Lords, I entertained

the strongest objection to that course, both with reference to the time at which it was proposed to adopt the measure, and to the proceeding itself; and on the following day I wrote to the Prime Minister requesting him to submit my resignation to the Queen as soon as the fleet should sail. Meanwhile circumstances seem to have occurred to change his mind, and on the following day I learned that the order to the fleet was cancelled. In order to make this clear, I will read the following letter which I addressed to the Prime Minister :

16 BRUTON STREET : *January 18.*

My dear Lord,—On Monday last, the 14th instant,¹ I wrote to you requesting you to be good enough to submit my resignation to the Queen as soon as the order for moving the fleet to the Dardanelles should be given. I afterwards received a message from you through Mr. M. Corry, to the effect that subsequent telegrams had induced you to change your mind, and on attending the Cabinet on Tuesday,² the following day—as I did to prevent any rumours which might be injurious to the Government arising—I understood that they, as well as you, saw reason to abandon the course which had been agreed upon. I am very glad that so sound a decision has been come to, whatever the reasons upon which it may have been founded; but, looking to the fact that my resignation, though provisional, is in your hands, and to the serious nature of such a fact, I think it is my duty to state, in a manner which cannot be mistaken, what I conceive to be my position.

When at the last Cabinet held I stated the course which I had taken in placing my conditional resignation in your hands, no opinion was expressed or comment made by you or, as far as I remember, by any other member of the Cabinet, and therefore it is the more necessary that there should be no room for misapprehension as to my past or present action. I have no desire to separate myself from colleagues with whom I have acted on terms of great personal regard and goodwill. I am sensible of the public inconvenience which would arise from discord or open difference of opinion at this moment, and I am ready now, as I hope I have been on former occasions, to modify or concede my views on doubtful points in detail to secure a general harmony of action among the members of the Government. But I have been led to consider carefully the events of the last few weeks with respect

¹ This should be Tuesday, 15th.

² Wednesday, 16th.

to the divergences of opinion which have unfortunately developed themselves amongst us, and I cannot conceal from myself that those differences have been very considerable on a question where it is of the utmost importance to the country that the Government should be one and undivided.

Taking, therefore, all this into account, I avail myself of this opportunity to place clearly on paper the opinion—even though you and my colleagues are already familiar with it—that I am not prepared in present circumstances, or in circumstances similar to them, to agree to any armed intervention, or any course of a similar nature. I see no reason as yet why the questions at issue should pass out of the sphere of diplomacy. Further, the Vote of Credit or increase in the Army and Navy Estimates, whichever it may be, is a measure which I consider useful as a means of strengthening our diplomacy at this juncture ; but I do not contemplate the application of any aid granted by Parliament to the purposes of a foreign expedition unless circumstances should change in a manner and to a degree wholly beyond my present anticipations. The anxiety which I own to have felt on this subject has been greatly relieved by the explicit language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in which he explained that the Government would not, until it was clear that the Russian conditions are unsatisfactory, make any proposals for the increase of armaments.

Relying, therefore, upon this as a trustworthy exposition of the views of the Government, I feel that I may for the present content myself with the statement which I have endeavoured to express as clearly as possible in reference to my own position. But it remains for you to consider whether this view, which is satisfactory to me, and on which my continuance in office depends, is also satisfactory to you and my colleagues. I shall be glad to hear from you at your convenience, and meanwhile

I remain, my dear Lord, yours faithfully,
CARNARVON.

To this, my Lords, the noble Earl, the Prime Minister, replied in a courteous and friendly letter, with which, unless he desires it, I shall not trouble the House. It was marked private, but it concluded with the following words: ‘I shall not therefore submit your resignation to Her Majesty. Such a step would deprive me of a colleague I value, and at any rate should be reserved for a period when there is an important difference between us, which

at present does not seem to be the case.' My letter was written on the 18th, as was also the Prime Minister's answer on the same day—the day after the meeting of Parliament. I thought, therefore, I might safely conclude that the proposal to send the fleet into Turkish waters was abandoned; but on the 23rd the proposal was made in the Cabinet to send the fleet not only within the Dardanelles, but to Constantinople, and after discussion it was decided that the fleet should be sent there. Your Lordships will, I think, agree that I had then but one course to pursue. I had endeavoured to state in as clear a manner as I could in my letter that such a course would necessitate my resignation, and I accordingly wrote the following letter:

16 BRUTON STREET, *January 24, 1878.*

Dear Lord Beaconsfield,—The Cabinet yesterday afternoon decided to give immediate instructions to the Admiral to take the fleet up to Constantinople, and to invite the House of Commons to grant a large sum to the Government for the increase of armaments. My objections to such a course were fully stated a short time since with reference to a similar proposal, and my resignation was tendered if, as seemed then probable, the proposal should be definitely adopted. For various reasons it was not adopted, but now that it has been renewed and accepted by the Cabinet—believing, as I do, that circumstances have not so changed in the interval as to render it necessary—I see no alternative, though with deepest personal regret in separating myself from my colleagues, but to request you to submit to the Queen my humble resignation of the office with which Her Majesty has been pleased to honour me.

I remain, dear Lord Beaconsfield, yours very faithfully,
CARNARVON.

That letter was written yesterday, and to-day I received a letter from the Prime Minister, of which the following is the first, and the only paragraph I need read:

10 DOWNING STREET, *January 24, 1878.*

Dear Lord Carnarvon,—I have the honour to inform you that the Queen has accepted your resignation of the office of Secretary of State, and has been graciously pleased to grant to you Her

Majesty's permission to make any statement of what passed in the Privy Council which you may think necessary to elucidate your conduct.

Meanwhile, however, as the noble Lord has informed us this evening, an order has been sent to the Admiral to countermand the sailing of the fleet to Constantinople. Your Lordships will thus observe that three times within three weeks it has been my misfortune to be at material variance on a matter of the highest importance with my colleagues; and that twice during that interval I have felt myself constrained to place my resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister on this particular subject. Twice the order which has been given for the fleet to proceed to Constantinople has been cancelled, but—it is essential to observe—not because we had come to an agreement of principle, but owing to some more or less fortunate accident which interposed at the last moment.

I rejoice at the soundness of the decision not to send the fleet into Turkish waters. I am also glad that if I have the misfortune to separate myself from my colleagues, it will be from a difference of feeling, and even of principle, rather than in consequence of any direct act which they have taken, and which I must have condemned; but what I have stated to your Lordships shows that there have been for a considerable time wide divergences of opinion as to the principles upon which our policy should be conducted. My object, therefore, in making this statement has been twofold: first, to show your Lordships that I have not been guilty of caprice or precipitation in now tendering my resignation—(Opposition cheers)—and in the next place, I think it just to acquit the noble Earl, the Prime Minister, of having hastily snatched at my resignation when offered to him. He has, looking to the wide differences of opinion subsisting between us, treated my opposition with forbearance.

My Lords, as the question of the moving of the fleet is no longer at issue, it relieves me from the necessity of fully arguing the point; and I will therefore only say that my

objection to the moving of the fleet, whatever explanations or declarations of neutrality might accompany it, is based upon a variety of grounds. I say nothing of the strategical demerits and risks of the scheme if it was to be considered from a military point of view; but politically it seemed to me to lead to a wide departure from that neutrality to which we had pledged ourselves, and the conditions of which we declared at the meeting of Parliament neither of the belligerents had infringed; and as far as I could see, no circumstances had arisen between the 17th of January and the 23rd, when this decision was taken, to induce the Government to vary its conduct in so essential a matter. (Opposition cheers.) I also thought that the time at which this movement was proposed was unfortunately chosen. It was a time in the midst of negotiations that had now reached their most critical point; when intervention on our part was liable to every sort of misconstruction; when it might encourage Turkey fatally as regards her own interests; when it might not unnaturally be construed as a menace to Russia, and when it might embarrass the Porte itself in the conduct of its negotiations, imposing thereby on us a responsibility which, from an honourable point of view, it would be hard to bear. I also thought it was an unwise policy to place the English fleet in a position where at any moment the contingencies of war might provoke a collision that might lead us into difficulties—(Opposition cheers)—which no one could foresee or measure.

My Lords, it seems to me that, in adopting such a course, we were exchanging our former attitude of observation for an attitude of menace; that we were exchanging the position of a neutral for the position of a belligerent; that we were making a distinct step in the direction of war. (Cheers.) We could enter the Dardanelles only as allies or as opponents of the Porte. If we enter with the consent of the Sultan, we enter, disguise it as we may, as allies intervening at the last moment between him and his enemy; and if we enter without his

consent, the position would become an almost absurd one, because we should be setting at naught those treaties which we have professed it our object to uphold. I believe the policy which, up to this time, has been adopted by my noble friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has been wise and consistent. We have avoided the use of threats upon the one hand, and of promises upon the other. We have spoken plainly to both belligerents—firmly to Russia, clearly to Turkey; we have endeavoured to define, or rather to specify, the points of British interests which might become affected in the progress of the war; and we have, above all, declared our intention to observe a strict, though, of course, a conditional, neutrality. We have also said, in the clearest language, that we shall deem it our duty to assert our voice in the final settlement of the question so far as it affects British interests. I do not swerve in the slightest degree from any of these propositions; and till we know that it is the intention of one of the belligerents to do that which he has over and over again declared that there is no intention of doing, I am slow, as a matter of international courtesy and of sound diplomacy, to assume that these assurances have been deliberately false.

My Lords, if the House will permit me, I desire to take this opportunity to refer to a matter which is connected with the present question, and on which I have apparently become exposed to some misconception. To the deputation to which I alluded, I was by a singular mistake supposed to have spoken of the Crimean War as an 'insane' war. I never thought or said anything of the kind. What I did say was that England and Russia had drifted, to use an expression which has become historical, into that war; that I did not think any one could now look back with satisfaction upon it, and that I did not believe any one, whether Englishman or Russian, was insane enough deliberately to desire a repetition of it. That statement was a very different one from what is imputed to me.

I am the last to forget all that has touched the feelings, the pride, the sorrow, the sympathies of persons and families in the Crimean War. It was my fortune when quite a young man to go over the battle-fields with one who played a most distinguished part in the war, the late Lord Lyons; and no lapse of time has effaced from my memory the scenes where English courage was illustrated from the soldier who fought at Inkerman to the lady who in her devotion tended the sick and wounded in the hospitals of Scutari. It was a page of European history filled with British achievements, but wars are not to be measured by heroic deeds and the death-roll of those who have fallen; and now after twenty years we may reasonably ask what have been the political value and the results of that war. I confess, even though I may be in a minority, I fail to see the political value of those results, and I point to the present war in the East as the evidence of that opinion.

My Lords, it is with much regret that I have come to the decision to separate myself from my colleagues. There are some amongst them to whom I am bound not merely by ties of political alliance, but by bonds of almost life-long friendship; and your Lordships will believe me it is not without an acute feeling of pain that I have brought myself to such a separation. A Cabinet must in the nature of things be maintained on a principle of 'give and take': it differs in this from no other body of men constituted for a particular object. I know therefore that in every Cabinet there will be many questions on which its members must agree to differ; but there are also questions in which the lives and welfare of others are so deeply involved, that a Minister dare not waive his convictions at whatever cost or sacrifice to himself. Such has been the case here. I will not say whether I have been right or wrong. I must leave that to the judgement of others. Nor do I blame my colleagues for the course they have adopted, and the views they have maintained. I am sensible of the forbearance which I have received at their

hands, and I take this opportunity of expressing the hope that I have never pressed my own unwelcome doctrines on them with undue earnestness.

I have foreseen for some time that this issue must come. We have been travelling on the road together until we have reached a spot at which the path diverges, but I venture with all deference to them to say that I have consistently held on to the right path, although they naturally will contend that I have turned aside. But this is a matter in which every one must be guided by his own conscience, and by a sense of his own personal honour; and this I know, that when a man walks in that light, his countrymen will not be stern to mark his errors of judgement. One thing further I must say, that it is of the highest importance at this moment that Her Majesty's Government should be united, and if my departure removes one of the obstacles to harmony, my resignation will at least have had one good effect. It is not fair that one individual should constantly check the action of many; nor is it right that he himself should be drawn on by a desire for compromise to approve of measures in which he cannot agree.

As regards the office with which Her Majesty has been pleased to honour me, it would be affectation on my part to say that I do not regret to leave it. I regret to leave many questions incomplete and unsettled. I beyond measure regret to leave it when clouds, for the time at least, are gathering over one of the most important dependencies of the Empire. I could well have wished to meet those difficulties, and to have endeavoured to overcome them. At the same time I can look back with satisfaction to much which has passed within the last four years. I have been fortunate in four years of not uneventful administration; I have been fortunate in the able men, both within and without the Colonial Office, who have given me their time, and labour, and skill; I have been fortunate in the friends who have helped me by their counsel, and fortunate also in the generous support

of political opponents. The least that I can do is to place at the disposal of my successor any experience I may have gathered, and if I can do anything to smooth his path and remove difficulties, I need not say that every assistance in my power shall be rendered to Her Majesty's Government, so far as I may, with the utmost cheerfulness and unreserve.

CHRONOLOGY¹

1869

- Jan. 12. Installed at Bath as Provincial Grand Master.
- March. Publishes his Father's Diaries, *Athens and the Morea*.
- March 3. At Keble College, Oxford Trustees' Meeting.
- March 4. On Parliamentary Proceedings Bill.
- March 5. On the 2nd Reading of the Habitual Criminals Bill.
- April 15. Considers the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill radically defective.
- April 16. On Pauperism and Emigration.
- April 22. Supports the Increase of the Episcopate Bill.
- April 30. On the spread of agrarian outrages in Ireland.
- May 7. On the Irish policy of the Government.
- May 31—June 3. At Southampton ; opens Agricultural Exhibition ; unveils statue of Lord Palmerston ; attends banquets.
- June 3. On the Life Peerages Bill.
- June 14. On the Irish Church Bill.
- June 22. On disorderly manifestations in the late debate.
- June 28. Congratulates Government that the Endowed Schools Bill had passed the Commons and was in a fair way to passing the House of Lords.
- June 29. Comments on amendment to the Irish Church Bill.
- June 30. At National Society Meeting on the promotion of Middle Class Education.
- July 1. Moves an amendment to the Irish Church Bill providing for the commutation of life interests.
- July 9. Proposes the reinsertion of 1871 as the year in which the Irish Church Act should come into force.

- July 12. On the Seats of the Irish Archbishops and Bishops.
- July 13. Criticizes provisions of the Bishops' Resignation Bill.
- July 16. On the construction of the House of Lords—motion for alterations withdrawn after a debate.
- July 19. On the University Tests Bill ; moves previous question and suggests a compromise.
- July 22. Considers it necessary to accept the amendments to the Irish Church Bill.
- July 27. On the relations between New Zealand and the Mother Country.
- July 29. Leaves for the Baths at Wildbad.
- Sept. 22. On the Irish Land Question, to the Highclere Agricultural Association.
- Oct. 13. Distributes prizes at Manchester for the Oxford Local Examinations.
- Oct. 14. Visits Carnarvon Castle.
- Nov. 2. Letter to *The Times* on New Zealand and the Mother Country.

1870

- Jan. 4. At Hants Epiphany Sessions ; presents his report on Southampton County Prison for preceding five years.
- Feb. 14. Draws attention to the omission of all mention of the Colonies in the Queen's Speech, and speaks on Imperial relations.
- Feb. 17. On the arrangements for Public Business.
- Feb. 26. Returns to the Front Opposition Bench.
- March 7. Asks that the departure of troops from New Zealand should be deferred.
- March 8. At meeting for the Bishop of London's Fund ; objects to

¹ All speeches unless otherwise stated were made in the House of Lords.

- proposed closing of the City Churches. Attends Vestry Meeting at St. George's, Hanover Square.
- March 10. On the Naturalization Bill.
- March 24. On the Habitual Criminal Act.
- April 28 and May 23. On the Massacre in Greece.
- May 26. At a meeting for St. George's Hospital.
- May 27. On the Fenian attack on Canada.
- June 15. At National Society Meeting.
- June 17. On the Irish Land Bill.
- June 27. At Hants Quarter Sessions on the suppression of Mendicancy.
- July 9. Letter in *The Times* on the late Lord Lothian.
- July 11. On the Massacre in Greece.
- July 13. At the Mansion House on the restoration of St. Paul's.
- July 22. Objects to the withdrawal of troops from Canada.
- Sept. 2. Letter in *Pall Mall* on behalf of the British Charitable Fund in Paris.
- Sept. 16. At Especial Grand Lodge of Emergency, moves for a £500 grant to the Prince of Wales' Fund for the sick and wounded in the Franco-Prussian War.
- Sept. 18. Second daughter, Margaret Leonora Evelyn Selina, born.
- Sept. 23. On Military Defences, to the Highclere Agricultural Association.
- Oct. 20. Letter in *The Times* on behalf of the British Charitable Fund and the War Refugees in Paris.
- Oct. 27. Letter in *The Times* on the English in Paris.
- Nov. 8-10. At Freemasonic meetings and dinners, Manchester.
- Nov. 19. At opening of the new Church at Highclere.
- 1871
- Jan. 3. At Hants Quarter Sessions, presents his report on vagrancy.
- Feb. 23. On National Defences.
- Feb. 27 and March 2. On the Pauper Inmates Discharge and Regulations Bill.
- March 17. Moves for returns on the Government Stores of Gunpowder.
- March 20. On the Greek Massacre.
- March 24. On the Tien-Tsin Massacre; draws attention to the critical state of relations with China and desires the treaty of 1858 to be carried out.
- April 19. At dinner to Lord Normanby, Governor of Queensland, Willis's Rooms.
- April 24. On Emanuel Hospital, Westminster and the Endowed Schools Act.
- April 25. Calls attention to the inadequate supervision of Criminals, and the necessity of amending the Habitual Criminals Act of 1869.
- April 26. The organization of the Clarendon Trust, at Mr. Gladstone's house.
- May 5 and 8. On the Artillery Forces, the need for re-organization; explanation of figures.
- May 8. On University Tests.
- May 13. At the annual dinner of the Newspaper Press Fund.
- May 18. At Winchester Visiting Justices Meeting. At Highclere Working Men's Club.
- May 29-30. At Weston Super Mare. Presides at Mark Grand Lodge and dinner, lays foundation-stone of West of England Sanatorium.
- May and June 12. Criticizes the Treaty of Washington.
- June 22. On the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill.
- June 23. Moves for draft schemes of the Endowed Schools Commission in respect to Dr. Morgan's Charity at Bridgwater.
- July 4. Approves of the Prevention of Crimes Bill.
- July 14 and 31. Votes against 2nd Reading of the Army Regulation Bill, and moves vote of censure on Government.
- July 20. Moves for a despatch in acknowledgement of public services rendered by English residents in Paris during the siege.
- August. At Wildbad.

Sept.-Oct. Travels in Switzerland and Belgium.

Oct. Publishes Article on Army Administration and Government Policy in the *Quarterly Review*.

Oct. 17. At Oxford for election of trustee of Keble College.

Nov. 3. On the proposed International Prison Congress, to the Social Science Association.

1872

Jan. 3. At Hants Quarter Sessions, presents report on Prisons and the Lunatic Asylum.

Jan. 5. Sudden attack of serious illness, followed by slow convalescence.

March 28. At meeting of principal Highclere tenants to discuss the labourers' strike in Warwickshire.

April 6. At dinner to Highclere labourers, on Cottages and Gardens, wages and the Saturday half-holiday.

April 8. At Hants Quarter Sessions, announces his intended resignation.

April 19. Speaks in the House for the first time since his illness. Buys the *Marcia*.

April 26. On Prison Ministers Bill.

April 27. On the expenses of the proposed Prison Congress.

May 1-6. Inspects the Chesterfield property and collieries.

May 7. On the South Sea Islanders Kidnapping Bill.

May 15. Cruises in the *Marcia*.

June 10. States objections to, but abstains from voting against the Ballot Bill.

June 15-18. Cruise to Cherbourg.

July 1. At Hants Quarter Sessions, retires from the Chairmanship of the Judicial Committee.

July 3. At opening of the International Prison Congress. Serious attack of gout.

Aug. 4. Cruise to Guernsey.

Aug. 18. The Scilly Isles with Sir Stafford Northcote.

Aug. 26-28. Dieppe with Charles Kingsley.

Sept. 2. Returns to England.

Sept. 16. Lays foundation-stone of Mechanics' Institute at Carlton.

Sept. 25. On the Labour Question, to the Highclere Agricultural Association.

Sept. 28. On Foreign Missions, to S.P.G. Meeting at Portsmouth.

Nov. 14. His re-organization scheme accepted by Governing Body of Repton School at meeting at Derby.

Nov. 18. At Newbury on the Didcot-Southampton Railway.

Nov. 27. At the Bishop of Winchester's Meeting, on the Athanasian Creed.

Dec. 28. Becomes Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 1851 Exhibition.

1873

Jan. Visits Paris and the battle-fields.

Feb. 1. At Bretby for Colliery business.

Feb. 8. On the North fleet, the Murillo collision, and the need for an extradition treaty with Spain.

Feb. 13. On the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill.

Feb. 17. On Emigration to Brazil and the way in which English emigrants were deceived.

Feb. 18. On the Prevention of Railway Accidents Bill.

March 5. Arrives at Gibraltar and Tangiers.

March 20. Yachting: Ceuta, Malaga, Iviza, Barcelona.

April 12. Returns to London.

April 24-25. At Oxford, Keble College meeting and visit to the Clarendon Laboratory.

May 1. Moves into new house, 16 Bruton Street.

May 5. On the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill.

May 9. Receives the Queen and Commissioners at the Exhibition.

May 15. On the Australian Colonies (Customs Duties) Bill.

On the Vagrant Law Amendment Bill.

May 20. On the Public Worship Facilities Bill.

May 26. At a Committee of Privy

- Council on a case arising from the Endowed Schools Act.
- May 31. At Labourers' dinner, Pixton, on Cottages and Gardens, wages and the Saturday half-holiday. Letter to *The Times* on Moneylenders.
- June 3. At the Provincial Grand Lodge, Taunton.
- June 16. At the Albert Hall, Conference on Silk.
- June 23. Receives the Shah at the Exhibition.
- June 26. On the 2nd Reading of the Public Worship Bill.
- June 27. Deprecates the establishment of a military centre at Oxford.
- July. Publishes 'Lessons of the French Revolution' in the *Quarterly*.
- July 3. Distributes prizes at Dulwich College.
- July 14. On the Persian Concession to Baron Reuter.
- July 24. On the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill.
- Aug. 5. At the opening of the new Cattle Market, Dulverton.
- Aug. 9-29. Yachting.
- Sept. Publishes anonymously *The Shadows of a Sick Room*.
- Sept. 25. At the re-opening of Bingham Church. On University Education in Nottingham.
- Sept. 29. Opens Carlton Working Men's Club.
- Sept. 30-Oct. 1. At the Lincoln Diocesan Conference on Labour and Capital.
- Oct. 16. At Oxford, Keble College Council and election of Canon King.
- Oct. 30. Distributes prizes at Cranleigh.
- Dec. 3. Lecture to Highclere School on Missionary work.
- Dec. 6. At annual meeting of the Birkbeck Literary and Scientific Institution, on Scientific Education.
- Dec. 18. At the opening of the new Cattle Market, Newbury.
- Feb. 12. Introduces new Master to Repton School.
- Feb. 19. Accepts Colonial Secretaryship in Mr. Disraeli's Government.
- March 6. Receives deputation from the Aborigines' Protection Society.
- March 23. At the annual dinner of the Institution of Civil Engineers.
- March 24. On the South Sea Islands.
- March 25. Resigns Chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the 1851 Exhibition.
- March 30. On our relations with the Gold Coast.
- April 6. At Hants Quarter Sessions. Re-organizes County Police system.
- April 15. At Osborne.
- April 20. On the rumoured cession of Fiji.
- April 27 and May 7. Supports the Colonial Clergy Bill.
- May 12. On our policy on the Gold Coast.
- May 19. On the Straits Settlements' Courts Bill. Approves of Sir Arthur Clark's proceedings.
- June 16. On the Zulu insurrection in Natal.
- June 18. Moves the 2nd Reading of the Harbour of Colombo (Loan) Bill.
- June 24. Decision as to Mr. Froude's Mission to South Africa and Australia.
- June 25. On the 3rd Reading of the Public Worship Bill.
- July 6. On Sir Henry Orde's Expenditure in the Straits Settlements.
- July 10. Reviews Canadian Volunteers at Wimbledon.
- July 17. On the cession of Fiji.
- Aug. 4. Objects to amendment to Public Worship Bill giving an appeal to the Archbishop from the Bishop's discretion.
- Sept. 10. His yacht the *Alruna* launched.
- Sept. 25. Publishes Introduction to Dean Mansel's *Gnostic Heresies*.
- Sept. 29. Opens the Chesterfield Memorial Hall and Working Men's Club at Newhall. On Labour and Capital.

1874

Feb. 5. At Cowes, inspects new yacht *Alruna*.

- Oct. 6. To the Highclere Agricultural Association, on the Labour Question.
- Oct. 17. Receives news by telegram of the annexation of Fiji.
- Dec. 2. Effects a reconciliation between Bishop Colenso and Mr. Shepstone. Installed at Grand Lodge as Pro Grand Master.
- Dec. 30. Third daughter, Victoria Alexandrina Mary Cecil, born.

1875

- Jan. 25. Death of Lady Carnarvon.
- Feb. 16. Appoints Sir Garnet Wolseley on a Special Mission to Natal.
- Feb. 19. On the removal of the Convict Prison at Gibraltar.
- March 16. Moves the 2nd Reading of the Pacific Islanders Protection Bill.
- April 12. On the Kaffir outbreak in Natal, and the imprisonment of Langalibalele.
- April 16. On the prerogative of mercy in Canada and New South Wales.
- April 28. Installs the Prince of Wales as Grand Master of England at the Albert Hall.
- May 9. At Windsor; writes on Foreign affairs for the Queen.
- May 10. Entertains Colonists and President Burgers of the Transvaal Republic to dinner.
- May 11. Interview with President Burgers, who approves of his Conference despatch and promises all support.
- May 12. Decision in Cabinet to issue a Commission on Vivisection.
- June 24. Moves the 2nd Reading of the Canadian Copyright Bill.
- June 29. Receives deputation deprecating the policy of the late Government with regard to the Colonial Churches.
- July 7. Presides at Festival of the Royal Masonic Institution for Boys.
- July 10. At Gravesend, speaks to Royal Engineers going to Fiji.
- July 19. On the Coolie Traffic.

- July 20. Inspects Canadian Volunteers at Wimbledon.
- July 23. On the change in the Constitution of Natal.
- July 26. Replies to question on Prince Edward's Island.
- July 27. Receives information that the French Government accepts the exchange of Gambia.
- Aug. 3. On the Gold Coast.
- Aug. 5. Receives deputation on the North-West African expedition, and the sea route to Central Africa.
- Aug. 12-31. Yachting.
- Sept. 4. At Highclere, interviews Col. Crossman on his mission to Griqualand West.
- Sept. 12-20. At Balmoral.
- Sept. 22. At Knowsley; raises the question of the Slave circular.
- Nov. 5. Is offered the Viceroyalty of India and refuses.
- Nov. 10. Receives news of the rising in Perak.
- Nov. 16. Is offered the Admiralty, and refuses.
- Nov. 17. Receives deputation on the Compulsory Acquisition of New Guinea.
- Nov. 25. The Cabinet purchases the Suez Canal shares.

1876

- Jan. 4. At Hants Quarter Sessions, resigns from the Police Committee.
- Jan. 17. Takes possession of the new Colonial Office.
- Jan. 18. The Andrassy Note discussed in Cabinet.
- Feb. 1. Receives deputation on the proposed exchange of Gambia.
- Feb. 6. Receives deputation on the Coolies in the Mauritius.
- Feb. 17. On the proposed exchange of Gambia.
- Feb. 21. Discussion with President Burgers.
- Feb. 28. On the Straits Settlements.
- Feb. 29. Discovers that the French will not cede posts in West Africa.
- March 3. Explanation of his statement on the Straits Settlements.

- March 9. On the University of Oxford Bill.
- March 13. On Heligoland.
- March 14. On the Indian Tariff.
- March 18. Windsor. Urges inclusion of the Colonies in the Royal Titles Bill.
- March 20. On Gambia; French withdrawal from proposed cession of forts, and end of negotiations.
- March 21. Raises question of troops for the Colonies in Cabinet.
- March 24. On the Gold Coast and the King of Dahomey.
- March 25. At the annual dinner of Civil Engineers.
- April 3. On the Royal Titles Bill.
- April 6. Leaves England for Coburg.
- April 23, 24, 25, and 28. Receives deputations on the rising in Barbadoes and makes statement in the House.
- April 28. Presides at Grand Lodge Banquet. Attends séance at Mrs. Guppy's.
- May 3. At the Royal Literary Fund dinner, on Literature.
- May 8. Presents President Brand at Windsor.
- May 12. On Emigration to the Mauritius.
- May 16. On the King of Dahomey. Berlin Memorandum considered in Cabinet.
- May 22. Moves 2nd Reading of the Vivisection Bill.
- June 22 and 28. Discusses the Supreme Court Act with Mr. Blake.
- June 23. On the Merchant Shipping Bill.
- July 1. Proposes in Cabinet new Constitution of St. Vincent, Tobago, and Granada.
- July 3. On the Straits Settlements.
- July 8. Writes strong despatch to President Burgers on the Transvaal atrocities.
- July 13. Signs the Diamond Fields Agreement with President Brand.
- July 19. Inspects Canadian Volunteers at Wimbledon.
- July 22 and 23. The Solent and Osborne.
- July 27. Vivisection Bill passed.
- July 31. Interviews Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Mr. Molteno.
- Aug. 1. On the Barbadoes disturbances.
- Aug. 3. Opens Conference on South African Affairs and explains its objects.
- Aug. 5. Writes despatch on the Boer war with Sekukuni.
- Aug. 13. Colonial gathering at Highclere; Wolseley, Froude, Shepstone, Robinson and Akerman, Molteno, Blake and Herbert.
- Aug. 14-29. Yachting in the Channel Islands.
- Sept. 6. At Highclere; writes to Disraeli on the Turkish atrocities.
- Sept. 16. Telegraphs to Sir Henry Barkly enjoining caution on reported offer of the cession of the Transvaal.
- Sept. 20. Appoints Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Special Commissioner to the Transvaal.
- Oct. 2. At Derby School, on Eastern Affairs.
- Oct. 26. Receives deputation on South African Confederation.
- Nov. 11. Offers Lord Salisbury assistance at the India Office during his absence as Special Envoy at Constantinople.
- Dec. 10. Urges Lord Derby to accept the Russian proposals.
- Dec. 18 and 22. Urges the Cabinet to sanction Lord Salisbury's agreement with Russia; presses for moral coercion on the Porte.
- Dec. 19. At Dulverton, on the Eastern Question.
- Dec. 29. Appoints Sir Bartle Frere as Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner in South Africa.

1877

- Jan. 2. Signs orders for the execution of the Malay murderers of Mr. Birch.
- Jan. 3-29. India Famine Administration.
- Jan. 3. At Grand Lodge, establishes in perpetuity two Lifeboats to

- commemorate the Prince of Wales' visit to India.
- Jan. 9. At Newbury, on proposed Memorial to Lord Falkland.
- Jan. 31. Obtains addition to the Queen's Speech on the good government of Christian populations.
- Jan. 6. Lord Salisbury arrives from Constantinople and dines with him.
- Jan. 21. Presides at Festival of Hospital for Sick Children, Freemasons' Tavern.
- Jan. 27. Takes the chair at 'The Club'.
- Jan. 28. At the banquet to Sir Bartle Frere, Langham Hotel.
- March 1. Replies to question on Kidnapping in the South Seas.
- March 1-28. Dissensions in Cabinet on the Eastern policy.
- March 15. Becomes a member of the Society of Antiquaries.
- March 18. Meets Ignatieff at Hatfield.
- March 23. Cabinet crisis; Lord Beaconsfield's attack on him and Lord Salisbury.
- April 1-30. Dissensions in Cabinet. Engaged in completing the Penal Code for Jamaica.
- April 18. At dinner of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Willis's Rooms.
- April 23. Moves the 2nd Reading of the South African Confederation Permissive Bill.
- April 28. Calls attention in Cabinet to the defenceless state of Simon's Bay.
- May 6. Receives telegram announcing the Annexation of the Transvaal.
- May 14. On the news of the Annexation of the Transvaal.
- May 29. At meeting as hereditary Governor of Etwell Hospital.
- May 31. At Chard, Society of Antiquaries.
- June. Cabinet dissensions on the Vote of Credit and the Eastern War.
- June 23. At Trinity House Banquet.
- July 6. Sudden attack of illness.
- July 13. On the Universities Bill.
- June 20. On the necessity of watching over the treatment of Coolies in the West Indies.
- July 21 and 22. Divisions in Cabinet, Lord Salisbury's change of attitude.
- July 26. Receives deputation on proposed Custom's Ordinance in Gibraltar.
- Aug. 9. Moves that Commons' Amendments to South Africa Bill be agreed to.
- Aug. 10. Interviews Transvaal delegates.
- Sept. 27. At laying the foundation-stone of educational buildings, Nottingham, on Universities.
- Oct. 5. Objects in Cabinet to Lord Beaconsfield's Eastern proposals.
- Oct. 18. Receives news of the Kaffir rising at the Cape.
- Oct. 30. Entertains the Transvaal delegates at Highclere.
- Oct. 31. Entertains the Mayor and Corporation of Newbury.
- Nov. 5. Objects in Cabinet to Lord Beaconsfield's proposals on the Eastern War.
- Nov. 16. Receives deputation on the Kaffir rising and urges the speedy despatch of troops.
- Nov. 23. At Dulverton, on the Empire.
- Nov. 26. At the Provincial Grand Lodge of Somerset, appeals for money for the Indian Famine Relief Fund.
- Dec. 5. Presides at Grand Lodge; on the renunciation by the Grand Orient of France of the fundamental principles of Freemasonry.
- Dec. 14, 15, and 17. Cabinet crisis; Lord Beaconsfield's threatened resignation.
- Dec. 18. Lord Beaconsfield's change of purpose; neutrality maintained.

1878

- Jan. 2. Receives deputation; on the Kaffir Wars, and the Eastern Question.
- Jan. 3. The Prime Minister's censure; offers to resign. At Osborne; the Queen's displeasure.
- Jan. 4-7. Memorandum to Cabinet accepted, withdraws resignation. Confined to his room by illness.

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| Jan. 9. Obtains a modification of threatening paragraph in the Queen's Speech. | Jan. 18. Cabinet decision reversed, and the Prime Minister asks him to withdraw his resignation. |
| Jan. 15. Repeats objections to sending the fleet to Gallipoli; Cabinet decides to do so. | Jan. 23. Resigns definitely on the order to the fleet being despatched. |
| Jan. 16. Sends resignation to take effect when the order to the fleet is despatched. | Jan. 24. The order to the fleet countermanded. |
| | Jan. 25. Personal explanation of his resignation. |

END OF VOL. II

